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Abstract
European integration has increasingly shaped the political opportunity 
structure of minority nationalism. This thesis studies the attitudes and 
responses to European union of nationalist and regionaiist parties 
from Brittany, Flanders, Scotland and Wales, in addition to co­
operation between the parties and the emergence of transnational 
regionalism through the development of the European Free Alliance.
W hilst nationalist and regionaiist parties responded to the broad 
themes of European integration, and demonstrated preferences for an 
integovemmental or federal Europe, the EC has brought a range of 
specific opportunities and resources to aid minority nationalism and 
self-determination. This involved the EC’s challenge to traditional 
national sovereignty, responses to EC policies and participation in 
European elections.
However, the most significant effect of European integration was its 
ability to shape and influence party goals and strategies for self- 
determination. The goals of the nationalist parties of Scotland and 
Wales became heavily Europeanised to fit the new European context 
that emerged in the 1980s with the Single European Act. This led to a 
reversal of policy and attitudes towards the EC, and a relaunch of the 
idea of self-government in the new Europe. Attitudes towards the 
M aastricht Treaty also demonstrated the flexible responses of 
nationalist parties to economic and political sovereignty in contrast to 
the inflexible attitudes of the 1970s.
Regionaiist parties in contrast showed more stable attitudes to 
European union. They used the issue to complement demands for 
regional autonomy and federalism by linking domestic demands to 
European developments. Though regionalists demonstrated strong 
affective links to European union, they were less able to turn the 
issue to their advantage in political debate or elections. They 
increasingly Europeanised their autonomy position, often using 
arguments associated with nationalism rather than regionalism. This 
mixing of agendas brought a blurring of distinctions between 
nationalist and regionaiist political positions.
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Introduction
Introduction; Themes And 
Concepts
‘Today’s Welsh separatists are those who want to keep Wales separate from Europe.”^
“The nineteenth century states have been overtaken. They are either too small or too large for 
efficient democracy and to fulfil their functions. A number of these 
must be used to build a democratic Europe of the regions.”^
“Right across Europe, nations are asserting their right to self-determination - a fundamental 
principle enshrined in international law. The newly-liberated nations of Eastern and Central 
Europe - many of them smaller and all of them poorer than Scotland - are queueing up to 
join the European Community, alongside many of the former EFTA countries. None of 
them would settle for some sort of second-rate regional status; all insist on becoming 
independent member states in their own right”^
1. Introduction
This thesis examines the impact of European integration upon nationalist and 
regionaiist parties in Western Europe from the Versailles Conference in 1919 to 
contemporary discussions on European union in the Maastricht Treaty. During this 
time European integration has had a distinct effect on nationalist and regionaiist 
parties, which derives from the fact that both European integration and 
nationalism/regionalism are bound up with the central issues of sovereignty and 
integration.
The regionaiist party family shares a broadly common approach to European union, 
though different nationalist/regionalist parties and traditions offer their own 
interpretations. The flavour of these different approaches, and their particular 
historical contexts within the European Community, can be gathered from 
considering expressions of party opinion on Europe and political behaviour in 
relation to European issues.
This is not a study of the effect of nationalism and regionalism on international 
society and the EC, but an attempt to explore the unicausal effect of European and 
international developments upon nationalist and regionaiist parties. In focusing on 
parties, the intention is to study their behaviour as political actors, and to square that
1. Gwynfor Evans, Fighting for Wales, p.217.
2. Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 20th January 1973, p.6.
3. Alex S almond MP in SNP, Scotland: A European Nation, p.3.
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behaviour with the experience of nationalism and regionalism in European politics. 
The methodology to pursue this end is primarily empirical, rather than theoretical.
External Influences on Nationalism and Regionalism
The exogenous political environment has a strong influence upon the behaviour and 
context of domestic political actors. This influence is especially strong in the case of 
parties seeking self-determination. Though it may appear that European integration 
and substate nationalism are diametrically opposed,^ they both challenge the status 
quo of the state system. They challenge the existing constitutional system but do not 
necessarily attack the nation-state. Party attitudes to the duality of European 
integration - whether it reinforces or diminishes nation-states - will be referred to 
throughout this study, to explore their perceptions of Europe as a supranational body 
or an intergovernmental union to support the nation-state in international affairs.
Some authors have identified a reciprocal connection between European federalism 
and substate nationalism, with each acting to help fulfill the other.^ Federalism and 
regionalism are seen as compatible responses to state centralism and Jacobinism, 
with regionalism trying to overcome these monocultural influences through support 
for polycultural Europeanism.^ Federalism allows regionalism to escape 
monoculturalism through subsidiarity and political autonomy. Two cases in this 
study fall into this category of federal-regionalism. The others are of nationalist 
parties which seek self-government and independence rather than a federal state, yet 
still experience the exogenous influence of European integration. The reactions to 
this development therefore fall into two categories, with some parties trying to 
rebuild the nation-state and some trying to transform and transcend the nation-state, 
whilst demonstrating affective or utilitarian attitudes to European union.^
Nationalist and regionaiist parties have a special interest in the process of European 
integration as it challenges state sovereignty. This primary constitutional concern is 
not generally shared by other party families. The general constitutional challenge of 
European union can be unpacked into a number of specific challenges and
4. Martin Kolinsky (ed), Divided Loyalties; also see Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination, 
p.lOO.
5. Andrea Chiti-Batellli, “Regionalism and Federalism in Europe: A Biunivocal Connection”, in 
Theodor Weiter (ed), Fédéralisme, Régionalisme et Droits des Groupes Ethniques en Europe, p.49.
6. Ibid., p.50.
7. Léon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity, p.7 and p.40. An affective 
response involves a positive emotional response to the EC, whilst a utilitarian response is 
primarily interest-motivated. Also see Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European 
Community.
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opportunities since the 1920s. The response to these opportunities has had 
significant effects on the parties in this study. These changes have been strategic and 
program m atic for the most part, but in some cases have involved the 
Europeanisation and re-interpretation of party goals.
Whilst European integration provides a challenge to the constitutional status quo in 
the nation-state system, and creates opportunities for regionaiist parties to challenge 
the states, it also functions as an external support system. Much of this external 
support was present in the postwar period in two ways. First, the security context of 
the international system changed: the size of a state and its capacity to defend itself 
unilaterally have become less important through the development of NATO and 
regional security arrangements, which enabled small states to survive and develop 
through collective security and co-operation. Second, the economic context of the 
international system changed, with greater economic interdependency, the 
development of international and regional economic organisations and trade 
associations, and agreements that facilitated market access to small states.^ These 
developments enabled small states to use external support systems, such as NATO 
and the European Community, to gain the economic and defence benefits of large 
states, whilst preserving local autonomy.
The Objects o f Study
This study examines the European attitudes of four nationalist and regionaiist parties: 
the Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru (PC), the Flemish Volksunie (VU), 
and the Parti pour l ’Organisation d ’un Bretagne Libre (POBL) and Union 
Dém ocratique Bretonne (UDB) amongst others in Brittany. There is also 
consideration of the development of transnational regionalism from the late 1940s 
through four political organisations: the International Congress of European Nations 
and Regions, the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, the European Free 
Alliance and the Rainbow Group in the European Parliament.
Any research strategy on nationalism and regionalism is limited by the number of 
parties within the regionaiist family itself. The four cases have been selected to allow 
consideration of two features of the regionaiist political family. First, there is a 
cleavage on goals within the regionaiist party family at the national/regional level. 
The consistency of this cleavage at the European level must be examined. Second, 
the cases involve different and changing political contexts. Each has a different
8. Anthony Birch, Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles, p.l73.
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experience of regional and local government, and the level of regional autonomy in 
each region shapes the environment of each party. The strong regional institutions of 
Flanders for example, are superior to the regional council in Brittany. The territorial 
bureaucracies of Scotland and Wales, which serve central government, are in 
contrast, examples of administrative devolution. Party political contexts also differ 
between the cases, along with different interpretations of the process of European 
integration.
The electoral contexts of the cases are also different. The electoral systems of the 
three countries at national and European elections provide both problems and 
opportunities for the parties. In France the two round system of national elections 
has acted as a barrier to small parties, whilst the designation of the whole country as 
a national constituency for European elections using proportional representation with 
a 5% threshold has also brought problems. The UK electoral system uses the same 
procedures for national and European elections, that of single member constituencies 
using the plurality system. The Belgian system is the most favourable to small 
parties as it uses proportional representation in districts in national elections, and 
allows voter preferences to be transferred between the districts of a province. 
European elections in the country are organised through a combination of territorial 
and linguistic lists, using the list system of proportional representation.
Methodology
This study is almost wholly reliant upon original materials generated by field work 
in all five of the areas of study (see appendix). This involved the selection of 
materials and interviews with key political actors. Where possible the original 
material has been supplemented by general accounts of the development of the 
parties themselves, though this has not been possible across all of the cases. In the 
case of the Volksunie the case itself involves a general account of the party’s 
development as it stands as the forgotten regionaiist party in Western Europe. Whilst 
political scientists, sociologists and historians have concentrated upon French, 
Italian, Spanish and UK regionaiist parties, the particular context and development 
of the Volksunie has been neglected. Thus there are a plethora of accounts of the 
unsuccessful Breton movement in English and French, yet few in French or Dutch 
concerning the Volksunie, and nothing in English.
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Nationalism and Regionalism
Nationalism, according to Gellner, is “primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent”.  ^This political principle 
is the basis of both substate nationalism and regionalism but each has its own 
interpretation o f congruence. The goal of most nationalist movements involves the 
creation of nation-states.^® This goal is questioned by regionaiist parties, who 
propose constitutional arrangements and definitions of sovereignty that do not fit the 
orthodox conception of nation-states. Some of these parties are regionaiist in 
orientation and have never sought to establish a nation-state in the classical sense, 
whilst others have accepted that European integration has altered the nation-state and 
moved it away from the classic nineteenth century conceptualisation.
These two different types of party are examples of autonomous nationalism and 
primary regionahsm. Autonomous nationalism is a classification consistent with the 
SNP and Plaid Cymru, and refers to a separate national group which rejects its role 
in another, larger state, and seeks to transform its status through maximum self- 
determination and independence.^^ Primary regionalism  can be accepted as a 
typification of the Volksunie and the Breton parties, and involves parties who base 
their political claims upon stateless peoples and ethnic territorial groups who were 
not assimilated by n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g ,  seek a level of pohtical autonomy short of 
independence.
2. Approaches To European Integration
Nationalism And Integration
Three types of integration are usually the focus of academic study: social integration, 
through cultural interactions and communications; economic integration, with the 
growth of economic interactions and interdependence amongst previously 
autonomous economic units; and political integration, the development of common
9. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.l.
10. Peter Alter, Nationalism, p.93.
11. Andrew Orridge, “Separatist and Autonomist Nationalisms: The Structure of Regional Loyalties 
in the Modem State”, in Colin Williams (ed). National Separatism, p.44.
12. Michael Hebbert, “Regionaiist Aspirations in Contemporary Europe”, in Weiter, Op. cit., 
p.501.
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identities, values and loyalties that help to form and sustain a co m m u n ity .E ach  
presents problems for nationalists and regionalists.
Social integration, which involves cultural and linguistic issues, is not something to 
which nationalists and regionalists would give a favourable response unless it 
developed on their own terms. This type of integration helped generate such 
movements and parties, through the effect of integration on minority languages and 
culture. Social integration is strongly related to economic integration, particularly 
through industrialisation and urbanisation, which can have a homogenising effect on 
minority populations.^"^ The response may not be economic, but may take the form 
of a cultural/linguistic revival. It manifested itself in literary and linguistic 
movements and demands for protective or emancipatory legislation for the language.
Social integration at the supranational level can be perceived rather differently: not as 
a threat but as an opportunity. European integration up to 1992 was not the dominant 
threat to minority languages and cultures. It did not aim to replace them with one 
single language and uniform culture. The very plurality of European culture and 
identity made such homogenising integration problematic. The EC may influence 
linguistic usage through styling certain majority languages as ‘official Community 
languages’, but this situation does not additionally threaten minority languages. If 
anything it threatens the status of the non-official majority languages within the EC 
institutions themselves. The EC has also shown some support for minority 
languages through funding a minority language centre in Wales.
The real damage to minority languages has come from existing education and 
communications systems, policy domains in which the EC lacks significant 
competences as functional responsibility resides with the member states. Also, while 
the EC pursues economic integration, which may achieve a degree of social 
integration, the pattern of integration may have a limited impact on existing levels of 
social integration relative to language. The large population movements and 
linguistic erosion brought by industrialisation, urbanisation and rural decline have 
not yet occured under contemporary European economic integration, and if they
13. William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, p.55, and also see Ernst Haas, The 
Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-57, p. 16.
14. The effect of industrialisation and urbanisation in Wales in the nineteenth century is an example 
of this phenomenon, with economic integration reducing rural Welsh-speaking populations and 
producing a more uniform English-speaking population in the industrial South: see Kenneth 
Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980 .
15. The Community’s two official languages are English and French. This causes problems for the 
other Community languages, especially the smaller languages of Danish, Dutch, Greek and 
Portugese.
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were to do so there is no dominant language group that would seem to be especially 
privileged.
Reactions to economic integration are often perceived relative to economic strength. 
Such integration may be seen as a threat to weak economies, or those disadvantaged 
by geography. Three of the cases in this study are peripheral, and all have 
experienced economic integration in larger economic areas dominated by extra­
national groups. The condition of domestic economies, and their prospects for 
economic growth, would seem to be a key influence on attitudes to economic 
integration, though this is rather simplistic.
Weak economies are often prone to viewing integration as a threat to their domestic 
prosperity and development, and disposed to resist it through protectionism, though 
they could be subject to levels of economic interdependence that made such 
protectionism un viable. In the context of EC economic integration, different parties 
within the Breton movement have taken opposing stances, with some seeing 
interdependence as a threat to the regional economy requiring protectionism, while 
others have identified the internal free market as the best means to reinvigorate the 
regional economy. The latter reveal that nationalists and regionalists can see 
economic integration as an opportunity for economic modernisation, especially when 
economic integration involves trade-offs and subsidies. Scottish nationalists linked 
peripherality to this agenda of side-payments in contemporary campaigns in favour 
of independent Scottish membership of the EC:
“as a nation on the North-West edge of Europe, an independent 
Scotland will also press for the developm ent of a stronger 
Community regional policy, so that the nations on the EC’s periphery 
do not lose out to its central ‘golden triangle’ in the distribution of 
resources”.^^
In other words, economic integration may be accepted as an unavoidable 
consequence of economic interdependence. This may seem a surprising attitude to 
find amongst nationalists and regionalists yet it is found in two different settings: 
amongst regionalists who accept their interdependent role within and between states, 
and seek to develop interdependent political arrangements and overarching themes or 
ideologies which express acceptance of interdependence at the transnational level; 
and amongst nationalists who accept their interdependence within a larger economy 
but seek to regain political control of economic development through independence.
16. SNP, Scotland: A European Nation, p.l8.
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and autonomous participation in institutions that deal with the agenda of economic 
interdependence.
Political integration is the primary focus of this study, but is present in two different 
senses. First, there is the domestic sense, in which regional and national movements 
resist political integration into multinational states and seek political autonomy within 
that state or the establishment of their own state. Second, there is the international 
sense, in which these movements react to supranational political integration. These 
two pressures have different effects and implications and will be explored 
throughout this study.
Consideration of integration within Europe has tended to bring these three types of 
integration together. Integration theory has sought to describe and prescribe the 
development of economic, social and political integration. These theories offer a 
guide to European integration and a menu of challenges facing the nationalist and 
regionaiist parties in this study. In a brief exploration of these theories particular 
attention will be paid to the type of supranational community that is proposed and the 
effect it is seen to have on political loyalties within national communities, to see 
whether they hold threats or opportunities for nationalist and regionaiist parties. 
Following this, there will some consideration of alternative understandings of the 
European Community.
Functionalism
Functionalism is most closely associated with David Mitrany. It was promoted to 
diffuse national loyalties within the global political system rather than concentrate 
them in new supranational entities. Mitrany was suspicious about the creation of 
new communities, seeing in them the potential to recreate the nationalistic flaws of 
the nation-states they superseded. Functionalism has been seen to be consistent 
with the continuation of nation-states rather than associated with their replacement.
In this way its effect on states is limited in the short to medium term. It sought to 
create a Gesellschaft at the global level rather than a specific Gemeinschaft or 
political community.^
17. Wallace, Op. cit., p.61.
18 David Mitrany, "Pan-Europa: A Hope or a Danger?", Political Quarterly, Vol.l, No.4, 1930, 
pp.457-78.
19. Lindberg and Scheingold, Op. cit., p.7.
20. Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and International Organisation, p.26.
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The basis of functionalism was the view that socio-economic issues were primary 
elements in political and national loyalties. Rather than challenge these loyalties 
directly through political initiatives, which would provoke a nationalist response, 
functionalism proposed a more indirect and non-conflictual means to challenge the 
primacy of national interests.^i Functionalism sought to undermine the conflicts 
within global politics associated with nationalism and national competition. It 
proposed to deal with the issues of low politics, the technical and non-controversial 
aspects of socio-economic policymaking, through a web of interlocking international 
institutions and agencies. These would seek to deal with issues on a functional rather 
than a territorial basis. Countries and their political and technical elites would 
participate in such organisations as utilitarians seeking socio-economic benefits, but 
a process of social learning would diffuse primary loyalties away from the national 
community and enhance appreciation of international co-operation.^^
From this description of functionalism it would appear that nationalists and 
regionalists had little to fear from functional co-operation. Since no new political 
community was formed then there was little prospect of the social and cultural 
integration that may damage national communities. The functionalist intent was to 
create a global society not a new superstate or super-nation. The goal of 
functionahsm may have been acceptable, but its method was problematic.
The functionahst method was essentially ehtist and administrative. If regionalism can 
be considered primarily as a decentralist and a participatory movement - a quest for 
self-determination - then the elitist and technocratic nature of the functionalist 
approach is problemmatic and particularly unappeahng to these groups. The lack of 
popular control produces uniformity and administrative problem-solving remote 
from local populations. The functional approach also sought to remove the principle 
of territorial representation in politics since functions cut across national 
b o u n d a r ie s .T h e  functionalist approach was therefore suspicious of territorial 
prescriptions such as federalism and confederalism, as territoriality was responsible 
for the problem of international conflict rather than part of its solution.^^
In short, while functionalism avoided the centralising and integrative tendencies of 
other approaches, it posed some threats to identity-based and territorial movements. 
Mitrany sought to defuse the potential conflict between functionalism and national
ll .Ib id .,  p .ll .
22. Ibid., p.l3.
23. Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p.75.
24. Ibid., p.76.
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sovereignty by stressing that functionalism was not inconsistent with the 
continuation of the nation-state. He sought to stress the fact that functionalism didn’t 
offend against the national sentiment or damage sovereignty to any great degree. It 
transformed political self-determination into functional co-determination, but such 
functionalism was democratic and accountable to the nation-states. It was intended to 
create functional assemblies in which representatives of the nation-states sat as 
de legates.25 However, its bureaucratic nature made it rather unappealing to 
decentralists.
Neo-functionalism
Neo-functionalism is similar to functionalism, but more clearly focused on 
undermining the nation-state to create a supranational political authority with 
w idespread legitim acy and the loyalty of national populations.2  ^ It is a 
transformational approach to integration that attempts to transform the political 
structure of Europe, rather than merely adapt it or build on top of it as the 
functionalists suggest.
The neo-functionalist approach involved an incremental approach to integration, 
within regional institutions,22 which used economic and political successes in 
regional co-operation to develop political integration at a deeper level. Each policy 
success in this process was seen to generate another through sp illover  - the 
application of the integrative policy to another issue area through social learning and 
the intermeshing of policy areas. This has been described as the ‘politicization 
hypothesis’ of neo-functionalism, which refers to the cumulative tendency of 
spillover to bring national actors into supranational co-operation in more 
controversial policy areas, widening the audience and clientele of the supranational 
sphere and altering the political expectations of the actors involved as they look to 
the supranational level for initiatives and support rather than the national level.28 
This shift in expectation was seen to produce a shift in allegiances, and allow new 
loyalties to develop at the supranational level.
25. David Mitrany, “The Process of Integration; Federal or Functional?”, Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 1965, pp. 119-149.
26. Lindberg and Scheingold, Op. cit., p.7.
27. Here the term ‘regional’ applies to continental areas such as Europe or Latin America, rather 
than to regional sub-divisions of states such as Brittany or Flanders.
28. Philippe Schmitter, “Three Hypotheses of Neo-functionalism”, International Organization, 
Vol.23, No.l, 1969, p.l66.
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Neo-functionalism aspired to the supersession of the nation-state, and the creation of 
new loyalties and institutions. It sought to use the Gesellschaft to create a new 
regional Gemeinschaft. This transformation was to be achieved through the transfer 
of political loyalties from the institutions of the nation-state to the supranational 
institutions. Since loyalty to the nation-state was a consequence of the functional 
activities of the state, then the transfer of those functions facilitated the transfer of 
loyalties. Haas proposed that
“personal political loyalties are the result of satisfaction with the 
performance of crucial functions by an agency of government. Since 
actors can be loyal to several agencies simultaneously, a gradual 
transfer of loyalties to international organisations performing most of 
the crucial functions is likely”.^ ^
This gave neo-functionalism the dual goal of continuously expanding the 
supranational level and also creating a new community from co-operation. Haas 
referred to this latter process by emphasising that
“the redirection of loyalties is crucial here because it is expected to 
yield a community of sentiments and loyalties, which, in turn, is 
conceived as a psychological prerequisite for political f e d e r a t i o n * \ 3 0
Neo-functionalism was an attempt to achieve integration through the involvement of 
wider political forces than administrators and bureaucrats. It sought to redirect the 
loyalties of political parties, interest groups, governments and publics.^ ^  This 
provided opportunities for participation beyond the bureaucratic level identified by 
functionalism. That it was intended to draw in non-governmental actors, such as 
political parties, is obviously of significance here - the expectation was that the 
support of political parties would also bring the support of voters.
Neo-functionalism tended to view the international political system as having the 
same characteristics and procedures as national political systems. The proponents of 
neo-functionalism also tended to hold the view that states could create nations, and 
that this could be replicated at the regional level in international s o c i e t y . ^ ^  Thus 
super-nationbuilding was seen to be both possible and desireable. In seeking to 
create a regional superstate, neo-functionalism was creating a community on a larger
29. Haas, Op. cit., 1964, p.50.
30. Ibid., p.22.
31. Pentland, Op. cit., p. 100.
3 2 ./W .,p .l l8 .
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territorial principle, using territorial constitutional devices such as federalism to 
construct and sustain a political community.
The notion of a regional state model for integration has continued in the hands of 
European federalists, and maximal integrationists who seek a deeper European 
Community. Whilst functionalism proposed a loose international community model 
of integration through co-operation, neo-functionalism proposed a state model and a 
regional political authority. Neo-functionalism in particular was concerned with 
describing and predicting the end-condition of integration in Europe. It is this which 
is of concern to the political actors in this study, though each is concerned with 
constitutional models for Europe rather than theoretical models of integration.
Both functionalism and neo-functionalism have loose constitutional variants at the 
practical level. The federalist approach, which favours close integration and the 
development of a political community, can be seen to be challenged by an 
intergovernmental approach, which takes a looser, confederal approach to the 
European Community. Both of these approaches offer different visions of European 
union, and effect the preferences of political actors - especially those for whom 
constitutional issues and self-determination are primary concerns.
Federalism
The idea of federalism has been consistently bound up with European union in the 
twentieth century. It has acted as an ideal for European union as well as an 
organising principle. Though these concepts have shared such a long-term 
relationship there has been no convincing convergence between them that has 
produced a federal Europe. This is a consequence of the division of opinion in 
Europe on the appropriate constitutional design for union, both within and between 
nations and governments.
Whilst many proponents of European union would refer to themselves as federalists, 
the disparate nature of the concept is a recipe for confusion. This study focuses 
primarily upon integral federalists: those who wish to create a regionalised European 
union through maximum decentralisation to regional states. But, this end-condition 
is contested by two types of opponents. First, the centralist federalists: those who 
seek weak national government structures and maximum powers for supranational 
institutions. Second, by those seeking to protect the constitutional status quo from 
attack by international institutions, and aimed instead to promote intergovernmental
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solutions. This latter point of view is not federalist at all, though it can be considered 
as confederalist in certain circumstances.^^
Intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmentalism has been used as both a description and a credo for the 
European Community. It views nation-states as the primary actors in international 
affairs and organisations. Since the role of the state in international affairs is reliant 
upon national sovereignty then such sovereignty is not seen to be negotiable or 
transferable to supranational organisations, but only to intergovernmental 
organisations in which the nation-state holds executive power. The state’s role in 
international organisations is seen to revolve around the promotion and defence of 
the national interest rather than the pursuit of integration. As a descriptive term 
intergovernmentalism applies to those international organisations which preserve 
national sovereignty and the defence o f the national interest with their 
decisionmaking mechanisms.^"^
The existence of the Council of Ministers in the European Community, and of a 
national governmental veto, are examples of such intergovemmentalism,^^ which 
make the states the primary actors in the EC and gatekeepers with control over other 
actors within their states. The first entrenches the role of the nation-states within the 
executive of the Community, whilst the other, though reduced by the adoption of 
majority voting for some aspects of the Single European Act, provides a line of 
defence for national governments.^^ Those groups who would oppose the further 
extension of the powers of the European Commission and the expansion of 
supranational decisionmaking tend to wish to preserve the primacy of the Council, 
and view the EC as a confederal rather than a federal body, with the majority of 
powers resting with member states rather than the common executive. This division 
of powers has often been made explicit through reference to the high politics and 
low politics dimensions.
33. See David Calleo, Europe’s Future: The Grand Alternatives, p.34,
34. Carole Webb, “Theoretical Perspectives and Problems”, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and 
Carole Webb (eds). Policy-making in the European Community, p.l3.
35. The National Veto arose during the decisionmaking crisis in the EC in the mid-1960s: See 
Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis.
36. The Single European Act brought the institutionalisation of qualified majority voting within 
the Council of Ministers on issues related to the single market, though unanimity remained in the 
areas of taxation, employment and the free movement of people: see article 6 of the Single 
European Act.
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The notion of high politics refers to those aspects of government or national 
sovereignty closely protected by nation-states like national security, independence 
and control over vital national resources. Low politics issues, in contrast, are seen to 
be relatively uncontroversial areas of economic decisionmaking. These distinctions 
have been made by those seeking to point to the intergovernmental nature of the 
European Community.^^ They point to the existence of a hard-shell to nation-states 
and a hierarchy of issues on the national agenda that are not subject to negotiation as 
they would undermine the existence of the nation-states itself.
Intergovernmentalism is an adaptive model for Europe, seeking to develop co­
operation between nations whilst retaining the primary role of the state in 
international affairs. States are seen to be willing to indulge in co-operation on issues 
of low politics, but to preserve their monopoly of power in high politics when 
challenged by international organisations such as the EC. Co-operation which occurs 
between the nation-state and international organisations is seen to allow the 
advancement of national interests through bargaining and negotiation; and these 
aspects are the key motivations for co-operation. The- attitude of nationalist and 
regionaiist parties to compromise on these contrasting issues of high and low politics 
will be examined in the case studies.
3. The Development of European Union Since The 1920s
Pre-War European Integration
It will become obvious from the analysis below that European integration has been a 
subject of concern for nationalist and regionaiist parties since 1918. As the issue of 
European union rises on the political agenda, so does the attention of political actors 
to the subject. In the early period of European integration two main developments 
were notable. First, the campaigning efforts of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi to 
promote the issue of European union. Second, the presentation of a plan for 
European union by the French foreign Minister Aristide Briand.
From the 1920s onwards Coudenhove-Kalergi promoted the idea of European union 
amongst Europe’s political elites. Though lacking any governmental or diplomatic 
accreditation, he was reasonably successful in generating interest for the idea 
amongst politicians, diplomats and academics. Coudenhove-Kalergi favoured a
37. Stanley Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-state in the Case of Western 
Europe”, Daedalus, Vol.95, Summer 1966, pp.862-915.
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maximum position on European union, with a preference for economic and political 
union rather than a customs union. His intention was to move towards creating a 
common European Gemeinschaft rather than an intergovernmental union or 
economic entity. Europe was to be built on common cultural and political 
foundations, to construct common symbols and themes to stress its unity.^^ This 
involved any pan-European organisation taking on the trappings of the nation-state.
The more significant political development in this period came with the Briand Plan 
proposed in 1929-30. Briand had laid out suggestions for European federal union in 
a speech to the League of Nations General Assembly in 1929. These proposals were 
formalised in the Memorandum on the Organisation o f a Federal Regime in Europe 
presented to the League in 1930. Briand proposed to create a number of common 
institutions with joint responsibility for Europe within the structures of the League of 
Nations, but other League members were unenthusiastic.^^
Both Coudenhove-Kalergi’s and Briand’s efforts failed, and the League of Nations 
foundered, in the climate of the 1930s. These experiences were, however, influential 
in the period after the second world war. Efforts to promote European integration in 
this period occured in a very different context from those previously. The war was 
seen to be the apotheosis of nationalism, and produced a European state system 
weakened by the economic and social destruction of six years of conflict and divided 
between two opposing superpowers.
Post-war European Integration
The postwar movement in favour of European integration had its roots in the 
political and resistance networks that developed in the latter stages of the war, and 
were instrumental in the formation of a number of Euro-federalist organisations. 
Their attitudes were influenced by the experience and failure of the League of 
Nations and the nation-states system on which it had been constructed. The lessons 
of this experience, in a climate of great antipathy towards nations and nationalism, 
produced a strong preference for maximum prescriptions for European union. 
Instead of the intergovernmentalism of the League, these groups proposed 
supranationalism, and strong, central authorities for Europe. A centralised European 
federation was seen to be the best mechanism to deal with national conflicts, achieve 
economic union to undermine economic conflicts, and settle the problem of the
38. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europa.
39. Richard Vaughan, Post-war Integration in Europe, p.l l .
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restoration of the German state. The new union was also presented as a means to 
enable Europe’s former great powers to play some role in world affairs, as a unified 
actor independent of the two superpowers."^®
The effectiveness of these federalist groups was limited by the existence of an 
alternative prospectus for Europe. Rather than the whole-hearted constitutional 
approach of the federalists, this second set of opinions favoured a looser, 
intergovernmental union. Though the initiative for establishing common institutions 
lay in the hands of national governments, both of these alternate groups of actors 
sought to promote their respective positions. The meeting point was the Hague 
Congress in 1948. The Congress intended to produce a design for European union, 
and its output involved support for the creation of a European Court of Justice, a 
European Charter of Human Rights, and various plans for economic and political 
union.
The differences between federalists and intergovemmentalists were clearly evident in 
governmental reactions to the Hague agenda. Both France and Britain responded by 
proposing very different types of European union. Though both had been 
signatories to the Brussels Treaty in 1948 to establish a common European 
Assembly, there was little agreement over the role and powers of the assembly. 
Britain objected to the supranational nature of the assembly proposal and promoted 
an intergovernmental alternative that retained national sovereignty. The U K ’s 
preference manifested itself in the weak, intergovernmental Council of Europe, 
which employed Ministerial participation to safeguard national rights."^^
The need to restructure political and economic relations between Germany and 
France in the postwar period provided a more definite opportunity for the 
development of European union than the Council of Europe approach. The Schuman 
Plan in 1950 was intended to close the Franco-German gap. It proposed to unite the 
political and economic goals of the two states through establishing a common 
authority for coal and steel production amongst W est European countries, to 
undermine the economic bases of international conflicts. This initiative was 
presented as the first step towards federalism rather than a simple economic project, 
and a means to integrate the new West German state, created in 1949, into the West 
European political structure. The Schuman Plan came to institutional reality in the
40. Walter Lipgens (ed), A History of European Integration 1945-7, pp.53-55.
41. Clive Archer, Organising Western Europe, p.43.
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shape of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which included 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and West Germany as members.
The European Coal and Steel Community established a number of common 
institutions to facilitate the management of the coal and steel markets. These 
institutional arrangements included a political compromise to protect smaller ECSC 
members from the political dominance of larger members."^^ Though the ECSC was 
originally designed as a supranational organisation, administered by a supranational 
High Authority, intergovernmental aspects were added in order to protect the smaller 
states. A Council of Ministers was grafted on to the ECSC structure which diluted 
the supranational aspect of the institution, and provided each member state with 
equal voting rights. Despite this intergovernmental aspect, it was the creation of 
federal forces, who were prepared to make compromises to sustain the dynamic of 
integration.
After the success of the ECSC, European governments moved to examine other 
opportunities for co-operation. A European Defence Community (EDC) was 
proposed by the French government as a means to develop a common European 
defence force. It was controversial as it involved the remilitarization of Germany and 
the merger of separate national mihtary forces. The latter was an evident challenge to 
national sovereignty - it proposed a common European Defence Minister accountable 
to a supranational assembly - and was defeated by the French National Assembly for 
this reason. The idea of a European Political Community came much more 
informally, through meetings of the common assembly of the ECSC. The ECSC 
parliamentarians prepared a draft treaty for European union which outlined a 
common structure above individual initiatives such as the ECSC and Defence 
Community.
Both of these ambitious proposals were rejected by 1954, leading to crisis amongst 
the federalist movement. As the federal proposals for European security failed, 
interstate initiatives succeeded. Instead of the federal European Defence Community, 
the intergovernmental Western European Union was established, with British 
support. The federalist response to the failure of the Defence Community and the 
reinvigorated intergovernmental approach, was to attempt to relaunch the integration 
process through the creation of a European Community. Jean Monnet and other 
federalists took a leading role in marshalling elite support for new European policy 
initiatives through the Action Committee for the United States of Europe formed in
42. Brigid Laffan, Integration and Co-Operation in Europe, p,32.
2 4
Introduction
1955."^  ^They intended to concentrate on economic integration, which had succeeded 
with the ECSC, and promoted the idea of a set of institutions to guide the creation of 
a common market.
The European Community
The new consensus on co-operation was evident at the intergovernmental conference 
of the ECSC at Messina in 1955. The conference established a committee to design 
institutions to facilitate the creation of a European common market and a pan- 
European nuclear industry. It proposed the creation of a customs union between the 
six ECSC members, involving common policies and institutions. This agenda 
produced the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957.
These new institutions were established through the Treaty of Rome. The 
Community proposed to achieve a level of economic integration through abolishing 
customs duties and tariffs between individual members and establishing a common 
external tariff regime. It also proposed to create a common market by providing for 
the free movement of goods, services and people within the market area, and 
developing common policies in the spheres o f agriculture, transport and 
communications. Though the institutions of the new Community contained 
intergovernmental aspects through the Council of Ministers, the primary role was 
given to the supranational Commission to act as the motor of integration. The 
Commission was to be staffed with members who owed their loyalty, though not 
their appointment, to the supranational institutions rather than their member states. 
The Commission was joined by a European Court and the supranational, though 
weak and unelected, European Assembly.
The initial membership of the EC mirrored that of the European Coal and Steel 
Community. Britain continued its role as a Community outsider, though it sought to 
reverse its initial opposition to membership with applications in 1961 and 1967, 
which were vetoed by France. Britain’s non-membership, in contrast to the 
involvement of Belgium and France in integrative projects from the early 1950s, 
means that two of the cases in this study experienced a period of European 
integration outside the Community.
43. Archer, Op. cit., p.65.
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Intergovernmental Alternatives to the EC
While the six Western European states established the institutions of the European 
Economic Community, the UK involved itself in the creation of an alternative 
intergovernmental trading organisation. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
favoured a trade association rather than the customs union approach of the EC, to 
pursue limited economic co-operation and preserve national sovereignty. The group 
of countries involved in EFTA had preferred to achieve trade integration through the 
co-operative mechanisms of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, 
but the advent of the EC brought them to establish the EFTA in 1960 as an 
alternative trading bloc."^^ The EFTA declaration outlined limited goals that 
contrasted markedly with those of the EC, with its federalist outlook and intention to 
proceed towards ‘ever closer union’. EFTA can be seen as a response to the EC’s 
approach to integration and also an indication of the unwillingness of the EFTA 
group to trade off sovereignty for integration. The lim ited goals and 
intergovernmental approach of the EFTA made it a plausible alternative for a number 
of countries to achieve limited economic co-operation and avoid isolation. As will be 
illustrated below, it also offered an institutional alternative for nationalist parties 
during periods of opposition to the European Community.
The Crisis o f Deepening in the EC
During its early years the European Commission set about the task of establishing a 
customs union and common agricultural policy between the six member states. This 
process was substantially disrupted by the conflict over sovereignty and integration 
that developed in the mid-1960s. The Treaty of Rome had indicated that the Council 
of Ministers would progress to majority voting on issues related to the common 
market rather than retain the unanimity procedure. This prospect, which undermined 
the national veto, along with proposals to alter the Commission’s powers over 
agriculture and the EC budget, led the French Government to veto further 
integration.'^^ Whilst the French sought the passage of the agricultural reforms, they 
did not want them to contribute to the expansion of the Com m ission’s 
decisionmaking capacity. The Commission had linked these two issues together in a 
package deal to facilitate the extension of its competences, but France strongly 
opposed this practice, and created a crisis in 1965 when its officials and Ministers 
temporarily abandoned EC institutions in protest at the Commission strategy. This
44. The signatories to the EFTA agreement included Austria, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland, with Finland joining in 1961 and Iceland in 1970.
45. For consideration of the crisis in the Community in 1965-6 see Miriam Camps, Op. cit.
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effectively paralysed substantial elements of EC decisionmaking, and stifled 
progress towards majority voting.
French opposition to supranationalism, and prom otion of the alternative 
intergovernmental position of a Europe des Patries^ produced a solution to the 
sovereignty/integration paradox. The Luxembourg compromise of 1966 created a 
national veto within the Council of Ministers that removed the prospect of majority 
voting. The veto enabled national governments to declare some Commission policy 
initiatives as non-negotiable, as they affected vital national interests, leading to their 
non-implementation, or use the threat of the veto as a bargaining tool to extract side- 
payments or concessions within the Council of Ministers over particular policies. 
This altered the balance of power w ithin the Com m unity away from 
supranationalism towards intergovemmentalism, and effectively entrenched the 
intergovernmental position of the member states within the Council.
Following the disruption of the Luxembourg crisis the Community entered a period 
of institutional rationalisation. The three existing communities, the ECSC, the 
European Economic Community and Euratom, were merged into one institution 
governed by a single Commission. One result of this was the recognition of the 
intergovernmental mechanisms that had developed since 1957 but had not been 
included in the Treaty of Rome. The diplomatic networks that had grown up around 
the Council of Ministers was institutionalised as COREPER, the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, to act as the working groups for Council meetings. The 
new arrangements were inserted into the Treaties during the merger.
EC Efforts at Widening and Deepening
By the end of the 1960s the Community had lost its way on the road to integration. 
Not only had De Gaulle prevented the deepening of the Community by taking a 
stand on sovereignty, but he had also blocked the EC’s widening through placing a 
veto on British entry in 1961 and 1 9 6 7 This in spite of the fact that the Treaty of
46. The concepts of deepening and widening refer to the general strategies/approaches of the 
European Community: it can pursue integration through increasing the extent of integration 
amongst existing members, through new institutions and policies, or alternatively through 
expanding the process to include new members. These approaches are considered as opposing 
choices by some EC actors - the British Government for example - and though there is a distinct 
tension between them they are not inherently contradictory.
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Rome had stated that Community membership was to be open to all democratic 
states in Europe."*^
The period after De Gaulle's departure was notable for the Community’s efforts to 
pursue enlargement and integration. The Hague Summit in 1969 explored the issues 
of expansion, economic and monetary union and foreign policy co-operation, and 
the EC quickly entered into negotiations with four prospective member states. The 
Community then moved towards developing European Political co-operation and 
EMU through the Werner Report in 1970. These goals were written into the 
communiques dealing with enlargement following the Paris Summit in 1972.
The political and economic shocks after 1972 did much to undermine the EC’s new 
beginning. The changing status of the dollar in the global economy, the oil price rise 
in 1973 and the onset of economic recession all produced problems for the 
integrationist agenda of Paris. In difficult economic times the resurgence of national 
economic interests and limited rationale for co-operation reduced the appeal of 
further integration, and EMU, which was supposed to have been completed by 
1980, was lost from the Community’s political agenda until the latter 1970s. This 
period has been depicted as the confederal phase of the Community, typified by the 
weak, managerial role of the Commission, the predominance of intergovernmental 
activity and the defensive attitudes of national governments."^
The period from the Paris summit until the early 1980s has been considered as one 
of relative stagnation for the Community, though several institutional developments 
occured. The informal summit meetings took on an enhanced status through their 
designation and institutionalisation as the European Council, with heads of 
government rather than just government Ministers taking a prominent role in EC 
affairs and diplomacy. This partially removed the leadership of the EC from the 
Commission to the European Council and further elevated the intergovernmental 
dimension. Despite the period of stagnation the Community successfully enlarged 
itself in 1973 to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The EC also 
deepened the process of integration through establishing direct elections to the 
European Parliament in 1979, to replace the nationally-nominated assembly with a 
more democratic and supranational institution.
47, Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome requires unanimity within the Council of Ministers before 
new members can join the EC, since 1987 there has also been a requirement for majority support 
within the European Parliament: See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and 
Single European Act (Luxembourg: European Communities, 1989).
48. Paul Taylor, “The Politics of the European Community: The Confederal Phase”, World 
Politics, Vol. xxvii, April 1973, pp.336-60.
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The Community also made an attempt to restore progress towards economic and 
monetary union through the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
in 1979. The EMS was created to produce a regime of monetary stability within the 
EC to facilitate internal trade. Though the device was initially subject to a great deal 
of intergovernmental bargaining, with poorer EC members seeking side-payments 
through the European Regional Development Fund in exchange for supporting the 
EMS,"^  ^the new regime was successful in producing more stable exchange rates and 
prices.^® This degree of convergence was intended to produce the economic climate 
for economic and monetary union and market integration, though progress on these 
issues was not made until the mid-1980s.
Towards the SEA
The early 1980s did see a further enlargement, with Greece joining the EC, but the 
Community continued to suffer from a negative image because of the CAP funding 
crisis and British dissatisfaction with budgetary contributions to the EC. Pro- 
integrationists within the Community saw a need to relaunch the EC in this period, 
to generate a new dynamism towards integration. The Genscher-Colombo initiative 
of the German and Italian Governments was an attempt to have the Community 
recommit itself to economic and political union at the Stuttgart Summit in 1983. The 
European Parliament also sought to relaunch integration through the preparation of 
the draft Treaty on European Union in 1984. The Stuttgart declaration sought to 
minimise the use of the national veto, through states abstaining in Council votes 
rather than vetoing initiatives of benefit to other member states, whilst the 
Parliament’s initiative sought to remove the veto completely.
The reappearance of economic integration on the EC’s agenda was a consequence of 
efforts of integrationists in the Commission and member states, and committed 
intergovemmentalists, who saw market integration as beneficial to their national 
interests. The Commission had pursued the issue of market integration for some 
time in the early 1980s, but it was the Council of Ministers which really seized the 
initiative through the appointment of the Dooge Committee on Institutional Affairs, 
to examine the need for institutional changes to aid the process of market integration, 
and package together the Community’s preference for institutional development with 
the member states desires for economic benefits. The Franco-German nexus within
49. Roy Jenkins, European Diary 1977-1981, p.350.
50, David Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences”, in Alberta Sbragia (ed), 
Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the New European Community, p.47.
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the Community was also adept at linking the single market to the agenda of political 
union, which brought the intergovernmental conference to amend the Treaty of 
Rome and institute the Single European Act.
The Treaty amendments that comprised the Single European Act reintroduced an 
element missing from the Community since the 1960s: qualified majority voting. 
This procedure was to be used in the policy domains of the internal market, 
removing the unanimity rule in these areas and undermining the national veto. This 
produced the situation in which member states were seen to be using the EC and the 
Council of Ministers as instruments for pooled sovereignty y accepting joint action in 
certain areas whilst retaining sovereignty in others.^^
The internal market aspects of the Single European Market achieved considerable 
prominence, and sought to produce the level of economic integration originally 
intended in the Treaty of Rome. The blockages in internal Community trade were 
due to a number of non-tariff fiscal, technical and physical barriers to trade. The 
Commission therefore developed policies to deal with the level of customs controls 
between EC states; the harmonisation and mutual recognition of national technical 
standards, regulations and contract arrangements; and differing VAT and excise 
rates.^^ The removal of these barriers was seen to provide a substantial trading boost 
to the Community’s members with cost-reductions on trade, improved price 
efficiency and new patterns in comparative advantage.
From Single Market to EMU
The success of the single market programme in relaunching the Community and 
providing the path towards economic and monetary union was considerable. While 
for some Community members, such as the United Kingdom, the single market was 
an end in itself, for others it was a route to EMU and political union. Following the 
success of the Single European Act, the Council appointed the Committee for the 
Study of Economic and Monetary Union to examine the prospects for deeper 
economic integration. The Committee itself held the view that the single market had 
substantially restructured interstate economic relations:
“by greatly strengthening economic interdependence between
member countries, the Single Market will reduce the room for
51. Robert Keohane and Stanley Hofftnann (eds), The New European Comnunity: Decisionmaking 
and Institutional Change, p.7.
52. For more on goals of the single market initiative see Paulo Cecchini, The European Challenge 
1992: The Benefits o f the Single Market.
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independent policy manoeuvre and amplify the existing cross-border
effects of developments originating in each member country.”^^
The ambitious nature of the Delors Report’s proposals on EMU brought an 
intergovernmental conference to discuss and prepare the necessary amendments to 
the Treaty of Rome. The Franco-German alliance within the EC also succeeded in 
forcing the issue of political union onto the Community agenda, which brought a 
second intergovernmental conference. A year of bargaining and negotiation in both 
conferences bought forth the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1991, which sought to 
design the institutions, policies and timetable to implement the Delors Report. The 
Treaty followed the three stage process outlined in the report, with the transition 
phases to complete economic and monetary union to be achieved by 1st January 
1999.
The first stage of EMU sought to achieve economic policy convergence between the 
EC member states, with the Community’s Finance Ministers meeting through Ecofin 
to monitor and enforce convergence guidelines. The convergence criteria agreed at 
Maastricht were detailed and involved stringent monetary and fiscal targets for 
member states to be accepted into the transition to complete EMU;
1. The member state’s inflation level had to be no more than 1.5% 
above the average of the three lowest national rates of inflation within 
the EC;
2. Interest rates had to be no higher than 2% above the average of the 
three lowest national interest rate levels in the EC;
3. The budget deficit of national governments had to be within 3% of 
GDP;
4. Gross public sector debt had to be kept within 60% of GDP;
5. National currency had to be within the 2.25% divergence band of 
the European Monetary System for two years in advance of EMU, 
without any unilateral devaluation.^
These criteria were to be implemented and monitored by Ecofin, and subsequently 
by the European Monetary Institute established at the second stage of EMU in 1994. 
This institution was to take over the role of Ecofin in co-ordinating national 
monetary policies, facilitate the use of the ECU, strengthen the levels of co-operation 
between national central banks and monitor the operation of the European Monetary 
System. By the 31st December 1996 the European Council was to consider the 
levels of fulfilment of the stipulated convergence criteria, and if a majority of EC
53. Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Report on Economic and 
Monetary Union in the European Community, p. 10.
54. “Protocol on the Convergence crieria referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community”, Treaty on European Union, 1992.
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states had achieved these conditions then the Community would progress towards 
the third stage. This staging post to EMU was the aspect of most concern to the 
Danish and UK governments during the Maastricht negotiations and both secured 
opt-outs within the Treaty on their final agreement and participation in stage three.^^
The European System of Central Banks was to be established by July 1998 at the 
latest, in preparation for stage three and the emergence of an independent European 
Central Bank to manage European monetary policy. During this period the ECU 
would become a currency in its own right, and exchange rates would be fixed to 
facilitate the exchange of national currencies for the ECU.
Whilst the Treaty made progress on EMU, there was more limited agreement on 
aspects of political union. Foreign policy was not elevated to become an EC policy 
domain. However, an intergovernmental body for joint decisionmaking in foreign 
policy was constructed alongside the EC, not subject to supranational influences. As 
in other areas, the UK government negotiated an opt-out on joint decisionmaking in 
the area of foreign affairs. The member states were able to achieve increased co­
operation in home affairs and justice, though this was limited. There were also 
political problems over the Community’s desire to insert the social chapter into the 
Treaty over the veto of the British. In a hybrid move the eleven other members 
agreed the chapter and inserted it as a protocol to the Treaty. This exercise and the 
general use of opt-outs and protocols in the Maastricht Treaty may have set a number 
of precedents that undermine the Community decisionmaking process. Aspects of 
the Treaty were picked apart by intergovemmentalism and national interests, and 
may have created a precedent for the emergence of an ût /a carte Community rather 
than a unified one.^^
Whilst Maastricht was signed and largely ratified, its impact was difficult to predict. 
It was conceived during a more optimistic environment for integration, but required 
implementation in a period in which economic problems reduced the enthusiasm for 
further economic integration, and the crises in the former Yugoslavia showed the 
weakness of European political union in the foreign policy sphere. Domestic 
economic and political problems, and the political scepticism of European electorates 
over integration further tarnished the Maastricht agreement. The public’s lukewarm 
support for integration evident in the French and Danish referenda in 1992 and
55. “Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland” and “Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark”, ibid.
56. The idea of integration developing on an a /a carte basis was first propounded by Ralf 
Dahrendorf in 1979. See Laffan, Op. cit., p.l3.
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problems with the EMS from 1992-3 also stalled progress towards economic and 
monetary union.
4. The Party Dimension
The Political Opportunity Structure of European Integration
European integration has offered a variable political opportunity structure for 
political actors since the 1920s. This relationship between political contexts and 
behaviours is a product of group activities and strategies and also of the various 
openings and resources in the political system itself.^^ A political opportunity 
structure can be seen to have three aspects: first, it may help or hinder the agenda- 
setting efforts of a political organisation; second, it influences the process of alliance 
formation with sympathetic political actors; third, it influences the policies and 
strategies of political organisations.^*
Stateless nations and their political systems offer a definite structure of opportunities 
for political actors. They present “a space offering several possibilities of action to 
those people living and working within it”.^  ^ The bounded communities of this 
study are also subject to exogenous factors such as pressures from neighbouring 
communities and the political or economic centre. European integration is one such 
exogenous influence, and the endogenous political response to it forms the core of 
this study.
The European issue has provided a new opening for nationalist and regionalist 
parties, exposing the weak spot of sovereignty in the established state-nations and 
providing an external support system to aid autonomy. Each party has faced a 
different political opportunity structure, and adopted different behaviours and 
responses to European integration, though each exhibited similar behaviour in 
linking the issue to their own drive for autonomy. This in itself constitutes the main 
response to the political opportunity structure: hitching autonomy and independence 
to exogenous factors that challenge and undermine state sovereignty.
In addition to considering the EC/subnational interface as a political opportunity 
structure, the European issue is a political resource. It is an external resource for
57. Peter Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol.67, March 1973, p. 11.
58. Dieter Rucht, “Environment Movement Organisations in West Germany and France”, in Bert 
Klandermans (ed). Organising For Change: Social Movement Organisations in Europe and the 
United States, p.68.
59. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity, p.3.
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political parties deployed in their political strategies and debates. The role of the EC 
as an external support system to assist in the autonomy or independence of small 
states is one example of its usage as a resource. Such deployment may be contingent 
upon the suitability of the political opportunity structure. For nationalist and 
regionalist parties, which are usually but not always opposition parties, the 
opportunities come in the shape of elections and referenda as well as through general 
political discourse on constitutional issues and political questions. Such parties 
would be expected to take account of this external political influence and resource in 
their consideration of constitutional reforms. Some of this was manifest in the 
debates and proposals on such reforms. The examination o f the deployment of this 
political resource, through linkage politics, shall receive treatment throughout this 
study.
The Meaning Of Europe: Supranationalism And Sovereignty
As an idea, European union has meant very different things to different people over 
time.^® It is not a uniform concept but open to competing expectations and 
aspirations. This very looseness and conceptual ambiguity has been convenient for 
many political actors, though some have argued that the idea itself has been 
undermined by its ambiguity.^^ European union is a contested notion. It can be 
regarded as an article of faith for some such as the European Movement or as a 
demon by those political groups seeking to preserve British sovereignty. The idea 
has been used by centralist federalists, intergovernmental federalists, decentralist 
federalists, functionalists, neo-functionalists, and by most political parties in 
contemporary Europe. The flexibility of the notion of European union should not 
detract from the fact that it is contested, with a degree of conflict over what the term 
means and what the substance of the union should involve. This level of generality 
is shared by the nationalist and regionalist parties in this study, though they 
occasionally provide more exact definitions of their conception of European union.
Though European union is conceptually vague, and therefore malleable, the 
European Community has an empirical reality that has led to more serious 
interpretations by political actors. Nationalists and regionalists could afford to be 
indulgent with the concept of European union but the reality of a set of institutions, 
policies and power .relations in the EC required some re-evaluation of self- 
determination and sovereignty. The new institutional and policy implications of the
60. Calleo, Op. cit, p.36.
61. Stanley Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America”, Daedalus, 
Vol.93, Fall 1964, p.l273.
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European Community, brought a behaviourial change to some political parties. 
Vague international goodwill and feelings about the efficacy of co-operation were 
interrupted by political reality and new sets of stimuli and considerations, related to 
sovereignty and integration.
In the strict historical sense sovereignty refers to the belief that a society or body- 
politic has absolute political power.^^ In the international system this domestic 
assertion of state sovereignty has brought acceptance of the principle of self- 
determination and the sovereign independence of nation-states. This study will seek 
to define the attitudes of the political parties to sovereignty through examining its 
interpretation at the domestic and international level. This will allow some depiction 
of their respective absolutist or pragmatic positions. Though supranational 
institutions have developed which hold powers and responsibilities above the state 
they are not sovereign bodies but alliances of sovereign states. The European 
Community, for example, has been characterised as an intergovernmental union 
rather than a sovereign body.^^ Its limited powers rely upon member states’ 
acceptance of limits on their individual national sovereignty. This study wiU examine 
how parties who support different levels of self-determination reconcile their 
demands for sovereignty with the existence of European institutions.
Since the European Community involves some trade-off between national and 
supranational sovereignty parties and movements concerned with national self- 
determination face a dilemma. As nation-builders, nationalists and regionalists may 
regard the European Community as a constraint on the exercise of national 
sovereignty in certain areas of policy or in overall policy. Alternatively they may see 
positive benefits from sharing sovereignty with a supranational organisation. This 
‘sharing’ is problematic for nationalists seeking independence. For they are normally 
seeking to attain complete sovereignty from their multinational states, not to share it, 
and then concede some to another external body. For regionalists, by contrast, there 
is no contradiction. They propose to share a more equal degree of sovereignty within 
their state through decentralisation, and in the EC, through integral federalism.
W hilst focusing upon political sovereignty, and exploring the notions of 
independence and interdependence in the case studies, the notion of economic 
sovereignty is also important, as it can be seen to underlie political independence.
62. F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, p.l58.
63. Stanley Hoffmann, Op. cit., has been among the strong proponents of this view.
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Here it is party attitudes to economic autarky and interdependence that are of interest. 
Economic sovereignty can be seen as
“the de facto power of a national government to control economic 
conditions within its territories”.^
This power is difficult to measure, but an analysis of the beliefs and expectations of 
the nationalist and regionalist parties in this area will suffice. Identifying what the 
parties believe about economic sovereignty will offer some guide to their attitudes on 
economic integration. Two of the Breton parties in this study, for example, hold 
contrasting views of economic integration. The moderate regionalist parties 
associated with Yann Fouere have favoured liberal economic principles and open 
markets, whilst the socialist UDB has favoured protectionism. Both of these views 
have implications for attitudes and responses to European integration.
Attitudes to economic sovereignty fall logically into two polar types. Regionalists 
may be protectionist and autarkic or internationalist and oriented towards economic 
m o d e rn is a t io n .A lte rn a tiv e ly , parties may follow a mixture of these two 
approaches, according to the particular economic issue or period. Exploring and 
defining these positions in each case will offer some explanation of a party’s attitude 
to the EC and the threat or opportunity that it offers to the notion of economic 
sovereignty.
Conceptualising Party Responses to European Integration
European integration is an overlapping phenomenon which occurs within and 
between national and international political systems. Developments in one area are 
linked to another. The focus here is predominantly on unidirectional influences, that 
of international issues on domestic, subnational actors. There is a reciprocal 
relationship between the two systems however, and effects that occur and have 
influence across systems. This is the context which facilitates political linkage.
Linkage is “any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is 
reacted to in another”.^  ^The national and international systems involve a sequence 
of inputs and outputs which generate reciprocal responses. For weak domestic
64. A.M.C. Waterman: “Nationalism, Sovereignty and Economic Policy”, Canadian Review of  
Studies in Nationalism, Vol.2, N o.l, 1974, p.6.
65. Michael Keating, “Minority Nationalism and the State: The European Case”, in Michael 
Watson (ed). Contemporary Minority Nationalism, p.l89.
66. James Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays On JTie Convergence Of National And International 
Systems, p.45.
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actors, such as the cases in this study, this is an essentially reactive experience. 
Policy outputs in the national system are therefore generated by behaviour in the 
international system and vice-versa. Such linkages effect the level of independence 
or interdependence in a society and can also have integrative or disintegrative 
effects.^^
The nature of the linkage between autonomy and European integration involves 
subnational parties reacting to policy outputs from the international system and the 
European Community. As well as reacting to outputs - the policy response - the 
parties are also making a systemic response to the design, substance and future of 
those systems and institutions, and to their impact upon domestic political goals and 
contexts. The argument of this study is that nationalist and regionalist parties react to 
these outputs and institutions through a series of distinctive political linkages. 
Linkage has some similarities with the notion of policy coupling, a concept which 
refers to the process through which issues or problems within political debate are 
linked to other issues. It involves the re-articulation and repackaging of an issue 
through attaching it to a new theme or development.^* The difference between 
linkage and coupling is that the former can refer to policies and io fundamental party 
goals, whilst the latter is really only about policies.
Political linkage involves a number of distinct strategies according to the prevailing 
interpretation of political opportunities and contexts. Three types of linkage are 
examined in this thesis. Parties may pursue negative linkage on European 
integration: this involves complete opposition to European developments, indicating 
a preference for maximum sovereignty. Parties may alternatively practice strategic 
negative linkage, or qualified opposition, as a strategy to facilitiate bargaining over 
economic resources, side-payments, and also EC membership and representation. 
Parties may also use bargaining as part of their articulation of positive linkage, 
which views European developments as complementary to the pursuit of 
national/regional autonomy, and uses the European context to support it.
Linkage is not the only response to European integration by nationalist and 
regionalist parties. Two other behavioural responses are idenitifiable: the attempt to 
employ and benefit from the demonstration effect and the development of 
internationalisation strategies to externalise the autonomy issue.
67. Ibid., p.47.
68. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives And Public Policies, p. 181.
3 7
Introduction
The demonstration effect refers to the level of encouragement that regionalist parties 
receive from the success of other parties and movements within their political 
family.^9 Such success gives a psychological boost to parties internally, and enables 
them to make historicist appeals to their mass publics that the tide of history is 
turning in favour of decentralisation and small nations.
Contemporary European nationalism and regionalism has employed two appeals of 
this nature. Regionalists have made frequent reference to the decentralising trends of 
the contemporary phase of European integration, which is seen to give life to a 
Europe of the regions. The second appeal is related to the re-emergence of small and 
intermediate nations in Eastern Europe since 1989. The message is that small nations 
have broken free from Soviet domination, and small nations in the W est should 
follow their example. This ‘demonstration effect’ is really a demonstration of ‘the art 
of the possible’. This latter aspect has a lengthy pedigree amongst nationalists and 
regionalists, but has come into usage again since 1989.^^
Four waves of state formation can be identified since the nineteenth century: the 
emergence of Latin American states in that century, the post-1918 period in Europe 
and the post-1945 development of new states in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and 
Pacific,^^ and the re-emergence of independent nations in Europe since 1989. The 
three latter waves have been of some significance for nationalist and regionalist 
parties and movements.
The post-Versailles period of state formation offered considerable encouragement to 
national movements. Though the principle of self-determination was not adopted by 
the signatories to the Versailles settlement, national movements could claim that it 
had been adopted in reality through the creation of new states and the demise of the 
Habsburg Empire. A number of national movements attempted to attach their 
demands to the Versailles process, seeking to influence the peacemakers through 
exploiting Woodrow Wilson’s fourteenth point giving guarantees of international 
protection for minorities seeking self-determination. These national movements 
sought to deploy the ‘national principle’ and the right to self-determination in 
support of their arguments for autonomy.
69. Walker Conner, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?”, World Politics, Vol.24, 1972, 
pp.319-55.
70. See Gwynfor Evans, Fighting For Wales, p.212; and Gordon Wilson, “Address to SNP 
National Conference 1989”, The Scots Independent, November 1989, pp.5-6.
71. James Mayall, Nationalism And International Society, p.64.
72. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations And Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, p. 136.
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The Breton movement was one of those involved in taking its case to Versailles. A 
group of Breton notables presented a petition to the peace conference in 1919 
demanding linguistic and cultural rights for B ritta n y E lem e n ts  within the Flemish 
Movement also sought to play a role in the proceedings. The more extreme Activist 
tendency within the movement, comprised of those fundamentalists who had 
collaborated with the Germans during the occupation in W W l, had sent a telegram 
to Woodrow Wilson demanding self-government for Flanders.^"^
These efforts were not successful but illustrate the propensity of national movements 
to apply developments in international politics to their own contexts. From 1905 to 
1922 eleven new states were formed in Europe, with six created in 1918 alone, as a 
result of Versailles. Nine of these new states were established as a consequence of 
political secession.7^ The emergence of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Poland was not lost on nationalist and 
regionalist movements in Western Europe. Though there was an identification with 
these new states, and a degree of encouragement gained from their creation, the 
context which gave birth to them had a limited effect in Europe. The League of 
Nations Treaty on minorities only applied to Eastern Europe. Therefore the Western 
minorities could not use the League as an instrument to aid their linguistic and 
cultural autonomy.
The two subsequent waves of state formation in the third world and in contemporary 
Europe have also been important for nationalist and regionalist parties. The process 
of decolonisation gave nationalism and secession a new legitimacy in international 
affairs, it also reiterated the belief that alien rule was illegitimate.^^ It gave the 
principle of self-determination a new status through its inclusion in the charter of the 
United Nations, and was strengthened through General Assembly resolutions and 
the UN Convention of Civil and Political Rights in 1966.^^ Regionalists and 
nationalists have promoted the principle of self-determination and sought to give 
their political aims some legitimacy through employing this concept, and demanding 
its implementation in their own context.^^ Decolonisation also allowed nationalists
73. Meic Stephens, Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe, p.373. Scottish nationalists also 
called for Scottish representation at the Paris peace conference in 1919, see H. J. Hanham, Scottish 
Nationalism, pp.110-111.
74. "Flemish Committee Telegram To Wilson”, Theo Hermans (ed). The Flemish Movement: A 
Documentary History 1780-1990.
75. Mayall, Op. cit, p.28.
76. Walker Connor, “Ethnonationalism in the First World”, in Milton Esman (ed). Ethnic Conflict 
in the Western World, p.32.
77. Mayall, Op. cit., p.28.
78. For an example see Parti pour L’Organisation d’une Bretagne Libre, Pour Une Démocratie 
Bretonne, p. 12.
3 9
Introduction
and regionalists to identify a leftist aspect to nationalism and secession. This 
progressive element helped them to relegitimise nationalism and reclaim it from the 
experience of Europe since the 1920s. It also brought regionalists to develop leftist 
critiques of centre-periphery relations in their own states that focused upon claims of 
colonisation.^^ Decolonisation, and responses to it amongst regionalists, helped to 
generate a form of socialist-regionalism and led to the formation of a number of 
political parties and organisations such as the Union Démocratique Bretonne.
The internationalisation strategy involved efforts by regionalist parties to place their 
agendas for autonomy within the context of international developments and develop 
transnational linkages to articulate and publicise th is context. Such 
internationalisation involved the establishment of three transnational political 
organisations: the International Congress of European Nations and Regions, the 
Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations and the European Free Alliance which 
will be studied below. This co-operative strategy was accompanied by the efforts of 
individual parties and movement to raise their issue in international politics,^® which 
will also receive attention in this thesis.
5. Conclusion
Nationalist and regionalist parties are particularly suitable phenomena for a study of 
European integration. As constitutional parties, seeking to form or protect political 
communities and national identities and develop national/regional sovereignty, they 
share some of the same agenda as European integration. These overlapping aspects 
mean that Europe has a stronger impact on these parties than on others. Nationalism 
and regionalism are both partial and territorial, they do not share the univeralistic 
attributes of other political parties and ideologies. These territorial, particularistic and 
identitive aspects make their experience of European integration quite distinct as 
political objects and subjects and particularly susceptible to the neo-functionalist end- 
condition.
The cases in this thesis will be dealt with chronologically, in order to define the 
stimulus/response of each movement and party to successive waves of European 
integration in the 1920s, the 1940s, the formation of the ECSC and European
79. Robert Lafont, La Revolution Regionaliste ; Gwynfor Evans, A National Future For Wales.
80. Scottish Nationalists have occasionally taken their demands for self-determination to 
international organsiations, see “Scotland’s Claim of Right to the United Nations Organisation”, 
The Scots Independent, October 1947; “Declaration on Behalf of the People of Scotland”, Scottish 
National Party, 1970; John Law, “The Scotland UN Committee”, The Bulletin o f Scottish Politics, 
No.l, Autumn 1980, p.97.
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Community in the 1950s, and the development of the EC from then until the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. There will be an explanation of the political opportunity 
structure of each case, through individual and comparative consideration, to enable 
the identification of particular contextual factors. The similarities and differences of 
the cases will also be identified to draw firm conclusions about the behaviour of the 
nationalist and regionalist family of political parties towards European integration.
In examining these contexts and responses particular attention will be paid to the 
effect of Europe in shaping and changing the political goals of the parties under 
study. The effect of Europe, and the Europeanisation of party goals will receive 
attention, as will party efforts to exploit the opportunities provided by European 
integration and use it a an external support system for self-determination.
4 1
The SNP And Europe
The Scottish National Party And 
Europe: Independence Through 
Intergovemmentalism
“A Community of member states is a network of power and shifting power relations. The 
apparatus for making decisions reflects the power-structure nature of the Community.
Those outwith the power structure may lobby through setting up information offices, which 
help delegations make their point to tWs or that body within the Community. But by 
definition lobbyists can only cajole and plead, and without sanctions available are kept 
outside when the doors close and decisionmakers decide. When the real players gather round 
the top table of the Council of Ministers, it is only member states that count. They exercise
pOWCT.” ^
1.Introduction
The Scottish National Party (SNP) is a distinctive political case within the regionalist 
party family because it is a nationalist party seeking independence. It resides within 
the regionalist family because it is an example of autonomy parties commonly found 
in stateless nations in Europe. In contrast to continental parties, the SNP lacks a 
regionalist and federalist tradition. Rather the emphasis has been on home rule, 
independence or self-government. In the contemporary period independence has 
been the SNP’s fundamental goal, rather than intermediate solutions such as 
devolution.
The SNP’s nation-statism has been criticised by some authors as an example of 
Gaullism, favouring a Europe des patries, rather than a decentralised federation.^ 
Such criticisms do point to the particular European constitutional arrangement 
favoured by the SNP - intergovemmentalism or confederalism. These responses 
have appeared in the current debates on independence in Scotland, but will be 
examined over the longer term to determine their significance.
The SNP's contemporary response to European union has arisen at a difficult time 
for state-nationalists. Having come to terms with a European Community shaped on
1. Jim Sillars, Independence in Europe, p.7.
2. See Stephen Maxwell, “Scotland in a Wider Europe”, Radical Scotland, No.40, 
August/September 1989, p.25.
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an intergovernmental model, nationalists have found themselves faced with the 
development of a new European Community committed to deepening? and a level of 
régionalisation that has altered the existing intergovernmental position of the EC. 
This has led political opponents to assert that Scotland's constitutional future is 
regionalist rather than statist, as independence is obsolete. This view is 
opportunistic, using the changing balance of sovereignty and integration to allege the 
death of the nation-state. It has been used by opponents to discredit the SNP’s 
Independence in Europe programme, and Europeanise devolution to place it within 
the context of a Europe of the regions.  ^Thus, not only is Europe both a challenge 
and a political resource to the SNP, but something that can be used by its opponents 
to attack independence and promote competing constitutional options.
2. The Development Of The SNP
The SNP was formed through the merger of the Scottish Party and the National 
Party of Scotland (NPS) in 1934. Though the Scottish question had been salient 
since the formation of the cross-party Scottish Home Rule Association in 1886, it 
did not generate a separate political party until the formation of the NPS in 1928. 
There are a number of general accounts of the development of the party and the 
Scottish national movement, some of which will be referred to below. None 
has sought to explore the relationship between the national question and Europe in 
detail.^
The electoral progress of the SNP in Wesminster parliamentary elections is detailed 
below (table 2.1) and offers some picture of the party’s development. What is 
missing is the party’s performance in by-elections, where the SNP has been 
successful in raising its profile and electing members. This was evident in the 
growing electoral support for the SNP in the 1930s and early 1940s, as the party 
forced electoral contests in Scotland when the major parties had agreed not to contest 
vacant seats as part of the national coalition. This brought the party’s first electoral 
success in a by-election in 1945, which was followed by those at Hamilton in 1967, 
and Govan in 1973 and 1988.
3. Helen Wallace, Widening and Deepening: The New European Agenda,
4. For an example see David Martin, “The Democratic Deficit”, in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed), A 
Claim o f Right For Scotland ; and for consideration of this position see Peter Lynch, “European 
Integration and Regional Autonomy”, Political Studies Association, Leicester University, 1993.
5. The exceptions are; Brent Steel, The Ethnonational Threat To Supranational Integration: Impact 
on British Attitudes To European Integration unpublished PhD dissertation, Washington State 
University, 1984; Macartney, “Independence in Europe”, in Parry and Brown (eds), Scottish 
Government Yearbook ; Mitchell, “The Implications of European Integration for Scottish 
Nationalism”, conference p ^ r ,  European Consortium for Political Research, Bochum, 1990.
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Though the SNP has failed to make any great advance in terms of seats since 1974, 
its vote has risen from its lowpoint in 1983 to achieve the same level in 1992 as it 
attained in the first general election in 1974. In that period the economic factor of 
North Sea oil was an important ingredient in mobilising support for the SNP, along 
with general public concern at the need for more attention to be paid to Scottish 
issues. We can consider oil as the first great political resource for the SNP, which 
markedly altered the party’s political opportunity structure. This study will explore 
whether the European Community has played a similar role for the SNP in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
Table 2.1 Electoral Support for the SNP 1929-92
Election % Votes Support Seats
1929 0.1 *3313 0
1931 1.0 20954 0
1935 1.1 25642 0
1945 1.2 30595 0
1950 0.4 9708 0
1951 0.3 7299 0
1955 0.5 12112 0
1959 0.8 21738 0
1964 2.4 64441 0
1966 5.0 128474 0
1970 11.4 306802 1
1974 (Feb) 21.9 633130 7
1974 (Oct) 30.4 839608 11
1979 17.3 504180 2
1983 11.8 331975 2
1987 14.0 416873 3
1992 21.5 629034 3
*Two candidates standing on behalf of the National Party of Scotland.
Sources: F.W.S. Craig: British Parliamentary Election Results 1918-1949, (London: 
MacMillan, 1977); James Kellas: The Scottish Political System, ((Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984); Richard Rose and Ian McAlllister: United Kingdom Facts, (London: 
MacMillan, 1982).
44
The SNP And Europe 
3>The SNP And Europe To 1957
The European question had little early impact upon Scottish nationalism. Even when 
there was consideration of the issue, such as in 1930, the focus was minimal. 
Discussion of Europe and federalism in the nationalist press occasionally 
appeared, but they were seldom connected. Self-government in Scotland was 
initially considered in the context of the British Empire, through the pursuit of 
dominion status. As early as 1926 though, nationalists had taken some notice of the 
notion of world federation.^
Discussion of such maximal commitments was limited and inconclusive. 
Nationalists were more involved with examining the domestic consequences of 
constitutional arrangements than exploring their international contexts. When 
federalism was discussed, for example, it was in reference to its suitability in settling 
the issue of Scottish autonomy within the UK rather than Europe.^ Though it 
occasionally manifested an extra-European dimension that examined the merits of 
global rather than European federalism, the linkage between sovereignty, home rule 
and European union was mostly ignored. Where linkage was made, it was made in a 
restrictive and somewhat dismissive fashion. The Briand plan for a federal Europe in 
1930,* was only discussed because Scotland was excluded from participation 
because of the absence of self-government.^ The substance of the Briand proposal 
was neglected, despite its implications for national sovereignty and the operation of 
the League of Nations
The national movement was divided into four main strands of opinion in the 
1 9 3 0 s . T w o  different groups supported devolution: one sought a piecemeal 
approach to home rule with the gradual growth of autonomy, whilst another 
favoured a federal solution for Scotland within the UK. Against these autonomists 
stood two groups of secessionists: those favouring complete independence and those 
proposing dominion-status within the British Empire.
Inattentiveness to European union should not be taken as an indication of an 
isolationist tendency within the national movement. After its formation in 1934 the 
SNP was outward-looking: it participated in a conference in Brittany, organised
6. The Scots Independent, December 1926, p. 5.
7. The Scots Independent, November 1928, p.3.
8. For details see Vaughan, Post-War Integration in Europe, p .ll,
9.The Scots Independent, November 1930, p.l.
10. Webb, The Growth o f Nationalism in Scotland, p.49.
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delegations to Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic and the Isle of Man, and 
developed links with Plaid Cymru. The goals of the new party also displayed a firm 
tendency to international participation rather than isolationism. Like its predecessor 
the NPS, the SNP proposed Scottish membership of the League of Nations, with a 
Scottish parliament seen as the form that would facilitate “the Scottish people taking 
their natural place amongst the nations of Europe in the van of progress and 
peace’'.
The SNP did discuss Europe and federalism in a marginal way in these years. One 
nationalist declared in 1939 that “far from being a parochial issue, 
home rule for Scotland is indissolubly bound up with the larger question of 
European Federalism (the only possible solution to Europe’s problems).” i^ The 
nationalist press also explored the issue of federal union and the creation of a North 
Atlantic union of democratic states, i^ This suggestion was given a very cautious 
appraisal, with one nationalist remarking that “as nationalists we cannot avoid the 
conclusion that Federal Union might in the long run spell death to the 
federated national units.” Federalism was seen to mean integration. Nationalists 
were more concerned with the attitudes of federalists to home rule for Scotland than 
federalism itself. The SNP avoided links with organisations like Federal Union 
during the second World War,^^ and the European and federal questions continued 
to receive little attention.
The SNP took little account of supranationalism in the 1930s, preferring the loose 
intergovemmentalism of the League of Nations. The absence of any coherent policy 
on Europe was not remedied until the 1940s. The key feature of SNP policy in the 
international arena in this period was pragmatism. The party put forward cautious 
proposals for self-government, which would have had minimal international impact. 
Self-government involved some retention of the UK framework, through Anglo- 
Scottish intergovernmental co-operation, and the development of joint councils on 
defence, foreign affairs and economic policy. These proposals would have created 
a limited nation-state, with a minimal role in international affairs.
11. The Scots Independent, October 1935, p.l.
12. The Scots Independent, October 1939, p.3.
13. See Streit, Union Now: A Proposal For A Federal Union O f The Democracies o f The North 
Atlantic.
14. John MacDonald, The Scots Independent, December 1939, p.4.
15. For an account of this organisation see Lipgens, A History o f European Integration: Volume 1, 
1945-47.
16. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p.200.
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SNP Support for European Union
The adoption of a clearer position on European union coincided with the election of 
Douglas Young as the SNP’s leader in 1942. Young had earlier advocated 
federalism as a constitutional mechanism to aid the decolonisation process in the 
Empire, and reduce international conflict in E u r o p e . N o w  the issue was re­
examined with an emphasis on autonomy within a European context. The 
development of a position on European union was facilitated by the SNP’s 
acceptance of the necessity of limits on national sovereignty.^^ In accepting 
constraints on the nation-state in international affairs the party also made a 
commitment to develop co-operation with other European n a t i o n s . Y o u n g ’s 
influence led the SNP National Council in 1943 to move from vague support for co­
operation, to a commitment that Scotland would participate in the establishment of 
European and international organisations.^®
In 1948 the SNP adopted a position on Europe broadly similar to their 
current Independence in Europe programme. Though Young was involved in 
promoting the European idea and the new p o l i c y , h e  was on the threshold of 
leaving the SNP. However, the European issue did not fade away with Young’s 
departure. It was given a more profound and political meaning by the then SNP 
leader Dr Robert McIntyre.
For a short time in 1945 McIntyre was the SNP's first MP. His impact on the SNP 
during the 1940s and 1950s was considerable. It was McIntyre who picked up the 
European issue and developed the explicit linkage between self-government and 
European union. He was aware that any Scottish role in Europe and European 
development was contingent, pointing out that
“if the Scottish people wish to play a part in the preservation of 
freedom and in the new European Federation they have to regain 
control of their own affairs” .^^
17. The Scots Independent, January 1940, p.4.
18. The Scots Independent, May 1941, p .ll.
19. The Scots Independent, July 1943, p.4.
20. Minutes of SNP National Council, 1943: National Library of Scotland, Acc 
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21. Douglas Young, ‘The International Importance of Scottish Nationalism”, The Scots Secretariat, 
Glasgow, 1948.
22. The Scots Independent, April 1948, p.2.
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The SNP developed this linkage through their conference policy in 1948:
“the SNP welcomes steps towards the Federation of Europe but 
emphatically declares that the only just basis for such a federation is 
the equal co-operation of self-governing democratic countries. 
Domination such as that exercised by the British government over 
Scotland can have no place in a free Europe. Scotland is entitled to 
direct representation in any European Federation which may consider 
matters of customs, trade and miütary co-operation”.23
The SNP and the International Congress
The new opening to Europe in 1948 was exemplified by the party’s attempts at 
participation in the Congress of Europe at the Hague.^"^ This meeting had been 
convened by the United Europe Movement in order to discuss the prospects for 
European union. The SNP did not participate at the Hague, but did succeed in 
getting involved in the Congress of European Federalists in Paris in April 1949. 
McIntyre represented the party at this congress. This organisation, which grew into 
the International Congress of European Communities and Regions, was comprised 
of political organisations from different nations and regions in Europe, with rather 
different political aspirations for their regions.^^ Both the SNP and Plaid Cymru 
made it clear to the Congress that they represented ‘nations’ not ‘regions’ or 
provinces, and sought national self-government.
This initial encounter with European regionalism was not particularly fruitful, but 
was a harbinger of the future. The sole outcome of the Congress for the SNP - 
beyond the learning process involved - was that the Congress sent a declaration to 
the council of the United Europe Movement in support of regional and community 
representation in a federal Europe.^^ This was insufficient for the SNP, but did 
mean that the Congress took some political action.
Later in 1949 the SNP became involved in the International Congress of European 
Communities and Regions.^^ The SNP took some interest in this organisation, with 
McIntyre addressing its Federal Council in 1950.^8 The party’s involvement 
dropped away in the early 1950s, however, as it failed to develop beyond a
23. Minutes of the National Conference of the Scottish National Party, 1948: National Library of 
Scotland Acc 6419, box 45.
24. The Scots Independent, July 1948, p.2.
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discussion forum. The SNP’s departure led the Congress to seek alternative 
representatives from Scotland, with the home rule group, the Scottish Covenant 
Association, invited to attend the Liege Congress in 1953,^^ and the eccentric fringe 
movement, the Patriots Association, attending the Munster Congress in 1954.^®
Representative Linkage
This period of participation in the European debate led the SNP to develop one of its 
enduring them es, that of representation/non-representation in European 
institutions. This theme has been frequently deployed in the contexts of negative 
linkage and positive linkage. Its durability was a consequence of its flexibility. It 
could be used as an argument for or against European union and co-operation, and 
also involved an element of bargaining. The SNP used the representational theme in 
relation to the Schuman Declaration and the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), demanding Scottish representation in the new 
institutions.^ 1 The Schuman plan also afforded another opportunity to the SNP, 
beyond positive linkage: the chance to attack the UK political system for its 
isolationism in Europe. The attitudes of the UK parties to the ECSC allowed the 
SNP to cast itself as i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t . ^ ^  The SNP blamed the UK government for the 
collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954, because of the isolationist 
tendency of the UK state and parties.^^
In presenting the case for Scottish membership of European organisations, the SNP 
sought to reconcile sovereignty and integration. The party tried to deal with this 
problem by pointing to the different position of Scotland in the UK and in Europe. 
In order to deflect any criticism of the apparent paradox of secession from Britain 
but integration into Europe the SNP sought to differentiate between the two cases:
“the objection will, of course, be raised that all this only means 
exchanging one controlling authority for that of a whole set of
nations (this) presents a situation very much different from that
of subjection to a single and much greater nation with interests of its 
own to consider”.^^
29. The fourth Congress of European Regions and Nations was held from the 10th to 13th 
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30. The Scots Independent, 12th June 1954.
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32. The Scots Independent, July 1950, pp. 1-3.
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This argument was forgotten in the 1960s and 1970s as Scotland remained frozen 
out of European participation, and the greater political opportunities of opposing 
Europe became apparent to the SNP. This strategic switch, which took a more 
absolutist view of national sovereignty, conflicted with the earlier flexibility of the 
party on sovereignty and the efficacy of international and European co-operation. 
Now Brussels became the same as London, characterised by centralism and 
tendencies towards economic and military policies above aU else.
4. SNP Attitudes To Europe Since 1957
SNP Opposition to the EC
The SNP’s policy change on Europe may have been inevitable for two reasons: first, 
because of its preference for independence rather than regional autonomy, and 
second, because of political developments in Britain and the EC. At the time of the 
creation of the European Community in 1957 the constitutional position of 
Scotland was static, despite altered external circumstances. The new European 
context that followed the Treaty of Rome left SNP aspirations for participation in 
limbo. Scotland was not represented in any European institutions, and also remained 
outside the EC.
Scotland was still affected by the EC’s evolution and policies and the reality of initial 
non-membership of the EC had significant effects on SNP attitudes and responses. 
These effects were most evident as the UK government sought to negotiate entry to 
the EC in the 1960s and 1970s. Entry from the outside, through the UK, 
exacerbated the situation for the nationalists. In this process the SNP saw Scotland 
as doubly disadvantaged: excluded from the bargaining and negotiating process on 
entry to the EC, and from independent participation when membership was 
achieved. This post-1957 context alienated the nationalists. If the UK had joined the 
EC in 1957 then this response may have developed in a rather different way.^5 As it 
was the SNP was subject to a very British context and reaction.
35, It is difficult to postdict SNP behaviour if the UK had joined the EC in 1957. Would it have led 
to an independence in Europe approach or to a platform of dual secessicm from the UK and the EC? 
Given the hostility that was to develop to the EC the latter may have been adopted, but the 
pragmatism of the SNP and its desire for international co-operation may have made it untenable. 
Dual secession was too inflexible though the party would not necessarily have dealt with it in an 
unequivocal way,
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The response in the 1960s was markedly different from the positive linkage of the 
1940s to 1950s.^^ Generally the SNP called for Scotland and the UK to stay out of 
the EC, but for Scottish representation if membership was achieved. The party had 
recognised the need to alter its pre-1957 policy at the time of the EC’s formation, 
and began to consider the development of new EC institutions. In doing this the 
party identified the EC as a security community with the potential to develop as a 
political federation,^^ that reduced democratic participation.^^
This view brought a more cautious approach to the EC, in contrast to earlier 
enthusiasm for European union."^® The party was particularly concerned to protect 
Scottish economic interests in the context of UK negotiations in the EC, and called 
for the establishment of a Scottish Council to handle the Scottish aspects of EC 
negotiations."^^ This caution was a staging post towards the SNP’s policy reversal 
on Europe: it brought the SNP to oppose membership of the EC 
in 1962,"^2 and call for a referendum on Scottish and UK e n t r y .
Turning against the EC appeared to indicate a hardening of attitudes towards 
sovereignty in contrast to previous flexibility. However, the party leader, Arthur 
Donaldson, held the view that ‘com plete’ independence was a non-viable 
proposition: the SNP only sought “equal indepedendence” with other states, 
accepting limitations on sovereignty to enable international co-operation. The SNP 
therefore sought to maintain a window of opportunity for European union."^
Though sovereignty remained an elastic concept within the party, it was moving 
towards a more fundamental position of opposition to the EC. Such opposition was 
clothed in Scottish arguments and circumstances. The party sought to lobby the UK 
government, the European Court of Justice, and the President of the European 
Commission, to draw their attention to Scotland's right to be involved in 
negotiations. The SNP argued that the Treaty of Union of 1707 was affected by the 
removal of sovereignty from the UK to the European Parliament - a development 
which was not foreseen and provided for in the Treaty - and that the Act of Union
36. The changing attitudes of the SNP were similar to Plaid Cymru, see chapter 3.
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would make accession illegal without consent from a Scottish parliament. The new 
Scottish Parliament would then seek a seat on the European Council and full 
representation within European institutions.^^
The Government replied to this position by arguing that the Treaty of Union had 
given sovereignty to the British parliament, and therefore a rightful role in 
negotiating with the European Community. In responding to the nationalists the 
Government sought to minimise the impact of the EC. It was described as a purely 
economic organisation in which UK involvement would be limited to the economic 
sphere."^^ The party regarded this reply as vague, shortsighted and somewhat 
provocative. There was no indication of any Scottish role in negotiations, which was 
no surprise, but the SNP was critical of the government's narrow economic view of 
the EC which disregarded the propensity of other member states to see it as a 
political community."^^
From then on the SNP's new opposition to European union was based upon two 
objections. First, the Common Market was seen to cause economic problems for 
Scotland. Second, attaining self-government for Scotland in advance of UK 
accession to the EC was seen as an imperative."^^ Independence, then Europe, was 
the preference. Though it tried to use the European issue to distinguish between the 
UK parties and itself, the SNP did not make great use of the theme in the 1960s. 
Europe was absent from publicity and policy documents. Though undergoing a 
period of vigorous policy development at the time, the SNP did not mention the EC 
or the Common Market in its 1966 policy manifesto “SNP and You”, even though it 
had a section dealing with international affairs.^^
Towards Membership o f the Community
The prospect of UK accession to the EC in the late 1960s gave the issue saliency in 
Scotland. As the UK government became involved in discussions on membership, 
the SNP became more attentive. The road to accession brought the nationalists to 
reinforce their opposition to the Community. The party conference in 1971 followed 
the Heath-Pompidou summit in Paris that gave clearance to UK membership. In
45. Scottish National Party press statement, November 1961: National Library of Scotland, ibid.
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response the SNP conference strongly supported a motion that advanced a two­
pronged strategy for dealing with Europe. The party committed itself to campaigning 
against accession, through lobbying the EC and Commonwealth governments; 
publicising the merits of a wider free-trade grouping than that provided by the EC; 
and working with other organisations that opposed EC membership.^® The second 
response was based on the expectation that UK membership was inevitable as the 
House of Commons would support ratification. In the event of ratification the SNP 
committed itself to campaigning for Scottish representation; defending Scottish 
interests in the EC; and assisting those political forces seeking a confederal EC;^^ all 
on the proviso that Scotland would be free to leave the EC after independence.
There was ambiguity here. In the first place the SNP opposed EC membership, in 
the second it campaigned for Scottish representation in the EC. If representation was 
guaranteed there was a hint that opposition would disappear. This bargaining 
strategy developed despite hardline opponents who saw the EC as a “bureaucratic 
and undemocratic structure” with economic policies that would be “a serious threat 
to employment in Scotland”.^^
The party strongly supported the leadership’s position of opposition, though there 
were efforts by pro-Europeans to commit the SNP to Independence in Europe.^^ 
Attitudes on European strategy had hardened and became apparent in statements 
made by the party leadership. The party leader, Billy Wolfe, regarded the EC as 
“based on centralist control”, and led strong opposition to membership.^^ Wolfe was 
involved in three separate SNP delegations to the EC in 1970, 1972 and 1974, to 
stress to the Commission that an independent Scotland would not be held to 
agreements negotiated by the UK. Such visits only confirmed SNP opposition. 
Wolfe described the EC as a “bureaucracy even more remote and less sympathetic 
than Whitehall” a direct reversal of the arguments for European union advanced 
by the SNP in the 1950s. However, the party President, Robert McIntyre, sought to 
turn opposition in a more fruitful direction in this period by calling for a referendum 
on EC membership in Scotland.^^
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It might appear that the SNP’s oppositional strategy to the European Community 
was well established in 1971, with the party secure in this belief that its position was 
an accurate reflection of public attitudes to the EC.^^ This was not the case however. 
The party conference in 1972 saw renewed efforts by pro-Europeans to alter strategy 
on the EC if accession was achieved. A resolution committing the SNP to campaign 
for Independence in Europe was included on the conference agenda but not debated 
because of lack of time.^* This resolution was one sign of the emerging 
Independence in Europe option in the 1970s, although it would probably have been 
defeated.
To address the economic and political disadvantages of non-membership of the EC 
the SNP outlined two alternatives for international trade and co-operation. The party 
advanced the idea of a loose grouping to promote a common foreign and defence 
policy amongst the seventeen members of the Council of Europe,^^ and a free trade 
organisation based around the members of the OECD.^® Both were presented as 
alternatives to EC membership, though with the proviso of support for a confederal 
EC and independent Scottish membership.
The SNP conference in 1973 sought to develop McIntyre’s earlier suggestion with a 
proposal that Scotland would have the right to hold a referendum on membership, 
post-independence. The original anti-EC edge to this proposal was diluted through 
an amendment that any future Scottish government would implement any popular 
decision on membership after the renegotiation of entry terms.^^ This amended the 
oppositional position that sought withdrawal on more unequivocal terms and 
recognised that UK accession was already negotiated and only required the official 
signing ceremony to become effective.
The 1975 Referendum on the European Community
Accession to the EC was realised in 1973, though both main parties were divided 
over the diminution of parliamentary sovereignty. The Heath Government had 
successfully dealt with accession, but the Labour administration from 1974 was not 
so fortunate. Some Labour members were squarely opposed to the EC, taking an
57. The Scots Independent, June 1971, p.l.
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absolutist view of parliamentary sovereignty, whilst others were more concerned 
with the accession agreement negotiated by the Conservatives.
Labour had been divided on the European Communities Act in 1972, and its annual 
conference had proposed a renegotiation of the terms of entry to the EC, with a 
public say on the outcome of renegotiations through a general election or 
consultative r e f e r e n d u m . ^ ^  Labour retained this commitment at the conclusion of 
renegotiations in March 1975, though it led to a divided party during the referendum 
campaign.
The division within the Labour and Conservative parties on Europe provided a new 
opportunity for the SNP. Though the position adopted by the SNP was rather 
ambiguous, its message was clearer and more instrumental than those of the main 
parties. The nationalists had never considered the issue of Europe as an issue in 
itself, but had traditionally linked it to autonomy. The referendum of 1975 
provided a key opportunity for such linkage. One of the SNP’s senior officials 
remarked that Scottish sovereignty was the main issue in the referendum, as voters 
would have to decide whether Scotland would remain an unrepresented province 
within the EC or reach out for sovereign s t a t u s . T h e  referendum did not provide 
for any such thing in legislative or electoral terms but the political potential of 
separate results in Scotland and the rest of the UK was clear. One Scottish 
newspaper commented that
“to discard the separate view of Scotland would add fuel to 
nationalist fires, and the argument that Scotland’s interests are not 
represented at Westminster would gain considerable credibility”.^
The Labour Government was aware of the political linkage employed by the 
nationalists and took measures to undermine it. Labour’s strategy of delinkage was 
evident in the White Paper on the referendum. The contents of the White Paper 
began to leak out from January 1975, based upon rumours that the EC issue was to 
be subject to a national count rather than to regional or constituency counting 
arrangements. As the Euro-referendum was the first national referendum in the UK, 
no precedents existed for its administration, leading the cabinet to discuss the issue 
at length.^5
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The delinkage strategy of the government revolved around the proposal for a 
national count, which would prevent separate counts for Scotland and Wales.^*^ 
Central counting and a single UK declaration would have undermined the SNP’s 
efforts at linkage through merging the Scottish result in the UK vote. Labour’s 
general secretary, Ron Hayward, had briefed the party’s National Executive 
Committee to oppose regional and constituency counting arrangements on the 
explicit understanding that such provisions would only help the nationalists.^^
As its strategy relied upon a separate Scottish vote in the referendum, the SNP 
discussed holding a parallel referendum to allow the calculation of a Scottish total. 
However the cost and complexity of this proposal brought the party to settle 
on local ballots and opinion surveys to measure the Scottish vote.^^ Also, in spite of 
opposition to the national count, the SNP supported the Government at the first 
reading of the Referendum Bill in March, even though Labour had explicitly pointed 
out that the counting arrangements were intended to prevent the referendum from 
being used as a device by those who wished to divide the nation.^^ Supporting the 
Bill may have appeared a tactical error. However, the SNP’s linkage relied upon the 
referendum actually taking place. The party could also justify its support as it had 
policy that proposed the use of referenda on the European question, and expected 
that the arrangements for national count would be dropped because of administrative 
complexity and political pressure. The party intended to pursue this latter course 
during future debates on the Bill. In time, such efforts became unnecessary, as the 
cabinet allowed a free vote in the Commons on the counting arrangements which 
rejected the national count in favour of a decentralised solution.
The SNP sought to shape a particular appeal around the European question. It tried 
to project itself as an international party, to counter charges of isolationism stemming 
from its opposition to EC membership. The party published the policy document 
“Scotland International”, and announced a series of discussions with OPEC and the 
United Nations.'^® One of the party’s MPs, Douglas Henderson, stated that there 
was a need to examine Scotland’s European alternatives and look beyond Europe to 
find a role in international affairs. Instead of being forced into the “EEC straitjacket”.
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there was a desire to use the referendum as a means for Scotland to choose a role in 
world affairs.^^
The SNP National Assembly in January 1975 unanimously agreed to support a ‘No’ 
vote in the referendum. This position may have seemed clear, but it masked internal 
disagreement. Dissent was successfully managed however, with those nationalists 
who favoured separate Scottish membership of the EC agreeing to abide by the 
party’s policy and maintain a diplomatic silence during the referendum.^^ One 
newspaper editorial remarked that for the SNP, “No means maybe”, and pointed to 
tactical reasons for the SNP’s stance over Europe: that it would make the SNP the 
only united political group in the referendum and leave it in a strong position to 
benefit from the outcome.
The fragmentation of the Labour Party over Europe was part of the reason for the 
SN P’s position. The referendum campaign brought a very mixed 
response from Labour. The Secretary of State for Scotland, Willie Ross, spoke 
against the EC, as did the devolution Minister, Harry Ewing, who expressed the 
view that continued EC membership would derail the prospects for strong economic 
powers being effectively devolved to a Scottish A s s e m b l y . L a b o u r ’s pro- 
Europeans responded by publicising the benefits of EC membership and attempting 
to delink the EC and devolution questions, stressing that the referendum was about 
Europe not the constitutional question.^^
The SNP made httle of the devolution issue during the referendum. It did attempt to 
use some of the government’s own programme for Scotland in the campaign. The 
proposal to create the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), to aid economic 
development, can be seen as one of the economic, output-oriented responses to 
nationalism.^^ The SNP pointed out that the powers of the new agency conflicted 
with the competition arrangements in the Treaty of Rome, and made the 
governm ent’s proposals for Scotland incom patible with aspects of EC 
membership.^^
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Another main economic theme during the campaign was the situation of the Scottish 
fishing industry, through dissatisfaction with the government’s renegotiations with 
the EC. The fishermen had hoped that the government would have renegotiated the 
Common Fisheries Policy but the failure to gain more concessions allowed the SNP 
to attack the EC and the Labour government for neglecting Scottish interests: both 
were a consequence of the lack of Scottish representation.
The main theme, and slogan, adopted by the SNP in the campaign was “No voice, 
no entry”. Though it was ambiguous, it was indicative of a more flexible attitude to 
the EC than might have been expected given the official opposition of the party. That 
such flexibility was possible at the height of the referendum is notable. Behind it lay 
some expectation that the nationalists would succeed in their efforts to drive a wedge 
between the Scottish and UK electorates, and emerge on the winning side in the 
referendum. This expectation was not unrealistic, as opinion polls showed strong 
reservations about the EC.”^^
The European question cut across the main cleavages of fundamentalists and 
gradualists inside the SNP,*^  ^so that hardline independence activists linked up with 
devolutionists to oppose the EC: one through a maximalist view of sovereignty, and 
the other because of concern with the centralised and bureaucratic nature of the 
Community. Meanwhile other activists, from both sides of the cleavage, supported 
European membership as an aid to independence and a challenge to Westminster, 
which would pressure any future Scottish Assembly to become involved in 
European and international issues. The cleavage on the EC was most evident within 
the SNP leadership, with a Scottish-based National Executive who were anti-EC, 
and a parliamentary group in W estm inster who were sympathetic to the 
Community.^®
Though the SNP claimed it was fully united behind the ‘No’ campaign on Europe, 
the evidence did not bear that out. Large conference and National Council votes 
supporting withdrawal from the EC - which occured just three days before the 
referendum itself - could not mask the different voices of the SNP on Europe, which 
generated ambiguity: it was partly natural because of divisions within the party, but 
also intended to keep the door open to independent membership. The SNP’s plural 
attitudes towards the EC are illustrated by different statements and interpretations
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made by its leading lights during the campaign. The SNP’s finance spokesman, 
Douglas Crawford MP, remarked that
“we in the SNP are looking beyond the referendum. While we are 
against EEC membership without a sovereign Scottish voice in 
Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg, it is still important for us to 
look beyond June 5 and lay contingency plans”.*^
Another MP, Iain McCormick, deepened the ambiguity by stating that he opposed 
EC membership in the referendum but
“if this vote should go ‘Yes’ I would regard it as my duty to get 
Scotland independent membership of the C o m m u n i t y ” .^ ^
SNP fundamentalists were unhappy with such statements, and preferred an 
unequivocal position. The SNP parliamentary leader, Donald Stewart, rejected these 
ambiguous messages and expressed complete opposition to the Community. Stewart 
was critical of those within the SNP who were compromising the party on the EC 
question: “why should the position of nationalists be other than an uncomplicated 
‘N o’ ?”, he asked, complaining of the “ambiguities and confusions” employed by 
some party representatives. For Stewart complete opposition to Europe was 
justifiable because the EC
“represents everything that our party has fought against: 
centralisation, undemocratic procedures, power politics, and a fetish 
for abolishing cultural differences”.*^
The problems of dealing with the EC issue unambiguously was illustrated 
immediately by newspaper coverage of the SNP position. Whilst Stewart’s hardline 
position was reported on one page, another contained an appeal from the SNP MP, 
George Reid: it called for a tactical ‘No’ vote, with Scotland deciding upon EC or 
EFT A membership after independence. Opposition in the referendum was identified 
as “a solid gesture of dissent that can be used as a tangible bargaining counter once 
the referendum is over; as direct evidence that Scotland must decide her own links 
with the EEC”.*  ^Other SNP MPs pointed to the strong bargaining position that the 
referendum result would provide, leaving Scotland free to decide upon European 
links afresh.*^
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The dual approach to Europe was not necessarily a weakness for the SNP, as long 
as it avoided serious internal divisions. Externally, it enabled the party to appeal to 
different strands of popular opinion, without prejudicing future policy on the EC: 
hardliners could attract support from anti-EC currents in the Labour electorate, while 
pro-Europeans adopted an instrumental approach consistent with attracting those 
whose attitudes on Europe were more equivocal. The fact that other parties were 
publicly divided on the EC made it easy for the SNP to conceal these different 
opinions, as it only campaigned on one side in the referendum.
Though Scottish public opinion converged with the SNP position in early 1975, this 
position was gradually reversed. Support for continued membership of the EC 
increased from 29% in February to 45% in June, while opposition declined from 
45% to 32%.*^ The slide in support for the ‘No’ campaign continued until polling 
day, though a Scottish dimension to the issue did emerge. One poll found 64% 
support for Scottish representation in the EC.^^ This development raised a number 
of questions about SNP strategy. Should it not have pursued positive linkage 
through the independence in Europe option, rather than negative linkage and 
strategic negative linkagel The idea of using positive linkage as a mechanism to 
drive a cleavage between the Scottish and UK electorate was not realistic in the 1975 
referendum, as it was assumed that the UK would vote in favour of continued 
membership. However, membership itself may have been a secondary issue, with 
the SNP primarily concerned with using the referendum to detach support from 
Labour.
Some observers argued that the SNP had more to gain from positive linkage as the 
EC did not challenge national sovereignty, but allowed opt-outs and derogations on 
specific policies.^^ This type of argument was influential in the party’s pohcy change 
in the 1980s, but was not so helpful in the 1970s: the position was not purely related 
to national sovereignty but to the prevailing interpretation of the political opportunity 
structure. The political benefits of supporting continued membership were obscure. 
The Scottish and UK votes might have been the same - so no nationalist cleavage 
would have been visible - and the party would not necessarily have picked up 
electoral support for its stance. Either way, in support or opposition, the benefits 
and importance of the referendum for the party may have been overestimated. The 
SNP succeeded in getting its message on Europe to the voters, but it didn’t mean
86. The Glasgow Herald, 2nd June 1975, p. 13.
87. The Scotsman, 31st May 1975, p.l.
88. J. D. Vassie, The Scotsman, 22nd May 1975, p.lO.
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increased support for the party. Opinion surveys indicated that the EC was relatively 
unimportant for SNP supporters in contrast to devolution and oil, despite intense 
campaigning on the BC.*^
The economic scenario of Scotland outside the EC but England inside also caused 
problems for the SNP. Integration between the two economies was not seen to 
facilitate short-term seccession, according to the SNP’s Douglas Crawford.^® 
Integration with England was one problem, integration into the international 
economy was another. The Scottish Economic Research Council’s analyses in 1974 
had demonstrated a strong degree of economic interdependence. It was calculated 
that 25% of Scottish exports went to EC countries, compared to 11% to the BETA 
group, 18% to North America, 16% to the rest of the UK and 30% to the rest of the 
world.^i Had the SNP pursued an unambiguous policy of opposition and dual 
secession then such EC export dependency would have undermined the party.
The referendum produced a ‘Yes’ vote of 58.4% in Scotland. Though this figure 
was 10.2% less than in England, the nationalists had failed to reverse the southern 
result. None of the Scottish regions voted against continued membership. The SNP 
was obviously dissappointed with the result. It responded to the referendum by 
repeating its earlier call for Scottish representation in EC institutions and for the 
Labour Government to alter its devolution proposals to give a Scottish Assembly 
some representation in the EC. Negative linkage was reoriented as the party re­
issued its ambiguous and positive appeal, accepting the referendum result and using 
it as a means to argue for a Scottish voice.
The Post-Referendum Changes
Home rule and the referendum result brought a new political development in Scottish 
politics. The Scottish Labour Party (SLP) was formed in late 1975 by two Labour 
MPs who favoured maximum devolution. The EC referendum in June 1975 gave 
encouragement to the v e n t u r e . ^ ^  One of the party’s leaders, Jim Sillars, had 
previously made political linkage between devolution and the European 
Community,^ 3 and the unequivocal nature of the referendum led him to re-evaluate
89. Miller, The End of British Politics: Scottish and English Political Behaviour in the 1970s, 
p.125.
90. The Scotsman, 29th May 1975, p.l.
91. The Scotsman, 22nd May 1975, p. 10.
92. See The Scotsman, 4th June 1975, p.l3; 7th June 1975, p.l; and 10th June 1975, p.l. On the 
last occasion Sillars held a press conference hinting at the formation of
the Scottish Labour Party and promoting the concept of Independence in Europe.
93. Jim Sillars MP, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard 1216,4th February 1975.
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independence. The SLP was established to combine the traditions of socialism and 
nationalism, and increasingly stressed the European theme. The party’s initial aims 
were
“to secure the establishment of a powerful Scottish parliament to 
work in full democratic partnership with the rest of the UK and 
represent Scotland in the institutions of the EEC”.^^
Though form ed to pursue maximum devolution, the SLP 
progressed towards Independence in Europe. In debates on the Scotland and Wales 
Bill in 1976, Sillars made frequent reference to the efficacy of independence within 
the EC. He commented that “within the EEC the concept of separation is not a valid 
one” and that “independence outside the EEC is entirely different in quality from 
independence inside”.^  ^By 1977, the SLP had gravitated towards independence and 
emphasised the need for autonomy for Scotland in Europe.^^ Yet the party failed to 
develop to offer a challenge to the SNP or Labour. Its demise after the 1979 general 
election led its members to return to the Labour Party, though some prominent 
members joined the SNP. Sillars joined the SNP in 1981, and promoted the 
Independence in Europe option from the mid-1980s.
It was not just the referendum that prompted SNP revisionism on the EC. The 
advent of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) was also influential. The 
party had already been drawn into a degree of Europeanisation through having a seat 
in the nominated EP. This brought the party’s European spokesperson in the House 
of Commons, Winnie Ewing, to represent the party in Strasbourg. Though the 
European portfolio was initially rather unattractive, participation in the Strasbourg 
assembly provided useful opportunities to present Scotland’s case.
Direct elections brought one particular problem for the SNP: should the party contest 
the elections when still officially opposed to the EC? In the circumstances, 
participation in the nominated assembly had undermined the argument for non­
participation, despite fears that the elections were a step towards the creation of a 
centralised political community. The party’s electoralism also meant that every 
electoral opportunity was welcome.
94. Drucker, Breakaway: The Scottish Labour Party, p. 147.
95. Jim Sillars MP, Scotland and Wales Bill, second reading. Parliamentary Debates, Hansard 922, 
14th December 1976, p. 1324.
96. Ibid., p.1368.
97. Drucker, Op. cit., p.l34.
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The European elections in 1979 followed two substantial defeats for the nationalists. 
Though a narrow majority had voted in favour of the devolution proposals at the 
referendum in March, the fact that the election required a 40% threshold of the 
electorate meant defeat for the Scotland Act. In addition, SNP support slumped at 
the general election, and cost it nine of its eleven seats. The election of a 
Conservative government also lessened the chances of constitutional change. The 
European elections were more encouraging. The party gained 19.4% compared to 
17.3% at the general election, and had one M E? elected. This slight recovery in the 
European elections may be a consequence of their second order nature, b u t  it 
enabled the SNP to bounce back from two heavy defeats.
The election of Mrs Ewing facihtated a gradual evolution in opinion inside the SNP. 
As an individual MEP and member of the European Progressive Democrats in the 
parliament, Ewing gradually imported a more positive European orientation into the 
party. This effect was achieved through publicising her successes in the European 
Parliament, gaining funds for her constituency, visits by other MEPs to SNP 
conferences, and consistently raising European issues in the SNP. The party 
remained opposed to EC membership in this period, however, reaffirming its 
opposition during the 1983 general election.^
The 1983 SNP Conference
The efforts of SNP leader, Gordon Wilson, to make the party less negative and 
isolationist brought a new European policy at the 1983 conference. The proposal that 
the SNP should support Scottish membership of NATO was defeated, but hardline 
opposition to Europe and devolution was ended. The pro-European resolution was 
couched in cautious terms, and promoted EC membership as an aid to secession 
because it involved minimal disruption to the Scottish economy. Wilson described 
EC membership as
“a first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence 
without any threat of economic dislocation. W ithin the common 
trading umbrella the move to independence can take place smoothly 
and easily”.
98. This concept will be discussed further in chapter 7, see Reif (ed). Ten European Elections: 
Campaigns and Results o f the 1979/81 First Direct Elections to the European Parliament.
99. Scottish National Party, Choose Scotland - The Challenge o f Independence, general election 
manifesto, 1983, p .ll .
100. The Glasgow Herald, 1st October 1983, p.5.
63
The SNP And Europe
The motion proposed that a referendum on Scottish membership would take place 
after independence, but that the SNP would favour independent membership if 
negotiations were successful. Such endorsement was not exactly cast-iron support 
for the EC, but does not detract from the fact that it was a policy reversal. It was 
passed overwhelmingly at the conference, despite opposition, and enabled the 
party to conduct a more positive campaign in the 1984 European elections.
The new position was not accepted by all members of the SNP. At the subsequent 
party conference in 1984, anti-EC members tried to modify SNP support for the 
Community. The anti-EC motion tried to commit the party to oppose 
any increase in EC powers unless accepted by a referendum in Scotland, and 
declared that the SNP must retain Scottish sovereignty in economic and fiscal pohcy. 
Anti-EC members attempted to limit SNP policy on Europe rather than reverse it. 
Such efforts were unsuccessful, but did show the fragihty of the pro-EC position, 
with strong support for the anti-EC p r o p o s a l .
5. Independence in Europe: The Ultimate Positive Linkage
Preparing for Independence in Europe
The path to the adoption of Independence in Europe was smoothed by three factors: 
growing elite and membership consensus on the EC, attempts by party elites to 
promote a more advanced European position than that of 1983, and the evolution of 
positive attitudes to the Community after its relaunch with the Single European Act.
This new context provided a useful backdrop to Independence in Europe. Just as the 
negative image of the EC had proved useful to opponents of the EC in the 1970s, the 
new Community was of use to Euro-realists within the SNP. It enabled them to use 
the contemporary EC to reverse older arguments against the Community. In the 
1984 European election manifesto the SNP leader argued that
“many of the fears that the Common M arket would become a 
superstate have been eased by experience. Far from becoming a new 
European despotism where bureaucracy triumped over national 
rights, the enlarging of the Community in recent years has diluted 
some of the dangers of centralism. The bigger it gets, the looser it 
becomes". 103
101. Resolution 35, Outcome of business report, SNP Annual National Conference 1983.
102. The anti-EC motion gained 115 votes against 158: Resolution 9, Outcome of Business 
Report, SNP Annual National Conference, 1983.
103. European election manifesto, Scottish National Party, 1984.
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Context wasn’t everything however. In order to make capital out of the new context 
the party had to develop and maintain a level of internal support for European 
membership. In addition to maintaining this coalition, a major effort was made by 
one of the party’s figures on the left, Jim Sillars, to develop the intellectual case for 
independent Scottish membership of the EC.
Sillars proposed Independence in Europe in a pamphlet in 1985, and a book in 
1986. Sillars’ views played a vital part in shaping SNP strategy on the European 
question: making it consider its role in the development of a ‘Euro-nationalism’ that 
would share sovereignty between European nations. His intention was to move the 
party away from ‘separatism’ and the isolationism of the 1970s towards a more 
constructive policy, and utilise the stability of the EC to counter political opponents 
who saw independence bringing economic dislocation. Beyond this objective, Euro- 
nationalism was a vague concept, more concerned with Europeanising the SNP and 
independence, than applying European themes and issues to the SNP, but then its 
primary aim was domestic.
Sillars’ approach was influential because of his popularity within the SNP, his role 
on the left of the party, and the fruitful context for raising the European question: the 
changing nature of the EC, and the hostile position of the Conservative Government 
to Europe. Sillars can be considered as a policy entrepreneur, similar to Douglas 
Young in the 1940s, acting as an advocate for a particular idea or p o l i c y . T h e  
success of such individuals is often attributable to their position within an 
organisation, their expertise and the available political resources. As a figure on the 
left, and a gradualist at the time, Sillars' approach enabled various sections of the 
party to reassess the prospect of EC membership. Previous opposition to the EC had 
come from a coalition of fundam entalists  who took a maximalist view of 
sovereignty, and leftist members who saw the EC as a superstate with centralist and 
superpower ambitions. The strength of Sillars’ approach was that it could be sold to 
both fundamentalists and gradualists in the SNP: to reinforce the argument for 
independence and damage devolution.
The internal discussions on EC policy, did stimulate anti-EC opposition. The SNP’s 
National Executive had adopted a policy on the Single European Act in the absence 
of other policymaking bodies, and sought to present this position at the party’s
104. This produced the Euro-Realist coalition in the party, which encompassed moderate 
fundamentalists and gradualists on both the left and right of the SNP.
105. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, p. 129.
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National Council in June 1986.^®  ^The National Council responded negatively, and 
defeated the leadership’s position through amendments that produced an anodyne 
commitment to examine the implications of the Single European Act rather than 
positive support for Independence in E u r o p e . This outcome was difficult to 
interpret. It may have been National Council's reaction to the leadership supplanting 
its policymaking function, rather than a comment on the SEA itself.
The National Council vote did not undermine the leadership strategy very much. 
Euro-realists continued to control the EC debate in the upper 
levels of the party. In losing the argument on Europe within senior decisionmaking 
structures,^®^ anti-EC activists began to make public criticism of the proposed policy 
change. Critics sought to use existing SNP policy commitments on landholding and 
regional development as arguments against the EC, as each would be undermined by 
Community policies. In addition, opponents pointed to the weakened position of 
member states in the European Council after the Single European Act. Qualified 
majority voting was seen to undermine the national veto, which the SNP had 
previously endorsed to protect vital Scottish interests. ^®®
The 1988 SNP Conference
Opponents of Independence in Europe faced a number of disadvantages in their 
efforts to defeat the policy. The debate followed the contours of contemporary UK 
debates between pro-Europeans and Euro-sceptics. As they had to argue directly 
against the EC motions they had little opportunity to propose alternatives, and found 
themselves trapped into arguing against the EC per se rather than being able to adopt 
a more constructive approach. The dearth of alternatives to the EC and isolation 
(dual secession), even led one opponent to propose a reformed Commonwealth as a 
trading alternative to the Community.
The structure of debate did not help anti-EC members, and neither did the behaviour 
of the party leadership. The senior officebearers of the SNP were already using the
106. SNP National Secretary’s report to National Council, 4th June 1986.
107. Minutes of SNP National Council, 4th June 1986, p.5. Opponents of the leadership's stance 
removed positive sections of the NEC policy that stated that the SEA did not threaten 
national sovereignty, was no problem for existing SNP policy on the EC, and was an opportunity 
to achieve independence without separation.
108. The anti-EC members had failed to have their motions placed upon the conference agenda. 
They were also unsuccessful in the selection of 24 amendments to the pro-EC motions. The pro-EC 
members were determined that opponents would have to argue from a direct negative stance, in an 
all or nothing style, rather than have the opportunity to dilute the independence in Europe position 
through amendments.
109. The Scotsman, 13th September 1988, p. 13.
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Independence in Europe slogan, and included it on the cover of the party’s 
conference agenda. It was chosen as the conference slogan, showing considerable 
confidence that it would become party policy. Such confidence was not misplaced. 
Both pro-EC motions were passed by overwhelming majorities at the conference.
It re-launched the party and the independence issue in preparation for the 1989 
European elections.
Independence in Europe was the product of just two conference resolutions. This 
minimal development was a subject of criticism, with concern that the new 
policy lacked substance, and that the SNP had committed itself to unforeseen future 
developments in European integration. Two resolutions do not make a programme, 
but more substantive aspects of the policy followed as the SNP reacted to the 
evolving European political agenda. The resolution that committed the party to 
Independence in Europe^ resolution 29, gave the SNP leadership three specific 
tasks:
“ 1. To continue its efforts to alert the Scottish people and their 
institutions to the creation of the single market in die European 
Community in 1992.
2. To continue its efforts to emphasise that within the context of the 
European Community the achievement of Scottish independence wiU 
accelerate Scodand to a full say in all Community policy without any 
adverse effect upon trade relations with all other members of the 
Community including England.
3. To continue its efforts to highlight that unless Scodand achieves 
independence within the Community, and is thus able to protect 
Scottish interests, the single market of 1992 will have devastating 
consequences for what is left of Scottish control and our 
economy”, m
The substance of Independence in Europe grew since 1988, though its impact was 
difficult to determine. It helped give the independence issue wider public support, 
though the unpopularity of Mrs Thatcher’s government had already achieved this by 
the mid-1980s. Both the Thatcher effect and the EC effect raised support for 
independence above that experienced in the 1970s. But the contemporary popularity 
of independence, and Independence in Europe, did not help the SNP to regain its 
peak electoral support of 1974. The correlation between the SNP and independence 
in the 1970s found strong support for the party, but weak support for its
110. Resolution 29 and 30, outcome of business report, SNP Annual National Conference, 1988.
111. Resolution 29, SNP Annual National Conference, Inverness, 1988. The passage of these 
motions led a small group of fundamentalist dissidents to leave the party to establish the Scottish 
Sovereignty Movement, committed to independence outside the EC. Little came of this 
organisation in terms of number or political profile though some of its members kept
up a debate in the letters pages of the papers that embarrassed the SNP.
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constitutional option. In the 1980s to 1990s this was reversed, with strong support 
for independence but weaker support for the SNP.
In 1989 the SNP formally launched its Independence in Europe platform, written by 
Jim Sillars. This document presented the political and economic aspects of the new 
policy, to enhance the case for independence by contrasting Scotland’s independent 
role in European institutions with UK governmental practices. Sillars recognised that 
sovereignty was being redefined by European integration, a process that would 
continue as the EC moved beyond the single market towards EMU.^^^ This 
economic and social development, if  left untouched, would leave the Scottish 
economy vulnerable to centralising forces, takeovers and declining Scottish 
economic control. He argued that independence and Scottish involvement in EC 
decisionmaking and negotiations were necessary to deal with these threats.
Sillars saw little problem for Scottish sovereignty within the European Community: 
Scotland would be repatriating powers from London and so would be gaining 
powers rather than merely surrendering them to Brussels. Most of the existing 
powers of Westminster and Whitehall were seen to be destined for S c o t l a n d . I n  
addition, the Community was not seen as a threat to national policymaking 
and activity. The SNP assumed that the EC’s jurisdiction could expand, but would 
remain constrained by the Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments. Finally, 
the party did not see the political behaviour or style of the EC as threatening because 
of its consensual nature, and the possibility of recourse to the national veto should a 
member state feel its interests were threatened.
Though the national veto was partly undermined by the Single European Act, it still 
remained in force. Other aspects of the EC were also attractive to the SNP. The party 
argued that Scotland would gain from representation in the European Council, in 
COREPER, the ability to appoint a European Commissioner, and gain more seats in 
the European Parliament. This list was the same set of institutional benefits 
demanded in the 1970s by those pursuing strategic negative linkage, recycled in the 
new context of complete positive linkage.
The EC was seen to have a substantial institutional impact on Scotland, with 
Independence in Europe generating a diplomatic and political multiplier effect. The 
dimensions of Scottish goverment and administration were seen to be radically
112. Jim Sillars, Independence in Europe, p.5.
113. Ibid., p.23.
114. Ibid., p.l3.
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altered in this context, propelling Scottish civil servants into all aspects of EC affairs 
and enabling Scotland to claim its share of official positions in the European 
Commission. A role in the Council, the Commission and in intergovernmental 
negotiations, would reduce the provincial outlook of Scottish administration through 
involvement in European and global affairs.
The international economic context was seen to have a strong impact on Scotland 
and her relation with Europe. Sillars remarked
“we live in an increasingly internationalising world, and it would not 
be sensible for us to attempt an escape from it into some kind 
Scottish bolt-hole on which we pulled the shutters. That would lock 
us out of the world, at precisely the time when we need to get into the 
world and become a player”.
Becom ing a player, in the SN P’s analysis, required a Scottish 
government, with the ability to work within the European Community to address the 
problems of the Scottish economy. Gellner has observed that “the nationalist state is 
not only the protector of a culture, but also of a new and often initially fragile 
economy”. The SNP’s intention was to use independence in the EC as an aid to 
economic development, with economic integration necessitating independent 
representation, and also providing an umbrella for development. In this context the 
new European initiative was acceptance of interdependence, and a move away from 
protectionism and autarky.
The SNP and EMU
The Independence in Europe programme of 1989 was timebound, and could not deal 
effectively with the future European agenda. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
was one example of this, though it generated several discussion papers and debates 
at the time. SNP policy on EMU was first considered in late 1990 in the party’s 
National Assembly, an institutionalised discussion forum for activists and senior 
office-bearers. This forum debated two briefing papers on EMU prepared by SNP 
office-bearers. The first paper sought to define the limits of Scottish sovereignty 
within the EC through examination of a range of policy areas in which pooled
115. Ibid., p.22.
116. Ibid., p. 14.
117. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 15.
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sovereignty was seen to increase the powers of small countries rather than limit 
them, as long as a confederal framework was retained.
The second paper, prepared by Sillars, considered possible responses to EMU. It 
dealt with the issue of national sovereignty in a pragmatic fashion. First, in 
becoming a full member of the EC the SNP recognised that it would be necessary to 
accept the prevailing policy and institutional status quo of the Community, and ruled 
out the prospect of independent Scottish accession bringing fundamental change to 
the EC’s institutions and p o lic ie s .^ S e co n d , since Scotland had no national 
sovereignty within the UK then any level of sovereignty gained within the EC was 
an advance.120 Third, the EC was firmly identified as a union of nation-states
“who have pooled their sovereignty in certain policy areas, but they 
have not thereby handed it over to any single body but themselves 
meeting as a single Council” .^ ^^
Some of these messages were intended to reassure fundamentalists within the SNP 
and also point out that independent membership in the context of EMU did not lead 
to the death of nation-states.
The greater part of Sillar’s paper was concerned with assessing the impact of the 
Delors Committee proposals for Economic and Monetary U n io n .  122 attempted to 
be both informative and analytical in guiding SNP activists towards considering 
EMU. As the first stage of the transition to EMU had been achieved, the paper 
sought to assess stages two and three. The economic options involved supporting 
the creation of a European central bank, and determining its pohtical status, and then 
deciding upon the merits of a single currency and specific criteria for economic 
convergence. Consideration was also given to SNP attitudes to political union, with 
Sillars outlining four possible options:
(i) to reject further transfers of sovereignty to the EC;
(ii) to accept the necessity for more transfers of sovereignty but place 
no limits upon them;
(iii) to agree upon limited transfers of sovereignty that retain the EC’s 
confederal character and require unanimty to amend the Treaty of 
Rome;
118. George Leslie, “Discussion Paper on SNP Policy on Scotland in Europe”, SNP National 
Assembly, 9th December 1990.
119. Jim Sillars, “Scottish Independence in Europe”, SNP National Assembly, 9th December 1990,
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121. Ibid., p.l5.
122. “Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the
European Communities”, Committee for the study of Economic and Monetary Union, European 
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(iv) to accept limited transfers of sovereignty with the proviso that 
they be accompanied by an enhanced role for the European 
Parliament in the Council of Ministers and the appointment of 
European Commissioners.
Though this paper did not put forward specific recommendations, the choices for the 
SNP were narrowed to preserve the coherence of Independence in Europe, The 
decisions made at the SNP’s special conference on Europe in 1991 reflected some of 
these constraints. The majority of the resolutions dealing with EC questions had 
been submitted by the SNP’s institutionalised policymaking bodies rather than by 
the activists,!^ though that did not prevent them gaining strong support
The special conference confirmed the party’s support for a confederal European 
Community, with support for institutional adjustments to make the EC more 
d e m o c r a t i c ; g a v e  support to the creation of an independent European central 
bank,i26 ^nd a single European c u r r e n c y ; a n d  supported the Social Charter and 
Community enlargement
This conference determ ined party attitudes to the issue agenda of the 
intergovernmental conferences on economic and political union that preceded the 
Maastricht Treaty. It brought a triple orientation to the European question in this 
period: to deal with the criticisms and proposals of competing parties, to develop 
political bargaining around the question of a European central bank and to seek to 
exploit the government’s European weaknesses over the Maastricht Treaty through 
calling for a referendum on the Treaty.
The SNP’s “Memo to M aastricht” in December 1991 updated the case for 
Independence in Europe in the new context of EC deepening and also dealt with the 
positions of competing parties. This document sought to dismiss the prospect and 
attractiveness of regional status for Scotland in the EC, as an alternative to national 
membership. The “regional” option, which involved federalism or the Europe o f the 
Regions position, had been adopted by the Liberal and Labour parties in response to 
developments within the EC and the SNP’s new p r o g r a m m e . T h e  SNP was
123. Sillars, Op. cit., 1990, p.l7.
124. Seven out of ten resolutions came from central party fora rather than local organisations, 
reflecting the elite nature of the EC issue.
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particularly keen to point out the differences between Independence in Europe and 
regionalism, and outline the inferiority of the latter position.
The party also dealt with the legal implications of secession/integration in the EC 
context. Political opponents had presented the argument that Scottish membership 
after secession could not be guaranteed as it would have technically ceased to be part 
of a member state and its membership application could be vetoed by other member 
states. The EC has had experience of countries acceding to the EC but very little in 
the way of countries leaving. The only precedent involved Greenland from 1982-5, 
but there is no legal precedent to illuminate the Scottish situation. This uncertainty 
led opponents of the SNP to claim that Scottish membership could not be achieved, 
and that readmission and the application/negotiation procedure would be damaging. 
The SNP answered such criticisms by asserting that secession created two successor 
states from the UK, each would hold equal status within the EC,^^9 and have to 
apply for separate membership. This issue is rather circumspect however, as the 
European Community has no position or precedent on the issue and Scotland would 
provide a test case.
The SNP also used Maastricht to indulge in political bidding, calling for the 
proposed European central bank to be located in S c o tla n d ,a ss is ted  by the fact that 
other parties lobbied for the bank to be located in London. The political geography 
of pitting Edinburgh against London was attractive for the SNP, and it argued that 
London had already received European largesse in the shape of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and was unlikely to receive any more.^^^
Maastricht brought a return to earlier patterns of linkage. Though supportive of the 
Treaty the SNP sought to exploit the political dynamics of Maastricht by calling for a 
referendum linked to the constitutional question in Scotland. The SNP’s efforts to 
make capital out of the Maastricht issue were aided by the result of the Danish 
referendum in June 1992 in three ways. First, it helped its argument for a 
referendum. Second, it meant that it was possible to alter sections of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Third, it showed the ability of small nations to influence the development of 
the Community. The SNP leader, Alex Salmond, made use of this latter point saying 
that “this result finally crushes the claim that small nations can have no influence in
the European C o m m u n ity ” .
129. Scottish National Party, Memo to Maastricht, p.3.
130. Ibid., p.5.
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Events following the Danish referendum brought a defensive response from the 
SNP. The party was particularly sensitive about speculation that the Treaty could be 
adopted without Danish support, and undermine the unanimity rule on which the 
Community and Independence in Europe programme were constructed. Jim Sillars 
dealt with this possibility by stating that
“we have heard statements from various sources saying that the rest 
of the Community could proceed with M aastricht without the
Danes such a move would be a fundamental breach of Article
236 of the Treaties establishing the Community. It leaves no room 
for doubt: ratification is required by all Member States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional arrangements”.
The SNP sought to use the new uncertainty over Maastricht to push for a dual 
referendum and the application of subsidiarity to ensure decentralisation in the 
U K . 134 The SNP sought to use subsidiarity to promote the Scottish dimension and 
demands for self-government, while the Government employed subsidiarity as a 
political resource to defend U K  sovereignty from the European level. The SNP 
leader sought to exploit the Government’s singular usage of the subsidiarity concept 
by complaining that according to the Conservatives “subsidiarity means power for 
Westminster, but none for anywhere else”.i35 Whilst the rhetorical position of the 
SNP was clear, the political position towards Maastricht in the voting lobbies of the 
House of Commons was confused. The SNP supported opposition amendments 
during the second reading of the European Communities (amendments) Bill in 1992, 
but then voted for a second reading of the bill with the G o v e r m e n t .  136 There was a 
particular concern to avoid appearing anti-EC, to prevent any resurrection of the 
party’s opposition in the 1970s and protect the Independence in Europe policy.
The government's problems with the European M onetary System (EMS) in 
September 1992 provided further opportunities for the SNP to develop linkage. It 
significantly raised the temperature on the Maastricht Treaty. The government’s 
reduced parliamentary majority at the 1992 general election meant that the legislative 
ratification of the Treaty was problematic. The SNP and PC sought to exploit this 
situation by linking a constitutional referendum in Scotland and Wales to support for 
Maastricht in the lobby of the House of Commons. These referenda were presented
133. Scottish National Party news release, 4th June 1992.
134. The Herald, 18th June 1992, p.4.
135. Alex Salmond MP, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard 205 ,21st May 1992, p.556.
136. The second reading was passed by 336 votes to 92, Ibid., p600.
73
The SNP And Europe
as the price for nationalist support for Maastricht in talks with the Conservative 
Prime Minister,!^'^ and also gained support at the SNP conference in 1992.^^8
The SNP’s proposal for a referendum was popular in Scotland, though it did not 
lead to increased support for the nationalists. One opinion poll found 
66% of SNP supporters favoured a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, compared 
to 61% of voters in Scotland. The Treaty itself was not widely supported in 
Scotland, though it was not necessarily widely understood either. Only 25% of SNP 
voters favoured the Treaty, compared to 31% against, and 41% undecided. Given 
the Government’s weak situation in the House of Commons, further political 
opportunities arose through the ratification procedures for the Maastricht Treaty. The 
government tried to test its position in the Commons through introducing the 
parliamentary innovation of a ‘paving motion’, a means to see how much support 
there was for the Treaty before preceding with the second reading stage. This 
brought the SNP to vote against this motion, along with Labour and Conservative 
dissidents in order to embarrass the Government.
The government’s difficulties over Maastricht also led the SNP, as well as PC, to 
support the Conservatives over aspects of the Maastricht bill that dealt with the 
proposed Committee of the Regions. Under the Treaty, the nomination of members 
of the Commmittee of the Regions was left to national governments. The opposition 
parties proposed an amendment to the bill that would have ensured that Committee 
members had to be elected members of local government. The strength of the 
opposition, and the willingness of Conservative backbenchers to vote against 
numerous aspects of the Treaty left the government short of a majority. Conservative 
efforts to avoid another defeat on the Treaty led them to approach the nationalists 
with a deal. The SNP pursued two objectives in this deal: eight Scottish 
representatives on the Committee (out of the UK delegation of 24), and also the 
removal of government control of nominations. To achieve the latter, the SNP 
proposed that Scottish representatives on the Committee should be selected on 
proportional arrangments, so that each party in Scotland would have members 
approximate to its share of the vote in the 1992 general election. This proposal 
was confirmed through a loose verbal and written agreement with the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, Ian Lang.
137. The Herald, 24th SeptembCT 1992, p.9.
138. Resolution 30, SNP Annual National Conference, Perth, September 1992.
139. The Herald, 2nd October 1992, p.2, confirmed by a subsequent poll in The Herald, 25th May 
1993.
140. The Scotsman, 9th March 1993, p.l.
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The SNP had previously modelled itself on opposition to the Conservatives, and 
found this strategy undermined. The event had no significance for party attitudes to 
Europe, but greater importance for the party leadership and the SNP’s efforts to 
embarrass the Labour opposition. The consequences o f the deal were numerous. 
First, the party suffered a short-term loss in support. Second, the issue provoked 
internal conflict within the p a r t y . T h i r d ,  the deal undermined the SNP’s attempts 
to portray Labour as the collaborationist party, as it opposed the insertion of a 
referendum clause into the Maastricht bill proposed by Liberals, nationalists and a 
number of anti-Maastricht Conservatives. This position was the democratic high 
ground for the SNP, and the deal with the Conservatives meant that it was then lost 
for the duration of debates on the bill. Fourth, and most importantly, the event gave 
Labour the excuse to walk out of interparty talks between the SNP, Labour and 
Liberal Democrats on proposals to advance constitutional change. The Maastricht 
vote therefore torpedoed the SNP’s own efforts to gain advantage through putting 
pressure on Labour to respond to demands for more radical action on the autonomy 
issue in Scotland.
Whilst the issue did not affect the SNP position on Europe, it brought short-term 
problems. It placed the party on the defensive during a period in which it had exerted 
considerable pressure on Labour. Beyond this deal, the Maastricht debate yielded 
very little for the nationalists. Since the SNP had debated the contents of the 
Maastricht agreements in advance of the bill coming before parliament there was little 
left to discuss in the Commons.
Between 1975 and 1993 there had been a reversal of the SNP's position on the EC 
and the political context of European integration. In 1975, there was an expectation 
that Scotland would vote against Europe, whilst the rest of the UK voted in favour. 
In 1993, though the SNP expected that it could drive a new European cleavage 
between Scotland and the UK on the European question, with Scotland now pro-EC 
and the UK isolationist, it was confronted by weak support for the Maastricht Treaty 
in Scotland. This weakness, and the absence of voter knowledge on the Treaty, 
tempered efforts to exploit the Maastricht Treaty.
141. One opinion poll recorded a 4% reduction in SNP support following the Maastricht deal, see 
The Herald, 2nd April 1993, p.2.
142. See Scotland on Sunday, 14th March 1993, p.l.
143. See The Herald, 27th April 1993, p.8 and 5di May 1993, p.9.
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6. The SNP And Transnational Co-operation
The contemporary involvement of the SNP in transnational organisations was a facet 
of its success in continually electing a member to the European Parliament. This 
post-1979 development was not without its contradictions however. The SNP did 
not participate in the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations - evidence of its 
disdain for regionalism and the efficacy of associating with micro-regionalist parties, 
and of its state-nationalist tradition. The problem of finding suitable parties or 
groups for political co-operation did not arise until the direct elections themselves. 
Before 1979 the SNP’s nominated MEP did not join any group in the European 
Parliament, but remained an independent member.
The expansion of the EP with direct elections brought an increase in political group 
sizes and types. This brought Mrs Ewing to consider the range of group alternatives 
available for the SNP. In doing so, she was given considerable individual autonomy 
to select a group, with minimal involvement from the SNP leadership or 
membership. In the absence of a regionalist/nationalist group, Ewing joined the 
European Progressive Democrats (EPD) formed by the French RPR and Fianna 
Fail, an ad hoc parliamentary alliance between state-nationalist parties. This decision 
was endorsed by the SNP National Executive.
The relationship between EPD members was limited, though it suited the parties 
involved. The group operated as a formal unit within the EP, but had very loose 
internal ties. There was no common manifesto or programme, members had 
maximum autonomy within the group, and there was little or no ideological or 
political cohesion as a basis for its actions. Since it was a parliamentary alliance 
rather than an electoral alliance, coherence was unimportant. The EPD's impact 
upon the SNP was minimal. Inter-party links beyond the parliament were very 
weak, with no attempt to develop a wider federation or association. The greatest 
degree of warmth within the EPD developed between the SNP and Fianna Fail 
members, with the latter occasionally attending the SNP conference, and an SNP 
delegation attending the Fianna Fail congress in 1988.
The development of the EPD coincided with that of the European Free Alliance 
(EFA). The formation of the EFA led some SNP members to consider membership
144. Duverger, Political Parties, p.330.
145. Mrs Ewing and the SNP National Secretary, John Swinney, visited the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis 
in February 1988; The Scots Independent, April 1988, p.4.
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in the new organisation, and the party began to attend EFA meetings from April 
1983.^^^ Observer status was pursued to ensure the SNP did not undermine its 
association with the EPD, One of the observers subsequently submitted a report to 
the SNP National Executive recommending that the party retain its observer status in 
the medium-term and look at full membership of the EFA in the longer term. The 
two SNP observers became prime motivators behind SNP participation, and the 
party agreed to continue its political involvement provided that it did not involve any 
financial c o m m i t m e n t . T h e  SNP members wished to involve the party in the EFA 
as a prelude to full membership, and sought to make an input to the EFA policy to 
develop a degree of political convergence between the organisation and the SNP: 
preparing for full membership by closing the policy distance between the SNP and 
EFA.
There were efforts to have the SNP change political groups within the European 
Parliament in the 1983-6 period. The EFA parties sought to attract the SNP to the 
Rainbow Group and some within the SNP also pursued this end. The party’s 
National Executive agreed to maintain its role in the group, which was renamed as 
the European Democratic Alliance (EDA), following the 1984 European election, 
though some voices argued for a change in group at the party’s National Council in 
1986. Here Mrs Ewing successfully argued for continuing the party’s role in the 
group, and defeated the proponents of accession to the Rainbow Group.
Though entering into co-operation with the EFA, the SNP remained part of the 
EDA. This alhance caused problems with the EFA, which was attempting to form a 
specifically regionahst political group, and also affected the SNP’s relationship with 
PC. This relationship was problematic in the 1984-7 period for a number of 
r e a s o n s . F i r s t ,  PC was unhappy with the SNP’s role in the EDA, particularly its 
alliance with the RPR. Second, the SNP was suspicious of PC during this period 
because of its growing regionalism, which was largely articulated by the PC leader, 
Dafydd Elis Thomas. These problems persisted in spite of the development of a 
parliamentary alliance between the two organisations in the 1986-1987 period,
146. Minutes of the European Free Alliance Congress, Eupen, Belgium, 22-23 April 1983: EFA 
Bureau, Brussels, 1983.
147. Interview with George Leslie, Vice-Convenor for Local Government and delegate to EFA, 
Scottish National Party: 6th November 1992, Glasgow.
148. SNP National Secretary’s report to National Council, 1st December 
1984, p.3.
149. Minutes of SNP National Council, 1st March 1986, p.4.
150. Interview with Dr Phil Williams, former Vice-Chair Policy and Research, and EFA delegate. 
Plaid Cynmi: 13th November 1991, Abersystwyth.
77
The SNP And Europe
designed to enhance their bargaining power in the event of a minority government 
after the 1987 general election.
Into the late 1980s the SNP’s role in the EDA was threatened by the rightward drift 
of the RPR: evident during its cohabitation with the Socialist President in the 1986-8 
period. The RPR’s move to the right on issues like immigration, made continuing 
SNP involvement difficult However, relations within the group remained positive. 
The RPR in the European Parliament posed no problems, in contrast to its behaviour 
in domestic politics. Labour MPs in Scotland began to raise the alliance with the 
RPR as a means to question the SNP’s adopted centre-left stance.
The political problems with the RPR and the more positive developments within the 
EFA and Rainbow configuration provided grounds for the SNP to switch group in 
the European Parliament. Mrs Ewing warned the SNP executive of the possibility of 
a change in group coming very quickly after the European elections in 1989.^^^ This 
situation brought the SNP into the Rainbow Group, but did not undermine the 
party’s commitment to independence.
7. Conclusion;
After 1988 SNP policy on Europe sought to make independence feasible, coherent 
and safe for Scotland. It involved relaunching the new Europeanised view of 
independence as the big idea in Scottish politics, and one intended to undermine 
lesser forms of autonomy such as devolution. One consequence was pragmatic: the 
SNP accepted that an altered and limited state was better than none at all. The nation- 
state previously held ultimate responsibility for national economic development, 
defence and foreign affairs,^^^ yet its economic primacy was reduced through 
interdependency and political change. In the Maastricht Treaty debates in particular, 
the SNP has modified the concept of economic and political sovereignty to take 
account of European and global developments and tailor its programme to suit 
contemporary events. The notion of economic sovereignty and political sovereignty 
became separated, with one treated differently from the other by nationalists.
151. Interview with Mrs Winnie Ewing MEP for the Highlands and Islands 1979-94: 25th February 
1992, Brussels.
152. Mayall, Op. cit., p.85.
153. Other authors have made this observation in the context of the developing world: see Harris, 
National Liberation, p.23.
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The SNP’s transformed Euro-linkages are, in Panebianco’s language, examples of 
the “re-articulation of ends” rather than the “succession of ends” within a political 
party. The SNP has retained its commitment to independence but redefined the 
idea and reahty of independence in the Scottish context. Independence nows means 
pooled sovereignty intergovemmentalism and acceptance of the limited capacities of 
the nation-state in the global economy.
Had the party experienced a succession o f endsy with radical changes to its 
programme, aims and identity, then it would have abandoned independence in 
favour of regionalism. Instead, the contemporary phase of European integration was 
used to reinforce and relaunch nation-state independence. The 1988 SNP 
conference, and the adoption of the Independence in Europe programme, allowed 
the relaunch of independence through the economic and pohtical security of the EC. 
For the SNP, European integration has been about building rather than transcending 
the nation-state.
Agenda-linkage is not a risk-free activity however. If independence is reliant upon 
European integration then it may be a hostage to fortune. Economic and political 
integration are not linear processes. Haas has described the potential for integration 
to create a number of ‘turbulent fields’ which disrupt integrative progress and lead to 
increases in demands for national decisionmaking. In pursuing a process of 
partisan Europeanisation the SNP may have put itself at the mercy of turbulent 
fields, over which it has neither influence nor control.
The SNP’s strategy of setting the independence option within the context of the 
European single market and reduced tariff and customs barriers may come unstuck if 
the process of economic integration falters. This outcome may develop through 
elements of the single market failing to operate or more likely, with the economic 
disadvantages of peripherahty causing problems for the Scottish economy.
There are also difficulties with political integration, as the SNP was wary of this 
development It was committed to the démocratisation of the EC, but cautious about 
the extension of the powers of the European Parliament and weakening of the 
Council of M inisters. The SNP position relied upon the continuation of 
intergovemmentalism, rather than the evolution of supranationalism, seeking a 
confederation rather than a federation. Political federalism within the EC would take
154. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, p.257.
155. Haas, “The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory”, paper no.25. Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1975.
79
The SNP And Europe
the SNP back to considering the independence issue within an autonomous context, 
though it may be that the SNP is willing to accept certain economic pay-offs from 
the EC in exchange for greater political integration.
The SNP was inevitably cast in a reactive mode as regards both economic and 
political integration, which made policy responses limited and ineffective. This 
reactivism was also a function of the SNP’s predominantly instrumental attitude to 
Europe. In this respect it has operated like other British parties, using the EC context 
to support its domestic agenda. It became committed to Independence in Europe to 
use the EC to facilitate the argument for independence, and the reality of 
independence itself. There was no great affection or Euro-enthusiasm evident within 
the party. This in itself may offer some protection for the SNP against the ‘turbulent 
fields’ of integration.
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Plaid Cvmru And Europe: From 
Nationalism To Regionalism
“There can be no nationalism in one country. Our small-nation nationalism 
recognises the rights and democratic aspirations of all other national, language, 
ethnic and minority groups worldwide...this is not the old nationalism of nation­
states with their insistence on borders and sovereignty but a new understanding of 
the role of the national community as an important level of political power, 
sharing power with other nations and regions, and decentralising power so that 
communities have real say in running themselves".^
1. Introduction
Plaid Cymru (PC) can be considered as the intermediate case in this study, and in the 
regionalist political family. This is because it eschews separatist nationalism but has 
also traditionally rejected regionalism. The party has preferred to subscribe to self- 
governm ent or home rule, and has taken a sceptical view of independence. 
However, there has been a level of disagreement within the party over its goals: with 
some favouring independence rather than more general aims. This conflict ran 
through the party in the 1920s and 1930s, fueled by the opposition of the party 
President, Saunders Lewis, to independence and nationalism,^ and also re-emerged 
in a different form in the 1980s as a consequence of European integration. These 
two developments can be seen to give the debate over party goals a certain 
symmetry, in which the European question is influential.
2. The Development of Welsh Nationalism
Plaid Cymru was formed in 1925 by a group of nationalists at a meeting in a cafe at 
the W elsh cultural festival, the Eisteddfod, in Pwllheli. In contrast to other 
nationalist and regionalist parties considered here, PC has been the only nationalist 
party formed in Wales, and has continued as a single political actor since its 
formation. It was created from a number of pre-existing groups which had 
developed in Wales at the close of the first world war such as Byddin yr laith (The
1. Dafydd Elis Thomas, President of Plaid Cymru 1983-91, The Welsh Nation, 
November/December 1989, p.4.
2.D. Hwyel Davies, The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-1945: A Call to Nationhood.
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Language Army), Byddin Ymreolwyr Cymru (The Wales Home Rule Army) and 
Mudiad Cymru (The Free Wales Movement). All contained future nationalist leaders 
and activists such as Saunders Lewis and Ambrose Bebb. These m icro­
organisations acted as elite groups rather than political movements. They had been 
preceded by the development of the home rule issue in the 1890s in the Cymru Fydd 
group formed by Liberal MPs like Tom Ellis and David Lloyd George.^
The early establishment of PC, with attempts to develop a separate political 
philosophy, programme, exclusive membership, and an electoral strategy,"^ brought 
an early stability to Welsh nationalism, and avoided the organisational complexity 
and cross-party bodies found in other national movements. The movement 
experienced this phase of multiple organisations in the 1920s in advance of the 
formation of the p a r t y w i t h  the coalescence of these organsiations bringing party 
formation. The maturing of the party lasted from the 1920s right into the 1960s, as 
the party’s programme expanded from the core issues of home rule and language 
rights to international affairs and socio-economic policies.
PC’s political agenda initially included three external support systems: dominion 
status for Wales, a similar constitutional status to independent Commonwealth states 
such as Australia and Canada; Welsh membership of the League of Nations; and 
support for European union. These provided a variety of political, economic and 
security supports for small nations. PC has had an underlying positive disposition to 
European union throughout its existence, though it has not prevented it from 
changing policy quite markedly on Europe when it was deemed necessary.^ PC can 
therefore be seen to have operated pragmatically on the European issue, international 
co-operation and the European Community itself.
Plaid Cymru’.s electoral performance over time can be divided into three periods: that 
when the party contested only a few seats within its region; the expansion phase 
from 1945 to 1966 when the party committed itself to fielding candidates in greater 
numbers; and the period since 1966 when it has contested every seat in Wales and 
began to surpass the threshold of representation. In the earlier period from 1929 to 
1945 the electoral effort was limited to contesting the University of Wales seat and 
that of Caernarfonshire. These contests produced marginal votes for Plaid Cymru,
3. Kenneth Morgan, The Rebirth o f a Nation: Wales 1880 to 1980, p.41.
4. Ian McAllister, “Party Organisation and Minority Nationalism: A Comparative Study in the 
United Kingdom”, European Journal o f Political Research, V ol.9 ,1981, p.238.
5. Davies, Op. cit.
6. Denis Balsom and Peter Madgu/‘c/c^  “Wales, European Integration and Devolution”, in Martin 
Kolinsky (ed). Divided Loyalties, p.78.
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and the only advances came with the by-elections at Caernarfon Boroughs and Neath 
in 1945, though the support gained at these elections ebbed away at the general 
election in the same year. Despite the low number of votes polled in the general 
election the performance was notable for the fact that the party contested eight seats, 
and resolved to contest more in future.^
Subsequent by-elections in 1946 boosted the standing of PC in traditionally Labour 
seats, but these small advances passed by without the party making greater capital of 
its ability to gather support in such areas. From then the electoral growth of the party 
was fairly consistent, peaking in 1970, though gaining no seats, and then appearing 
to be in steady decline until the 1992 election, as the party traded off national support 
for geographical concentration and limited electoral success. This trade-off left the 
party representing North and W est W ales - the rural areas with the higher 
concentrations of Welsh speakers - rather than those of industrial and urban South 
Wales. This pattern emerged in spite of the PC’s efforts to become more oriented to 
the South through the leftward movement of the party and its designation as a 
socialist party in 1981,^ and the post-modern strategy involving alliance with the 
Greens in the early 1990s. These developments in the 1980s did not succeed in 
producing any breakthrough for the PC in South Wales, though the party succeeded 
in entrenching itself in North Wales and gained a seat in West Wales at the 1992 
general election.
7. Alan Butt Phillip, The Welsh Question: Nationalism in Welsh Politics 1945-70, p.74.
8. Phillip Cooke, “Ethnicity, Economy and Civil Society: Three Theories of Political 
Regionalism”, in Colin Williams and Elenore Kofman (eds). Community Conflict, Partition and 
Nationalism, p.218.
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Table 3,1 Electoral Support For Plaid Cvmru 1929-92
Year Votes % of Welsh Total Seats
1929 609
1931 2050
1935 2534
1945 14751 1.1
1950 17580 1.2
1951 10920 0.8
1955 45119 3.2
1959 77571 5.3
1964 69507 4.8
1966 61071 4.3
1970 175016 11.5
1974 (Feb) 171374 10.7 2
1974 (Oct) 166321 10.8 3
1979 132544 8.1 2
1983 125309 7.8 2
1987 125589 7.3 3
1992 *154957 7.9 4
*This includes the votes for joint PC/Green candidates.
Sources: Alan Butt Phillip, The Welsh Question: Nationalism in Welsh Politics 1945-70 and 
Denis Balsom, The Wales Yearbook I99I (Cardiff: HTV (Zymru, 1990), TK<e -riMts
3. Welsh Nationalism And European Union 1925-57
The Early Years of Plaid Cymru
Plaid Cymru’s role in Welsh politics was very limited in its formative years. Though 
the party membership grew from 500 in 1930 to 2500 in 1945,^ it made little public 
impact PC contested very few elections in this period, with the most notable activity 
in the public sphere coming through the adoption of civil disobedience by a section 
of its leadership in 1936 with the destruction of the RAF bombing school at 
Penyberth. The slow organisational and electoral development of the party did not 
prevent the gradual evolution of policies related to international affairs within the 
organisation. Debates on such issues were pursued through the party’s Welsh 
language newspaper Y Ddraig Goch (The Red Dragon) founded in 1926 with a 
circulation of approximately 4000-7000 in the 1930s, and through The Welsh 
Nationalist, the PC English language newspaper that had a circulation of around 
2000.^® These two papers, and the party’s summer schools and meetings, were the 
main forums for internal political debate. The Welsh language paper, in particular, 
was instrumental in leading PC discussions on European union.
9. Butt Phillip, Op. cit., p. 17.
10. Ibid., p.l8.
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The aims of PC were formally established in 1931. The party called for dominion 
status for Wales, action on the Welsh language and culture and Welsh membership 
of the League of Nations. These three goals were a reflection of the groundwork 
of the early PC leaders, particularly that of the President, Saunders Lewis, who 
sought to link the issue of Welsh autonomy to developments in international society. 
In his lecture to the PC summer school in 1925, Lewis placed both Wales and 
nationalism in international historical contexts. Lewis emphasised that Wales was an 
old European nation, not merely a region of Britain. Wales had existed in the pre­
national Europe of the middle ages, during the period of shared religious traditions 
under the common supranational authority of the Catholic Church. Lewis argued that 
this early European union, based upon a common elite language and literature in 
Latin, and a common ecclesiastical authority, had been undermined by nationalism. 
He saw this emergent nationalism as both materialistic and etatiste, in seeking to 
establish the nation-state as the primary form of political organisation and develop 
linguistic and cultural unity within its boundaries. Lewis considered this managed 
uniformity as a regrettable contrast to the more varied culture that predated the 
reformation.
Lewis regarded nationalism as a potentially destructive force between societies, 
particularly when practiced by England on W ales. in his efforts to create a political 
philosophy for PC Lewis sought to reconnect Wales with Europe, to encourage 
national diversity as a force against British uniformity and present a positive 
alternative to materialistic and statist nationalism. The European aspect was later 
pursued through a volume of essays published by Lewis in Welsh. Here, Lewis 
argued that if Wales was to play any role in Europe, whether cultural or political, it 
would have to achieve self-government as the nation-state was the natural form of 
society. European union would be useful both to deal with destructive state 
nationalism and to help Wales and Welsh development. Lewis adhered to the 
mainstream view of European integration as a means of ensuring peace in 
international society. In this respect he regarded Europe as a security community, 
and a cultural community, but not as a political or economic community as such.
Lewis also hitched the European issue to the political opportunity structure of Welsh 
nationalism. Though Lewis’ work was based upon intellectual connections, it
11. The Welsh Nationalist Party, Welsh National Party Aims 1931.
12. Saunders Lewis, Principles of Nationalism.
13. Saunders Lewis, Canlyn Arthur.
14. For definitions and discussion of this concept see K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, p.37 and 
Preston King, Federalism and Federation, pp.79-85.
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contained elements of political instrumentalism. Lewis was genuine in his support 
for European union, and pursued the political linkage throughout the 1920s and 
1930s by championing the cause of Welsh autonomy and European union in the 
party’s Welsh language newspaper as twin challenges to state sovereignty and 
materialistic nationalism. These two themes remained a durable influence on Plaid 
Cymru, particularly as the party tried to square its support for European union with 
economic integration and the perceived centralisation of the European Community in 
later years.
Lewis’ political philosophy and attitude to Europe were derived from a number of 
interacting sources. Lewis’ conversion to Catholicism, which was quite exceptional 
in Wales, led him to examine the experience of pre-reformation Europe, and analyse 
the condition of Europe in a similar manner to more contemporary academics. 
Lewis also showed a predilection for France and French political writers such as 
Charles Maurras and Maurice Barres, as well as Irish writers such as Yeats and 
S y n g e . T h e  Francophile in Lewis was an aspect shared with other Welsh 
nationalists such as Ambrose Bebb, though they also showed concern for Brittany. 
The Francophile tendency led one writer to remark that “it became something of a 
tradition up to the second world war that the Welsh nationalist should adopt France 
as his second country”. This tradition had been established by the writings of 
Emrys Ap Iwan in the late nineteenth century, who had argued for Europe rather 
than the Empire to form an alternative political arena for Welsh nationahsm.^^ There 
was, however, some inconsistency here. Lewis’ description, and condemnation, of 
materialist and statist nationalism would seem to apply fairly accurately to France, 
with Brittany as one of the obvious victims of this type of nationalism. Embracing it 
appears rather incoherent in retrospect.
Plaid Cymru’s newspapers have covered European issues since their establishment, 
partly to encourage W elsh people to consider international political issues 
independently of England,^® but also to make use of the demonstration effect 
through publicising the experiences and successes of other small nations who have 
achieved self-government. Linking Wales to such countries as Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Denmark and Ireland was an attempt to encourage nation-
15. Dafydd Jones, “Politics” in Jones and Thomas (eds). Presenting Saunders Lewis, p.32.
16. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism.
17. Dafydd Jones, Op. cit., p.23.
18. Ibid., p.54.
19. Ibid., p.56.
20. Gwynfor Evans, Fighting for Wales, p. 156.
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building by emulation. Such countries were repeatedly presented as models for 
Welsh national development and international involvement. This list of countries 
was raised in an article in The Welsh Nationalist in May 1934, and bears comparison 
with contemporary national models, despite the tendency towards regionalism within 
contemporary Welsh nationalism. This identification with nation-states, and their 
different agenda in international affairs, was reinforced by demands for a Welsh seat 
at the League of Nations, as protection against aggression by larger states. That 
League membership was advanced as a primary goal of PC is clear,^! and also 
significant, with nationalists trying to enlist the League as a defence mechanism for 
Wales and also discussing the possibility of the development of a world federation 
of states with its own police force and settlements bank - again with Wales as a
member. 22
The prospect of European union itself was undermined by conflicts that damaged the 
League of Nations. From the nationalist’s viewpoint, union was also frustrated by 
the absence of Welsh self-government, and the actions of the British Government in 
international affairs. The government was seen to be unwilling to consider European 
interests and solidarity, and the nationalists expressed concern
“at seeing ourselves committed by our European rulers to a policy
intended to make any real European co-operation im possible” .23
The European rulers in this case were the British Government, whom PC regarded 
as obsessed with state sovereignty. Though claiming a role for Wales in international 
affairs, it is highly doubtful that it would have had any impact upon the instability in 
European politics during the 1920s and 1930s. Though there was, and remains, a 
tendency for nationalists to talk up their role in international affairs, a practice 
usually accompanied by denunciations of big-state politics, realism is not the issue 
here. To an extent nationalist parties were merely setting out their positions on the 
issues of the day, offering a set of principles to guide the behaviour of their small, 
embryo states and raising them up above the society of states to claim some special 
mission in international affairs. In the Welsh case, this involved working to bring 
peace to the international system - a reflection of Christian and pacifist influences 
within the party - and also criticising the goals and behaviour of the main actors in 
the international political system.
21. The Welsh Nationalist, March 1932, p.l; Welsh Nationalist Party, Op. cit., 1931.
22. The Welsh Nationalist, March 1933, p.l.
23. The Welsh Nationalist, June 1941, p.4.
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Plaid Cymru in the Postwar Years
The late 1940s and 1950s found PC attending to its domestic organisation and 
campaigning needs. The issue of European union was underplayed in this period as 
the party concentrated on developing its political role in Wales rather than trying to 
outline a political philosophy. The retirement of the party leader, Saunders Lewis, 
and the election of his successor Gwynfor Evans in the post-war period brought a 
number of changes to the party. Though Evans remained committed to Lewis’ 
position on European union,^"^ the issue had little saliency for PC until the debates 
on membership of the Common Market in the 1960s. Whilst PC’s foreign policy 
agenda played a minor role, the party was transformed from a pressure group of 
Welsh activists, occasionally contesting elections, into a campaigning movement that 
was to grow into a more significant political party.
Party membership grew under the new leadership, and the number of local 
organisations increased.^ PC also began to contest elections more regularly. Eight 
seats were fought in 1945, though the party achieved seven lost deposits in the 
process. By-elections proved more fruitful with PC gaining almost 30% at Ogmore 
in 1946 and 20% in Aberdare, despite traditional Labour support in these areas. 
The greater consistency in electoral politics was accompanied by the adoption of 
campaigning and protest tactics which gave PC a profile in both local and all-Wales 
issues, and effectively radicalised the party. It also showed that parties could still 
operate as movements and pressure groups, adopting different political strategies to 
suit the needs of the organisation. The radicalism of the new PC was evident 
through the direct action campaigns against the military authorities, the Forestry 
Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture and Liverpool City Corporation, over the 
issue of landholdings and planning proposals that effected W elsh language 
communities and damaged the environment.
W hilst PC’s campaigning and electoral mobilisations developed, the issue of 
European integration was progressing. From the close of the second world war a 
number of developments took place: Winston Churchill’s speech in favour of 
European union in 1946, the process of European reconstruction and the Marshall 
Plan, the Hague Congress of the European movement in 1948 and the establishment 
of the Council of Europe in 1949. The attitude of PC to such developments is
24. See Gwynfor Evans, Plaid Cymru and Wales.
25. Butt Phillip, Op. cit., p.73.
26. Ibid., p .l5.
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difficult to discern, though there was some positive response to the discussions 
within the SNP, and its adoption of European federation as a goal of Scottish 
nationalism .27 The Hague Congress seems to have passed by with little impact, 
though PC did seek involvement at the subsequent Paris Congress of regional 
minorities organised in 1949. Like the SNP, the Welsh nationalists joined the 
International Congress of European Communities and Regions, attending its 
meetings from 1949 to at least 1954. PC’s participation in this organisation was 
deeper tlian that of the SNP. The party’s General Secretary attended the Congress 
meetings and was elected to its permanent committee at the inaugural Congress in
1949.28  and continued to attend the meeting until the fourth Congress in Munster in
1954.29
Though PC was a more serious participant in the Congress’ meetings than the SNP, 
it shared the latter’s scepticism about the organisation. There was concern that the 
Congress seemed oriented towards acting as a forum for regions and regional 
interests rather than for minority nationalism, and sought to avoid the political 
consequences of regional autonomy and self-determination.^® PC’s participation at 
these meetings provided a useful learning process for it in distinguishing between 
nationalist and regionalist aspirations and movements. Though these meetings, and 
PC’s involvement with the International Congress provided very little tangible 
rewards for Welsh nationalism, they were indicative of a positive disposition to 
European union and a willingness to co-operate with transnational regionalist 
bodies.
The proposals and agreements on European union during the 1950s led PC to 
reassess Welsh prospects in Europe. As one nationalist pointed out, “the most 
compelling economic topic of our day is the imminent reality of economic integration 
in Western Europe. This must be welcomed by Plaid Cymru, which had always 
called for greater co-operation with Europe in general” .^  ^The political potential of 
the new institutions was not lost on Plaid Cymru, which thought that Europe was
“probably creating a permanent political entity, which will 
undoubtedly develop even closer t i e s ” . ^ 2
27. The Welsh Nation, July 1948, p.4.
28. Minutes of the Welsh National Party Executive Conunittee, National Library of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, Box A.Bl, 1974-5.
29. Ibid.
30. The Welsh Nation, August 1951, pp.3-5, and June 1955, pp.3-4.
31. The Welsh Nation, January 1957, p.4.
32. Ibid.
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Though these were rather vague linkages and observations, they demonstrated the 
party’s awareness of the danger in having W ales locked out o f European 
organisations. W ales’ absence from the European Coal and Steel Community was 
seen as particularly costly, in addition to the lack o f opportunity for the 
representation of W elsh interests in ongoing negotiations between the UK 
Government and the nascent European institutions.^^ This representational linkage 
was to become an orthodox response. However, in recognising the process of 
deepening within the new Community and the prospect of political integration, the 
party showed an awareness of the fact that the new EC held more serious integrative 
potential than weak institutions like the Council of Europe.
PC did not miss the opportunity for linkage as a tool to exploit the UK 
G overnm ent’s negative bargaining on European union. As one nationalist 
confidently remarked,
“a W elsh Government would gladly enter into discussion and 
negotiation over a European Customs Union, with due regard to the 
requirements of the nation of Wales and her people”.^^
The lack of self-government dented such confidence, and undermined the previous 
policy of positive linkage, particularly as the party crossed the threshold between 
broad support for European union to face the reality of institutional Europe. The fact 
that Wales was locked out of the European Community in 1957 but remained locked 
into the United Kingdom brought PC to reinterpret the political opportunity structure 
of European integration and develop a new approach and strategy to linkage.
4, Plaid Cymru And Europe Since the Establishment of the 
European Community
Despite its earlier pro-European traditions PC turned against the European 
Community in the years following its creation in 1957. Welsh exclusion from the 
EC led to growing disquiet, and then to complete opposition to Welsh membership. 
In the early 1960s PC expressed concern at Welsh exclusion from the Common 
Market negotiations undertaken by the British Govemment.^^ Such exclusion was 
not surprising given W ales’ subordinate status within Britain. PC’s answer was to 
develop and deploy negative linkage, complaining of exclusion and non-
33. The Welsh Nation, March 1957, p.4.
34. Ibid.
35. “The Coal Industry and International Economic Relationships”, resolution no.5. Plaid Cynuu 
National Conference, 1961.
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representation in contrast to the more positive linkage practiced between 1925 and 
1957 which sought to talk up the role of Wales as an international political actor 
seeking to participate in European politics. In the pre-1957 period nationalist support 
for a united Europe did not envisage or suggest any particular institutional form. It 
was more of a positive value orientation, a belief in the efficacy of European union 
rather than a detailed policy. That PC had no more than a vague idea about the 
construction of Europe was not surprising. It was a small oppositional party with no 
nationally elected members, and little experience or function in national and 
international politics. In the 1950s, when European integration took an institutional 
form, it was still a micro-party. The form and content of European union was 
decided by others. The infiuence of the institutional structure of Europe in turning 
PC against the EC is unclear. The reality of Welsh exclusion seems to be the 
dominant factor in the immediate post-1957 period, though other factors were to 
develop in the 1960s and 1970s.
PC's early response to the perceived weakness of W ales’ position in Europe was to 
propose a common front with other small nations and minorities.^^ The 
establishment of the European Community had made co-operation more pressing 
than it had been in the 1950s with the International Congress. However, the 
development of a new period of transnational regionalism had to wait until the 1970s 
and British accession to the European Community.
PC’s position on Europe hardened as the 1960s progressed. The previous strategy 
of positive linkage was seldom deployed, though occasionally given an airing in 
certain circumstances. It was replaced by a mixture of outright and qualified 
opposition to the EC, which were essentially negative linkages, and by political 
ambiguity. Such ambiguity was because of Welsh exclusion from negotiations and 
the party’s view that Wales could not be committed on the outcome of UK-EC 
negotiations until it received separate representation within the Community.^ ^  
Ambiguity also derived from the fact that PC always wanted to hold out the prospect 
of Welsh membership of the EC if the price was right in negotiations. Such qualified 
opposition was shared by the SNP. It was as if the party felt that the European 
Community would make Wales an offer it couldn’t refuse in any post-independence 
context. Such ambiguity was even sustained during the referendum campaign in 
1975, in spite of the party’s commitment to unqualified opposition to the EC. 
Ambiguity played a key role in maintaining party unity in this period, as the internal
36, “Co-operation with Small Nations”, resolution No.4, Plaid Cymru National Conference, 1962.
37. Butt Phillip, Op. cit., p .l82.
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cleavages of the party prevented it from adopting a fundamental attack on the 
Community in pursuit of maximum political and economic sovereignty for Wales.
The Development o f Negative Linkage
In 1969 the party’s European policy began to develop a more consistent theme. The 
party conference at Aberystwyth expressed opposition to UK membership of the 
EC, regarding all negotiations and discussions as inadequate if Wales lacked 
representation.^^ The conference noted the potentially negative economic impact of 
the EC on Welsh agriculture, and expressed the expectation that the political attitudes 
of the six EC countries would lead them to develop as a monolithic satellite of the 
United States.^^ This new theme was to be developed in future by anti-EC activists 
within the party as part of a leftist agenda that identified the EC as a security 
community produced by the cold war and US sponsorship.
As an alternative to the European Conununity the party reaffirmed its proposal for a 
UK customs union following Welsh independence, which had been proposed at 
conference in 1960. This rather curious external support system suggests that PC 
had a very limited view of self-government which fell well short of the classic notion 
of independence. The proposal sought to develop economic integration within the 
United Kingdom, in the context of Scottish and Welsh independence, and secure 
continued free trade within the UK and access to the English market for Welsh 
products. In choosing the UK over the EC, the party adopted a rather conservative 
position, aimed at deflecting criticism of separatism. The proposal included several 
aspects that resem bled the EC institutions. PC called for intergovernmental 
structures to administer the customs union, with a common executive and 
interministerial conferences."*®
PC’s efforts to focus on the problems of UK membership of the Community were 
aided by an «omission in policy by the Welsh Office in 1970. During the Crowther- 
Hunt (later Kilbrandon) hearings on constitutional reform - the Royal Commission 
on the Constitution established by the Labour Government - it emerged that the 
Welsh Office, which had been established in 1964 as the territorial bureacracy for
38. “Wales and Europe”, resolution No. 16 and amendment, Plaid Cymru National Conference,
1969.
39. The Welsh Nation, November, 1969, p.2.
40. “British Customs Union”, resolution A, Plaid Cymru National Conference, 1960; Gwynfor 
Evans, Self-Government for Wales and a Common Market for the Nations of Britain.
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Wales, had made no assessment of the effects of EC membership on the Welsh 
e c o n o m y .T h is  administrative lapse occured in spite o f ongoing negotiations 
between the European Commission and the UK Government. It suggests some 
failure at the level of the Welsh Office, but also indicates its status within the UK 
Government structure. Had the bureaucracy been consulted on the negotiations then 
an assessment of the policy impact of the EC would have been required. In admitting 
that it was unprepared, the Welsh Office gave the nationalists the opportunity to 
make capital from the fact that Wales had no role or input in the negotiating process. 
If the Welsh Office was not advising the UK Government on Welsh interests during 
entry negotiations then no one was. The publication of the Government White Paper 
on UK membership brought further criticism from PC.'^^ The Government’s 
economic assessment of membership treated the UK economy as an undifferentiated 
whole, ignoring regional economic differentials.^^ This inadequacy brought the 
party to call for a separate White Paper for Wales and Welsh membership of the 
Community."^
Despite its political opposition, and efforts to exploit weaknesses in the case for UK 
membership of the EC, PC still asserted that it was a pro-European party. During the 
House of Commons debates on accession to the Community in 1967 the party 
leader, Gwynfor Evans stated
“I am not against the idea of the Common Market. I am saying that if 
we go in in our present position the effect on W ales could be 
devastating”.^ ^
Such ambiguity persisted in the 1970s, along with the dual position that expressed 
support for European union but not for the European Community as the institutional 
manifestation of that union. PC’s view of Europe moved towards a Europe o f the 
Regions rather than nation-states as the best option for Welsh involvement,"^^ though 
the door was still open to independent Welsh membership of the EC “if Wales had 
her own government, if  she were in the Common Market as a separate political 
entity”."^  ^This bargaining position implied that EC membership could be beneficial if 
self-government brought a Welsh government to negotiate with the EC, on the
41. The Welsh Nation, February 1970, p.6.
42. “Britain and the European Communities: An Economic Assessment”, Cmnd 4289, HMSO, 
London, February 1970.
43. The Welsh Nation, March 1970, p.l.
44. Gwynn Matthews, Wales and the European Common Market.
45. Gwynfor Evans, Voice o f Wales - The Parliamentary Speeches of Gwynfor Evans, p.29.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p.26.
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assumption that this would lead to favourable concessions for Welsh industry and 
agriculture.
In agriculture, PC presented a number of issues that arose from the absence of any 
Welsh role in EC negotiations, building upon the differences between Welsh and 
UK agriculture. The distinctiveness of Welsh agriculture was often deployed as an 
argument for autonomy, especially when considered in the EC context. Nationalists 
in Scotland gave similar emphasis to the fishing industry, whose role in the 1974-9 
period was enhanced by the fact that nine of the eleven SNP MPs represented 
constituencies with fishing interests. The Welsh agricultural industry was seen to be 
more dependent on subsidies and deficiency payments than the UK industry, and 
PC expected that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would bring particular 
problems in this area in the absence of transitional relief for Welsh farmers."^* PC 
expected that CAP would bring an end to subsidies for hill-farming, and also 
anticipated problems in the livestock industry through reduced subsidies and 
increased food costs for animals as the CAP structure increased cereal prices."^^ The 
strength of hill-farming in Welsh-speaking areas made the CAP issue a cultural and 
economic priority for PC, which sought to retain employment in the industry to 
prevent rural - and linguistic - depopulation. The provisions of the Mansholt Plan to 
encourage the amalgamation of agricultural landholdings were seen as another threat 
to Welsh farmers, penalising the structure of the industry and its small farm basis. 
PC again linked this situation to Welsh autonomy, optimistically declaring that 
independent Welsh negotiations would have brought more favourable terms.
In addition to drawing attention to Welsh interests in the negotiations, PC’s 
approach to Europe in the early 1970s focused upon the domestic and European 
contexts. Within the UK system PC sought assurances that accession would not 
restrict the transfer of government functions from London to Wales, and that UK 
regional policy would not be undermined by the Community.^® PC pointed out to 
the Community that the constitutional arrangements of the UK were fluid, and any 
future Welsh Government could not be held to the terms being negotiated by the UK 
Government.^ ^  The party also proposed that referenda should be conducted in all 
territories of the UK on the subject of EC accession, and the suspension of 
negotiations by the Government until the public had decided upon the principle of
48. Matthews, Op. cit., p. 13.
49. Ibid.
50. “Wales and the European Community”, resolution No.20, Plaid Cynuu National Conference,
1970.
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membership itself. This ‘federal’ referenda required all four of the nations of the UK 
to support membership, after which each would have separate representation in EC 
negotiations, with a second batch of referenda required to approve the outcome of 
the negotiations.^^ The secession potential of such referenda was clear.
The idea of dual referenda was to exploit the consensus position adopted by the 
major parties on European accession, which pursued the orthodox parliamentary 
route to ratify British membership. With no commitment to the Westminster system 
and parliamentary sovereignty, PC could adopt the more populist approach of calling 
for referenda. Two reasons for the dual referenda strategy were evident. First, there 
was some expectation that a referendum would weaken the ties between voters and 
the main parties, through offering the electorate a free vote on an issue which they 
could cast against their party. Second, the approach enabled significant political 
linkage between autonomy and Europe, particularly through the form of the 
referenda. Both were attempts to drive a cleavage between the Welsh and UK 
electorates, to be exploited in future to increase support for autonomy.
PC also began to question the role of the European Community in the international 
political system, in leftist terms consistent with some academic critiques of the EC.^^ 
PC did not share the view that EC enlargement was an aid to integration in Europe. 
Rather the EC’s close relationship to the United States would ensure that Eastern 
Europe would perceive it as a developing political and military threat, and use that 
threat as a justification for increasing their nuclear and conventional weapons.^'^ This 
leftist theme was extended to the party’s view of the EC as a whole, as the 1971 
conference stated
“the Common Market is a club of old imperial and capitalist countries 
and it is not a club into which we would wish to see W ales 
dragged” .^ ^
PC was also critical of the institutions of the EC. The fact that the European 
Assembly was a nominated body, and that the European Commission was not 
responsible to it, was held to be unsatisfactory. PC did not, however, favour direct 
elections to the Assembly to democratise it, as that was seen to undermine the role of 
national legislatures - though PC seems to have ignored the fact that this meant 
Westminster rather than Cardiff. The party had a rather contradictory position here.
52. Ibid.
53. Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making.
54. “Europe - The White Paper”, resolution A (v), Plaid Cymru National Conference, 1971.
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on the one hand complaining of the lack of democracy within EC insitutions and on 
the other denying the efficacy of direct elections to redress the problem. PC also 
criticised the allocation of votes within the European Council, favouring one vote per 
country instead of votes being distributed according to the size of the country. A 
suspicion of large states was evident here, along with the desire to achieve formal 
sovereign equality regardless of size, just as it was in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
economic agenda of the EC also found little favour with PC. The absence of a 
Community regional policy, and the perception of integration having negative effects 
upon labour mobility in Wales were part of the reason for this. There was a fear that 
increased labour mobility in the EC would mean further depopulation in Wales, as 
local people emigrated to enhance their employment prospects. This unemployment 
exit was also seen to provide a rational disincentive to the development of job 
creation schemes in Wales by the Government and EC, who would prefer to allow 
the free market in labour in the Community tackle unemployment rather than 
intervene in regional economies.^^ Economic integration was also seen to affect the 
language situation through freedom of movement, described above, and the lack of 
regional policy to offset this pressure.
In the cultural domain, PC was critical of the government’s White Paper on 
accession for its failure to present the case for Welsh as a Community language, or 
as a minority language within the EC. The party was also sceptical about the effects 
of membership on industrial policy. PC did not share the government’s optimism 
that Community membership would generate economic growth. There was concern 
that Wales would be joining a bounded economic space which would have deterrent 
effects upon inward investment from countries outside the EC and Europe - such as 
the USA and Japan - though this concern has been largely reversed through the 
develoment of the single market and Welsh success in inward investment in the 
1980s and 1990s. The Community was also seen to offer little to the Welsh coal and 
steel industries beyond external controls on production and pricing that Wales would 
be unable to influence.
The 1971 position of PC was also notable for the fact that the party abandoned 
ambiguity and detailed the issues which would need to be settled in order to satisfy 
the conditions for Welsh entry into the EC. Plaid Cymru stressed that it was seeking 
to strengthen relations between Wales and Europe, but did not want to do so from a 
position of weakness. The party expressed the hope that the Community itself did 
not develop structures which could preclude any future Welsh membership of the
56. Ibid.
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EC through threatening Welsh autonomy and interests. The nationalists declared that 
they wanted to gain assurances from the EC that it would not operate economic 
policies which would have a negative effect on Wales because of its peripheral 
geographical and economic situation, and that the EC would seek to develop a wider 
European union that embraced Eastern Europe and was not wholly oriented towards 
the United States.^^ This demand was unrealistic - in fact the idea that a minor party 
in a region of a prospective member state could make demands was unrealistic - but 
illustrated the party’s commitment to a broader Europe than that embraced by the 
EC.
Once UK entry was assured PC sought to redefine its goals in relation to the 
European Community. Membership was no longer an issue as the UK joined the 
organisation in 1973 through becoming a signatory of the Treaty of Rome. As 
membership was a fait accompli the party turned to defending Welsh interests within 
the EC, detailing the party’s attitude to future membership in the post-independence 
context and developing a bargaining position on EC issues. PC committed itself to 
holding a referendum on membership after self-government, and to campaigning 
against membership in that situation if the Community showed signs of developing 
as a unitary state or establishing a common defence force.^* In the interim, PC 
committed itself to campaigning for Wales to retain its allocation of two members in 
the European Assembly in face of direct elections - this claim moved upwards as the 
Assembly’s planned membership expanded - and for the Welsh Office to establish a 
lobbying office in Brussels.^^ This latter suggestion had to wait until 1992 to be 
fulfilled.
Europe provided another opportunity for the nationalists in 1973 in the form of 
political co-operation with continental regionalist parties. PC was invited to the 
conference of StrolladAr Vro (SAV), the Breton regionalist party, to participate in 
discussions on the development of a common European forum.^® PC involved itself 
in these co-operative efforts - propelled and facilitated by UK membership of the EC 
- and established the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations with other 
regionalist parties. This acted as a lobbying and publicity office for regional parties 
in Brussels, seeking to raise the profile of the stateless nations within the EC.^^
57. Ibid.
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This organisation only involved one other major regional party, the Basque PNV in 
exile, which was not even part of a member state of the EC. The remaining members 
of the Bureau were microregionalist parties. SAV itself was small, a characteristic 
shared by the Mouvement Socialiste Occitan, Mouvement ELSA from Alsace and 
Mebyon Kemow from Cornwall. These were political parties, however, rather than 
cultural movements or economic lobbies. This ensured that the Bureau did not share 
a similar internal fragmentation to the International Congress of European 
Communities and Regions.
The period between the Plaid Cymru conference in 1973 and the referendum on 
continued British membership of the EC in 1975 was a very successful one for PC. 
It included two general elections in 1974, which brought considerable electoral 
success for nationalists in Scotland and Wales. Though PC’s overall vote declined in 
1974 compared to 1970, the increased geographical concentration of its support 
brought two seats in February 1974 with 10.7% of W elsh votes, and then three 
seats in October 1974 with 10.8%. In 1970 PC had gained 11.5%, its electoral peak 
in general elections, yet it had gained no seats. The marked improvement in 
representation gave PC a new profile in the House of Commons and a high degree 
of political visibility in Wales.
The European Referendum 1975
The growth of the party coincided with renewed opportunities for linkage on the 
autonomy and European questions afforded by the referendum on British 
membership. The period in advance of the vote nearly produced a significant change 
in the party’s outlook on the EC that would have changed its behaviour during the 
referendum. The party conference in Aberystwyth in early 1975, which had been 
held over from 1974 because of the October general election, almost committed the 
party to abandoning opposition to the EC and supporting continued membership 
through the adoption of a policy supportive of a Europe o f the Regions. This 
proposal was rejected as the party stuck to its hardline policy of opposition. The 
conference did reveal cleavages on Europe that were similar to those found in other 
parties, though with different edges. Part of the compromise worked out at the 
conference between pro and anti-Europeans involved the party’s response to the 
government’s renegotiated package on accession.
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PC’s pro-European MP, Dafydd Wigley, wanted the party to delay the adoption of a 
definitive stance on EC membership until these renegotiations were completed and 
made public.^^ Wigley sought to enlist the party’s support for a proposal to delay 
any decision until a special conference on the EC and referendum strategy, but this 
was rejected at Aberystwyth. The party preferred to commit itself to a clearer 
oppositional stance on the EC, at the instigation of the party’s anti-EC MP, Dafydd 
Elis Thomas, who wanted an unequivocal policy on the EC to contrast with the 
divisions of the other parties on Europe. Such clarity would have enabled PC to 
begin campaigning for the referendum immediately. The idea of the special 
conference on the EC remained however, as part of the compromise between the 
opposing forces on the European question.
The pre-referendum conference also considered the changes that would have to be 
implemented at the Community level for the party to support membership. Some of 
these took the shape of impossible demands. The conference called on the 
Community to reject any military role, abandon the aim of becoming a unitary state, 
and allow member states to exercise full control of their own socio-economic 
development. These issues of high politics cannot be considered as bargainable. The 
new hardened position aligned the party with the left of the Labour Party, giving it a 
competitive entry into the Labour strongholds of South W a le s .T h is  was part of 
the rationale for the strategy on Europe i ts e lf .T h is  left the question of party unity. 
The conference passed a resolution imposing party discipline upon its MPs, insisting 
that they must follow party policy in the House of Commons.^^ This development 
was seen as a consequence of the election of three MPs and the formation of a 
parliamentary group rather than an effort to ensure cohesion on the European 
question, though it is notable that it was passed in close proximity to debate upon an 
issue that divided the party’s MPs and activists.
The conference revealed a triple cleavage on the European question within the party. 
Some members were clearly pro-EC and favoured independent membership for 
Wales; some totally opposed the EC from a socialist or Galtungian perspective, 
viewing it as a capitalist superstate, or from a fundamentalist nationalist perspective 
that was fearful of the erosion of Welsh sovereignty; a third group was keen to 
develop a regionalist position that would facilitate maximum decentralisation but also 
European union. These cleavages re-emerged in the shape of the Independence in
62. The Western Mail, 6th January 1975, p.9,
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Europe and Europe o f the Regions positions in the late 1980s which will be 
discussed below.
The reaffirmation of opposition in 1975 was aided by a series of study papers 
produced by the party’s research group dealing with the position of Wales in the 
likelihood of continued UK membership of the Community.^^ This analysis was 
produced as part of the PC referendum campaign and can be regarded as “an 
objective” look at the Common Market by anti-Marketeers. The research involved a 
sectoral economic study of the EC impact on Wales, and also dealt with the political 
questions related to the Community’s future development, the alternative routes to 
European union, the opportunities for Welsh co-operation with countries outside the 
EC, and a detailed assessment of the structure and attractions of the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA).
PC expressed a strong preference in favour of the EFTA organisation. It favoured its 
looser trading structure and limited aims rather than the more centralised and political 
ambitions of the EC. The membership of EFTA was also an attraction to PC, with a 
predominance of social democratic and neutral countries within the organisation. 
Thus the EFTA was not only attractive in its economic goals, it was also politically 
correct. The EFTA was presented as the best structure for Welsh co-operation in 
Europe, though the party also favoured negotiating associate membership of the 
European Coal and Steel C om m unity .C hoosing  EFTA was intended to make the 
party appear less isolationist in the referendum campaign, and allow PC to connect 
the Welsh economy to an alternative trading bloc. The reliance on EFTA was 
curious, as it invested the organisation with a degree of stability and strength that it 
lacked. Its stability was questionable as a number of countries had exited from the 
organisation or sought to leave. Its largest member, Britain, had sought to exit in 
1961 along with Denmark, and again in 1967, before finally leaving with Denmark 
and Ireland in 1973. Norway also sought to leave EFTA to join the EC in 1961 and 
1973, though this latter attempt was prevented by a referendum.^^
The Europe o f the Regions position was also considered and dismissed in the 
party’s referendum study papers. The fact that Wales could join the EC and seek to 
change it from the inside in conjunction with other peripheral ethnic groups was not 
taken seriously. It was dismissed as a ‘romantic’ and ‘idealised’ attempt to replace 
the reality of the Community. Such regionalism was not seen to be possible in the
66. Plaid Cymru Research Group, The Referendum Study Papers.
67. The Welsh Nation, 12-18th December 1975, p .l.
68. Brigid Laffan, Integration and Co-operation in Europe, p. 12.
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EC of 1975. The study proposed that the pursuit of a Europe o f the Regions would 
be best made outside the EC rather than inside, building upon such as the Celtic 
League to create an alternative political community.
The referendum campaign itself brought varied opportunities for the nationalists. 
Some of its efforts in the campaign brought a cautious response from its political 
competitors in spite of being on the same side in the referendum. PC sought to 
involve themselves in the ‘Wales Get Britain Out Campaign’, the regional umbrella 
organisation for anti-EC campaigners, but received a mixed response. PC’s efforts 
to get the organisation to develop a more independent campaign in Wales was 
thwarted by other members though it did succeed in having the group adopt a more 
distinctive regional campaign rather than a replication of the UK campaign. The 
party’s General Secretary was elected to the organisation’s executive committee, and 
some joint campaigning was developed.^®
The Labour government’s initial decision to make the referendum subject to a 
national count led PC to declare that it would run its own parallel referendum. The 
party’s MPs also threatened to vote against the referendum biU in parliament, unless 
a separate count for Wales was granted. Though PC supported the referendum in 
principle it was of little strategic value to the party if national counting arrangements 
were instituted. The party set about examining the prospects for its own 
referendum,'^! but the government came to accept the principle of regional counting 
arrangements which made such a measure unnecessary. PC had voted against the 
bill initially to demonstrate its opposition to the counting arrangements, but now 
found itself free to support it. In the months leading up to the referendum PC sent a 
delegation to the European Commission to have talks with EC representatives. It 
also used this visit to announce its formal co-operation with the Bretons in the 
Bureau of Unrepresented European N a tio n s .^ ^  goth can be considered as attempts to 
boost the transnational role of PC and ward off accusations of isolationism during 
the referendum campaign, though the delegation idea had been developed well 
before there was any prospect of a referendum.
The settlement of the counting arrangements and the belief that the Government’s 
renegotiations had not altered the unattractiveness of EC membership led PC to
69. Michael Geddes, “Wales and Regional Development in the EEC”: in The Referendum Study 
Papers, p.9.
70. The Western Mail, 15th February 1975, p.5.
71. The Western Mail, 28th February 1975, p.6.
72. The Western Mail, 26th February 1975, p.2.
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abandon its plans for a special conference on the EC. The party’s National Council 
agreed to make opposition more unequivocal. The renegotiated package enabled the 
PC parliamentary group to calculate the effect of the CAP on Welsh farming, a 
concern shared by the Farmer’s Union of Wales. This meeting laid out three main 
reasons for the party’s opposition to the EC: the Community’s pursuit of political 
union, the proposal for an elected European Parliament, and the lack of adequate 
regional policies.^^ Two of these three issues were bargainable, leaving some room 
for compromise. The opposition to direct elections was made at a time when PC was 
attempting to gain representation in the nominated Assembly. Labour members had 
boycotted the European Assembly in protest at the terms of membership, leaving 
several seats vacant When PC tried to apply to fill one of the seats it was blocked by 
the Labour Party, leaving Wales unrepresented in the Assembly. This failure did not 
bring an end to hopes of European representation. The party was soon involved in 
discussions with Fianna Fail over the formation of a political group in the 
A ssem bly,”^  ^ though to no avail. PC remained unrepresented in the European 
Assembly, operating through the Bureau rather than the parliament.
PC campaigned vigorously during the referendum on various economic and political 
themes, though its pro-EC MP kept out of the campaign in deference to the position 
agreed at the 1975 conference. Despite unequivocal opposition to the EC, the party 
still employed some ambiguity in order to keep pro-Europeans happy. Such 
ambiguity was calculated to aid the party. The PC campaign slogan “Europe Yes, 
EEC No” was one illustration. The party’s campaign was further confused by the 
proposal from the party’s former leader, Saunders Lewis, for voters to abstain from 
the referendum to avoid the twin evils of supporting a centralised EC or voting 
against European co-operation.^^
The PC campaign did not convince Welsh voters to leave the EC, nor did it succeed 
in driving a cleavage between the Welsh and UK electorates. The referendum result 
was a dissappointment for the party. All of the Welsh Counties voted for continued 
membership, including the PC heartland of Gwynedd which delivered a 70.6% vote 
for the EC. Wales as a whole supported the EC by 66.5%, quite close to the UK 
average of 67.2%. The differential achieved by linkage was minimal. The defeat 
caused some problems for PC, and a rapid change in strategy in light of the result. 
As the party had connected the issues of autonomy and Europe during the campaign
73. The Western Mail, 8th April 1975, p.9.
74. Senator Brian Lenihan of Fianna Fail held meetings with the SNP and Plaid Cymru on this 
issue; The Western Mail, 1st May 1975, p.5.
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through negative linkage, it was free to put some distance between the two issues as 
a consequence of the result. PC attempted immediate delinkage^ pointing out that 
voters saw Europe and self-government as two distinct issues, and that defeat for the 
party on Europe did not mean that self-government was also unpopular.^^
Post-Referendum Attitudes
PC did revise its attitude and strategy to the EC in light of the referendum, though 
policy was not to change substantially until the 1980s. The party accepted the result 
of the referendum - given its unambiguous nature in Wales it had little choice - and 
developed a modified position. PC’s response to continued British membership was 
to return to bargaining mode. The party’s representatives met with the Belgian Prime 
Minister, Leo Tindemans, in July 1975, to participate in consultations over the 
inquiry on European Union. Just weeks after the referendum, the party presented the 
case for “full national status for Wales inside the European Communities” to the 
Tindemans inquiry.^^ This new approach continued in the post-referendum period, 
with PC campaigning for national rights in the EC. The party called for increased 
Welsh representation in the European Assembly and for national status with a 
complement of ten members in the parliament, nine members on the Economic and 
Social Committee, the right to nominate Commissioners, membership of the Council 
of Ministers, and amendments to the Treaty of Rome.^^ There was an element of 
bargaining here, but it was essentially the demand for Independence in Europe. The 
referendum result had the effect of freeing the party’s pro-Europeans, who 
elaborated a very different future for Wales in Europe than during the referendum.
PC also began to link the European question to discussions on devolution taking 
place in Wales and at Westminster. PC argued for direct links between a Welsh 
Assembly and the European institutions, increased regional policy measures to aid 
Welsh economic development, and frequently repeated its demand for better Welsh 
representation in the European Assembly. The party was not satisified with the 
constituency allocations for direct elections which only gave four seats to Wales. It 
argued that fairer representation would only be achieved through self-government, 
which would increase its seats in the European Parliament to a size similar to 
Ireland.^^
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The party’s position on the European Community did enter a new period of 
flexibility after the referendum, though it still appeared confused. The new flexibility 
was partly produced by direct elections. These were to provide a new issue, and a 
new electoral process, for the development of linkage. Despite its earlier opposition 
to direct elections,*® the party decided to contest the elections and use them in its 
electoral strategy for autonomy.*^ This, in contrast to the party’s involvement with 
the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, opened up a more convincing 
second front for Welsh autonomy, adding an electoral approach to what had 
previously been a lobbying strategy. Though the party committed itself to 
participating in the elections, it wished to play down their significance for the EC. 
The party did not believe that direct elections in themselves would play an important 
role in the démocratisation of the Community, instead they might provide grounds 
for the development of a unitary political structure for Europe. Agreement to 
participate did not blind PC to the role of the elected parliament in the construction of 
a European ‘superstate’.
The first direct elections in 1979 took place during a difficult period for Plaid 
Cymru. The referendum on devolution had been a disaster for the nationalists with 
only 20.8% support for a Welsh parliament. In PC’s Gwynedd heartland only 
34.4% had supported devolution.*^ This result, followed by the slight decline in the 
party’s vote in the subsequent general election to 8.1%, combined with the loss of a 
seat, left the party both disillusioned and exhausted. The third electoral test in June, 
the European elections, was consequently greeted by minimal campaigning. The 
result was, however, encouraging for PC. The party gained 11.7%, its highest ever 
national share in Wales.
In the 1980s PC’s dual position of opposition and bargaining on the EC was 
maintained. Though the party was feeling its way towards a new policy, negativism 
was still evident. The opponents of the EC within the party continued to publicise 
the costs and failings of the Community. The EC was blamed for having brought job 
losses in the Welsh manufacturing sector,*^ and producing inferior standards of 
living to the EFTA economies.*^^ But as the 1980s progressed the shape of the 
Community began to change, with the enlargement of 1981 and the proposed
80. Plaid Cymru National Conference 1975, Op.cit.
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Mediterranean expansion in 1986. Enlargement changed the balance of the 
Community, making EFTA less attractive, and producing policies within the EC that 
PC found more attractive.
A New European Policy
There was some evidence of changing attitudes towards the party’s policy on Europe 
in advance of the 1983 conference in Treorci. Independence in Europe was 
promoted as a means to avoid the economic difficulties of separation.^^ The 
conference itself focused upon three different positions: one explicitly opposed to the 
EC, one implicitly supportive, and one a restatement of an earlier ambiguous 
position. The anti-Community proposal sought to equate the party strategy of 
contesting European elections with that of Westminster, with electoralism bringing a 
dilution of the party’s aims and objectives. A second proposal suggested that the 
party should seek membership of the Confederation of Socialist Parties (CSP) of the 
European Parliament, with the intention of working to reform the European 
Community from the in s id e .P C  had declared itself a socialist party in 1981, and 
affiliated to the Socialist International. It was also a member of the European Free 
Alliance of regionalist parties, having just become a full member in 1983. 
Membership of EFA precluded that of the CSP, though the party should not have 
anticipated a warm welcome from the socialists as PC brought no MEPs to the group 
and was in electoral competition with one of the CSP’s members. The political 
practicalities of this proposal were dubious but it does show the intention of working 
within the institutions of the Community.
The third position debated, and accepted, at the party conference involved a lengthy 
condemnation of the policy faüures of the EC and the lack of Welsh representation. 
It proposed that EC membership be put to a referendum after self-government, 
without any political recommendation on the issue from Plaid Cymru.^^ This 
position was essentially a reaffirmation of the policy in 1970, calling for two 
referenda on EC membership. This policy was adopted but was not to remain in 
effect for very long. It was a staging post towards a pro-EC position, as the party re­
examined the political opportunities offered by a changing Community.
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Though PC’s policy in 1983 was essentially only a restatement, the party had not 
retained the hostile position from 1975. Events within the Community and changed 
attitudes within the party provided the context for a new position. The crisis in the 
EC in 1983-4 was seen as an opportunity by PC. Dissatisfaction with the CAP, the 
EC budget and the negotiations relating to the Mediterranean enlargement all cast a 
shadow over the Community. Instead of seizing on these developments to campaign 
against continued membership, PC used them to argue for a more decentralised EC, 
reflecting the attitudes of its partners in the European Free Alliance.
The expectation of increasing the party’s share of the vote and gaining representation 
at the European elections was also a factor in generating a more positive approach to 
Europe. Something more positive was required than merely trying to capitalise on 
anti-EC feeling. The result was a policy change in advance of the European 
elections, that had not been put to party conference, which proposed a Europe o f the 
Regions position for the party.^*
This position was more consistent with the party’s decentralist and pro-European 
traditions than outright opposition. PC’s appeal in the election was confused 
however. The argument for self-government received a considerable boost during 
the European election campaign through the strong stance of the Irish Government 
over milk quotas. The new CAP regime for milk discussed in 1984 was seen to be 
unfavourable to Irish dairy farmers, and the government fought a vigorous campaign 
to avoid cuts in milk production. This allowed PC to show the ability of small 
countries to defend their interests in the EC, and the efficacy of the national veto to 
defend Welsh agricultural interests if the country achieved independent status within 
the Community. Such nation-statism was not consistent with the party’s new policy. 
PC was committed to the régionalisation of the Community, exploiting the issue of 
the veto meant that they were also arguing for Independence in Europe.
Despite embracing the Europe o f the Regions, PC maintained its demand for full 
W elsh representation within the Community. There were considerable 
inconsistencies here. Regions did not have the right to nominate European 
Commissioners, attend and vote at sessions of European Council or receive a 
national complement of MEPs, but these remained high on PC ’s agenda for 
Europe.*^ This dichotomy persisted since 1984, accompanied by bargaining 
demands consistent with full national status. Confused though this was, it should
88. The Welsh Nation, March 1984, p.8.
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not obscure the fact that the party committed itself to support for the European 
Community. Acceptance of the EC did bring some internal dissent within the party 
and the formation of an ultra-fundamentalist group outside PC. This group, the 
Covenanters, remained small, with no members who had been prominent in the 
party. This small split was confined to those who had other policy differences with 
the party than Europe.
The 1984 European elections were reasonably successful for PC but marked no 
significant advance. It gained 12% of the vote in Wales, more than in 1979 and 
significantly above the party’s general election average. PC did not win any seats, 
however, and only managed fourth place in each of the Welsh constituencies. 
Though the party was in a healthier state than at the last European elections in 1979, 
it committed few resources to the election campaign. The European elections were 
still clearly regarded as inferior to general elections. The party had sought to address 
this problem informally in advance of the 1984 elections. It had been proposed that 
the party’s two MPs resign their seats in the House of Commons and contest the 
European election, thus redefining the im portance o f Brussels vis-a-vis 
W estm in s te r.T h is  proposal was not acted upon. It held obvious problems as the 
party stood to lose its only seats at Westminster and yet still gain no representation in 
the European Parliament. It was also unclear which seats the two MPs would have 
hoped to contest. Both came from Northwest Wales, which meant that one would 
have contested the North Wales seat leaving the other to choose a far less promising 
constituency. This proposal had its origins in the party’s Commission of inquiry in 
1981, which had examined PC strategy and organisation. The minority report of the 
Commission had argued for the party to de-emphasise Westminster elections and 
promote the local electoral arena in Wales, but was not accepted by the Commission 
as a whole.®^ The European strategy, if adopted would have meant the party giving 
the European e l e c t i o n s order status, which it later gave to the elections in 1989.
The 1989 European Election
The importance of the European elections was not lost on PC after 1984. PC was to 
identify the 1989 European elections as offering “a particular opportunity to place the 
Welsh national question within a European context”.®^  This opportunity was 
enhanced by the fact that PC had gained a third seat in the North Wales constituency 
at the general election in 1987, and hoped to gain from its geographical concentration
90. Interview with Dr, Phil Williams, Vice-Chair of Plaid Cymru, 1991.
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of support in this region. With three seats in this area, PC expected to have a good 
chance of winning the seat in 1989. In pursuit of obtaining this seat PC implemented 
half of its private proposal from 1984. One of the party’s MPs, the party leader in 
fact, stood in the North Wales seat as the best means to promote linkage and achieve 
electoral success. During the campaign in 1989 PC claimed that it was polling 
around 20% in Wales and stood to gain the North Wales constituency in a three-way 
fight with the main parties. The nationalists actually only achieved 12.3% in Wales, 
and they also failed to win the targetted European seat.
Though PC became the third party in Wales for the first time since 1979 it was the 
Green Party which made the greatest electoral impact. PC’s support only increased 
by 0.3% between the two European elections, and this marginal improvement was 
solely due to the party’s performance in North Wales. In the other three seats the 
party’s vote fell, with the Greens picking up votes from the nationalists and from the 
Liberal Democrats. The arrival of the Greens, coupled to Labour’s success in styling 
the European elections as a referendum on Thatcherism, had allowed UK issues and 
developments to remain more important than Welsh and European questions. PC’s 
agenda was submerged under stronger opposition forces in the shape of the Green 
wave and the anti-Thatcher tide. Though PC had previously been the recipient of 
second order benefits, the 1989 experience indicated that these occasions could also 
help main opposition parties and new parties.
The success of the Greens in Wales led PC to look to the development of an electoral 
alliance with them. The two parties selected joint candidates for by-elections and 
some constituencies in the 1992 general election. This succeeded in giving PC a 
fourth seat. The linkage with the Greens had a threefold motivation. First, it was 
evidence of attempts to develop elements of a post-modern strategy by the party 
President, Dafydd Elis Thomas, to take PC into the new politics agenda of social 
movements. Second, it was a means for the party to reach out to the English 
population in Wales. Third, it intended to make PC politics more relevant to non- 
Welsh speakers, particularly in South Wales. Whether such co-operation would 
persist was doubtful. Divisions between the parties emanating on the Green side, as 
well as significant divisions within the Welsh Greens made future prospects for co­
operation both limited and unlikely.^^ One development that came from this 
relationship was the ‘Greening’ of the PC programme. The party adopted new 
environmental and economic policies as part of its relationship with the Greens,
93. Peter Lynch, “Political Co-operation Between Green and Regionalist Parties”, unpublished 
paper, 1993.
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which brought PC to support an economic policy for the European Community 
based upon sustainable economic growth.^"^
Autonomy In Two Stages
During the European elections PC presented its dual position of independence for 
Wales and a Europe o f the Regions, proposing that the Europe of states would 
transform itself into a community of decentralised regions.^^ This position was 
adopted by the party conference in October 1989. Since then PC presented 
Independence in Europe as a short-term approach to achieve self-government, with 
the longer term aim of accommodating continental demands for regional self- 
government through the reformation of the EC into a Europe o f the Regions. This 
two-step policy used the prospect of Independence in Europe as a campaigning tool 
because it was easily understood and popular amongst voters who favoured 
d e v o l u t i o n . I n  proposing independence PC was not prepared to accept the 
institutional status quo of the EC in the same way as the SNP. The party proposed to 
alter the structure and behaviour of the Community, in common with continental 
regionalist parties, rather than leave it as “an ad hoc compromise for a limited 
association of six countries”.^^
In 1990 PC formally adopted its two-step strategy for autonomy, whilst supporting 
the continued transfer of power from the nation-state to the European Community 
Whilst the SNP concentrated on mapping out a role for Scotland as an independent 
state in the EC, PC sought to elaborate its two-step strategy by indicating its 
preferences for the future institutional development of the Community. PC, in 
common with continental regionalists, proposed the establishment of a second 
chamber of the European Parliament, comprised of nominated representatives from 
the parliaments of the nations and regions of the EC. This senate would be accorded 
powers through the transfer of legislative responsibilities from the European 
Parliament and other EC institutions. The Senate would also play a role in the 
nomination and appointment of European Commissioners. PC proposed that 
regional representatives should be added to the Council of Ministers and that its 
function should be changed to act as a consultative rather than deliberative body. 
This new senate was to be established by 1995, with powers to scrutinise and
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initiate European legislation, and able to act in tandem with the European Parliament 
in taking over the powers of the European Council and Commission in the year 
2000.
Maastricht and Economie And Monetary Union
PC’s proposals for institutional reform seem to have outran party thinking on EMU. 
The party agreed to support Welsh membership of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) but avoided committing itself to EMU despite calling for any European 
Central Bank to be accountable to the European Parliament and Senate. The party 
seems to have assumed that a Welsh parliament would have discretion in these areas, 
but did not specify what policy they should follow. Despite this absence, the party 
conference gave strong support for “Wales in Europe’, making it the flagship policy 
for the 1990s.
PC’s position on the Maastricht Treaty and economic integration had similarities to 
the SNP. There was the strategic goal of linking subsidiarity to the principle of 
decentralisation within states,^^ and the phrase has, as a result, become code for 
’home rule’. The party also argued for the M aastricht Treaty to be put to a 
referendum linked to the constitutional question in Wales, an echo of earlier support 
for referenda in 1970 and 1975, in spite of expressing the view that the completion 
of the single market and the EMS had brought de facto economic integration. Indeed 
in late 1991 the party even dismissed the referendum device itself in stating that it 
was “too late to debate monetary union and a referendum could decide nothing”. 
This attitude was rather inconsistent. PC supported referenda for democratic and 
political purposes in the past, though this negative attitude was replaced with a more 
instrumental position on Maastricht, as the party called for dual referenda on home 
rule and Maastricht.
PC identified the economic challenge of Maastricht but did not appear to comment on 
the substance of the challenge. Instead it focused upon the effect of economic 
integration on the Welsh economy. PC wanted the centralising effects of EMU to be 
offset by increases in the EC’s regional and social funds - what has become known 
as the cohesion fund - accompanied by a process of regional twinning to link weak 
regional economies to strong one and reduce the disadvantages of those outside the 
golden triangle. Thus they sought greater European funds as side-payments for
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economic integration and resources for economic modernisation. Such regional 
twinning was also part of the economic strategy of the Welsh Office in the early 
1990s, with the negotiation of a number of economic and trading agreements with 
the EC ’s motor regions; Baden Wurrtemburg, Catalonia, Lombardy and Rhone- 
Alpes.
Beyond economic policy PC also addressed the issues of agricultural policy and 
decentralisation in its assessment of the Maastricht Treaty. The party pointed to the 
levels of decentralisation in other European countries such as Germany and Spain in 
order to identify Wales with mainstream European régionalisation. This argument 
was an attempt to deploy the demonstration effect and also a means for the party to 
say that ‘history is on our side’. Subsidiarity was one element of this rhetoric, 
though the party employed other aspects of Euro-speak in arguing that the UK 
suffered from a ‘democratic d e f i c i t ’ .
Similar to the SNP, PC used the occasion of voting on the Maastricht Treaty to seek 
political concessions from the government. The numerical weakness of the 
government over amendments to the proposed Committee of the Regions allowed 
PC to strike a deal with the Conservatives. PC supported the government in 
exchange for 3-4 Welsh seats on the Committee, with members of the Committee 
nominated by the parties in Wales. In addition, PC received a commitment that the 
Secretary of State for Wales would develop an all-Wales forum to discuss Welsh 
issues outside parliam ents^
5. Conclusion
Plaid Cymru’s evolution on Europe has followed similar contours to the SNP, but 
the content of this process was very different. The most pronounced divergence 
occured in the 1980s as PC moved away from nationalism towards regionalism in 
response to developments in the EC. This shift altered the party’s formerly 
ambiguous position on self-government, which had been vague and general since 
the early work of Saunders Lewis, and remained so in discussions on the EC in the 
mid-1970s. From a general commitment to self-government, the party moved to 
supporting both Independence in Europe and a Europe o f the Regions. Both are 
highly specific positions, and also contradictory, though not necessarily understood 
as such by the mass public. The influence of the party leaders was important in
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determining European policy with one formulating the early commitment to 
European union and another affecting the transition to regionalism. The latter has left 
the current party President, Dafydd Wigley, with the problem of extricating the party 
from the regionalist aspect of its two-track strategy. Wigley proposed that the party 
simplify its position on Europe and stress the independence message, in doing so he 
sought to downplay the regionalist position.
The former party leader, Dafydd Elis Thomas, who guided the party towards 
regionalism, experienced a complete u-tum on the European issue. In the 1970s 
Thomas was one of the strongest opponents of EC membership, employing a leftist 
critique of the Community, but this position changed completely with the 
development of a ‘regionalised’ EC. Thomas also talked of the development of post­
nationalism in Europe, and the decline of nationalism as a motivating force in 
politics, which was difficult to maintain when trying to capitalise on the 
demonstration effect of the re-emergence of small nations in Eastern Europe. In the 
post-national context Thomas identified W ales’ future as that of a ‘Euro-region’ 
rather than a nation-state, therefore removing the need for secession. Some of the 
reason for this shift was Thomas’ understanding of interdependence and belief in the 
crisis of the nation-state, which was no longer able to tackle global problems:
“radioactivity is no respecter of national boundaries created by 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Passport control and 
territorial boundaries cannot control the real drives and energies of 
our increasingly interdependent, international, interstate mode of 
living”.
This abandonment of the nation-state occured at a time when the European 
Community had altered the scope, content and prospect of secession significantly.
European integration, in its contemporary phase not only brought PC to reassess 
sovereignty but brought it to reassess the notion of self-government and confirmed 
the party’s opposition to outright independence as a long-term goal in the 1980s, 
taking the party back to Lewis’ negative definitions of the nation-state and 
nationalism in the 1920s. The effect of European integration, and in particular the
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‘new’ European Community, was to move PC away from broad definitions of self- 
government towards regionalism. Therefore the overall effect of European 
integration in the contemporary period was to provide the party with new goals that 
resembled the continental regionalist tradition. The fact that the policy position of 
PC was contradictory makes it difficult to cast the 1980s experience as a clear 
successK< r^s o f endsy^^  ^ though the fact that it defined a clear position on autonomy 
in contrast to earlier vagueness was notable.
Europe altered the goal of the party from self-government to that of independence 
followed by regional status. The succession of ends here was part of the escape 
from nationalism and the orthodox nation-state structure. It was evidence of an 
element of anti-etatisme within PC more often found amongst continental regionalist 
parties who favour federalism than the statism of the SNP, the Irish Parliamentary 
Party or Sinn Fein. The adoption of regionalism left the party needing to define what 
form of community would succeed the nation-state and also how Welsh self- 
government would lead to fundamental institutional reform within a European 
Community in which states remained predominant. The SNP position was 
essentially a status quo position on the EC itself, whereas PC’s agenda and aims 
involved fundamental changes to the Community. Such transformation was both 
ambitious and unrealistic. As a strategy it was also weak as its fulfilment was 
dependent upon external political developments. The post-1992 party leadership was 
engaged in moving away from this position to emphasise the first part of the two- 
step strategy and de-emphasise the second. Having affected linkage on the issues of 
European union and Welsh autonomy since its formation the party needed to achieve 
partial delinkage to escape the weakness of the regionalist position.
108. Panebianco, op. cit., p.151.
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The Breton Movement and Europe: 
The Intellectual Linkages Of 
International Federalism
“The Europe of tomorrow cannot do without its regional and national forces, in the ethnic 
sense, nor the fertile contribution that they represent. Moreover, the Europe of 
regional-states, the Europe of Peoples, will not only bring about their autonomy. For they 
alone have the capacity to undermine the myth of the nation-state. They alone have the 
dynamism to achieve the transformation of centralised states into federal states."^
1.Introduction
The Breton movement presents a very different case to that of the SNP and PC as its 
response to Europe has been distinctive and also more consistent, Although it has 
not been able to make any great political capital out of the issue. The reason for 
studyrsgthe attitudes of the Breton movement to European integration is threefold. 
First, to examine the prevalence of European linkages across different types of 
regionalist organisations and contexts. Second, to look at the European attitudes of a 
set of parties which have made very little impact in electoral politics. And third, to 
look at the influence of the European dimension in a set of weak, unstable political 
organisations. The two latter aspects offer considerable contrast with the other cases 
in this thesis.
The most obvious difference between the Breton movement and those in the UK is 
that it has a longstanding predisposition towards regionalism and federalism, and a 
different attitude to national sovereignty than its Scottish and Welsh counterparts. 
Though it has sought to mobilise on the cleavage of national identity, and language, 
rather than on a purely territorial basis, it has seldom taken its nationalism to the 
logic of complete self-determination through secession. Instead, it has proposed 
regional autonomy and dual federalism. The Breton movement has not sought to 
create its own state, but to transform political arrangements within France to obtain 
sovereign equality with the national state and international community.
1. Yann Fouèrè, L ’Europe aux Cent Drapeaux, p. 196.
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The development of the Breton movement has also been very different from that of 
the Flemish movement studied here, though each shared a number of similar 
experiences. Both movements had their roots in the nineteenth century and mirror 
Hroch's depiction of the early development of national consciousness through 
literature and history: the 'scholarly' phase of national movements.^ Both 
movements generated political parties in the twentieth century as politics entered the 
democratic age and franchise extensions ushered in mass politics.^ Sections of each 
movement also diverted into collaboration with German occupiers in WW2, a 
development which delegitimised regionalism in the postwar period, and stalled the 
formation of new parties until the mid-1950s.
Despite the small size and instability of the Breton movement, it has been subject to a 
plethora of historical literature on the development of political regionalism in 
France."^ These have tended to neglect the European dimension in the movement's 
development however. Brittany, through France, has been a member of the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Community since their 
foundation. Such as the Briand declaration of 1930 also brought the question of 
Europe into political debate very early. The Breton movement's response to 
European issues will be examined from the Versailles settlement onwards. 
However, before then it is necessary to detail the development of regionalism in 
Brittany.
2. The Development Of The Breton Movement
In other case studies in this thesis analysis has been confined to one main political 
party, though others receive a walk-on part. The Breton case does not share this 
organisational simphcity. The key defining characteristic of the Breton movement is 
that it remains just that, a movement, and not a mass movement either. Nicholas has 
referred to the Breton movement as an “attitude” rather than a “structure”.^  This is an 
oversimplification, as structures exist. But it does point to the fact that there is no 
consistent or predominant organisation within the movement. Instead the Breton 
movement has generated a large number of political parties, groups and economic
2. Miroslav Hroch, The Social Preconditions for National Revival in Europe.
3. See S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments.
4. Patricia Elton Mayo, The Roots o f Identity: Three National Movements in Contemporary 
Europe ; Michel Nicholas, Histoire du Mouvement Breton - Emsav, Le Séparatisme en Bretagne-, 
Jack Reece, The Bretons Against France.
5. Nicholas, ibid., 1982, p.26.
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and cultural organisations, which is illustrative of the movement's persistent 
instability.
Since the movement's early mobilisation in the nineteenth century, the Breton 
context has not produced a social movement organisation or party with any great 
capacity for organisational survival or expansion. The only contemporary 
organisation which has endured is the Union Démocratique Bretonne. A less stable 
moderate grouping around Yann Fouèrè has also endured, though this tendency has 
generated three different political groups since 1957. Organisational complexity and 
fragmentation, coupled with weak mobilisation, placed strong constraints upon the 
Breton's capacity to capitalise upon the political opportunity structure offered by 
European integration. Despite these problems, a number of parties, including those 
mentioned above, attempted issue linkage between Europe and the Breton question.
The first significant Breton political organisation was formed in 1898. The Union 
Regionaliste Bretonne (URB) sought administrative devolution for Brittany, and the 
region's recognition as a distinct community.^ This organisation was oriented 
towards aristocratic and rural interests, and the agricultural decline of the region. The 
traditionalism of the URB led to the emergence of a splinter organisation in 1911: the 
Federation Regionaliste Bretonne. It was animated by the urban bourgeoisie and the 
professional classes, and sought to escape from the rural agenda to mobilise 
industrial and commercial groups into forming a modernising coalition for the 
economic development of the region.^
Economic regionalism was joined by more political regionalism in 1911, with the 
formation of the Parti National Breton (PNB). This organisation was of a more 
radical disposition than its two predecessors, formed by students and young people, 
and committed to Breton independence and the adoption of Breton as the national 
language of the new state.* This organisation was one of the few examples of 
separatism within the Breton movement's otherwise strong regionalist tradition.
3. The Breton Movement And Europe To 1957
The European issue had little discernible impact upon the Bretons until the 
conclusion of the first world war. Elements within the Breton movement had been 
active in presenting the Breton case to the Versailles conference, but this initiative led
6. Yann Fouèrè, Histoire Résumée du Mouvement Breton, p.23.
7. Nicholas, 1982, Op. cit., p.67.
8. Fouèrè, 1977, Op. cit., p.23.
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nowhere. Instead, the postwar years saw the development of a more consciously 
political movement, generated initially by the formation of the Groupe Regionaliste 
Breton (GRB) in 1918. This organisation initially concerned itself exclusively with 
Breton issues, and limited its attention to domestic appeals. It sought to influence the 
attitudes of the Breton political and economic elite through its journal Breiz Atao. 
The group was formed by younger Breton activists, influenced by the principle of 
national self-determination that formed part of Woodrow W ilson’s fourteen points, 
and by involvement in the Versailles process.^ The group made little political 
headway beyond publishing a journal, which argued for regional autonomy rather 
than separation in its early years. Though the GRB was somewhat inspired by the 
activities of the national movement in Ireland in and after 1916, it generated little 
activity beyond hitching this demonstration effect to the Breton cause.
The most notable aspect of the Groupe Regionaliste Breton in the 1920s was its 
support for pan-Celticism. The group tried to develop political links with Scottish 
and Welsh nationalists, and present the notion of a Celtic alliance as a meaningful 
political community. Such inter-Celtic links had developed in the cultural sphere in 
the nineteenth century between Wales and Brittany - and they later generated such 
organisations as the Celtic Congress - but the Celtic political project came to little. It 
can, however, be seen as part of the internationalisation of the Breton movement that 
led to links with other organisations and national minorities, and the adoption of 
international federalism.
The activists around the GRB gained great encouragement from the politicisation of 
the national cleavage in Alsace in the mid-1920s. The position of the minorities in 
this area brought the development of a Germanophone political party and its 
suppression by the French state. The dem onstration effect of the E lsa ss  
Lotheringischer Autonomisten Partei radicalised the Breton movement,^ ^  and 
encouraged the adoption of domestic federalism to address the position of other 
minority populations in France. The Alsace situation also provided some of the 
political impetus for the formation of a new political party out of the Groupe 
Regionaliste Breton in 1927. It was this juncture that took the issue of European 
integration to centre stage within the Breton movement, and brought the first 
coherent presentation of dual federalism in Breton regionalism.
9. Olier Mordrel, L ’Idée Bretonne, p.97.
10. Alain Deniel, Le Mouvement Breton, p.73.
11. Ibid., p.75.
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The Parti Autonomiste Breton
The Parti Autonomiste Breton (PAB) had a short political life in Brittany from 1927- 
31. However, its strong federalist position proved influential to its successors in the 
movement. The PAB’s position of dual federalism sought the creation of a federal 
state within the French Republic, which would emancipate both the Bretons and 
other minorities. The multi-national aspect of the state was seen to make this solution 
viable. It was the French version of the ‘home rule all round’ solution presented 
intermittingly in the United Kingdom. However, the PAB also embraced the 
principle of international federalism: a French federation would be balanced by the 
development of a European federation based on nations and minorities rather than on 
centralised states.
In pursuit of its dual goals, the PAB sought to develop organisational links with 
other national minorities. It attempted to form the Central Council of French National 
Minorities in partnership with the Alsace and Corsican movements, whilst trying to 
develop contacts with other European minorities and regionalist m o v e me n t s . T h e  
PAB's federalism aimed at transcending nation-states, an early model of the Europe 
o f the Regions position, and creating a European union of more natural, ethnic 
nations. This approach carried with it the explicit belief that European federalism 
would bring the withering away of the s t a t e , a n  expectation shared with Marxists 
and contemporary neo-functionalists.
At its second congress at Chateaulin in 1928 the PAB pursued its internationalisation 
strategy: the congress was attended by representatives from other nationalist and 
regionalist movements in Ireland, Wales, Flanders, Corsica and Alsace. The 
Chateaulin congress, and the subsequent meeting in 1929, aimed to develop the 
PAB’s organisation and programme. The party committed itself to political and 
administrative autonomy for Brittany, rather than independence - which cleared up 
some of the ambiguity developed amongst the members of Breiz Atao and the 
Groupe Regionaliste Bretonne which were more nationalist and vague about 
federalism  - and to European union as a means to develop both a security 
community and an economic union, with the latter providing the economic grounds 
and co-operative practices for common security. The PAB also presented federalism
12. Nicholas, 1982, Op. cit., p.78.
13. Mordrel, Op. cit., p.l08.
14. Mordrel, ibid., quoting from a pamphlet written and published by the author in 1922.
15. Fouèrè, 1977, Op. cit., p.31.
16. Deniel, Op. cit., p.79.
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as a mechanism against the state, with any union to be based upon nations not state 
structures. Dual federalism was seen to offer autonomous solutions for national 
and regional minorities in France and other countries.
Though the programme and organisation of the PAB was developing, it still faced 
the obstacle of electoral representation. Though in existence for only two years, the 
party acted to implement an electoral strategy on two occasions in 1930. This 
electoral mobilisation brought the party face to face with the barriers of a French 
electoral system that penalised small parties. The PAB contested a by-election at 
Guingamp in April 1930, but only received 0.02%, in spite of strong campaigning. 
PAB also stood a candidate in the legislative elections in October 1930, contesting 
Rennes-Sud. Here the result was even worse, with only 81 votes achieved from 
16084.1* Such low results established an electoral precedent for the electoralists 
amongst the Breton movement that was often repeated.
These elections left the PAB financially ruined and politically divided, and the 
party's internal cleavages on the autonomy issue threatened to split the organisation. 
The early adoption of an electoral strategy proved costly, with little reward from 
such an all or nothing approach in a small, weakly institutionalised organisation. 
Such defeats opened internal cleavages on the core goals of the party, with conflict 
between its fundamentalists, who sought Breton autonomy as their only goal and 
disregarded the European dimension, and the federalists, who linked autonomy to 
the agenda of Europe and international federalism.
These divisions, coupled to the organisation's electoral failure, brought its demise in 
1931.^^ This cleavage on ‘ends’ - with disputes over the efficacy of European union 
as a political resource for Breton autonomy - may have endured were it not for the 
experiences of the 1930s and the second world war, which removed this 
fundamentalist group through its associations with the extreme right. This tendency 
desired Breton autonomy alone, and did not want to subordinate it to either French 
or European federalism,^® and its conflict with the federalists brought the end of the 
PAB and the development of new Breton organisations based upon the two PAB 
cleavages.
17. "Declaration adoptee a Chateaulin, le 18 août 1929, par le Congres du Parti Autonomiste 
Breton", in Maurice Duhamel, La Question Bretonne dans son cadre Européen,
18. Deniel, Op. cit., p.90.
19. Jack Reece, Op. cit., 1977.
20. Deniel, Op. cit., p.96.
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The Parti National Breton (PNB) was formed by the fundamentalist wing of the 
PAB, and displayed rightist and pro-nation-state views. It degenerated into more 
extreme positions as the 1930s progressed. It contrasted with the more moderate and 
cross-class Ligue Fédéraliste de Bretagne^ which developed from the federalist wing 
of the PAB.21 The Ligue continued the PAB’s efforts to develop co-operation and 
solidarity between national minorities and regional movements in France. The Ligue 
remained a pressure group, however, and failed to develop into either a party or a 
movement. It continued as an elite forum for several years, publishing a journal on 
European minorities, but resembled the pre-party phase of the Groupe Regionaliste 
Breton and Breiz Atao. The Ligue did not establish an exclusive membership or 
pursue an electoral strategy,22 it remained as a cross-party group with members from 
other organisations and parties. 23
Maurice Duhamel and International Federalism
Though the Parti Autonomiste Breton failed as an electoral organisation it succeeded 
in establishing an enduring linkage between the Breton and European questions. The 
party, through one of its founders, Maurice Duhamel, managed to develop a 
coherent and integrated approach to the autonomy issue through international 
federalism. Duhamel was the main animator behind the party's intellectual linkage, 
and can be regarded as a policy entrepreneur^"^ similar to advocates of European 
linkage in other parties. Duhamel laid out the intellectual case for dual federalism in a 
PAB pamphlet and book in 1929: the author's approach set the Breton question in 
international context, and used it to develop an autonomous future for the region that 
did not require separatism.
Duhamel saw two prominent currents in international politics in this period: the 
revival of nations and nationalism, and the desire for international agreement and co- 
operation.25 These remained important themes for the Bretons and other regionalist 
movements throughout the century. Duhamel was carçful to stress that the 
nationalism of the Bretons, Alsaciens and Corsicans was not opposed to 
internationalism, but shared its roots in the experiences of W W l. Duhamel saw that 
the international community had failed to deal with the problems of national 
minorities in the post-Versailles years. Despite the creation of new states at the
21. Nicholas, 1982, Op. cit., p.81.
22. Ian McAllister, "Party Organisation and Minority Nationalism: A Comparative Study in the 
United Kingdom", European Journal o f Political Research, V ol.9,1981, p.238.
23. Deniel, Op. cit., p. 143.
24. Kingdon, Op. cit., p. 129.
25. Maurice Duhamel, Le Fédéralisme International et le Réveil des Nationalités, p.l.
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postwar peace conference, the national question had only achieved a partial 
resolution. The conference had created states but not always nation-states, multi­
national Empires had given way to states which contained plural national groups: for 
example Slovenes remained in Italy and Hungarians in Romania.
Duhamel saw that national problems remained in Europe, despite the growing 
tendency towards economic interdependency and international co-operation, that he 
interpretted as trends towards global economic union.^6 These transnational 
developments and interdependencies in the economic sphere^^ were creating the 
grounds, and the necessity, for political union in Europe, in which states would 
become provinces within a federal union. This would mirror the earlier experiences 
of small states involved in the nation-building processes that created multi-national 
states,28 yet would manage to transcend the nation-state itself. However, in contrast 
to contemporary neo-functionalists, Duhamel did not see nations as economic 
entities but as political and cultural constructs, which required a degree of political 
sovereignty to be retained amongst individual peoples and groups. Territorial 
federalism was seen as the best way to balance the need for local participation with 
the twin pressures of political sovereignty and economic union.
Duhamel's prescription for dual federalism promoted the issue of interdependence 
above that of independence for two main reasons. First, autarky was seen to be 
unachievable. Duhamel held that economic boundaries could not be frozen in the 
same way as political boundaries. The interdependent nature of the Breton and 
French economy required free trade. In the European sphere this meant the pursuit 
of liberal policies within a European common market, and the reduction of 
international conflict to economic competitition.^^ Second, Duhamel saw no future 
for Brittany as an independent state, subject to external political and economic 
dominance by Britain, France and other global actors. Duhamel's alternative was an 
equal role for Brittany in a decentralised European federation of peoples which 
would produce a more egalitarian society of states.
Another notable objective of Duhamel's work was to place the Breton problem in 
international context: to make international federalism credible, internationalise the 
Breton question and confer it with a degree of domestic and international political 
legitimacy. This linkage enabled the Breton cause to be hitched to others, as was the
26. Ibid., p.7.
27. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds). Transnational Relations and World Politics.
28. Duhamel, 1928, Op. cit., p.7.
29. Ibid., p.8.
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case with the situation in Alsace. Such identification was intended to legitimise the 
movement, but also link it to progressive trends in other societies.
In placing the the Breton question in international context, Duhamel explicitly 
presented it as one national minority problem amongst many: not just in France but 
in Europe generally, for that is the logic of dual federalism. It was a univeralist 
approach to Breton autonomy that contrasted strongly with the unilateral efforts of 
national movements in the case of Scotland and Ireland. Duhamel saw that the 
solution of the Breton question could not be settled in isolation from the other 
minorities in France and Europe. Minority problems were seen to be interdependent. 
This interdependence was the logic for federalism. It existed in contrast to secession 
which was politically questionable as it undermined the chance of a global solution 
for France to develop as a federal state and tackle all minority problems 
universally.^®
Duhamel's understanding of federalism was essentially decentralist Within France, 
federalism was to divide powers between the central institutions, the regions and 
communes. It would have required the creation or designation of regions 
themselves. Duhamel intended to preserve as much power and autonomy at the 
lowest levels, and create mini-states rather than regions.^ ^  In the case of Brittany this 
policy meant giving cultural autonomy to the subnational level, through the removal 
of legislation and pressures for linguistic and cultural homogeniety in France.^^
Duhamel had a strong distaste for regionalism. He saw it as a limited and negative 
force, used as an administrative tool by the state rather than as a political ideal. 
Duhamel held that the state saw regions as purely territorial entities, without cultural 
or historical significance. His preference was similar to social federalism, which 
required regions to have an ethnic-historical bases, to turn them into genuine political 
communities.^^ In the Breton case, state regionalism might create regions from 
amalgamations of departments to leave Brittany as part of an enlarged "region de 
rOuest" with non-Breton departments, as central authorities designed a regional 
system that maintained their political dominance.^"^
30. Duhamel, 1928, Op. cit., p.l5.
31. Maurice Duhamel, La Question Bretonne dans son Cadre Européen, p.86.
32. Ibid., p.84.
33. For a discussion of social federalism see W.S. Livingstone, Federalism and Constitutional 
Change.
34. Duhamel, 1929, Op. cit., p.88.
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Duhamel's suspicions of centrally-inspired regionalism and régionalisation were 
quite prescient. His critique could be applied to the déconcentrations of the 1950 and 
1960s, and to the Socialist reform of the state in 1981. Duhamel recognised that 
regionalism and decentralisation were concepts and practices that would not 
challenge the unitary nature of the state, and would conflict with federalism through 
preserving the pre-eminence of central authorities. Duhamel's federalism was 
intended to prevent the centralist possibilities latent in regionalism, and allow 
multinational and multilingal France, to preserve subnational autonomy and social 
and cultural freedom.^^
Duhamel’s efforts established a coherent tradition of linkage in the Breton 
movement, but it was received by a small audience. When the PAB collapsed, 
Duhamel’s circle of intellectuals survived to form the LiguCy but the ability to 
popularise the issue of international federalism was lost. The Ligue was an elite 
device, rather than a mobilising vehicle, and it and the Parti National Breton adopted 
lobbying strategies as pressure groups on the Breton question rather than an electoral 
appeal in the manner of the PAB. The latter’s failure had closed off any electoral 
strategy in the Breton movement in the 1930s.
Regionalism Turns to the Right
Whilst the Ligue evolved as a think tank, the PNB developed a loose popular front 
strategy, and sought to endorse candidates from other parties who favoured greater 
autonomy for Brittany. The Breton movement therefore moved back from contesting 
elections in its own right to acting as a cross-party pressure group.^^ The PNB 
endorsed 41 candidates in the 1936 legislative elections, who stood for the Front 
Breton^ as well as their own party. Fifteen of these candidates were elected, and 
formed themselves into the Comite de Defense des Producteurs Bretons in the 
National Assembly to lobby for the region’s economic interests.^^ This limited, and 
conservative, economic regionalism was not what the PNB had intended. The party 
had merely further institutionalised the role of the Breton notables in centre-local 
relations and given them greater legitimacy in Brittany by reinforcing their role as 
interlocutors.
The history of a section of the Breton movement in the latter 1930s and early 1940s 
was a permanent blemish upon the movement. In the mid-1930s, the PNB
35. Ibid., p. 114.
36. McAllister, Op. cit.
37. Nicholas, 1982, Op. cit., p.l38.
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developed a corporatist ideology and began to show some political sympathy with 
the extreme right. The party became pro-German in this period, especially as the 
Germans were perceived to be anti-French. The political development of Nazism and 
Fascism provided ideological and mobilisation models for the more extreme 
elements within the Breton movement, and the activities of these members led to the 
banning of the PNB by the French government, which brought some of its leaders 
to seek ‘asylum’ in Germany. The extreme Bretons in this period reinterpreted the 
political opportunity structure for regional autonomy and came to the conclusion that 
it was achievable via German involvement.
During the German occupation and the Vichy period, some Breton activists 
collaborated with the authorities, and were granted a Consultative Council for 
Brittany in 1942. Both the Nazi and Vichy authorities were prepared to concede 
elements of cultural autonomy to national minorities in France, to gain local support 
and divide opposition. The attitudes of elements of the Breton movement were 
clearly opportunistic at this time, hoping to gain concessions on autonomy from the 
occupiers that were previously unavailable within the French state. The long-term 
effect of this collaboration was wholly negative. It brought suppression and 
unpopularity after 1945, with Breton activists imprisoned for collaboration. It 
effectively delegitimised the Breton cause after the war and made the movement 
suspect in the eyes of the state and the population.
The Development of Economic Regionalism
The development of the Breton movement after the second world war initially owed 
more to economic regionalism than to political regionalism, perhaps a consequence 
of the wartime experience itself. Coombes identified two different types of 
regionalism in Europe: one that is separatist or irredentist, and another that is 
utilitarian, and attempts to advance regional economic demands.^* This latter element 
came to prominence after 1945, and remained influential into the 1960s. Since the 
war had taken political regionalism off the regionalist agenda, the new economic 
regionalism was relatively apolitical and attempted to gain economic concessions 
through negotiation with the state. Such economic demands were bargainable, and 
easier for the state to accommodate. However, it developed an agenda of economic 
and social modernisation that affected traditional centre-local relations, and reopened 
debate on political autonomy.
38. David Coombes, "Europe and the Regions", in Bernard Crick (ed). National Identities, p. 134.
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Breton utilitarian regionalism developed through the establishment of CELIB, the 
Comite pour Etudes et Liaison des Intérêts Breton. It was created as a non-party 
lobbying and research group, with an open membership that included federalists and 
modernising notables. It sought to aggregate and advance economic, social and 
cultural interests in the region, and promoted them within the general context of 
postwar French economic development and global economic modernisation. The 
strong federalist presence in CELIB was a consequence of separate but related 
political developments in Brittany. CELIB acted as a lobbying and coordinating 
organisation for regional interests, and presented its regional economic proposals to 
the central authorities.
The Union Breton des Fédéralistes
Some of the modernising elements within CELIB were also ardent federalists, and 
raised the issue of regional autonomy in the post-war period. One of CELIB’s 
founding members, Joseph Matray, had been involved in the journal Le Peuple 
Breton in 1947, and it became a mechanism for the internationalisation of the Breton 
question during postwar discussions on European co-operation. The journal's 
politics were similar to the Ligue Fédéraliste Breton in 1931: proposing dual 
federalism as the domestic and international solution to the problems of national 
minorities. The journal was the intellectual seedbed for CELIB. It called for the 
development of a regional lobby in Brittany, and the re-establishment of the Breton 
Front in the National Assembly to ensure more coherent lobbying, and provide the 
means to research the needs of the regional economy.^^
The new journal was the product of increased interest in federalism in France after 
the liberation. Such interest was both domestic and European, though it had its 
origins in the latter. The Comité Français pour la Fédération Europeéne (CFFE) was 
founded after the war by federalist politicians, and quickly established the Comité 
International pour la Fédéation Europeéne to lobby more widely for European co­
operation and develop contacts with other European federalists."^® The federalist 
movement in this period developed more distinctively through the efforts of the 
journal. La Fédération in 1946-7, which generated both an organisation and a 
decentralist political philosophy - integral federalism - which made the linkage 
between French and European federalism. It had its origins in both Proudhonian and
39. Le Peuple Breton, 15th November 1947, p.5.
40. Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration: Volume 1,1945-47, p.l25.
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Catholic political and social ideas, and converged with the federalist and democratic 
aspirations of the regionalist movements.
Integral federalism held that society and government should be based upon natural 
and historical groups and communities such as the family, the workplace, 
community or region, rather than at the level of the nation-state.^^ The anti-étatiste 
element to integral federalism sought to achieve the maximum decentralisation of 
power to communes, municipalities, producers' organisations, professional 
organisations and trade unions, all acting independently of political parties in pursuit 
of their own interests.
La Fédération promoted these ideas, and also played a role in the formation of the 
Union Europeénes des Fédéralistes (UEF): a co-ordinating organisation for 
European federalist groups. The UEF was responsible for organising the Hague 
Congress of European federalists in 1948 through the Joint International Committee 
of the movements for European unity."^  ^This congress politicised Breton federalists, 
and encouraged them to relaunch dual federalism as a political project. French 
federalists had been requested to provide a delegation for the Hague Congress. They 
turned to the federalists from Brittany, organised around the Peuple Breton^ to 
provide a regional component to the French grouping.'*^ This invitation was made at 
a time when the Peuple Breton group had started to concern itself with other national 
minorities in Europe, and developed an interest in the Basque Country, Scotland, 
Val d ’Aosta and W ales.^
Consistent with its own dual federalism, and with the times, the Peuple Breton (PB) 
group tackled the question of European integration. The journal discussed the 
prospect of administrative reform in France producing a level of autonomy for 
Brittany and the political and economic situation for greater European co-operation. 
The PB group pointed out that federalism would have to take place within and 
between nations, to produce genuinely decentralised federations rather than retain the 
centralised units that would create a European union of large economic and military 
powers.^^ The PB was also wary of customs unions, as they had very limited 
economic aims. It favoured a genuine political union in constrast to the economic 
and security communities identified at the time in Europe."^^ The group was more
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concerned with achieving European integration than with worrying about its effect 
on Breton sovereignty.
The Peuple Breton's involvement in the Union Bretonne des Fédéralistes (UEF), 
brought the Breton question to the Hague Congress of the European movement in 
1948. There the Bretons put forward the case for abandoning state sovereignty in 
favour of dual federalism and for changes in internal state structures to allow 
subnational participation in international affairs."^^ Domestically, the UBF proposed 
the unification of the five Breton départements into one region, with a parliament 
responsible for cultural, administrative and socio-economic affairs, with some 
discretion in external relations.
The UBF used the Hague Congress to develop contacts with Irish, Scottish and 
Welsh delegations. The Congress also acted as a learning process for the Breton 
federalists, as they were able to identify the level of commitment and motivations of 
various political actors to European union. They identified two distinct types of 
federalist. One saw European union as a means to develop a security community 
with some diminution of national sovereignty, while a second was more disposed 
towards intergovernm ental co-operation and the preservation of national 
sovereignty."^* The UBF’s decentralist agenda was sidelined at the Congress, and it 
found itself in a minority."^^ The European movement was not particularly well- 
disposed to regionalists and national minorities. As one author has pointed out
“the major thrust of the postwar European movement was to create a 
political system to contain the nationalisms that had provoked two 
world wars. In that climate the lesser known subnational or regional 
proposals of many European federalists were virtually ignored’’.^^
Dissatisfaction with the ‘federalists’ at the Hague led the UBF to pressure the Union 
des Fédéralistes Français (UFF) to organise a Congress of European regions and 
peoples.^ ^  This ‘alternative’ Congress was a decentralised version of the Hague, and 
a vehicle for the UBF and others to press their decentralist vision of European 
union. This Congress met in Paris in 1949, with the UBF playing a leading role as 
the Congress secretariat
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The experience of the Hague, and the behaviour of centralising federalists did not 
dissuade the Bretons from supporting European union. The UBF was aware of the 
potential for a federal Europe to develop ‘superstate’ pretensions, but thought that 
union would generate tensions that led to decentralisation. European union was to 
have a transformative aspect within member s t a t e s : ^ ^  an expectation shared by 
contemporary regionalists and decentralists. As a counterpoint to centralisation the 
Bretons advanced the notion of Europe as a “federation of diversity” and “group of 
communities”, with tlie implication that such social federalism and diversity could 
not go unrecognised in the administration of states.^^ Though the UBF’s use of 
federalism was positive linkage in itself, the group also made more instrumental 
linkages by calling for Breton representation in future European institutions, in the 
context of the French state.^"^
In common with other regionalists, the UBF placed a degree of faith in European 
developments to aid its cause.^^ This expectation required those designing European 
federal institutions to share the UBF's decentralist version of federalism. Had they 
shared a concern for decentralisation, they would also have supported the UBF’s 
desire to produce more traditional historical and cultural units within each state. The 
UBF was keen to avoid the development of ‘artifical’ state units, and preferred state 
boundaries to coincide with linguistic and cultural units.^^ As integral federalists in 
the Proudhonian mould, the UBF supported two internal federalisms within the 
French state: the ethnic territorial federalism mentioned above, but also functional 
federalism, and the representation of socio-economic and professional interests 
within and across the state.^^ Each would act to balance the competing territoral and 
functional pressures for representation within the state.^^
The position of the Bretons within the French state, and the centralised nature of 
state structures, brought a tendency to regard the state as a tyrannical Leviathan.^^ 
This perception also influenced attitudes to those states involved in developing 
common European institutions. The agendas of the Breton movement and national
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governments in Europe were, of course, very different. The UBF’s aims contrasted 
with a governmental agenda focused on interstate relations in the sphere of defence, 
monetary policy and customs arrangements. For the UBF, Europe’s political elites 
were essentially unionists, seeking a limited union and unconcerned with substate 
concerns and demands. The supranational commitment of these governments was 
also questioned by the UBF, as they were seen to be reluctant to cede national 
sovereignty to achieve common goals, and establish European institutions 
independent of national political influence. The proposal for a European Assembly to 
be comprised of national rather than supranational representatives was held up as 
one illustration of this obstruction.^
The evolving debate on European union made the UBF aware of two things. First, 
decentralists had lost the argument on the type of federalism to be adopted for 
Europe. Second, the likely framework for European union brought no opportunities 
for subnational representation and participation.
Though it became heavily involved in the federalist movement and was paramount in 
the development of transnational regionalism, the UBF did not become transformed 
into a political party. It kept clear of party political conflict and avoided divisive 
socio-economic questions through a catch-all approach. As an organisation, its 
cross-party strategy relied upon influencing other bodies, and using the UFF to 
press its case at the transnational level. It operated as an elite intellectual association 
rather than a movement and generated no demand for political action or mobilisation.
Whilst the UBF made intellectual linkages between Europe and regional autonomy, 
the partisan development of Breton regionalism remained stalled. Nationalism was 
discredited in Brittany and Europe. Following the right-wing deviance of the Parti 
National Breton in the 1930s, the postwar Breton movement manifested itself in the 
UBF, the economic regionalism of CELIB and cultural associations. In this context 
it took until 1957 for a new Breton political organisation to be formed.
60. Ibid., p.7.
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4. The Breton Movement And Europe Since 1957
4.1, Moderate Regionalism
The Mouvement pour VOrganisation de la Bretagne (MOB) was established by 
moderate regionalists in 1957. Though a number of former members of the PNB 
were involved, it was essentially inspired by the membership and experiences of 
CELIB.61 The key feature of the MOB was its apolitisme. It took a broad and non- 
ideological view of politics to avoid the ideological fragmentation of the interwar 
years, which facilitated its role as a cross-party body. It can be regarded as a 
pressure group rather than a political party.
MOB was not an exclusive organisation and allowed multiple memberships. This 
cross-party stance was assisted by the absence of any electoral strategy within the 
organisation. It aimed to raise the salience of Breton cultural and economic issues in 
the region, and in other parties, rather than divert its attentions into dealing with 
domestic socio-economic questions. MOB’s position on Europe was similar to that 
established by Duhamel and repeated by the UBF,^2 but it had little time to develop. 
The formation of the European Community in the same year as the MOB had little 
impact. It did not influence the new party’s attitude to Europe or lead it to reinterpret 
domestic political opportunities. Rather it led the MOB to restate the position of 
Duhamel and relaunch the notion of a Europe o f the Regions in a more substantial 
way.
The apolitisme of the MOB was not easily sustained in this period. Generational 
change and new adherents to the Breton movement made a non-ideological stance 
problematic, particularly amongst the new, younger members from the leftist student 
groups. Generational and ideological differences were compounded by the MOB's 
failure to take a stand on the Algerian war of independence.^^ Ignoring such an issue 
damaged its credibility, particularly as it involved a French colony. The M OB’s 
failure to side with the independence movement in Algeria was intended to avoid 
identification as enemies of France (as in 1939-45), and prevent the splintering ofthe 
movement. However, these constraints helped contribute to its decline.
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The MOB shed several ideological splinters before its demise in the mid-1960s. The 
first was in 1962, with the establishment of the anti-capitalist and more nationalist 
group Sav-Breizhy which supported the creation of a separate, leftist Breton state.^ 
This minor rupture was followed by the departure of a large number of the MOB’s 
younger generation, to form the socialist Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) in 
late 1963. The UDB emerged as an ideological Breton party, pursuing an electoral 
strategy and exclusive membership, in complete contrast to the MOB. These 
splinters effectively brought an end to the MOB, and the organisation faded into 
obscurity. The moderate regionalists behind the organisation did not retire from 
politics however, they re-emerged in 1972 to play a role in the formation of a new 
Breton regionalist party.
Yann Fouèrè and A Europe of a Hundred Flags
Though European union was not substantively dealt with by the MOB, one of its 
members sought to adapt the Breton preference for dual federalism to postwar 
circumstances. The work of Yann Fouèrè relaunched decentralist federalism, with 
different emphases from Duhamel. Fouèrè was influenced by the ideas of de 
Rougement and Héraud, but viewed the subnational level on a more equal footing 
with established states. Federalism was seen to be necessary to deal with the 
incompatible nature of the Breton and French nations and states. It would undermine 
the exclusivity of sovereignty at the international level through creating a pluri­
national structure, which would serve as a model at the domestic level.^^
Fouèrè saw Europe evolving through three distinct stages. First, Europe was feudal 
and absolutist in its character and organisation. Second, it was composed of nation­
states and multi-national Empires. And third, Europe was to consist of supranational 
authorities and decentralised, regional structures. W hilst there was empirical 
evidence for the first two stages, the third was hypothetical and propagandist.
The rationale for identifying a ‘third Europe’, apart from its rhetorical role as an 
appeal to historical inevitability, was to distinguish between a decentralist European 
union and one developed at the hands of the nineteenth century states. For Fouèrè, 
the European Community was a statist construct, influenced by Jacobinism.^^ The 
EC was an example of the defeat of ‘genuine’ federalism at the hands of nationalism
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and national interests.^^ The demise of the European Defence Community (EDO) in 
the French National Assembly in 1954 was an example. The EDC treaty had 
proposed the creation of a supranational assembly to oversee its affairs, similar to 
the European Coal and Steel Community, which proved to be its undoing. The 
failure of the EDC convinced Fouèrè that the European states were more concerned 
with preserving national sovereignty through integovemmentalism than developing a 
wider and more participatory union.^* The second Europe of nation-states, was 
protecting itself from the third Europe of supranationalism and decentralisation.
Fouèrè saw three possible options for European union in this period: the 
development of a confederal union of states, the complete integration of existing 
states and nations into one unit and the establishment of a federal union that diluted 
national sovereignty.^^ Fouèrè favoured federal union, and offered some description 
of its institutional appearance. The union was to exist independently of the member 
states, with a federal executive and bicameral legislature. The first chamber was to 
hold national representatives allocated on the basis of population size, with the 
second chamber having equal representation for member states and regions, to 
provide a federal and supranational reality to union rather than a centralised 
intergovernmental situation. The federal institutions were to be responsible for 
defence, foreign policy, customs, social security, transport, trade policy and human 
rights and liberties.'^® The ‘superstate’ aspect to the union was dismissed as the 
preference of the second Europe, which would be overcome by decentralisation.
Fouèrè’s plan for European federation involved the creation of regional states at the 
subnational level. Each state was to be based upon history, culture and language, 
with economic criteria given secondary importance to avoid the creation of economic 
regions on the French model in the 1950s.^^ Ethnic-national groups were to 
converge with the regional state, allowing each nation to manifest itself in a state.'^^ 
Fouèrè adopted this nationalist demand to counter the French process of nation- 
building:
“in Brittany, the state models itself on the nation. It’s the nation that
fashions the state, because the state must be of service to the nation.
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In France, to the contrary, it is the state that creates the nation. The 
state existed before the n a t i o n ” .'^^
Each regional state was to consist of a minimum of one to two million people up to a 
maximum population of seven to eight million. The size principle was intended to 
maintain a rough equality between regional states in the federation, and maintain a 
closeness to the domestic population. The regional states were to be responsible for 
all policy domains not given to the federal institutions.
Fouèrè’s liberalism manifested itself in economic policy.
Economic protectionism was a consequence of nation-state pretensions about 
sovereignty, motivating states to pursue autarky rather than accept interdependence. 
Proper European union would remove such practices and institute a free market 
regime within the federation, allowing region-states to have responsibility for 
regional economic p o l ic y .T h is  market preference was one aspect of Fouèrè’s 
politics that brought conflicts with the left within the Breton movement, and gave 
each wing of the movement very different priorities and visions of the EC.
Strollad Ar Vro
Moderate regionalists faded from political action with the demise of the MOB. In the 
1970s they regrouped to form Strollad Ar Vro (SAV). Unlike MOB, this 
organisation was formed as a political party to contest elections rather than act as a 
lobbying group. The moderates within the Breton movement had not followed an 
electoral strategy for some time, and it was not to be their strength. SAV itself 
shared the non-ideological preference of MOB. This trait, in addition to having 
members who had been previously associated with the PNB, brought conflict with 
the Union Démocratique Breton: as each fought to establish itself as the vanguard. 
Such fractionalisation was compounded by a double ballot electoral system which 
penalised small parties,^^ and made elections a test of survival. The desire to survive 
or to establish political supremacy, along with personal and ideological differences, 
generated bitterness between the parties.
The SAV programme claimed a neutral position on socio-economic policy, though it 
was clearly anti-communist and corporatist.^^ This antipathy towards the Marxist left
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made any relationship with the UDB impossible. One year after its launch SAV took 
a considerable gamble to become the premier regionalist party. Instead of adopting a 
gradual or localist approach to electoralism, SAV took one large step in the 1973 
legislative elections. The party presented twenty-seven candidates in Brittany out of 
a possible thirty-three. SAV’s candidates gained around 30,000 votes between them 
at the first round of elections, worth around 2.6% of the Breton vote.^^ The party 
narrowly defeated the UDB in the two seats it contested and gained short-term 
electoral dominance within the Breton camp. Tlie immediate gain of legitimacy was 
undermined by the cost of contesting the election. It was estimated that SAV had 
spent FF 1,650,000 during the election campaign in order to contest the 27 seats.'^^ 
This was an intolerable burden for a micro-party with a very limited resource and 
membership base.
As in 1930, the cost of electioneering was debilitating, and the financial costs of the 
1973 elections removed SAV from electoral competition. The party later attempted to 
contest the 1979 European elections, but was thwarted because of financial barriers. 
As elections were no longer an option for the moderate Bretons, the SAV returned to 
the European strategy of the UBF and instigated the creation of the Bureau of 
Unrepresented European Nations in the 1973-4 period. It involved SAV, Plaid 
Cymru, the Occitan movement, Cornish regionalists and the exiled Basque PNV.
The SAV congress in 1973 created UUnion Fédéraliste des Communautés 
Ethniques Europeenes, a transnational forum which preceded the establishment of 
the Bureau. This new approach was aided by the enlargement of the EC in 1973, 
which brought UK accession, and therefore new nationalist parties. The Bureau was 
financed by its regionalist members, an expensive financial commitment for SAV, 
and operated in Brussels from 1975. It was the first transnational regionalist reaction 
to the new political opportunity structure of the EC, though it was limited in size and 
scope.
The Parti pour VOrganisation d ’une Bretagne Libre
SAV became moribund as an organisation in the late 1970s but Fouèrè and the 
moderates rallied to produce the Parti pour L ’Organisation d ’une Bretagne Libre 
(POBL) in 1982. This organisation was slightly more radical than the MOB and 
SAV, and favoured a Breton parliament with its own government, administration
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and constitution.'^^ A more radical stance on Breton autonomy was necessitated by 
the decentralist reforms of the Socialist Government,^® which had created a Breton 
regional government on equal terms with other regions, in contrast to the superior 
autonomy statute given to Corsica.*^ The POBL stressed that its more maximalist 
demands for autonomy were not indicative of separatism, and used Fouèrè’s 
“Europe of one hundred flags” concept to effect a positive linkage that avoided 
isolationism. The POBL called for the new regional governments to be allowed to 
pursue their own interests in European and international affairs, and made the 
familar call for Breton representation in the EC.^^
In a similar vein to SAV, the POBL claimed it was the sole legitimate representative 
of Breton feeling.^^ The POBL’s involvement in the European Free Alliance in the 
early 1980s, as the sole Breton representative, helped to boost its vanguard 
pretensions,*^ but masked the party’s difficulties within Brittany itself. The POBL’s 
membership remained small and its electoral strategy limited: the party leadership 
had learned something from the experience of SAV in 1973. Despite its 
Europeanism the POBL played no role in the 1984 European elections, though its 
newspaper did cover the activities of its partners in the European Free Alliance.*^ 
The first electoral contest for the POBL came with the cantonal elections in April 
1985, three years after its formation. The party’s five candidates polled badly in 
Rennes but received stronger support in Finistère.*^ The results were not good, but 
the party’s cautious approach prevented it from repeating the mistakes of 1973.
The electoral and financial barriers to electoralism led the POBL to consider an 
alliance with other Breton parties at the regional council elections in 1986. The fact 
that the other electoralist party, the UDB, had moved away from alliances with the 
Communists and Parti Socialiste in this period helped provide the context for a 
regionalist alliance. The regional elections were conducted using proportional 
representation, with a 5% threshold for representation. The POBL held discussions 
on an alliance with the UDB and the small Emgann organisation to surpass the
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threshold,*^ but no alliance was forthcoming. The UDB and POBL presented 
separate lists at the election, with the POBL frozen out of a leftist list organised by 
the UDB, PSU, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and ecologists, which stood in 
aU five départements in Brittany.^^
The POBL contested only one département in the regional election, but was unable 
to compete alone. The party then avoided the electoral sphere, preferring to raise and 
publicise specific issues within the Breton context. The party was aware of the 
developments in the EC in this period, such as the Single European Act,^^ but was 
unable to deal with it. The lack of organisational and electoral means left the party 
operating as a pressure group. This demobilisation of moderate regionalism raised 
the standing of the UDB even further, and threatened the status of the POBL within 
the electoralist European Free Alliance.
The POBL continued to use the European issue in Breton politics, and called for the 
regional council to be transformed into a stronger parliament with powers to address 
the agenda of the single m arket,^ but the organisation was unable to translate such 
positive linkages into organisational or electoral resources. The weakness of the 
POBL in the late 1980s was evident from its failure to support the candidacy of the 
Corsican nationalist leader. Max Simeoni, who stood in the European elections on a 
list with the Verts. The POBL was too weak to take part in the campaign, in contrast 
to the UDB, though Simeoni tried to reach out to the POBL after 1989 by inviting 
them to the Congress of the Corsican UPC in Bastia.^^
4,2. Radical Regionalism  - The Union Démocratique Bretonne
The Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) was formed in late 1963 by eleven 
dissenting students who departed from the MOB.^^ Similar to the economic 
regionalists of CELIB, the UDB was a modernising force within the Breton 
movement, influenced by the postwar socio-economic and political environment and 
committed to popular mobilisation. The UDB can be initially regarded as a student 
party: it was established by them and they were its main recruits during its early 
development. The student and intellectual tendencies within the left of the Breton
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movement used the organisation to synthesise the traditions of socialism and 
nationalism into a new leftist regionalism, whilst escaping from the right wing, 
collaborationist baggage of the past.
Despite its intellectual composition, which could have made it a similar pressure 
group or elite association to the UBF, the UDB developed as a political party in a 
much clearer way than the organisations of moderate regionalism. The UDB 
sustained an electoral mobilisation strategy since 1973, despite frequent setbacks and 
considerable strategic reorientation in the 1980s. Though the UDB has never 
managed complete organisational stability and high institutionalisation, with two 
periods of organisational disruption in the 1960s and the 1980s, it has achieved a 
degree of longevity that is unparalled within the Breton movement. The socialist 
wing of the movement survived largely within one organisation since 1963, whereas 
the moderate regionalists progressed through three unsuccessful organisations.
The UDB’s attitude to European integration was curious, and spanned its socialism 
and regionalism. The party’s founding statement contained a commitment to the 
federal integration of European peoples amongst its thirteen points,^^ but this 
rhetorical commitment tells very little. The party’s critique of the European 
Community was much more informative. The UDB consistently viewed the EC as a 
capitalist institution and was critical of its free market agricultural policies. The party 
condemned the CAP as a mechanism for reducing the traditional farming sector in 
Brittany,9"^  leading to depopulation in rural and Breton-speaking areas, and sought to 
develop support in rural Brittany. This strategy was untypical of European socialist 
parties, but consistent with the UDB's strategy of defending the regional economy. 
The UDB was critical of much of the CAP system in the 1960s, and held up the 
M ansholt Plan as one factor contributing to Brittany's socio-economic decline 
through downward pricing adjustments in the dairy sector and efforts to remove 
small dairy herds from production.^^
The UDB saw such policies as evidence of a colonial relationship between the EC 
and regions, with EC policies contributing to depopulation and deindustrialisation.^^ 
Though favouring European union, the UDB consistently depicted the EC as flawed 
because of the behaviour of capitalist states. The EC itself was seen as a capitalist 
institution, with the common market determined by business pressure groups and
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pro-business governments.^^ The UDB did not respond by advocating secession 
from the EC, one of the political responses in Scotland and Wales, but proposed a 
socialist EC. The Community, despite its flaws, was reformable. This perspective 
gave the UDB the triple ideological goal of a socialist Brittany, within a socialist 
France, inside a socialist EC.
The UDB maintained that EC policies perpetuated regional underdevelopment within 
the Community, but also contributed to economic problems in the third world.^^ The 
Community practised internal and external colonialism, a key theme of the UDB into 
the 1970s. The party applied the colonial theme to much of its political analysis, 
adopting the slogan/programme Bretagne = colonie in 1973, and accused the EC of 
colonising Brittany and its economy.^ The colonial theme enabled the party to link 
socialism to autonomy, whilst adding aspects of the analyses of progressive third 
world nationalists.
The UDB’s preferred solution for Europe was a combination of a socialist EC and a 
federalist Europe of peoples. The latter element was similar to other factions in the 
Breton movement, and not greatly different from the MOB, SAV and POBL. What 
differentiated the UDB on Europe was its ideological position, which led to a 
number of general and specific criticisms of the EC and its policies. The moderate 
regionalists gave support to the concept of European union, but were mostly silent 
on the EC itself. The UDB, in contrast, spent little time elaborating the need for a 
Europe o f the Regions or international federalism, but concentrated on the politics 
and economics of the EC itself, and its impact on Brittany. As a party aiming at 
social and political mobilisation, the UDB's critique of EC policy was intended to be 
instrumental rather than intellectual: to raise and defend the interests of specific 
Breton groups. The socialism/regionalism nexus was also developed through 
opposition to the defence industry, the proliferation of military bases and the reliance 
upon the tourist industry. These were elements of a new left approach amongst 
UDB activists, demonstrating a pacifist and environmentalist orientation similar to 
other regionalist and nationalist organisations. They were later to become prominent 
in the UDB’s activism over nuclear power and in its opening to the environmental 
movement.
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In the late 1960s the UDB adopted an electoral approach, with discussions on co­
operation with other left parties in Brittany. This process was developing at the same 
time as extremists within the Breton movement were active in the terrorist Federation 
pour la Liberation de Bretagne (FLB), the extreme left terrorist group whose 
members had been expelled from the UDB.i®^ The UDB produced a programme 
minimum démocratique regional during the 1968 legislative elections and distributed 
it amongst the parties of the left. The programme called for the establishment of a 
Breton assembly and for a range of socio-economic policies for the region, The 
programme was the opening phase of the party’s effort to align itself with the left 
and pursue an electoral strategy.
The 1969 and 1972 Referenda
Though the UDB refrained from direct electoral involvement in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, it had two significant opportunities to link its agenda to national and 
supranational developments. First, the party campaigned for a ‘No’ vote in the 1969 
referendum on regional reform conducted by De Gaulle. The UDB opposed 
government proposals for d ecen tra lisa tio n ,w h ich  were intended to reinforce the 
role of the Prefecture and the CODER, the unelected functional assemblies 
introduced in 1964. Apart from opposing the substance of the government’s 
proposals, the UDB used the elections as a referendum on Gaullism: as part of its 
strategy to reduce the power of the right in Brittany. The UDB called on voters to 
defeat De Gaulle, undermine capitalism and centralism, and promote the prospect of 
a socialist Brittany. The defeat of De Gaulle did not bring any gains for the UDB 
however, as it had no role in the Presidential election that followed. It merely argued 
for voter a b s t e n t i o n , a n  ineffective electoral strategy that did nothing for the left in 
Brittany. The referendum did show a positive awareness of the merits of political 
linkage however, and a desire to use the resources of the political opportunity 
structure in an instrumental fashion.
The second opportunity for the UDB came with the referendum on EC enlargement 
in 1972. The UDB had already entered electoral politics at a minor level by this 
stage, through lists with the Communists and PSU in municipal elections in 1971.
102. See Patricia Elton Mayo, Op. cit., p.49.
103. Le Peuple Breton, 15th July 1968, p.l.
104. Le Peuple Breton, March/April 1969, p.2.
105. Le Peuple Breton, 20th April 1969, p.l.
106. Le Peuple Breton, 10th June 1969, p.2.
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The EC referendum offered a larger opportunity to the party, though one that was 
undercapitalised. The referendum had been called to allow Pompidou to use popular 
support to revoke De Gaulle’s veto on UK membership of the EC. The entry of 
Ireland, Denmark and Norway was also included in the referendum - subsumed 
within a simple yes/no question on EC enlargement
The UDB campaigned against enlargement, with opposition conditioned by a 
number of instrumental factors and motivations. The party adopted negative linkage 
during the referendum campaign, for tactical and ideological reasons. The 
referendum was seen as an opportunity to challenge Pompidou, the right, and 
capitalism. The party sought to use the referendum similar to the 1969 practice. 
The party opposed enlargement because it buttressed the socio-economic status quo, 
and called on those who had suffered from the liberal economic policies of the EC to 
form an electoral coalition against enlargement The UDB issued a joint communique 
with other regionalist organisations, such as the Basque Enbata and Lutte Occitane, 
highlighting common opposition to enlargement,^®* but little of its regionalism was 
deployed in the referendum campaign.
Though the UDB had the opportunity to exploit the EC question in a distinctive way, 
it approached it from a socio-economic perspective rather than a regionalist position: 
despite the fact that most parties in France, except the Communists, supported 
enlargement. The socio-economic tone of the UDB campaign was attributable to its 
socialism, but also to its economic defence role as it sought to gather support 
amongst those sectors of the regional economy that would suffer from EC 
enlargement. The fishing industry, concentrated in Western Brittany and one of the 
largest in the EC, was one prospective economic ‘loser’ from enlargement.
However, the UDB was unsuccessful, with France and Brittany supporting 
enlargement by substantial majorities. The Bretons recorded a ‘Yes’ vote of 74.8%, 
compared to overall French support of 67.7%,^®^ and any gains the UDB made in 
the election were difficult to measure. The use of negative linkage was clear, but not 
deployed in a purely regionalist fashion. The organisational outcome for the party 
was positive. It had actively campaigned and used the experience as preparation for 
future electoral contests.
107. Le Peuple Breton, April 1972, p.l.
108. Le Peuple Breton, May 1972, p.4.
109. Nicholas and Pihar, Op. cit., p.l 10.
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In 1973 the UDB entered the national electoral arena for the first time. The party 
contested the legislative elections with five candidates, gaining a total of 6062 votes. 
These results were gained at the first ballot. At the second ballot the party dropped 
out and urged its supporters to vote for the left candidates. This electoral alliance 
was constructed on the back of the earlier alliance between the UDB and left parties 
in 1971, and marked the beginning of the UDB’s formal relationship with the 
French left.
Duverger identified a number of alliance possibilities within the French political 
system: parties could have joint candidates, joint lists, adopt the practice of mutually 
standing down in the second round of voting, or make agreements on the 
redistribution of preferences.^^® The UDB had developed joint lists at the local level 
in 1971, and adopted the practice of standing down in 1973 - not that it had much 
choice given its status as a micro-party.
The next electoral test for the UDB was the local elections in 1976. The party’s nine 
candidates performed reasonably well, with five candidates gaining over 5%. This 
encouraged the party to continue its electoral role. The UDB’s role in the union of 
the left list in 1977 brought 37 councillors in the municipal elections, with 20 elected 
in the first round.^^^ These successes gave the UDB councillors in the urban centres 
of Rennes, Brest, Nantes and other towns in the region,^ and vindicated the 
party’s alliance strategy. As the party’s support and profile increased, its 
membership grew to reach 2000 by 1 9 8 0 . Though it remained a micro-paity it 
was at least operating on an upward trend.
From this period onwards, the party entered regular electoral competition, and 
increased the number of candidates contesting seats. It entered 17 candidates in the 
legislative elections of 1978, and gained an average of 1%. These elections, 
however, marked the beginning of the decline of the union of the left. The 1978 
elections were supposed to have brought the breakthrough of the combined PS and 
PCF into national government in France, but the conservative parties retained an 
overall majority in the National Assembly. This electoral failure, coupled with a 
growing feeling within the UDB that it was being co-opted by the French left, led 
the UDB to consider its future as a more autonomous force. The UDB leadership
110. Duverger, Op. cit., p.331.
111. Le Peuple Breton, April 1977, p. 15.
112. Le Peuple Breton, May 1977, p.6.
113. Nicholas, Op. cit., 1982, p.325.
114. Vaughan Rogers, “Brittany”, in Michael Watson (ed). Contemporary Minority Nationalism, 
p.74.
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felt that the organisation’s goals and policies had been subordinated to the 
unsuccessful national electoral goals of the French left. The strategy to deal with 
incorporation involved a return to nationalism.
Moving Away From The Left
The UDB’s Congress at Brest in 1978 discussed the notion of a Breton state and the 
question of separatism, and presented itself as a revolutionary nationalist party with 
a programme that could not be assimilated by ideological groups on the French left. 
In turning away from the main left parties the UDB sought to restore its regionalist 
credentials by developing linkages with other regional parties to produce a joint 
candidate for the 1981 Presidential e l ec t ions . ^The  motivation for this move had 
more to do with relations with the left than any expectation of having an independent 
role in the Presidential elections. Not surprisingly this effort was unsuccessful, 
leaving the UDB to form joint lists with the Parti Socialiste at the legislative elections 
following Mitterrand’s success in 1981. The UDB entered 15 candidates onto a joint 
list with the PS. The only alternative was non-participation, which would have 
completely undermined the UDB’s strategy and approach. This effort was costly 
however, with an estimated bill of FF 250,000 for the p a r t y . T h e  costs of national 
electoral participation still far outweighed any benefits involved.
The cost of the election in 1981 brought financial problems for the UDB, and the 
policies of the Socialists brought political problems. The economic context of the 
early 1980s and the failure of the government’s economic programme created 
difficulties for a party which had tied itself to the fate of the French left. The UDB 
was damaged by government policies and faced with the dilemma of distancing itself 
from the Government yet remaining an identifiable socialist party. The UDB had to 
choose between supporting the government and its programme, and suffering with 
its loss of popularity, or opposing the government and seeking an autonomous 
course which would undermine any future electoral alliance with the Socialists. The 
party tried to resolve this by adopting the compromise solution of “solidarity not 
alignment” in 1982, which brought divisions within the UDB and the departure of 
some members to the Socialists. The party then positioned itself in a state of semi­
opposition to the government, criticising aspects of economic policy but still open to 
electoral co-operation.
115. Ibid., p.75.
116. Le Peuple Breton, January 1982.
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The alliance with the French left had been the key component of the UDB's electoral 
strategy. W ithout such an alliance its involvement in elections was severely 
curtailed. Though this relationship allowed the UDB to ride the left's electoral wave 
from the 1970s, it had led to programmatic compromises. The party had to accept 
the political and economic integration of Brittany within the French state, and found 
itself undermined by the regionalism of the left parties. Both the Communists and 
the Socialists moved towards supporting regional decentralisation within France, 
proposing the establishment o f regional assemblies, and the abolition of the 
centrally-controlled regional prefects. Some sections of the left even adopted the 
UDB's s l o g a n s . D e s p i t e  these problems the UDB continued to pursue electoral 
mobilisation, though limited by its relations with the left.^^^ The party complained of 
having insufficient candidates placed on the union lists, which was how the UDB 
got people elected, so it was not gaining as many elected offices as it would have 
liked.
The party's changing attitude towards the left did not greatly effect the UDB position 
on Europe. Party policy remained the same. What did change was the party's tactical 
responses to European elections. Having ignored the first direct elections in 1979, 
and taken umbrage with the left, the UDB removed any positive role for itself in the 
1984 elections. The party was too small to present its own list and none was 
negotiated with the European Free Alliance, though the UDB had begun to attend 
EFA meetings. The party responded to the European elections by calling for 
abstentions and a change in electoral procedures to allow small parties to overcome 
the threshold requirements of the national list system. During the 1984 election the 
UDB campaigned for abstentions and blank ballots to be cast and took some comfort 
from the fact that turnout was very low, meaning that 44.5% of Bretons had not 
v o t e d . T h e  fact that low turnouts were common in European elections was 
conveniently forgotten.
The elections to the Breton regional council in 1986 offered the clearest opportunity 
for the UDB to address the Breton question in electoral terms. The party adopted a 
new alliance strategy that comprised a list with the Parti Socialiste UnifSy the Ligue
117. This was practiced by the Parti Socialiste in Finistère: See Vaughan Rogers, "Ethnicity, 
Inequality and Integration: Ethnic Activism in Post-war Brittany", in Peter Morris (ed). Equality and 
Inequality in France, p. 139.
118. The UDB had wanted to nominate 250 candidates at the 1983 municipal elections, but was 
prevented from doing so by the united left list: Le Peuple Breton, February 1983, p.l4. Considering 
that the UDB membership had declined since its identifiable peak of 2000 members in 1980 to 
around 800 (according to Rogers, ibid., 1990, p.79) the number of candidates was very ambitious.
119. Le Peuple Breton, June 1984, p.4.
120. Le Peuple Breton, July/August 1984, p.5
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Communiste Révolutionnaire and the ecologists. The progress of this alternative left 
alliance was limited, but representation was gained through the institution of 
proportional representation for the regional elections. The list's combined total of 
1.5% was worth one seat, which was held by the UDB.
The UDB's Transnational Links
Though the UDB had failed to make any great impact in Breton politics beyond local 
elections, the party had developed contacts with other regionalist parties. A UDB 
delegation had visited the House of Commons in 1975 at the invitation of the SNP, 
and also had meetings with Plaid Cymru,^^! ^^t little came from this development. 
Various organisations were invited to attend the UDB congress in 1976, but only 
minor movements and fringe organisations attended. The big parties stayed away, or 
sent their youth section in the case of the VU, leaving marginal organisations to 
a t t e n d .  ^22 j^o efforts were made to turn the congress into a common event or 
organisation. It can be seen as the UDB's limited response to exclusion from 
participation in the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations.
In the 1980s the UDB moved very slowly towards involvement with the European 
Free Alliance (EFA), perhaps because of the role of the POBL within the 
organisation. The involvement of both ideological wings of the Breton movement 
brought a degree of rapprochement and repaired some of its historical fragmentation. 
The UDB first became involved in the EFA at the invitation of Plaid Cymru. The 
Welsh nationalists were hosting the EFA Congress and had agreed with the EFA 
bureau to invite the UDB to attend as observers. This invitation was part of the 
EFA strategy to attract electoral organisations into membership, and develop the 
ground for a national list of regionalists at the European elections through addressing 
Breton fragmentation. The European theme was re-adopted within the UDB 
following the party's involvement with the EFA, and employed as the key theme at 
the UDB Congress at Toussaint in 1986. The party also developed a specific 
European Bureau within its structure to address the i s s u e .  ^ ^ 4
121. Le Peuple Breton, August 1975, p.l6.
122. The organisations which attended the Congress were: Mebyon Kernow of Cornwall; Cymru 
Goch, a Welsh socialist group; the Union do Pobo Galego from Galicia; Lutte Occitane', Le Parti 
Socialiste du Peuple Basque', the Volksunie Jongeren (VUJO); and the Jeunesse Fédéralistes 
Mondiales: Le Peuple Breton, June 1976, p. 10.
123. Peuple Breton, September 1986, p .ll .
124. An Emsaver, August/September 1987, p.3.
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The party was accepted as a full member of the European Free Alliance at the 
organisation's Congress in Brussels in September 1987.^25 The party's role in the 
EFA, and its attitude to the European Community, remained anomalous however. 
The socialism of the UDB, and its strong ideological commitment, made it an 
unlikely adherent to the EFA's common programme and policies. Its role was also 
confused by its opposition to most EC policies and initiatives. The UDB's entry into 
transnational relationships, and re-adoption of European themes, coincided with the 
launch of the Single European A ct The effects of the single market, and the notion 
of economic integration are inimicable to the UDB: the economic threat to a Breton 
economy and society already vulnerable to peripheralisation and d e p o p u l a t i o n . ^ 2 6  
Instead of seeing an opportunity in the contemporary phase of European integration, 
the UDB's ideological stance interpreted it as a threat. The party was more worried 
at the prospect of economic integration than the loss of sovereignty.
The UDB's involvement in the European Free Alliance did bring electoral 
reorientation away from the left, and allowed a new electoral relationship with other 
regionalist parties. EFA brought the opportunity to fulfil the earlier efforts of the 
Parti Autonomiste Breton and SAV to develop inter-party co-operation within the 
regionalist family in France. The UDB responded to EFA efforts to stimulate inter- 
regionalist co-operation, and began to explore the possibility of an electoral alliance 
for 1989.127 The UDB Congress agreed to EFA-inspired proposals to construct a 
common national list with the Basques, Corsicans, Occitans and Verts, and looked 
to widen the list where possible to improve the chances of regionalist representation 
in the European Parliament. The UDB optimistically announced that the regionalists 
could expect to gain 2 MEPs from such a list, with the assumption that the UDB 
would have one of them.i28
The agreement concluded between the Verts and the regionalists was not as generous 
as the UDB had hoped. Only one place was given to the regionalists on the Verts 
list, on the understanding that they would receive a member amongst the first four 
elected as long as the list surpassed the 5% threshold. The final outcome of 
negotiations placed the leader of the Corsican UPC Max Simeoni, in third place on 
the Verts list. The UDB also concluded an agreement with the UPC to give it a full­
time liaison officer in the European P a r l i a m e n t  ^ 2 9
125. Le Peuple Breton, October 1987, p.4.
126. Le Peuple Breton, September 1987, p.4.
127. Le Peuple Breton, June 1988, p.2.
128. Le Peuple Breton, December 1988, p .ll.
129. Le Peuple Breton, June 1989, p.4.
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The regionalist strategy was successful in 1989, Simeoni campaigned for preference 
votes in Brittany, and the UDB worked in the European campaign in a positive way 
for the first time. Despite a strong abstention rate at the elections the VertsfEPK list 
easily surpassed the 5% threshold. The list gained 10.6% in France overall, with 
better than average regional results in Brittany with 12.2%, and Corsica with 
15.5%. These were the list's best regional scores outside Alsace, and enabled the 
regionalists to claim the venture a success,
Given the previous history of electoral failure amongst regionalist parties in France 
this first success by Simeoni was encouraging, though it will probably stand as a 
one-off. Though the regionalist position has remained constant - still able to form an 
alliance - that of the Verts has changed considerably. The Verts had originally been 
denied representation in the European Parliament because of the divisions within the 
environmental movement that produced competing Green lists in 1984. The Verts 
strategy in 1989 required an alliance with other parties to avoid falling below the 
threshold as in 1984. However the reconciliation of moderates and fundamentalists 
within the environmental movement, and the development of alliances between the 
Verts and Generation Ecologie (GE) for the 1993 legislative elections, may have 
removed any need for an electoral alliance with the regionalists in 1994. Both the 
Verts and GE gained 6 seats each at the regional elections in Brittany in 1992, with a 
combined share of the vote of 1 5 . 6 % . This result showed the combined potential 
of the two parties, which far surpassed anything that could be gained from a 
renewed alliance with the regionalists. This prospect was evident from the fact that 
the regionalist parties in Brittany ran together in the 1992 regional elections, bringing 
a rapprochement between the UDB and POBL. This electoral aliance was notable, 
but did not lead to success. The two parties only achieved an average of 2% in 
Brittany, in spite of expectations that inter-regionalist co-operation would yield 
electoral representation.
After the 1989 European elections, the UDB continued to play on the European 
aspects of its appeal and programme. The party’s Congress at Plestin in 1990 
reaffirmed its commitment to develop European and international contacts and 
internationalise the horizons of the Breton movement. The UDB's efforts to deal 
with the economic changes brought about by the Single European Act and with the 
political changes of the post-cold war period led to the adoption of environmental
130. Analysis of European election results in France by Michel Nicholas, Department of Political 
Science, University of Rennes II: Le Peuple Breton, August/September 1989, p.9.
131. Le Monde, 24th March 1992, p.8.
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and pacifist themes. The UDB's Plan Ecologique Breton was produced to develop 
an environmental critique of EC economic and social policy, and there were 
proposals to reduce defence spending and reverse the development of the military 
and defence industry in B r i t t a n y .
EMU. Maastricht and the 1992 Referendum
The issue of Economic and Monetary Union also offered some political 
opportunities to the UDB. The party called for direct regional representation in the 
EC and the establishment of a Senate within the European Parliament to provide a 
forum for regional representatives. The party also sponsored a conference in 
Nantes on the European question to discuss regional autonomy within the EC, and 
the role of regionalism and regional governments in Europe.!^'* This concern for a 
strong regional role in the EC did not translate into support for provisions in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The UDB interpreted the Treaty as providing opportunities for 
regional participation, but limiting regional autonomy as it was central government 
which would decide upon regional representation in the EC.^^^ In addition, the 
weak, consultative nature of the Committee of the Regions undermined its 
autonomous role.
Apart from regional aspects within the Maastricht Treaty, other items dealing with 
economic and political union were not supported by the UDB. The party saw 
economic integration through the single market leading to improved employment 
opportunities in some areas, but continued economic decline in peripheral Brittany. 
The single market and EMU would also increase the economic domination of the 
centre, with greater economic inequalities between centre and p e r i p h e r y . N o n ­
economic aspects of the Treaty were also suspect in the UDB’s eyes. The 
Community’s desire to involve itself in cultural and educational issues was viewed 
as a potential threat. The Maastricht Treaty committed the EC to developing and 
promoting “the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching 
and dissemination of the languages of the M ember States” and also the 
“improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the 
European peoples”. T h e  UDB remained suspicious of EC competences in these
132. Le Peuple Breton, December 1990, p .ll.
133. Le Peuple Breton, June 1991, p.l9.
134. Le Peuple Breton, December 1991, p.2.
135. Le Peuple Breton, January 1992, p.4: making reference to article 198a, “Treaty on European 
Union”, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 7th Febniary 
1992, p .m .
136. Le Peuple Breton, July/August 1992, p. 12.
137. Articles 126 and 128, Treaty on European Union, Op. cit., 1992, pp.60-3.
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areas, and saw them as having the potential for standardisation and uniformity, 
through aiding majority languages at the expense of minority languages. By moving 
into these cultural/linguistic areas the EC may be entering into ‘Europe-building’, a 
contemporary example of nation-building. It may not work to the benefit of one 
particular majority language over another, but it does have implications for minority 
languages.
Despite dissenting from large parts of the Maastricht Treaty, the UDB did not 
campaign against it during the referendum in September 1992. The UDB’s response 
to the referendum was domestic and tactical. Opposition to the Treaty would have 
made them appear anti-European and isolationist, and lead to depiction as “archaic 
nationalists” rather than European federalists.^^* This problem of political identity 
led the party to recommend that voters cast a blank ballot in the referendum. The 
domestic criticism of voting against Maastricht which would appear locally in the 
media, to which a microparty could not respond, was seen to make opposing the 
Treaty very risky. Like other nationalist and regionalist parties, the desire to avoid 
being accused of being anti-European was important. The party didn't want to face 
the situation in which opposition to Maastricht was interpreted as opposition to
European integration. ^ 9^
The Maastricht Treaty referendum seemed to contain more threats than opportunities 
for the UDB. The referendum developed as a plebiscite on the Mitterrand 
Presidency, which the leftist UDB would not wish to assist, and involved a degree 
of French nationalism that was not to the party’s taste. Even if the party had 
swallowed its fears of appearing anti-European to campaign against the Treaty it 
would have found itself sharing platforms with the Parti Communiste and the Front 
National which would have further isolated the party from the moderate left, and 
benefited the parties of the right. The Maastricht Treaty gained strong support in the 
referendum in Brittany though, achieving 59.7% support, the second highest 
regional result in France. The effect of the UDB’s blank ballot strategy is difficult to 
judge, since such a microparty would have had little impact in any case. But the 
experience does show the party's limited room for manoevre and inability to take 
advantage of the political opportunity structure offered by the Maastricht Treaty.
138. Le Peuple Breton, July/August 1992, p. 13.
139. Ibid., p.l2.
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5. Conclusion
This analysis of the attitudes and behaviour of the Breton movement to European 
integration has shown that the issue has been important to various political actors 
within the movement. However the persistent weakness o f the Breton parties has 
meant that the European issue has been a frequent but rather ineffective political 
linkage. Indeed the frequency of the linkage was one of the most stable things about 
the Breton parties. The parties have been too weak to deploy the linkage as a political 
resource beyond using it as a means to ward off accusations of separatism and 
isolationism. This in spite of various referendum and electoral opportunities to utilise 
the issue. The electoral system in particular was responsible for this deficiency, 
keeping the Breton parties out of national and European competition and preventing 
them from being able to pick up second order benefits from European contests.
The issue of international federalism has been the enduring linkage of the movement, 
rather than just that of regional autonomy itself. In this respect, the Bretons were 
responding to their own agenda and to that of other federalist movements and writers 
in the twentieth century. The early and consistent linkages with European integration 
suggest that the Bretons have affective rather than utilitarian attitudes to the question 
of European union, even if they have sometimes made the linkage in an instrumental 
fashion.
This genuine concern for Europe has brought the Breton movement very little 
positive pohtical gain. It has generated strong intellectual positions which have aided 
the philosophical case for a Europe o f the regions, and created two transnational 
regionalist organisations, but it has not helped the Breton parties to develop. The 
fragmentation of the Breton movement and the nature of the French electoral system 
have been partly responsible for the failure of Breton regionalism to develop at the 
electoral level - leaving the movement frozen in the same position since the 1920s^4i 
The European question may have been most significant for the Breton movement in 
allowing it to play a role in developing dual federalism and a Europe ofthe Regions, 
and have a role in regionalist politics out of aU proportion to its size.
140. For more on these two alternative attitudinal responses to the EC see; Miles Hewstone, 
Understanding Attitudes to the European Community.
141. The Breton movement would still seem to be placed around phase A to B of Hroch’s threefold 
typology, occasionally making it to B then regressing back into A: See Hroch, Op. cit.
149
The Volksunie And Europe
The Volksunie And Europe: 
Fédéralisation and Europeanisation
‘The Flemish people must acquire as complete as possible self-government and this can be 
achieved in Belgium via federalism. The Volksunie not only demands self-government for 
Flanders. All peoples have the right to self-government. People’s nationalism leads to 
international understanding. A united Europe must base its co-operation on the freedom and 
light of self-determination of the peoples.”^
1. Introduction
The Volksunie (VU) is one of the most successful regionalist parties in West 
European politics, though it has received very little analysis. The success of the 
party is evident through the fact that it has achieved and maintained national political 
representation since its inception in 1954, participated in two coalition governments 
in 1977-8 and 1988-91, which is an exceptional situation for a regionalist party, and 
played a considerable role in generating the electoral dynamic behind the institutional 
changes that created Flemish institutions and federalised the Belgian state. These 
successes have, to an extent, led to its undoing and this theme will be examined 
later.
The case of the YU is a different instance of nationalism/regionalism to those 
presented in preceding chapters. Some of the differences are because of the political 
and historical context of Flanders, while others relate to the political development of 
regional government within the region. In the first instance Flanders, unlike the 
other cases, is not a peripheral region within Belgium, or within the European 
Community. It is geographically located at the centre, but also operates as an 
interface region between two larger national units. This interface provides a very 
different context for the Flemish national movement: it is a fragment detached from 
its national community in the Netherlands, which means there is potential for 
irredentism as well as autonomy.
1. Hugo Schiltz, Volksunie: Identity, History, Programme, p.3.
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Pan-Netherlandism gained political expression in two main periods: first, following 
the first world war, through the Activist movement (who had sought maximum 
autonomy and had been prepared to collaborate with the German occupying forces) 
which proposed the destruction of Belgium in favour of a unificationist Dutch­
speaking s t a t e a n d  second, the Verdinaso movement in the 1930s, which adopted 
the goal of pan-Netherlandism from 1934.^
In addition, the Flemish have a distinct role within the Belgian state. The Flemish 
community are the numerical majority within Belgium,"^ with an advanced industrial 
economy that compares favourably with the economically strongest regions of the 
EC.®- The politics of the Flemish majority situation is structured by the fact that it is 
not all territorially concentrated. The sizeable Flemish minority within Brussels has 
made territorial independence unattractive as it would lead to the abandonment of this 
minority amongst a Francophone-dominant community.^ The VU has placed itself as 
the defender of this minority and used this issue extensively in Belgian politics.
Flanders has three further distinctions which mark it out from other cases in this 
study. First, it has been involved in the Benelux union, a customs union with the 
other low countries: with Luxembourg from 1922, and with the Netherlands since 
1943-4. Second, Belgium was a founder member of the European Community in 
1957. Belgium is therefore a small, interdependent country, requiring some external 
support system  in both the political and economic spheres, to sustain its 
independence. But it has experienced, and widely accepted, two different types of 
external support in Benelux and the EC. This experience is important as it shapes the 
political opportunity structure, even if it had no great role in the development of 
Flemish nationahsm. Though it provided a useful external support for the autonomy 
issue in Flanders, the international context has been subordinate to the pohtical and 
demographic context of Belgium that militated against Flemish independence.
The third distinction between Flanders and other regions is evident in the 
institutional development of regionalism. Th& fédéralisation of the Belgian state has
2. “The Ten Commandments of the Flemish Nationalist”, an article in the Activist magazine 
“Vlaanderen”, 1922, document 38, in Theo Hermans (ed). The Flemish Movement: A Documentary 
History 1780-1990, p.262.
3. Jean Stengers, “Belgium” in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds). The European Right, p. 151.
4. The total population of Belgium in 1985 was 9,858,000, which comprised 5,673,000 in 
Flanders, 3,207,000 in Wallonie and 978,000 in Brussels, Eurostat - Regions Statistical Yearbook 
(Luxemburg: European Communities, 1988), p.26.
5. Ibid.
6. It is generally estimated that 20% of the population of Brussels is comprised of Dutch-speakers, 
though exact figures are difficult as the linguistic census was removed in the 1960s: see Group 
Coudenberg, The New Belgian Institutional Framework, p.7.
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been slow but continuous, has produced a substantial reform of the state and the 
establishment of strong regional institutions through a process of constitutional 
reform that developed in five stages from 1970 to 1993. The successful 
fédéralisation of Belgium in this period has had significant implications for both the 
European dimension and the VU as shall be demonstrated below.
Unlike Scotland, and to a lesser extent Wales, there has been little opinion polling on 
the EC and constitutional questions in Flanders. The small pieces of evidence that 
have emerged tell very little about popular opinion on constitutional questions in 
Flanders. One author employed a number of opinion surveys in a lengthy study of 
Belgian politics and society and touched on both institutional and European 
questions, but these produced no great surprises. On European union, different polls 
taken in 1957,1962 and 1975 all showed majority support for union, with no major 
cleavages until 1975, when it appears that the Walloon and Brussels populations 
favoured European political union and stressed the importance of the EC dimension 
much more strongly than the Flemish.^ There were wide margins between the 
Flemish and Francophones on this question, but its significance is difficult to 
interpret. More significant were evident changes in support for the unitary state as 
opposed to federation between 1975 and 1982: the Flemish population moved 
towards support for federalism, while the Francophones moved away from it. ^
Traditionally, Belgian politics has been structured by three competing political 
cleavages. Two of these cleavages, religion and class, have been subject to 
considerable institutionalistion within the political system. The third cleavage, that of 
language has been rather unstable and weakly institutionalised.^ Since the formation 
of the Belgian state in 1830, politics was organised between clericals and anti­
clericals, capital and labour and latterly between Francophones and Flemish. The 
religious and class conflicts remain influential, but it is the linguistic cleavage that 
has become increasingly politicised since the extension of the franchise in 1919 that 
established universal male suffrage.
7. Kenneth McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium, p. 119.
8. Ibid.
9. Derek Urwin, “Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of 
Institutionalisation”, Political Studies, Vol.18, No.3, 1970, p.332.
10. Val Lorwin, “Belgium: Religion, Class and Language in National Politics”, in Robert Dahl 
(ed). Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 147.
11. Wilfried Dewachter, “Changes in Partiecratie: The Belgian Party System 1944 to 1986”, in 
Hans Daalder (ed). Party Systems in Western Europe, p.287.
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The changes in the franchise from 1890-94 had initially provided an electoral 
opportunity for Flemish nationalists in two different ways: first, it gave the 
predominantly Flemish Catholic Party an electoral dominance in the Belgian state, 
and second, it provided the opportimity for the formation of a separate Flemish 
national party. The suffrage extensions enabled the Flemish Christian People’s Party 
to have a small measure of electoral success from 1894 to 1918.^^ The need for a 
separate party was more evident following the introduction of proportional 
representation in 1899 which undermined the Flemish role in politics through 
removing the dominance of the Catholic Party in the party system. The next 
franchise extensions of 1918, following the politicisation of the Flemish in the first 
world war, brought the establishment of the Frontpartijy which competed 
successfully as a semi-confessional Flemish national party during the 1920s.^^ 
Europe was not a notable issue during this period, though the external dimension 
and its imphcations were evident during and after W W l.
2. The Development of the Volksunie
The electoral record of the VU since its formation in 1954 has been impressive. The 
party’s performance was aided by a system of proportional representation that 
supported small parties through the redistribution of preference votes at the 
provincial level.
The theme of European integration has been evident within the VU’s programme 
since the 1960s, though it was given very little prominence imtil the party competed 
in European elections, and developed a motor role in the establishment of the 
European Free Alliance. These two issues were the most important for the party, 
especially within the context of the domestic federahsation of Belgium.
12. Lode Wils, “Introduction”, in Hermans, Op. cit., p.l4.
13. See Sheperd Clough, A History o f the Flemish Movement in Belgium, p.230.
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Table 5.1 Electoral Support for the Volksunie 1958-1991 (First
Chamber)
Year % Flanders % Belgium Seats
1958 3.4 2.0 1
1961 6.0 3.5 5
1965 11.6 6.7 12
1968 16.9 9.8 20
1971 18.8 11.1 21
1974 16.8 10.2 22
1977 16.3 10.0 20
1978 11.5 7.0 14
1981 15.9 9.8 20
1985 12.7 7.9 16
1987 12.9 8.0 16
1991 9.3 5.9 10
The Formation of the Volksunie
The VU was formed in Brussels by a group of nationalists in 1 9 5 4 . This was not 
the first effort to form a Flemish national party in the post-war period. The non­
confessional VU was preceded by efforts to form confessional Flemish parties in 
1949 and 1954. The Vlaamse Concentratie had been established as an electoral list 
in 1949, by dissident nationalists from the Christian Democratic Party, who 
attempted to create a new Flemish national party in spite of the post-war repression 
of the Flemish movement by the Belgian s t a t e . M u c h  of the effort of party 
formation was conducted privately as a consequence of the collaboration of extremist 
sections of the Flemish movement during the wartime occupation. As in Brittany, 
the nationalists suffered from their identification with extremists who had become 
prominent, but not particularly popular, during the German occupation.
The post-war suppression of the Flemish movement, and the overreaction of the 
state, affected the programme of the Vlaamse Concentratie as well as its formation.
14. Toon Van Overstraaten, Op De Barrikaden: Het Verhaal van de Vlaamse Natie in wording, p.20.
15. R.E.M. Irving, The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe, p.l68.
16. John Fitzmaurice, The Politics o f Belgium, p. 177.
17. Maurice-Pierre Herremans, “La Volksunie I”, Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No. 148, 
Brussels, 4th May 1962, p.7.
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The party demanded an end to the suppression of the movement and an amnesty for 
those accused of collaboration with the Germans. These short-term goals were 
supplemented by the more substantial objectives of securing linguistic reforms 
within Belgium: the establishment and freezing of a language border between the 
two communities, linguistic protection for the Flemish minority in Brussels, and the 
placement of geographical limits upon the Brussels metropolitan area. These 
linguistic aims were presented along with the explicitly political aim of reforming the 
Belgian state into a federation.^*
The Vlaamse Concentratie gained 104,000 votes on this platform in 1949, and 2% 
of the Belgian vote. The party did not surpass the threshold o f representation 
however, and this failure led to the party’s demise. Though the Flemish movement’s 
first post-war electoral organisation failed, the issues raised by the party remained, 
along with the voters and members who supported it. Those involved in the 
organisation were active in presenting Flemish national lists at the municipal 
elections in 1952. On this occasion nationalists were successful at gaining local 
electoral representation in Antwerp. This success provided a base for the new 
Flemish movement and led to the first nationally elected Flemish representative in the 
post-war period at the 1954 general election. In the early 1950s the Flemish 
nationalist activists^^ continued to follow the Christian Democratic orientation of the 
Vlaamse Concentratie. The strength of the Christian Social Party in this period made 
Flanders a one party dominant s y s t e m . T h i s  context, in addition to the fact that 
some of the new Flemish activists had been dissidents from the Christian Social 
Party, accounted for the confessionalism of the pr&-Volksunie parties. It was most 
evident in the 1954 elections when the Flemish nationalists designated themselves 
the Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie: a throwback to the party formed in the 1890s,2i 
and to the Frontpartij formed at the close of the first world war which employed 
religious symbolism in its nationalism.
This second nationalist party achieved the electoral success that eluded the first. 
Herman Wagemans was elected as a deputy for Antwerp in 1954, with the party 
gaining 2.2% of the vote in Belgium, worth 3.9% in Flanders. Wagemans was
18. Marcel Laloire, “Les Partis Beiges”, Res Publica, Vol.8, No.4, 1961, p.348.
19. The term activist is used in the general political sense to describe someone who is actively 
engaged in politics. It is not a reference to Activists or Activism: the extreme wing of the Flemish 
movement who sought to use the German occupation during the first world war to promote self- 
government for Flanders.
20. For a definition of the concept see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems.
21. The Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie is best understood as “The Flemish Christian People’s 
Union”.
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closely involved in the transition from the confessional party to the 
deconfessionalised VU that occured shortly after the general election.?^ Though 
Wagemans retired from politics after one term, the VU successfully retained his 
Antwerp seat through the election of the party President, Frans van der Elst, at the 
general election in 1958. After retaining its singular representation, in spite of a 
slight decline in electoral support, the VU continued to maintain its theshold of 
representation at a significant level in every subsequent election.
The Volksunie in Flemish Society
The VU was the primary electoral expression of the Flemish movement, yet existed 
within a subculture of other organisations and associations. These complementary 
organisations were part of the VU’s support network,^^ through supporting and 
legitimising issues of concern to the party rather than the party itself. It includes the 
Flemish movement organisation itself - the Vlaamse Volksbeweging - which was 
established in 1954 as the organisational umbrella for the Flemish movement,^ with 
a number of other associations such as the Leuvense Studenten Verbond, the 
Flemish universities and media and the political foundations such as the 
Davidsfondsy the Willemsfonds and the Vermeylensfonds.'^^ These organisations 
did not support the VU, indeed the latter foundations were formed by its political 
competitors, but they provided the means for wider discussion and debate on the 
Flemish question and contributed to the Flemish milieu.
W hilst participating in a wider Flemish subculture, the VU sought to develop its 
own particular pohtical space and create the means to deliver its own message to the 
Flemish population rather than rely upon other elements of the subculture. Belgium, 
like the Netherlands had a strong degree of verzuiling or pillarisation,^^ with 
different elements of society having distinctive subcultural organisations that hmited 
social integration across subcultures but supported it inside them. At the 
organisational level of society this manifested itself in the vertical role of the party in 
health and insurance companies, the press, trades unions, etc, with the traditional 
parties organising their own variants of these bodies. The VU, though opposed to
22. Herremans, May 1962, Op. cit., p.9.
23. Bert Klandermans (editor). Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States of 
America, p.305.
24. Maurice-Pierre Herremans, “Le Mouvement Populaire Flamand (De Vlaamse Volksbeweging)”, 
Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No.l30, Brussels, November 1961, p.3; and Herremans, “Le 
Mouvement Populaire Flamand”, Res Publica, Vol.4, N o .2 ,1962, pp. 195-7.
25. Fitzmaurice, Op. cit., p.208.
26. See Arend Lijphart, The Politics o f Accommodation.
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the traditional party verzuiling, had its own associations and insurance f u n d s , a n d  
its own party newspaper since 1955.2^ The importance of a sympathetic party paper 
for an emerging political organisation was obvious,^^ especially within the context 
of a party-oriented media which reflected the traditional subcultures and political 
cleavages within the Flemish community. The VU used its own press as a 
campaigning tool, but also as a means to diminish the role of the traditional 
subcultures. In this sense, the party can be considered as a modernising force.
The Expansion o f the Party
The early 1960s were the growth phase of the YU. In this period the party began to 
achieve sustained electoral success. Until 1961 the party had regarded itself as a 
pressure group rather than an electoral organisation, even though it had contested 
elections.^® The party began to move away from the linguistic and cultural agenda to 
address socio-economic and institutional questions. This broadening of the base of 
the party brought electoral success, though not amongst the social groups that the 
party had targetted as shall become clear below. The 1961 general election brought 
the first substantial success for the VU. The party contested all of the Flemish 
electoral arrondissements and Brussels, gaining 3.5% of the vote in Belgium, 6% in 
Flanders, and five deputies and two senators. The enlargement of the party’s 
parliamentary delegation, from one to seven, brought parliamentary activity and 
publicity across a range of policy areas, accompanied by extra-parliamentary action 
more consistent with the organisation’s role in the Flemish movement.
The VU campaigned heavily on the linguistic demography of Brussels following the 
1961 election. The VU and other Flemish parties regarded the expansion of bilingual 
Brussels into Flemish communities as an ‘oil stain’ that would continue to spread.^^ 
The VU called for the freezing of the language border in Belgium, and an end to the 
linguistic censuses which could bring linguistic changes to Flemish communities. 
Such censuses were seen to benefit the French language, as French language 
education had higher status and utility because of its primacy in higher status
27. Herremans, May 1962, Op. cit., p.l2.
28. De Volksunie was published from 1955-65, when its name was changed to Wij - Vlaams 
Nationaal Weekblad, the paper’s circulation grew in the early 1960s as the party increased its 
support, see “La Presse Périodique Radicale Flamand”, Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No.331- 
332, Brussels, September 1966, p.9.
29. Maurice Duverger, Op. cit., p.45.
30. Party President Frans Van der Elst gave the pre-1961 party this description, referring to the VU 
as a drukkingsgroep , Maurits Pierre Herremans, ”La Volksunie H”, CH du CRISP No. 169, 
October 1962, p. 15.
31. For consideration of the Brussels question see Martine De Ridder and Luis Ricardo Fraga, ‘The 
Brussels Issue in Belgian Politics”, West European Politics, vol.9, No.3, 1988, pp.376-93.
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o c cu p a t io n s .T h i s  problem was dealt with through the division of Belgium into 
four linguistic regions in 1961: a unilingual Dutch-speaking region in Flanders, a 
unilingual Francophone region in Wallonie, a German language region in the East 
and a bilingual Brussels region.
The early 1960s was the period of party-building, with the VU engaged in orthodox 
parliamentary and electoral activity and in protest politics. Working in parallel with 
the Vlaamse Volksbeweging and the Vlaams Aktiekomitie Brussel en Taalgrens, the 
VU campaigned vigorously on the language question, and adopted a range of new 
political campaigning techniques and activities that were not exploited by the 
traditional parties. They enabled the party to appear as a new, vibrant force in 
politics - the essence of modernity - and mobilise its sympathisers into forming a 
mass party organisation. Such mobilisation was conditioned by the fact that the party 
lacked the institutional means to achieve its goals, and had arisen in a social 
movement milieu.
Its role as a new  party and political outsider made it necessary to develop an 
autonomous mass base for the party. Such non-traditional activities as door 
canvassing, festivals, cultural events and annual landdagen (political meetings) 
generated political momentum and a mass membership base. Such mobilisations 
were also very effective mechanisms for socialising and utilising the expanding party 
membership. It gave the VU a very high and active profile in Flanders which was to 
pay dividends in future electoral contests.
As the party developed its organisational and electoral base it also sought to expand 
its political and economic programme. The original party programme was fairly 
limited in content and detail. It called for the fédéralisation of the Belgian state; the 
freezing of the language border between the two communities; the suppression of the 
linguistic census; a special statute for Brussels; and amnesty for those accused of 
collaboration during the war; and the industrialisation and development of the 
Flem ish e c o n o m y .33 Support for federalism was the centrepiece of the VU 
programme and the primary goal of its volksnationalisme. This objective was 
embodied in the party’s congress resolutions in 1961. The VU rejected the 
“nationalism of the state’, and held up federalism as the best means to achieve “a
32. Jean Ellen Kane, “Flemish and Wallon Nationalism: Devolution of a Previously Unitary 
State”, in Uri Ra’anan and John Roche (eds). Ethnic Resurgence in Modern Democratic States, 
p.131.
33. Herremans, October 1962, Op. cit., p. 11.
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decisive and global solution to the Flemish question’’.^ "^  Similar to the Breton 
movement, and other European regionalists, the VU sought a global rather than a 
unilateral solution to the desire for self-determination in Belgium: Federalism for 
Flanders also meant federalism for Wallonie.
The party’s commitment to federalism contained a European aspect, with both the 
domestic and European dimensions intended to distance the party from state- 
nationalism as practiced by unitary states, and from the more extreme variants of 
nationalism that appeared in Europe in the twentieth century. The Flemish movement 
experienced two phases of extreme nationalism in this century, with the development 
of the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV) in the 1930s and the establishment of 
Vlaams Blok in 1978. In the eyes of the VU these were not expressions of 
democratic and participatory Volksnationalisme, but of extreme nationalism and 
intolerance.^^ The VU sought to develop its anti-state and non-exclusive nationalism 
as a means to escape the past history of the Flemish movement.
The Mechelen Congress
In early 1960s the VU transformed itself from a pressure group into a party, mostly 
through the programmatic expansion of 1963. The Mechelen Congress of that year 
developed several organisational and policy initiatives. The Congress approved 
proposals to democratise the party’s internal structures to encourage local 
participation by activists and ordinary party members, and develop a decentralised 
mass party. The Congress also discussed the state reform process, the issue of self- 
employment and the socio-economic development of Flanders.
The socio-economic agenda debated at the Congress was the VU’s first substantial 
attempt to develop a platform beyond its primary issue-agenda of linguistic and 
institutional questions. Some of the programme originated in the party’s socio­
economic workgroup that met since 1961 to flesh out the VU’s federal programme 
with specific policy initiatives on the economy, the role of centralised financial 
investment in Brussels and Francophone dominance of the finance industry
In assessing the socio-economic position of Flanders the VU paid particular attention 
to the level of foreign ownership in the economy, and by foreign they meant non-
34. Ibid., p.20.
35. See Hugo de Schaupheliere and Yannis Thanassekos (eds), Extreem Rechts in West Europœ, and 
Stengers, Op. cit.
36. Sociaal Economische Weikgroep van de Volksunie, Voorde Hal Driemaal Zal Kraaien, p.4.
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Flemish; the levels of employee mobility, as a reflection of career and geographical 
factors; and the need for wider industrialisation across Flanders, on a decentralised 
basis, in order to overcome the structural imbalances of the regional economy. There 
was particular concern within the party about the unemployment level in Flanders, 
and the specific problems of the coalfields in the Limburg province in the Northeast 
of the region. Federalism was presented as the institutional mechanism to address 
these problems, with regional rather than national government having responsibility 
for structural interventions to aid Flemish economic development The VU depicted 
the unitary state as failing the Flemish economy: federalism was required to put it 
right. Under the VU programme such regional intervention would decentralise 
industry and provide a level of economic democracy in Flemish society
The importance of the Mechelen programme, the first major policy development 
undertaken by the VU, was obvious from the opportunity it gave the party to 
broaden its electoral base and reach out beyond those concerned with cultural and 
linguistic issues to wider social groups. The socio-economic programme was an 
attempt to gain and sustain a mass, working class electorate, which was then 
mobilised by socialism and Social Catholicism. The programme also acted to 
legitimise and reinforce the VU’s demand for federalism: a goal enhanced by the 
presentation of economic grievances.^* The programme provided an economic 
rationale for federalism, and also gave the electorate and media a clear picture of the 
prospective political and economic position of Flanders under a federal system.
Though the programme was intended to challenge the working class electorate of the 
Parti Social Chretien (PSC), its contents actually resembled that of the Parti 
Socialiste (PS). The new socio-economic approach proved popular within the party, 
and formed the core of its electoral programme in 1965. The resolutions adopted at 
the Mechelen Congress were pressed into service for the election campaign, and for 
the V U ’s ten year economic development programme for Flanders which was 
published in 1965.^^
37. “Le Congrès de Matines de la Volksunie", Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No.230, 7th 
February 1964, pp.3-13.
38. The role of economic grievances acting as a stimulus to regionalism and nationalism was part 
of Birch’s study of nationalism within the UK: Anthony Birch, Political Integration and 
Disintegration in the British Isles.
39. Sociaal Economische Werkgroep, Ontwikkelingsplan voor Vlaanderen 1965-75.
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The 1965 Election
The VU was successful in the 1965 general election: it was the first occasion in 
which the party broke through in substantial numbers. The VU gained 12 seats in 
the Chamber, with 6.7% of the vote in Belgium, 11.6% in Flanders. Ever since this 
election the party has managed to sustain parliamentary representation in double 
figures. In the post-1965 period the VU extended its extraparliamentary activities to 
build up working class support The Mechelen Programme therefore encouraged the 
radicalisation of the VU on socio-economic issues. The party was involved in 
organising demonstrations and campaigns on unemployment and the factory 
closures. The VU was particularly involved in the campaign against closures in the 
mining industry in Zwartburg in Limburg Province."^® It committed resources and 
activists to the campaign to save the coal industry. It was able to exploit this issue as 
the government made httle effort to produce a reconversion plan to aid the region’s 
re-development following industrial closures. The VU ran intense campaigns in the 
Limburg area, where it was and remained electorally weak, but it seems to have had 
little effect on the VU’s support.
Though the party vigorously pursued a working class electorate its support remained 
predominantly middle class. The social base of the VU electorate in this period 
closely resembled that of the Liberals in the region: with support from professional 
groups employed in the private sector in Brussels who had not attained career 
mobility through the linguistic reforms of 1963, and disenchanted Christian Social 
voters in 1965 and 1968.^^
The VU may have been in search of a working class electorate but it had not found 
one. These events were the beginning of the development of a progressive agenda 
inside the VU however: encouraged by the rise and political involvement of a post- 
1968 generation within the party. This generation made its way through the party’s 
youth organisations into politics, and had some impact upon the party in the period 
from the 1970s onwards. At the same time as these groups entered the party, an 
earlier generation of activists also gravitated towards leadership positions. This 
group, the governmentalists, advocated the professionalisation of the party and a 
departure from pressure group politics. This tendency was influential in the 1970s
40. See the articles “Vlaams en Sociaal” and “Limburg”, in Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 5th 
February 1966, pp.9 and 24.
41. Keith Hill, “Belgium”, in Richard Rose (ed). Electoral Behaviour. A Comparative Handbook, 
pp.48-51.
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through senior figures such as Hugo Schiltz and Maurits Coppieters, and succeeded 
in leading the party towards governmentalism  through participation in Belgian 
coalitions/^
Though the socio-economic programme did not bring a substantial number of 
working class votes, it was important for three reasons. First, it enabled the VU to 
compete with other parties on an equal footing without slipping into an ideological 
group that alienated potential supporters. The dominance of the Christian Social 
tradition in Flanders made this enduring cross-class approach particularly necessary. 
Programmatic expansion was also beneficial because it allowed the party to debate 
both specific and general policy issues with opponents. Second, it allowed the party 
to campaign at various levels for a wider range of issues than linguistic and 
institutional reform. Third, it acted to substantiate the party’s goal of federalism, and 
show how institutional change would address contemporary economic problems.
The socio-economic programme also demonstrated a more radical and modernising 
aspect to the VU. There was some degree of antipathy towards the free market 
system and a desire to balance it through social support and intervention. There was 
particular concern over economic concentration and the role of big business.^^ In the 
mid-1960s the VU contained a leftist group and a more Christian Democratic wing. 
However, although the party moved to the left on the socio-economic agenda it was 
not sufficient to keep some of the former group within the party. A small leftist 
splinter departed in 1964 as the VU adopted a cross-class front. Though they formed 
leftist nationalist lists in Brussels in the 1965 general election they had little effect 
and faded away."^
3. The Volksunie And Europe; Europeanisation And
Fédéralisation
The VU has been consistently successful in avoiding the conflicts over European 
integration experienced by other parties in this study. Indeed the issue has never 
caused difficulties for the VU, and only been mobilised in the period from the 
1980s. In contrast to the UK, Belgium was a founder member of the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. It was involved in 
the inner circle of European union since the 1950s, and the issue was greeted by
42. See Hugo Gijsels and Jos Vander Velpen, Het Vlaams Blok 1938-1988: Het Verdriet van 
Vlaanderen, p.43.
43. See Willy Cobbart, Welvaart en Vrijheid voor lederen: De Sociaal-Economische Vizie van de 
Volksunie.
44. Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, 1966, Op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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cross-party consensus rather than conflict. This consensus depoliticised the issue 
and reduced the utility of the EC as a political opportunity structure during most of 
the VU’s existence. The opportunities which came the way of the SNP and PC, in 
terms of referenda and exclusion from the EC, did not present themselves to the VU.
The demobilisation of the EC issue in Belgian politics did not mean that it was totally 
disregarded by Flemish nationalists. Rather, the EC was used to legitimise 
federalism. Like the Breton movement, the VU was both regionalist and federalist. It 
sought to transform and transcend the nation-state. European union was viewed as 
the desired and logical endpoint of the fédéralisation process in Belgium, with the 
demise of the unitary nation-state. However, this position was not the escape from 
separatism of other regionalist and nationalist parties. The position of the Flemish 
minority in Brussels and the federalist ethos of the VU removed the independence 
option, though it started to appear in political debate after the 1991 election as a 
result of federal reform and European integration. In common with the Breton 
movement, the issue of European union was endorsed in an affective way by the 
VU, rather than just in a utilitarian way. The party was not shy at making the 
linkages between domestic and European federalism however.
The earliest political linkage by the VU was a resolution adopted by the party 
congress in 1961. The VU passed a resolution linking the two themes of federalism 
and European union in the Belgian context, which stated that
“an ethnic-federalist base is a condition necessary for the promotion 
of co-operation and European unification, because only federalism 
gives the guarantees of survival to ethnic communities within a
supranational c o m m u n i t y ” .'^^
This definition appeared defensive in its outlook, based upon a purer nationalist 
conception of regionalism. Federalism was intended to develop domestically and 
then contribute to a decentralised European union rather than one constructed upon 
unitary states. This decentralist aspect led the VU towards a Europe o f the Regions 
position, to assist in the construction of the European Free Alliance, and, in the 
contemporary period, to oppose sections of the Maastricht Treaty.
Whilst the VU was enthusiastic about European union in the broad sense, it had 
reservations about its specific institutional and political form. Concern was 
expressed at the Mechelen Congress about the potential of European integration
45. Herremans, May 1962, Op. cit., p.21.
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producing homogenisation, standardisation and centralisation rather than a new 
supranational identity. The VU did not see the EC producing a specific ‘European’ 
identity or the United States of Europe creating a cultural melting-pot.^^ The party 
was more concerned with the political and economic dimensions of European 
integration than with language or identity. Curiously, though essentially regionalist, 
the VU at this time made a claim for equal status with other small nations.^^ This 
proposal indicated that the VU expected European integration to produce a 
convergence in the powers held by regions and states, yet also that it did not want to 
set limits on its own political goals. There was some recognition that integration 
could work to the detriment of cultural and linguistic minorities, though this was 
more illustrative of Flemish concern with the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels 
than with the Flemish in general. As Flemish is part of a wider language community 
with the Netherlands, the linguistic impact of the EC is smaller than that on non-state 
minority languages. The VU tended to use the European question to tilt at 
Francophone dominance in Brussels, pointing out the unsuitability of the city to be 
the European capital which was not suitably pluralistic and protective of 
minorities.^*
Though there has been widespread coverage of European and international affairs in 
the VU newspaper since its establishment in 1955, there was little coverage of the 
European Community dimension until the 1980s. The party did, however, respond 
to a number of developments in the EC consistent with its federalist stance. The 
Luxembourg crisis in the EC in 1965, generated by the reluctance of President De 
Gaulle to cede further sovereign powers to the Community, was one instance. The 
VU was critical of De Gaulle’s position, seeing it as an illustration of the problems 
of statism and state power within the institutions of the EC."^  ^It brought an attack on 
intergovemmentalism and support for more equal and democratic participation.
The European issue had little further impact on the VU in the 1960s. The issues of 
Belgian constitutional and linguistic reform were much more important. These 
questions predominated and the European issue was left fallow until 1969, though 
this one experience clearly illustrated the party’s preference for federalism rather than 
intergovemmentahsm as the guiding organisational principle for European union.
46. The Flemish in Today’s Europe, p. 11.
47. Ibid.
48. Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, 1964, Op. cit., pl4.
49. Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 13th November 1965, p.7.
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The VU’s preoccupation with domestic constitutional issues in this period was 
understandable. The party gained electoral popularity in the 1960s through 
combining linguistic, constitutional and socio-economic demands. Once the 
domestic constitutional questions began to be taken seriously by political 
competitiors, and the VU gained an agenda-setting role, then this domestic 
orientation was dominant. This was the beginning of the process of fédéralisation, 
and the VU’s attention became clearly focused on the institutional dimension.
Thç 1970 State Reform
The post-1968 Eyskens government of the Christian Social and Socialist parties 
adopted a constitutional reform programme which was partially implemented over 
the next few years. The central government itself was federalised, with the coalition 
having two Ministers for education, two Ministers for culture, and individual 
economic counsellors for Brussels, Flanders and Wallonie. This reform effectively 
regionalised the cabinet, and constitutional reforms institutionalised this development 
by establishing equal linguistic representation within the cabinet, though non-cabinet 
members of the government were not subject to this proportional arrangement. In 
future this differentiation, coupled to the expansion of regional government, was to 
allow the regional representation of the two main linguistic communities in the 
Council of Ministers at the EC level.
In addition the government divided the two houses of parliament into linguistic 
groups according to the territory they represented, with members from Brussels able 
to select their linguistic group. The 1970 constitutional reforms enshrined the 
designation of four linguistic regions into law, and developed special majority 
arrangements for amendments to these regions and their boundaries. Unilingualism 
was to be practiced in all territorial areas but those designated as bilingual. The 
special majority arrangements within the parliament also sought to ensure a degree of 
communal veto power to legislation. The constitutional reforms produced a special 
majority for future constitutional amendments, which would require that a majority 
of members of each language group be present in the chamber for voting, and that 
each group support a proposal by a two-thirds majority. This gave both the Flemish 
and the Francophone groups a veto power over future constitutional revisions, and 
meant that any future government legislation on state reform would require an 
enlarged coalition beyond the minimum threshold necessary for normal legislation.^®
50, In a lower chamber of 212 members a simple majority of at least 107 was sufficient for a 
coalition to sustain its legislative programme, concurrent special majorities altered this situation 
considerably, with substantial consequences for future coalition formation practices.
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The Chamber and Senate were also given an alarm-hell procedure, which allowed a 
special majority of each language group to suspend parliamentary business on 
certain occasions. This constitutional revision was designed to give protection to the 
numerical minority and prevent the Flemish majority dominating certain pieces of 
legislation. Politically controversial issues were to be referred to the cabinet for 
resolution.
These central and territorial changes were complemented by the creation of Cultural 
Councils and the legal establishment of provisions for the creation of regional 
governments in the 1970 reforms. Three Cultural Councils were created, for the 
Flemish, French and German languages. Each was given cultural autonomy, and the 
right to issue decrees with legislative force in culture, language and aspects of 
education. These powers were limited and shared with the centre, however, and the 
central government also retained a veto over Council legislation. The Councils for 
Dutch and French speakers were effectively centralised through both their 
representational and financial arrangements. The members of the Councils were 
members who had been elected to the national parliament and did not take the new 
institutions particularly seriously.^ ^  The new institutions did not enjoy political 
autonomy from the centre or any direct democratic aspect. Rather, they were merely 
the reproduction of the linguistic groups in the national parhament in two new formal 
bodies. Finance of these Councils remained with the centre, through block grants. 
This fiscal weakness did not make them very attractive to Council members either.
The constitutional reforms of 1970 also attempted to establish regional councils, 
with socio-economic powers, but it did not gain sufficient support in parliament. 
Cultural autonomy was the only concrete achievement of the Eyskens Government, 
though the legislation for regional councils was left intact for future implementation. 
The absence of regional autonomy on the federal model left the VU dissatisfied, and 
in a political position to demand more significant levels of autonomy for Flanders.
The New European Agenda
This period of reform coincided with the development of the issue of European 
union within the VU. Despite an early linkage in 1961, the issue of federalism and 
Europe was not linked in any substantive and coherent way until the party congress 
in 1969. Here, the VU called for a “federation of European peoples and regions” and
51. Anthony Mughan, “Belgium; All Periphery and No Centre”, in Yves Meny and Vincent Wright 
(eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe, p286.
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for the démocratisation of the European Parliament,^^ making this call more public in 
1970.^3 This gap from 1961 to 1969 was indicative of the rhetorical nature of the 
issue, having symbolic importance for the VU, but little practical consequences 
within an essentially domestic political programme. The issue was easily deployed 
as a political resource but was not of any great prominence within the party 
programme.
The party took the Europe more seriously as a consequence of the development of 
the issue of economic and monetary union in the early 1970s.^'^ As far as the VU 
was concerned the process of deepening within the EC required greater democratic 
participation and decentralisation, rather than limited institutional changes at the 
centre. The party used this development to outline the need for a decentralised 
federation,^^ building upon the intellectual position adopted by the VU senator and 
academic, Maurits Van Haegendoren. In contrast to the Breton movement, the 
development of an intellectual position on European federalism had some utility for 
the VU. It was readily applicable in parliamentary and electoral politics, as part of 
the process of domestic fédéralisation.
Van Haegendoren’s position was consistent with other European regionalists, 
informed by dissatisfaction with the nation-state. He pointed to the functional and 
representational inadequacy of contemporary nation-states in dealing with major 
economic and security questions. The political context of the late twentieth century 
had removed the possibility of effective unilateral action by nation-states, but 
structures to replace it had not been sufficiently transformed by decentralisation and 
participation. For Van Haegendoren the European Community had failed, as it had 
not developed beyond an intergovernmental economic organisation governed by 
centralised states. He counterproposed a decentralised federal Europe which 
involved economic and social provision, and a regional equalisation process to deal 
with the economic problems of the EC regions. These elements were reflections of 
the Mechelen congress and the socio-economic programme. Van Haegendoren’s 
federation was to consist of approximately fifty states - in contrast to the six EC 
members at that time. He made no attempt to detail these fifty members, but
52. Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No.606, p ll .
53. “Het Europa Der Volken", Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 23rd May 1970, pl5.
54. This issue had arisen at the Hague summit in 1969 and generated the Werner Report on 
Economic and Monetary Union, “Report to the Council and Commission on the Realisation by 
Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community”, European Council and Commission, 
supplement to EC Bulletin, N o .ll, 1970.
55. Frans Van der Elst, “De Volksunie en Europa”, Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 1st May 
1971, p8.
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followed the unusual regionalist approach of accepting that economic as well as 
ethnic regions would be acceptable as members.^^ This can be considered as an 
attempt to build bridges between the ethnic-regionalists and other regional groups 
and interests that do not use nationality as their collective starting point
The emphasis of the volksnationalisme outlined by Van Haegendoren was intended 
to stress the community basis to national identity rather than the state basis. In this 
way it was similar to the view of Saunders Lewis of PC. It was held up against the 
status quo of limited intergovemmentalism and the alternative future of a European 
superstate seeking to ape the behaviour of state nationalism.^^ The V U ’s 
volknationalisme was seen to have a cultural, community basis, helping individuals 
to tackle the isolation and alientation of industrial society in centralised states through 
communal involvement and participation.^*
The 1971 debate on EMU within the party had some similarities with that in the 
1990s. Then as now the VU was concerned at the undemocratic aspects of European 
integration and expressed support for the extension of the powers of the European 
Parliament to deepen and democratise the European union.^^ The need to strengthen 
the parliament was a persistent theme during the 1970s, with a desire to enable 
democratic participation within the European union and create genuine federal 
institutions, with volksnationalisme as the cohesive force to link peoples at the 
regional and transnational level.^® The strengthening of the European Parliament 
would also increase the level of supranationalism in the EC, which the VU thought 
would create a genuine European federation over the opposition of the 
intergovemmentalists.
The period in the early 1970s when the European issue gained the attention of the 
VU was relatively brief, and the political success of the party drove the constitutional 
agenda in Belgium to a new peak. A combination of electoral success by the Flemish 
and Francophone community parties and changing attitudes to the need for regional 
government, rather than just cultural autonomy, brought the constitutional question 
to a head.
56. Maurits Van Haegendoren, Nationalisme en Fédéralisme, pp.168-80.
57. This was not a new idea. The leading classical functionalist, David Mitrany, was suspicious of 
the notion of Euro-nationalism proposed by some authors as early as the 1920s, in which the 
European superstate would adopt similar behavioural characteristics to nation-states: see David 
Mitrany, “Pan-Europa: A Hope or a Dangw?”, Political Quarterly, Vol.l, N o.4 ,1930.
58. Frans Van der Elst, “L’Avenir de la Volksunie”, Res Publica, Vol.lO, No.5, 1968, p.l05.
59. Van der Elst, Op. cit., 1971, p.9.
60. Karel Jansegers, De 19 van het Europa de 9, p.3.
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State Re form. Governmentalism And Party Crisis
An opportunity for the VU to advance its preference for fédéralisation came in the 
shape of discussions on state reform in 1974-7. This period saw the involvement of 
the community parties in government coalitions for the first time. The effect of the 
1971 constitutional reforms, with their special majority rules, made for difficult 
progress on reform in the absence of enlarged coalitions. The Tindemans 
Government of Christian Social and Liberal parties sought to deal with this problem 
initially through broad party talks on reform, and then adding the Rassemblement 
Wallon (RW) to the government. This governmental enlargement did not provide a 
special majority, but did create internal pressures within the government and the RW 
that made the coalition a failure.^^
The state reform issue remained of primary importance to the government, and it 
developed inter-community dialogue to resolve the conflicts on constitutional 
change. A series of formal discussions took place between 1976 and 1977 involving 
all the political parties in parliament, to reach a compromise position on reform. The 
contents of these discussions formed the interparty proposals that emerged in 1977 
and became known as the Egmont Pact This agreement was constructed on the back 
of the six party coalition that emerged from the 1977 elections. The Flemish 
Christian Party (CYP) and Socialists (SP), entered into a coalition with their 
Francophone ideological counterparts, the Front Démocratique des Francophones 
(FDF) and the VU. This development was unpopular with VU members and 
supporters, who tended to prefer a protest orientation rather than a governmental 
one. This coalition achieved a special majority in both houses and language groups, 
and reflected the CVP dominance in Flanders and the PS dominance in Wallonie. 
This meant that the two main regions and communities were strongly represented in 
the government, through both the main parties and the community parties. The 
government coalition reached agreement on the details of the Egmont Pact, which 
was approved in votes in the legislature as part of the government programme in 
1978, but it was slowed down through opposition from members of the CVP.
The party’s involvement in the Egmont Pact, and the subsequent failure of the 
reform package, inflicted severe damage on the VU. As a signatory to the Egmont 
Pact, the VU made a number of compromises to Francophones in the Brussels area, 
allowing public funding for Francophone linguistic facilities in the Brussels
61. Fitzmaurice, Op. cit., p. 116.
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suburbs. Some VU members held that the party was aiding the spread of the 
Brussels ‘oil slick’ and internal discontent brought the resignation of one elected 
member of the chamber and the departure of a number of a c t i v i s t s . T h e  
disenchantment within the VU led to the formation of two splinter parties, in 
opposition to the VU compromises and governmental orientation.
The Vlaamse Volkspartij and the Vlaams Nationale Parti] were formed from VU 
defectors, and from the more conservative and extreme members of the Flemish 
movement. Both parties coalesced uneasily into the Vlaams Blok in 1978. The VU’s 
pragmatic and centre-left position offered a degree of political space for a more 
ideologically conservative Flemish national party with a more radical position on 
Flemish au tonom y.Am ongs t  the VU membership there was some awareness that 
the rightist tendency was exploiting the Egmont opportunity in order to establish a 
new political organisation.^^ The Vlaams Blok adopted a position in favour of 
national independence for Flanders, rather than federalism and co-existence. It 
gained little support until it turned to the immigration issue in 1987. This issue, 
rather than nationalism, was seen to be the main element of electoral support for the 
new party,^^ but it did not prevent the Vlaams Blok from taking support from the 
VU and most other parties in subsequent elections.
The 1979 European Election
W hilst involved in the domestic dimension, and in the government coalition, the 
European issue was of little consequence to the VU until the direct elections to the 
European Parliament in 1979. As a developed and successful electoral party - at least 
until the disruptive effect of the Egmont failure - the VU was well placed to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the election. Despite its electoral success 
the VU had not received an M E? in the nominated European Assembly. The 
nominated seats had been monopolised by the traditional parties, but elections now 
opened this exclusive situation to competition. The elections themselves afforded
62. Joseph Randolph, “Ethnoregionalism in Contemporary Western Europe: The Potential for 
Political Accommodation”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol.8, N o .2 ,1981, p.334.
63. Tom De Roep, “Een Poging tot Sociale Identifikatie van Extreem Ethnische Nationalistische 
Partijen in de EG na 1970”, unpublished thesis, Faculteit de Rechtsgeleerheid, Rijksuniversiteit 
Gent, 1991, p.l89.
64. Interview with Hugo Coveliers, Volksunie Kamerlid for Antwerp: 27th April 1992, Antwerp. 
Coveliers was one of the VU members who defected to the new Vlaamse Liberalen en Demokraten 
in 1992.
65. Opinion poll research carried out by De Standaard in Antweip from ll-13th October 1988 found 
that only 12% of Vlaams Blok identifiers were attracted to the party by the independence question, 
compared to 79% of identifiers attracted by its position on inunigration: See Gisjels, Op. cit., 
p.115.
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two opportunities to the VU. First, there was the chance to develop political linkage 
on federahsm and the EC in the electoral arena. Second, there was the opportunity to 
develop transnational linkages with other regionalist parties through European 
institutions.
The distinct political geography of Belgium brought a territorial compromise on 
electoral boundaries for the European election. Two electoral colleges and three 
electoral constituencies were established to ensure the proper representation of the 
linguistic communities. Seats were allocated on a population basis: giving thirteen 
seats to the Flemish electoral college and eleven to the Francophone. The Flemish 
electoral constituency contained the four provinces plus the Leuven arrondissement 
o f Brabant, with the Francophone constituency composed of the four Walloon 
provinces plus the Nivelles arrondissement of Brabant. Voters in Brussels, the third 
electoral constituency, were able to vote in either the Flemish or Francophone 
electoral college.^^ Despite these arrangements, the VU still complained that the 
Francophone community was overrepresented, and should have had only ten seats 
in the European Parliament instead of eleven. This complaint was also made at 
subsequent European elections.
Though the VU was not able to recover the levels of popularity it enjoyed during the 
1965 to 1977 period, it managed to sustain European representation in all three direct 
elections, in spite of efforts by the traditional parties to treat the European elections 
as domestic affairs: using prominent political personalities to head European electoral 
lists that turned them into “beauty contests” ;^  ^and the arrival of new parties in the 
Flemish electoral system that challenged the traditional parties and the VU. The VU 
sought to counter the personality orientation of the traditional parties by using its 
own prominent members to head the lists in each province.^^ The VU was 
successful in the 1979 elections, gaining one seat in the European Parliament, 
despite the party’s decline in the 1978 general election, dropping to 11.5% of the 
vote and only 14 seats. This outcome followed the party’s role in the coalition 
government, which ended over the failed Egmont Pact and the internal divisions
66. See Tom Mackie and F.W.S. Craig, Europe Votes 2, p.39.
67. This practice was evident in the 1984 European elections: former Prime Minister Leo 
Tindemanns headed the Christian Peoples Party (CVP) list, Karel Van Miert represented the 
Socialists (SP) and Willy De Clerq represented the Libères (PVV), See J. Gerard-Libois, M. Julin 
and X. Mabille, “Elections européenes en Belgique: géographie des votes de préférence”, Courrieur 
Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No. 1057-8, Brussels, llth  November 1984, p.7.
68. For example, the VU lists in 1984 were headed by Hugo Schiltz in Antwerp, Willy Kuijpers in 
Leuven arrondissement, Vic Anciaux and Jef Valkeniers in Brussels, and Nelly Maes and Maurits 
Coppieters in East Flanders.
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within the VU that produced the Vlaams Blok. Though the context was not very 
positive for the YU, it was able to gain representation in 1979.
The lack of competion for the anti-establishment vote enabled the VU to hold onto its 
support despite the decline. Such efforts were made more difficult in the 1980s and 
1990s. Maurits Coppieters was elected to the EP with just over 50,000 preference 
votes, and held the seat until 1981 when it was transferred to the current incumbent 
Jaak Vandemeulebroucke. From here the party found itself rather isolated in the 
European Parliament, and began a process that led to several party groups and the 
development of the European Free Alliance: which was the VU’s personal project 
from the 1979 election onwards.
The VU programme in 1979 stressed the need for a Europe o f the Regions y not as a 
utopian ideal, but as a realistic means to balance the centripetal forces of European 
integration and centralised states, with the countervailing force of regions and 
national communities. The VU was seeking a Europe of peoples rather than of 
states. This European context was seen to have a specific role in Flanders in two 
ways: first, it would contribute to the demise of the Belgian state, through removing 
some of its functions and undermining its exclusivity; second, greater European co­
operation would allow a degree of cultural integration with the Netherlands.^^ Both 
of these developments were seen to enhance Flemish political autonomy. The party 
also tried to stress the transnational dimension to minority nationalism, with its list 
designated as Volksunie-Europese Vrij Alliantiey even though EFA was still an 
informal grouping of parties rather than a formal organisation.
The 1979 elections were quickly followed by the resumption of the constitutional 
reform process in Belgium. The tripartite coalition government that involved the 
three traditional parties succeeded in gaining the two-thirds majority in parliament 
necessary for further state reform. This coalition proceeded with the régionalisation 
that had been ditched post-Egmont, though they chose to ignore the Brussels 
question. This issue was consciously set-aside by the governing parties as no 
agreement could be reached on a solution for Brussels. The government therefore 
agreed to separate it from the régionalisation of Flanders and Wallonie so that it did 
not operate as a blockage on progress.
69. Joan Hart and Bruno De Witte, “De Europese Programma's van Fianna Fail, FDF-RW en 
Volksunie”, Res Publica, Vol.21, No. 1, 1979, p.l04.
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The 1980 Fédéralisation
The 1980 state reform process contained two main developments. First, changes to 
the Community Councils that had been established in 1970. The councils were given 
the right to create their own executives and powers over ‘personal’ issues such as 
family policy, welfare, community health care and the integration of immigrants. 
The reforms also established the regional councils which had been provided for in 
1970 but not implemented. Both Flanders and Wallonie received indirectly-elected 
councils and executives, with each council being fully-elected in the future through 
the reform of the Senate into a regional chamber. This was intended to remove the 
possibility of overlapping membership whilst ensuring democratic legitimacy.
The powers accorded to the new regional councils essentially conformed to a low  
p o litic s  typification. The regions were given responsibility for planning, 
environment, conservation, housing, water and sewage, regional economic policy, 
certain aspects of energy policy and the supervision of local government. The 
regions also had limited fiscal powers, with a restricted right to raise taxes, and 
some small independent fiscal sources through charges, fees and borrowing. The 
bulk of the finance remained with the centre, by way of central grants and rebates. 
For regionalists the new reforms were a limited success. On the positive side they 
created regions, and the reform process moved beyond cultural autonomy to deal 
with territoriality and more genuine federalism. On the negative side the regions 
remained weak and fiscally dependent upon the centre.
The 1984 European Election
The 1984 European elections occured at a more fruitful time for the VU. It had 
recovered from its coalition experience and increased its support at the 1981 election 
to 16%. The party programme for this election gave a much clearer view of policy 
towards the EC. The VU reiterated its confederal aims within Belgium as a 
contribution to the construction of European union. In doing so the party struck a 
rather unusual note. The VU was keen to point to the strong economic and 
geographical position of Flanders within the EC, which was undermined by its weak 
political status. But instead of comparing itself to other regions - the German Lander 
for example - it compared Flanders to Denmark and Ireland.”^® This choice of 
comparison is rather irregular for a regionalist party. It indicated that Europe has
70. “Vlaanderen in Europa: Samen aan’t Werk”, Verkiezingsprogramma van De Volksunie/Europese 
Vrij Alliantie, 17th June 1984, p.l.
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blurred the boundaries between nationalist and regionalist political demands It 
certainly pointed to anomalies in EC representation and structures - and undermined 
the ‘size’ and economic viability principles of autonomy, but it was essentially a 
nationalist comparison weighted towards independence. Though not pursuing the 
independence option, the VU was prepared to deploy the same political resources 
that the SNP used to pursue Independence in Europe. The changing role of Flanders 
in Belgium and Europe made this necessary. The region was gaining political, 
economic and administrative powers in Belgium through federalisation. This process 
meant that the region required some new type of representation in the European 
Community. The VU argued that Belgium had regionalised its representation to the 
European Parliament, through the 1979 provisions for regional/linguistic electoral 
constituencies, and that this practice should be extended to other European 
institutions to enable fuller Flemish representation.^^
However, the bulk of the VU programme in 1984 was of the standard regionalist 
variety. The party called for the establishment of a Senate of the Regions in the 
European Parliament and increased powers for the European Parliament and 
Commission. The latter was an attempt to enhance the supranational level of 
decisionmaking and turn the Commission into a genuine governing executive rather 
than an intergovernmental body. It was intended to undermine the supremacy of the 
Council of Ministers, and curb the use of the national veto by Member S ta tes .^ ^  jh is  
desire to remove the veto, and reduce the role of the nation-states placed the VU in 
direct conflict with the SNP. It illustrated the European aspects to the internal 
cleavage of the regionalist political family that separates nationalists and regionalists. 
Though it is a key cleavage between the two sets of parties, it has not been 
politicised or mobilised to any noticable extent. The incompatibility of the VU’s 
position on Europe and the Independence in Europe policy has therefore been a non­
issue.
The VU responded to the EC’s developing economic agenda in two ways. First, 
there was support for increasing the EC’s role in social and regional policy, though 
these were to be reoriented to bring benefits to the regions and enhance regional 
autonomy rather than aid the central state.^^ This was an attempt to enhance regional 
economic resources. Second, there was strong support for the European Monetary 
System as a step towards futher economic integration. The VU supported an
71, Paul-H. Claeys, Nicole Loeb-Mayer and Guido Van Den Berghe, “Belgium”, in Juliet Lodge 
(ed), Direct Elections to the European Parliament 1984, p.60,
72, “Vlaanderen in Europa”, Op. cit., 1984, p,5,
73, Ibid., p,7,
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enhanced currency role for the ECU, rather than a mere monetary unit, with the 
intention of releasing it into common usage in the global economy
The 1984 European election found the VU constructing provincial ‘personahty’ lists 
as in 1979. The collapse of the Christian Democratic (CVP) vote in the 1984 
elections enabled the VU, Socialists (SP), A galev  and Vlaams Blok to make 
advances. The CVP lost 15.5% in the 1984 election in Flanders, which allowed the 
VU to take a second seat in the European Parliament. Though the party doubled its 
representation the other community parties in Belgium, Rassemblement Wallon and 
the Front Démocratique des Francophones, lost both their seats in the European 
Parliament.
The 1984 election was the second occasion on which the VU campaigned as a 
member of the European Free Alliance, though this organisation now had a degree 
of institutional reality which it had lacked in 1979. It was the only major regionalist 
party that seems to have campaigned under the transnational label.^^ As the prime 
movers behind the organisation, it was not surprising that the VU used the issue in 
the campaign. It was seen to be popular amongst nationalists in Flanders, and also 
gave some depth to the party’s policy of a Europe o f the Regions. The VU/EFA 
slogan and campaign theme were an exercise in political linkage with the party 
emphasising dual federalism and decentralisation, as well as the issue of nuclear 
disarmament, international co-operation and an end to the cold war arms 
manufacturing industry.^^ This latter issue was to cause problems for the VU during 
their involvement in the 1988-91 coalition government.
Between the two sets of European elections in 1984 and 1989, developments in the 
EC offered new opportunities to the VU and other regionalist parties. The Single 
European Act and the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers permitted more genuine transnational decisionmaking within the EC.^^ The 
new economic and institutional arrangements established the grounds for a 
decentralised and supranational federation in Europe, with economic and monetary 
union in future requiring a future degree of social federalism to deal with the socio­
economic problems of integration.^^
74. Ibid., p. 12.
75. Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 14th June 1984, p.8.
76. This issue was emphasised by the VU deputy, and former leader, Hugo Schütz at the YU 
congress that preceded the European elections, Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 7th June 1984,
p.8.
77. “Vlaanderen in Europa”, Vlaams Nationaal Studiecentrum, Brussels, 1987, p.2.
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The 1988 State Reforms
The post-1988 state reform process was a consequence of continuing constitutional 
change and also the dynamic result of the earlier fédéralisations. Each of the main 
parties had become converted to régionalisation to develop and protect their existing 
pow erbases in the two com m unity-regions. These developm ents further 
institutionalised the regional cleavage in the Belgian party system. The five-party 
coalition, which included the VU, developed the reforms in response to the Fourons 
problem, which involved a bilingual area on the language border between the two 
communities, and the economic conflicts between the two main regions. Though the 
VU was a member of the Belgian government from 1988-91, its role was limited. 
The party gained Ministers in the Budget and Overseas Development Ministry, 
which gave the party a rather conservative orientation and distanced it from a key 
role in the state reform process.
The new agenda of fédéralisation in 1988 involved phased negotiations and 
implementation. The reforms intended to resolve the Brussels problem through 
special regional status; “proporz” and special majority arrangements in the Brussels 
executive and council; extending powers and fiscal autonomy of the two existing 
regional governments; and re-establishing the regional parliaments as directly elected 
assemblies whilst federalising the Senate. These latter aspects raised a number of 
problems, with conflict over the proposals to reform the Senate, the effects of the 
division of Brussels on suburban francophones and the urban Flemish population 
and over the redistribution of seats and districts in Brussels. These conflicts left the 
reform process incomplete. The Senate was not regionalised, the Flemish and 
Wallon parliaments were not democratised, and the regional governments did not 
gain the role in foreign affairs that they had been looking for: the VU had sought to 
extend the policy domain of the Flemish parliament in relations with the European 
Community arid other international bodies, and develop Flemish representation in 
the international community. The party intended to extend the Flemish competence 
beyond the right to develop cultural relations and act autonomously in the European 
and international sphere.^^ The constitutional status quo reserved the right to act in 
foreign affairs for the national government, even when the issue concerned was 
clearly within the policy domain of the regional authorities. This problem became an 
issue in the community dialogue following the 1991 election.
79. Interview with Paul Van Grembergen, Volksunie Kamerlid and Fraktie leader, 29th April 1992, 
Brussels.
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The 1989 European Election
The 1989 European elections were disappointing for the VU, it suffered as a 
consequence of the party’s role in the coalition government with the'Christian 
Democrats and the Socialists. This governing role was not treated sympathetically by 
the VU’s own electorate, particularly as there were alternative electoral opportunities 
for voicing discontent with the government. The YU was not surprised at tlie 
downturn in its support in 1989, it had expected to lose votes because of its role in 
the coalition,^® but, as in the 1977-8 period, it accepted the risk of trading off 
support for gaining progress on constitutional change within the government. The 
YU lost one of its two seats, despite the fact that its second MEP increased his 
personal share of the vote.^^ The winners in 1989 were Vlaams Blok, which trebled 
its support to gain one seat; and Agalev, which improved its vote by 5% to retain its 
single member. The big losers were the YU and the Socialists, with all other parties 
gaining votes from them.^2 The YU lost 170,000 votes in the 1989 election, as its 
vote decreased from a European highpoint of 13.9% in 1984 to 8.7%. However, 
this loss did not lead the party to abandon its governmental strategy, even though it 
led to further losses in 1991.
The 1991 Electoral Crisis
The 1991 general election was a defeat for all major parties in Flanders. The three 
governing parties, the Christian Democrats, Socialists and YU, lost support, and the 
radical Vlaams Blok and Van Rossem lists gained votes from all o p p o n e n t s .T h e  
YU losses brought the party to abandon its role in the Belgian government, though it 
retained a role in the Flemish executive. The extent of the YU losses were not 
foreseen as a series of opinion polls from 1990 to 1991 had seen the party regain 
support fairly steadily from a low point of 8.4% in December 1990,*"  ^to a peak of 
15.2% in October 1991,*^ before falling to 13.9% in November, when the YU left 
the government over Flemish-Wallon conflict over subsidies to the defence
80. Hugo Schiltz’s comments following the elections were illustrative of the VU’s negative 
expectations in 1989, Le Soir, 21st June 1989, p.4.
81. Europese Verkiezingen”, Wij - Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 23rd June, 1989, p. 11.
82. E. Lentzen, X. Mabille and J. Vanlaer, “Les élections européens de juin 1989”, Courrieur 
Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No.1242, Brussels, 1989, p.25.
83. Electoral analysis of changing party alignments in the 1991 election estimated that the YU lost 
63,500 votes to the Vlaams Blok and 17,000 to Van Rossem, as well as substantial levels of 
support to the main parties. See De Standaard, 27-28th May 1992, p.3.
84. La Libre Belgique, 25th March 1991, p.3.
85. De Morgen, 2nd November 1991, p.l, with fieldwork on 29th and 30th October 1991.
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industry.*^ The polls also gave support for the Vlaams Blok at 5-7%, though they 
ended up with 10.3% to the VU’s 9.3% in the election.
The new government of Socialists and Christian Democrats took several months to 
agree its programme as the European and autonomy issues became entwined in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The VU and the two Green parties agreed to support the four- 
party government in its efforts to implement those state reforms that had not been 
completed in the 1988-91 period - thereby giving the government the required two- 
thirds majority in parliament. The majority of the parties then entered into 
community dialogue on the reform process in April 1992. This discussion resolved 
some of the issues for reform, such as the right of regions to sign international 
treaties, but left larger questions unanswered.
These larger questions were significant parts o f the European agenda for 
régionalisation. In order to pursue fédéralisation the parties had to tackle the 
régionalisation of the system of agricultural supports, and therefore aspects of the 
CAP. In addition, the issue of community representation in the European Parliament 
was raised. The most difficult issue from a European and a regional perspective 
however, came with the need to régionalisé the national budget. Dividing the budget 
and agreeing transfers was a difficult process, complicated by the convergence 
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. The limits on budget deficits in Maastricht 
added extra constraints on negotiations on régionalisation: how to régionalisé and 
reduce the Belgian national debt. Such problems led to a government crisis in March 
1993, with Flemish-Wallon conflict over spending cuts to achieve convergence, 
though an agreement was brokered between the governing parties to prevent fresh 
elections. The crisis was not able to effect the reform process, with parliament 
agreeing to enhanced powers for the regional governments in the areas of foreign 
trade, agriculture and the environment.
The Maastricht process did not pass without the VU seeking to make capital out of 
the issue. Though supportive of the deepening agenda of European integration, the 
VU opposed the Maastricht Treaty, and voted against it in both houses of the 
Belgian parliament The party was in favour of the proposals for EMU but found the 
democratic elements in the Treaty weak. The power and legitimacy of the European 
Parliament was not enhanced, and opportunités for regional participation were
86. Ibid., poll taken on 1st November after VU departs from the coalition.
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minimal.*^ Though the party had vacillated on the issue, the Danish referendum 
defeat encouraged it to oppose the Treaty rather than accept the consensual position 
of the other parties. The need to put some distance between the VU and the 
traditional parties, and escape the governmental image of 1988-91, was part of the 
reason for the rejection of Maastricht. Another reason was a result of the Treaty 
proposals itself, which had failed to develop the role of the European Parliament, 
and had produced a subordinate Committee of the Regions rather than a more formal 
chamber for regional representation. The VU expressed the view that the Maastricht 
proposals were not regionalist enough.
4. Institutional Change and Party Crisis
Though the reform of the state in 1988 was incomplete, the community dialogue in 
1992-3 produced a new fédéralisation package. The St Michelsberg agreement 
between the parties, and its subsequent passage in both houses of parliament, 
brought the Belgian state closer to a genuine federation.
This continuing programme of fédéralisation brought particular problems for the 
VU. Regionalist parties, as single issue parties, are very distinctive in programmatic 
terms because they have an identifiable end-condition. The successive reform of the 
state undermined the political reasons for the existence of the VU. When a party 
committed to constitutional reform and federalism has those goals fulfilled, then the 
rationale for organisational continuation is dubious. Since institutional change has 
brought programmatic fulfilment then the party should have little reason to continue.
Institutional change may undermine the popularity and demands of communal 
parties, though it may also produce the opposite effect through intensifying these 
regional demands.^* In the 1960s and 1970s the regional electoral sphere was 
reinforced by political problems related to institutional reforms. In the 1980s and 
1990s these problems were played out at the level of the new regional institutions. 
The electoral dynamic for change that brought reforms in earlier period was replaced 
by a functional and administrative pressure for reform. These developments cast 
doubt over the future role of the VU in Flemish politics, as its issue concerns 
became institutionalised within the party and governmental system, yet reduced in 
the electoral sphere.
87. De Standaard, 19th June 1992, p.2. The Maastricht Treaty was later ratified by the Belgian 
parliament on, 17th July 1992, by 146 votes to 33. The VU voted against the Treaty on this 
occasion along with ECOLO, Agalev, and the Vlaams Blok.
88. Rokkan and Urwin, Op. cit., p . l# .
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The VU was not oblivious to these problems. The party experienced a reinvention 
phase following the fédéralisation of 1988. It recognised the need for an updated 
regionalist appeal within a regionalised political system, and sought to recast its role 
in the Flemish party system and develop the political theme of démocratisation.
The party showed an awareness of the new post-federal environment by adding the 
designation Vlaamse Vrij Demokraten to its title. This was intended to identify the 
VU as a party in Flanders not just a party for Flanders, stressing its reform 
credentials and willingness to take part in the construction of the new Flemish region 
on a range of political and social questions, and de-emphasise the institutional 
agenda. Since the 1960s elements of the VU identified with the programme and 
approach of the Dutch liberal reform party the Demokraten ‘66  (D’66). This party's 
example influenced the post-federal changes. The D ’66 had been formed by young 
academics and intellectuals as a new politics party to supplant the established 
political and social cleavages in the Netherlands. The party sought to encourage the 
démocratisation of Dutch politics through eradicating the pattern of coalition changes 
and elite accommodations that tended to occur in the absence of electoral contests 
and popular participation. The D’66 wanted to remove alternation in the absence of 
elections.
The D ’66 also sought to undermine the traditional religious and social cleavages that 
structured Dutch political life. This preference for depillarisation, as a necessary 
component of political modernisation, was also adopted by the VU, with the VU 
seeking to transform the internal dynamics of Flemish politics and society rather than 
merely achieve institutional change. This was a consequence of the progressive 
agenda evident within the party since the late 1960s, with concern for both 
environmental and lifestyle questions, and for socio-economic issues. These were 
issues with which the VU sought to reinvent itself in the post-institutional climate. 
The issues are some evidence of a succession o f ends within the p a r ty ,th o u g h  
achieved through domestic developments rather than European integration: with the 
VU stressing that autonomy was not an end in itself but a means to societal 
transformation.
Though the party was content to deal with the post-federal agenda in a limited way, 
the experience of the 1991 election and the implementation of state reform brought a 
new crisis to the party. In the period after the election the VU’s former leader, Jaak
89. Panebianco, Op. cit.
180
The Volksunie And Europe
Gabriels, became engaged in informal discussions on the formation of a new reform 
party within Flanders to challenge the Christian Social and Socialist traditions. 
Gabriels' initiative indicated the lack of consensus within the party on the future of 
the VU, with some groups seeking the termination of the party whilst others sought 
continuation through the identification of new goals. This divergence over the 
reinvention of the party was manifest in two distinct tendencies within the party.
Both of these tendencies were committed to the modernisation of Flanders, and the 
removal of the subcultural tradition of organisational pillars that characterised the 
Christian Democrats in particular.^® However, they differed markedly on the means 
to achieve such depillarisation, and on the future of the YU itself. The first tendency, 
which sought to construct a a new liberal peoples party in Flanders, were primarily 
concerned with the adoption of a strategy of electoral efficiency, while the other 
tendency, which sought the continuation of the VU, was concerned with 
constituency representation and the maintainence and defence of the ideology and 
values of the VU electorate.®^
The peoples party tendency was responsible for the re-positioning of the party in the 
late 1980s and some of the emphasis on the liberal reform programme. In pursuit of 
this goal they adopted a maximum electoral approach through a catch-all strategy, in 
conjunction with other political forces in Flanders. When Gabriels, the former leader 
of the VU, announced his retirement from the leadership after the 1991 election, the 
catch-all view led to discussions with the Flemish liberal party (PVV) on the efficacy 
of political co-operation between elements within the VU and the liberals. These 
discussions led to an agreement to establish a new party in Flanders in November 
1992 - the Vlaamse Liberalen en Demokraten (VLD) - which began to attract 
members of the VU.
Whilst a section of the VU departed to the new party in pursuit of electoral success 
and governmental participation, the constituency representation tendency within the 
party sought to develop a new programme for continuation. This process of 
transition took place in parallel to the rise of a new and younger leadership cohort in 
the party. The new leadership stressed the radical anti-establishment aspect to the 
VU, to escape the party’s unpopular governmental past from 1988-91. This was a
90. For consideration of the development of verzuiling in Flanders, and attempts to reform it, see 
Serge Covaart, “Le débat sur le verzuiling en Flandre”, Courrieur Hebdomadaire du CRISP, 
No.1329, Brussels, 1991,
91. These alternative strategies have been drawn from Herbert Kitschelt, The Logic o f Party 
Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany.
181
The Volksunie And Europe
repeat of earlier efforts by a new leadership to restore the party’s nationalist face 
after the Egmont crisis.
The new party leader, Bert Anciaux, sought to stake out a future for the post-federal 
VU through advancing six main principles of contemporary Flemish nationalism, 
each intended to distinguish the VU from the Vlaams Blok and reclaim the mantle of 
radical nationalism for the VU.^^ The six principles were: tolerance of minorities 
within Flanders, pacifism, a commitment to develop political and social pluralism, 
social justice, environmental protection, and the maintenance and extension of 
regional and individual autonomy
Though these issues fell within the tradition of the party they were not its exclusive 
property. These concerns might be better represented and organised by competing 
political parties in Flanders: Agalev may be better placed to represent environmental 
interests, the Socialists more able to organise those concerned with social justice and 
the new VLD may be well-placed to represent individual autonomy and pluralism. In 
addition, the VU’s adoption of a radical, opposition aspect may fail to convince 
voters of its anti-establishment credentials while it retained a governmental role in the 
Flemish regional government.
Since the establishment of the VLD, the VU lost two prominent members of 
parliament, and a number of party activists. The VU sought to prevent further 
membership erosion in the post-federal period by developing a media advertising 
campaign to rally the party’s supporters by appealing to their political loyalty. 
Though this defensive strategy stemmed the flow of members away from the party, 
it did not address the fact that the party had not developed a new theme or project. 
The absence of a new goal or direction therefore cast some doubt over the ability of 
the VU to sustain itself in the post-federal period. Because of the success of 
fédéralisation, the party may be over.
5. Conclusion
In contrast to other nationalist and regionalist parties the VU seldom had the 
opportunity to exploit the European dimension. The prevailing consensus on 
European integration meant that the party was unable to use the issue in political
92. De Standaard, 15th June 1992, p.l.
93. “VU kiest nieuwe Voorzitter”, Wij-Vlaams Nationaal Weekblad, 4th June 1992 p .ll.
94. The VU campaign has featured prominent party figures using the slogan “Ik blijf ’ - I’m staying 
- with an appeal for members to stay loyal so that the VU can chart a post-federal course and keep 
autonomy on track.
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debate to divide opponents. The consensus in the Belgian parliament, and the lack of 
referenda on European questions, also reduced the potential for the party to exploit 
European union for electoral ends, rather than merely as a support for fédéralisation.
However, the weakness of the VU in deploying European union as a political 
resource was rather insignificant in light of the fédéralisation process. The other 
cases in this study may have had more use from the EC issue, but failed to make 
progress at the domestic level. The VU, as indicated above, succeeded in its 
domestic political mission, though it may use the European sphere to alter party 
goals to ensure organisational survival. Though the independence tradition was 
weak within the VU, the prospect of further European union may lead the VU to 
adopt an Independence in Europe position, and seek maximum autonomy for 
Flanders in Europe, or alternatively transfer its constitutional attentions more clearly 
to the European level, and seek to sustain itself through campaigning for a 
regionalised Europe.
Though the VU traditionally avoided the concepts of sovereignty and independence 
as notions more in tune with the Belgian state of 1830 than the Flemish region of the 
1990s,^^ neither of these concepts mean the same in the Europe of the 1990s. The 
new European situation may therefore lead the party towards a reconsideration of the 
reality of independence.
95. Interview with Herman Candries, Volksunie Kamerlid, 27th May 1992, Brussels,
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From Regionalism To 
Transnational Regionalism: 
European Co-operation Within the 
Regionalist Family
“The nationalist and autonomous parties have had to devote too much energy within the 
European framework to their quite natural desire to achieve emancipation, freedom and self- 
determination. Too much attention was focused ‘downwards’ and too little ‘upwards’. Too 
little of their own dyamism and inventiveness was devoted to the federal right to take their 
place within the international decisionmaking bodies.”^
1. Introduction
Until now this study has focused upon the domestic dimension of the European 
question, and neglected the transnational dimension. Though nationalist and 
regionalist parties are global phenomena, they are not bound together by a 
universalist outlook or ideology. However, such particularism has not prevented the 
developm ent of common organisations. It was the logical extension of the 
externalisation strategy: with parties forming transnational regionalist associations 
rather than just setting their constitutional goals within broader Europe-wide 
perspectives. This associational aspect to the externalisation strategy has developed 
as a long-term process linked to European integration.
Research into transnational parties has concentrated upon the larger party famihes of 
Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats,^ focusing upon integration in the party 
system through transnational federations and formal party groups within the 
European Parliament. However, they only offer a partial account of the evolution of 
transnational party linkages. These parties had an advantage over smaller and newer 
party groups because of their ideologies, historical traditions and governmental 
resources. Whilst the major parties had ideology to generate transnational cohesion,
1. “A New Political Group”, European Free Alliance, Brussels, 1989, p.l.
2. Keith Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration ; Emil Kirchner (ed). Liberal 
Parties in Western Europe; Beate Kohler and Barbara Myizik, “Transnational Party Links”, in Roger 
Morgan and Stefano Silvestri (eds). Moderates and Conservatives in Western Europe ; G.Pridham 
and P. Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation And European Integration .
184
Transnational Regionalism
the regionalists had the doctrine of federalism and the Europe o f the Regions to 
provide some political cohesion.
The three traditional families were also participants in the process of European 
integration after 1945. They were the mid wives of the political groups and 
transnational political federations in the ECSC and the European Parliament.^ In the 
Common Assembly of the ECSC ideological ties gradually became more important 
than national affiliation, and the assembly began to formalise its informal structure. 
This brought the formal recognition of political groups in June 1953, and the 
establishment of Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal groups, with common 
rules governing group formation and activity. As the Common Assembly evolved 
into the European Assembly with the creation of the European Community in 1957, 
membership quotas for groups were adopted that required groups to have at least 17 
members.^ The three existing groups experienced no difficulty in meeting this 
requirement.
They also established themselves early as formal transnational groups in the 
European Parliament, propelled by the process of direct elections. The European 
Peoples Party of Christian Democrats was created in 1975/6, the Confederation of 
Socialist Parties of the European Community was established in 1974 and the 
European Liberal Democrats in 1979. Community enlargement brought new political 
groups in the shape of the Conservative group and the European Progressive 
Democrats in 1973. The main party families organised earliest because they were 
most successful, holding the nominated positions of the European Assembly, whilst 
the minor parties were excluded, present in very small numbers, or disadvantaged 
by the rules on group formation.
The regionalist family had similar electoral problems to other small parties, but its 
restricted territorial appeal and base was unique. This constraint, as subsystem 
parties within national political systems, was not widely shared. In European 
elections such concentrations presented barriers to surpassing the threshold o f  
representation.^ In polities that use national list systems for European elections, 
geographical concentrations were not necessarily advantageous: they could produce 
fragmented regionalism through placing regionalist parties in competition with each 
other. Clearly this was not the case in Scotland and Wales where the two nationahst
3. Guy Van Oudenhove, The Political Parties in the European Parliament: The First Ten Years.
4. Ibid., p. 133.
5. John Pedersen, “Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespans and Minor Parties”, Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 1982, pp. 1-16.
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parties operated within defined boundaries that coincided with electoral districts. 
Here geographical concentration provided electoral rewards.
In contrast, in France and Spain the whole country was one constituency for 
European elections, which undermined the territorial strengths of the various 
regionalist parties. Spain, and to a much lesser extent France, had regionalist parties 
that were regionally strong but nationally weak. Most did not compete with each 
other in national or regional elections, but did in European elections. The regionalist 
response to this problem was to construct joint regionalist lists, or lists with non- 
regionalist parties, to increase their chances of representation. In France, for 
example, the weakness of regionalist parties meant that common lists were also a 
mechanism to surpass the threshold of authorisation in European elections.^ The cost 
of competing in European elections in France prevented regionalist electoral 
participation in 1979 and 1984. Participation required a FF100,000 deposit for each 
registered list, in addition to campaign costs, only refunded if the party list passed 
the 5% threshold.^
Following Downs, it could be expected that regionalist parties would form joint lists 
as a vote-maximising strategy in European elections.® Such vote maximisation, 
however, conflicted with the different ideological and programmatic goals of the 
various regionalist parties involved. It has already been demonstrated that there are 
strong cleavages between members of the various regionalist parties in Brittany, 
equally there were different goals amongst regionalist parties in Spain. This 
fractionalisation occured on the basis of different types of regionalists, which 
exhibited different political or economic orientations: between nationalists seeking 
independence and regionalists seeking ‘autonomy’, and between democratic 
regionalists and more extreme terrorist-oriented parties and movements. The 
fragmented nature of European nationalism and regionalism was evident both within 
countries and across them. It was also strongly influential in determining the 
composition of political federations and groups in the European Parliament.
2. Transnational Party Co-operation
The nature of transnational party co-operation and development is varied, with 
several different levels of integration into the transnational party system. Four levels 
of party engagement in transnational European issues and parties have been
6. Ibid.
7. Anne Stevens, “France”, in Juliet Lodge (ed). Elections to the European Parliament 1984 , p.97.
8. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy ,
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identified. These can be regarded as a continuum of integration into the transnational 
party system, though not a continuum of party strategies or responses. The 
placement of parties along this continuum will be tested in the comparative chapter 
below.
(i) Loose party links;
(ii) Membership of transnational groups or federations;
(iii) Contesting elections to the European Parliament;
(iv) Joining transnational party groups in the European Parliament.^
It is also necessary to consider whether groups or federations are genuine examples 
of transnational party co-operation. Indicators of group supranationality were the 
degree to which group policies and views transcended national interests to promote 
common European interests, at what level groups were able to present meaningful 
and coherent common viewpoints, and whether the composition of group 
membership was genuinely transnational.^®
Measuring transnationalism and group coherence involves the examination of a 
number of phenomena. Party cohesion can be measured through various indicators: 
group membership, the pattern of group meetings - their number and agenda - the 
adoption of common policies and programmes, and the level of identifiable collective 
parliamentary behaviour such as common voting, common committee strategies and 
pre-meetings before plenary sessions.
In transnational party federations there is a looser agenda for examination. There is 
more concern to identify the level of interaction that exists outside the institutions of 
the European Parliament. Do extraparliamentary relations develop?^ ^  Does the 
federation exist and hold meetings outwith the European Parliament? Are there 
European-level organisations stretching out beyond the European Community itself? 
Are there separate bilateral relations between parties that develop within such 
federations?
Do they involve themselves in common electoral campaigning in European elections? 
What linkages do they have to national political parties? Do they seek to promote the 
intermeshing of national and European parliamentary and party elites? Is the
9. Pridham and Pridham, Op. Cit., 1981, p.l93.
10. Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham, “Transnational Parties in the European Community”, in Stanley 
Henig (ed). Political Parties in the European Community, p.249.
11. Pridham and Pridham, ibid., p.278.
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transnational organisation dominated by MEPs, with national d ites  preferring to 
remain in domestic political systems? Many of these questions will be explored 
below.
The objects of study are the International Congress of European Communities and 
Regions, the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, the European Free 
Alliance, the Technical Co-ordination Group and the Rainbow Group. The 
behaviour and strategy of regionalists will be analysed in addition to identifying the 
genuineness of transnational co-operation and cohesion within groups and 
federations. This involves analysis of the development and programmes of the 
various organisations to determine whether they existed as transnational associations 
or merely as pragmatic mechanisms for obtaining parliamentary profiles and 
resources.
The endpoint for transnational party integration is unified party families contesting 
elections as single parties throughout all states, without regard to national 
differences. This would involve the transfer of political loyalties in a more ‘electoral’ 
sense than Haas originally intended, to produce pan-European parties in the new 
political community. For regionalists this goal is contradictory and unlikely. This 
endpoint can be treated as an ideal type, much like the different levels of societal 
integration laid out in the analyses of integration theory.
3, Transnational Regionalism In Advance of Direct 
Elections
Though the bulk of this chapter deals with the development of the European Free 
Alliance and the Rainbow Group, there are some notable precursors to these 
organisations within the regionalist party family which are evidence of the lengthy 
tendency towards transnational regionalism in Western Europe.
The Congress of European Communities And Regions
The International Congress of European Nations and Regions was formed in 1948/9 
following the Hague Congress on European union in 1948^ It was organised 
through a commission within the Union Français des Fédéralistes (UFF).^^ 
Nationalist and regionalist parties had had some involvement in the Hague
\2. Le Peuple Breton, number 10, July/August 1948, p.6.
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Congress, and saw this new forum as a means to gain greater participation in the 
development of European union.
The Congress involved a mixture of organisations and motivations. Some sought to 
use the Congress to give their stateless nations a higher profile in international 
affairs, promoting self-government through international contacts. Others, such as 
the Bretons, were more committed to using the Congress to generate support for a 
decentralised European union. The regionalist Congress that emerged in April 1949 
in Paris was therefore a result of frustration with the Hague Congress, where the 
centralists’ agenda had been successful, and evidence that some nationalists were 
prepared to see opportunities arising from international contacts.
The congress was primarily the product of the Union Bretonne des Fédéralistes 
(UBF), whose delegates had made contact with Scottish and Welsh representatives 
after the Hague Congress. The Congress occured in Paris on the 9th and 10th 
April 1949. Joseph Matray, the editor of Le Peuple Breton, was elected as 
Secretary-General of the Congress, and it featured delegations from the Basque 
Country, Bavaria, Catalonia, Cornwall, Friesland, Fruili, Nord, the Swiss Cantons, 
Sud Tyrol, Val d’Aosta and Wallonie, as well as organisations like the UFF, UBF, 
Celtic Congress, Plaid Cymru, and the SNP.^"^
In the first session of the congress the national delegations spoke about the history 
and background of their regions and movements. This must have been a revealing 
exercise for the SNP and Plaid Cymru, realising that they were amongst federalists 
and regionalists rather than groups who sought independent national status, and also 
amongst movements and pressure groups rather than political parties. Joseph 
Matray’s speech to the Congress delegates may have given some forewarning to the 
nationalists that the Congress and its members did not share their goals. Matray 
talked of the need to develop a united Europe through federalism, which was the 
only means to guarantee state sovereignty and the rights of regions and regional 
sovereignty. In this he explicitly spoke against separatism, and in favour of 
fédéralisation within states to enhance regional autonomy.
In addition to agreeing common policies, the organisation institutionalised itself as 
the Congress of European Communities and Regions, and elected a permanent
13. Le Peuple Breton, number 9 , 15th June 1949, p.8.
14. Le Peuple Breton, number 1 7 ,15th May 1949, p.6.
15. Ibid., p.8.
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bureau to oversee the congress’s goals and a c tiv i t ie s .P la id  Cymru’s General 
Secretary, J.E. Jones, became a member of the bureau at this initial meeting. The 
Congress also proposed to hold an annual conference in one of Europe’s regions 
and elect a bureau to promote the organisation and its interests.^^
The resolutions adopted by the Congress were clearly federalist. The Congress 
called for the transfer of state sovereignty to other organisations, and for any future 
European Assembly to offer genuine opportunities for regional representation. The 
Congress also established a special commission to draft a charter of rights of 
European communities and regions to advance the principles of autonomy and 
decentralisation. This charter was to be presented to the Union Europeene des 
Fédéralistes. The Congress also supported economic déconcentration in the postwar 
economy, particularly in relation to the Marshall Plan. Regional economic interests 
were to be respected, industrial overconcentration was to be avoided, and 
bureaucratic centralisation in economic policymaking was to be removed. The 
Congress also supported the introduction of a charter of cultural rights at the 
European level, and the opportunity for cultural communities to take their concerns 
to the European Court of Justice if they felt that their rights were being violated.
Several other Congresses were held into the 1950s, though the nationalists gradually 
slipped away from the organisation as they recognised its regionalism and weak 
role. The Bretons, the key motivators in the organisation, put their efforts into 
domestic political and economic action in the early 1950s with the establishment of 
CELIB to attain a regional role in French economic planning. The climate for the 
Congress had also become unfavourable. It had been launched as a consequence of 
the Hague Congress, but the process of European integration had moved beyond 
this early ‘congress’ phase to an intergovernmental one. It was the time of the 
Organisation of European Economic Co-operation and the Schuman Plan, and the 
beginnings of governmental designs for Europe rather than for loose, discursive 
congresses. This new context meant obscurity for the regionalists. The European 
agenda was set by centralised states, not by integral federalists, who found 
themselves powerless, lacking both the political and organisational resources to 
present an alternative agenda for European union.
In conclusion, the Congress failed because of the changing political opportunity 
structure and its own weak strategy. The Congress did not find a role for itself
16. Ibid., p.7.
17. Ibid., p.l3.
18. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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beyond the annual conference, and never involved itself in any real political action. It 
was a forum for discussion and minimal co-operation rather than for policymaking, 
political lobbying or electoral participation. Though genuinely transnational with 
some common viewpoints, the organisation failed to develop a proper role for itself. 
Had the organisation lasted until the formation of the European Community it might 
have survived by presenting the case for the regions within Europe. However, since 
the organisation sought a federal Europe rather than an intergovernmental one, the 
developments of the 1950s were seen as a defeat. This experience effectively 
demobilised the federalists, who were the key members of the Congress, who 
turned to cultural or political affairs in their own regions and communities.
The Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations
The Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations was the second transnational 
regionalist organisation generated by the Breton movement. It was proposed by 
Yann Fouèrè of the microregionalist party SAV in 1973. Fouèrè proposed the 
Bureau and invited other regionalist parties to discuss it.^^ This meeting involved 
Plaid Cymru, the Mouvement Socialiste Occitan^ the Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
(PNV), Mebyon Kernow and Mouvement ELSA from Alsace.^® The meeting had 
originated in a visit by Plaid Cymru and the PNV to the SAV congress in Saint 
Malo, which had mandated the SAV to establish a common lobbying organisation in 
Brussels with other regionalist parties. The accession of the UK to the EC in 1973 
made this proposal feasible as it added two new parties to the EC which the 
regionahsts could expect to count as their own.
The Bureau operated as a lobbying organisation and publicity office in Brussels, and 
a forum for the development of joint policies in response to European integration. 
For example the Bureau drafted a joint response to the Tindemanns Report in 1975, 
in addition to the individual submissions made by PC and others. The Bureau 
offered an alternative to the official Community position on integration, arguing for
“the full-blooded devolution of power downwards towards Europe’s
natural social and cultural communities’’. !^
19. Letter from Yann Fouèrè of Strollad Ar Vro to Dafydd Williams, General Secretary of Plaid 
Cymru, 1st October 1973: Plaid Cymru Archives, National Library of Wales, Aberystwydi.
20. Minutes of the first meeting to establish the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, 10th 
October 1973: Plaid Cymru archives. National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth.
21. Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations: “Draft Memorandum of the Bureau of Unrepresented 
European Nations to the Tindemanns Report”, Brussels, 1975, p.l.
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The Bureau rejected the conventional view of integration involving the slow accrual 
of power to a central European government, and called for a more decentralised 
alternative. The alternative to a Europe of nation-states involved the creation of “a 
Europe of nations, regions and communities":^^ a more harmonious process of 
integration because of the belief that
“as small nations we recognise that sovereignty is a relative and not 
an absolute commodity, and that given self-government, we would 
obviously find it easier to co-operate at the European level than do the 
existing member states”.^ ^
The Bureau also adopted a brief programme in 1976 titled “Declaration of Principles 
- Charter of the People and National Communities”. This formed the basis for its 
political work and supported the right of self-determination in politics, economics, 
culture and language; the creation of a European union that was based upon 
decentralised structures, the pluralist nature of Western democracies, and argued for 
the development of co-operation between peoples as the best basis for self- 
government.
The Bureau was short-lived as a consequence of the growing political co-operation 
between regionalist parties and development of the European Parliament. The 
process of democratic reform in Spain also removed the necessity for Basque 
involvement, as more legitimate and overt forms of political action became possible. 
The linkages and policies of the Bureau found fairly immediate expression in the 
Bastia Congress and the foundations of the European Free Alliance. In this period, 
as will be illustrated below, the phenomenon of transnational regionalism moved 
beyond loose co-operation and lobbying strategies to develop a common party 
political framework to pursue electoral ends. This evolution was a consequence of 
the altered status and operation of the European Parliament, which undermined the 
lobbyist approach and replaced it with an electoralist approach.
4. Political Groups In The European Parliament
The organisational and political structure of the European Parliament is heavily 
influenced by the activities of formal political groups, and structured to generate 
transnational party groups through financial and administrative mechanisms. The 
European Parliament is formally administered by a bureau of twenty members
22. Ibid., 1975, p.3.
23. Ibid.
24. Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations, “Declaration of Principles - Charter of the Peoples 
and National Communities”, Brussels, 1976.
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consisting of a President, fourteen Vice-Presidents and five Quastors.^^ These 
members have formal authority in the parliament, but it is the enlarged bureau, 
which includes the Presidents of political groups in the EP, that has actual 
authority.26 The enlarged bureau, along with the meetings that take place between 
the group presidents and Secretary-Generals, are the real decisionmaking bodies. 
The bureau has the task of recognising political groups, according to the criteria laid 
down by the parliament. 2?
Such recognition conferred both political and financial benefits. Political benefits 
involved a role in bureau and parliamentary appointments; electing the President, 
Vice-President and Quastors; representation at group meetings, which played a role 
in allocating appointments to the various committees of the European Parliament; and 
choosing committee chairpersons and rapporteurships who were responsible for 
drafting committee reports. The allocation of committee posts was often made 
through use of the d ’Hondt system or points system, applied by individual 
parliamentary committees, but political groups were often influential in negotiating 
certain appointments and trading positions on committees.
This might be considered as a competitive and negotiable patronage system. As there 
is no government and opposition in the parliament, and no single dominant group, 
then available benefits are subject to intra-group and intergroup competition and 
bargaining. Group Presidents and Secretary-Generals are also influential in 
determining the contents of the parliament’s agenda for plenary sessions in 
Strasbourg. In these plenaries the group spokesman enjoy enhanced recognition and 
speaking rights in debates, which afford them a degree of precedence over non­
group MEPs.
Group recognition also brings financial benefits. The Parliament provides financial 
support for secretarial and research work. 2* Such resource support is very important 
for small parties and groups which may lack sizeable independent sources of funds. 
It enables them to support their MEPs, and build a critical mass of researchers and 
publicity officers for each group. In addition to these resources the parliament also 
provided considerable financial support for groups through reimbursing election
25. Rules 14 and 15, European Parliament, “Rules and Procedures”, (Luxembourg; European 
Communities, 1992), p. 19.
26. John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Famborough: Saxon House, 
1975), p.41.
27. See rules 26,27 and 29, European Parliament:” Rules of Procedure”, Ibid., pp.24-5.
28. Stanley Henig, Power and Decision in Europe: The Political Institutions of the European 
Community , p.76.
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expenses in the European elections. The parliament provides post-election funds to 
those parties/members who receive at least 5% of votes in a member state, or 
compete in at least three countries and win 1% of the vote in each.^^ This provided a 
financial impetus for transnational electoral co-operation, and the development of 
joint lists and campaigns between family parties in various countries.
Group advantages have been limited by restrictive rules surrounding group 
formation. Initially the Common Assembly of the ECSC required a minimum of nine 
members to form a political group.^® The articles in the Treaty of Rome demanded 
that political groups be composed of at least seventeen MEPs, though this was later 
reduced to fourteen members in the 1960s.^^ Following direct elections to the 
European Parliament in 1979, new rules were adopted for group formation. With 
410 directly elected MEPs in the new enlarged parliament new criteria were adopted 
which offered a trade-off between group size and transnational composition: a 
minimum of ten MEPs could form a group if they came from three different 
countries, a minimum of fifteen if it involved two countries and a single country 
group required at least twenty one MEPs to gain r e c o g n it io n .^ ^
This reform facilitated the establishment of new political groups such as the 
Rainbow Group, though the rules were altered again in the 1980s to create a more 
restrictive climate for group formation. This reform uprated the numerical 
requirements so that twelve MEPs were needed to form a group amongst three 
countries, eighteen from two countries and twenty three from one country.^^
A combination of electoral weaknesses and the restrictive rules for group formation, 
created a number of embryo groups in the Parliament. Such embryo groups existed 
outside the traditional political families but were clearly separable from independent 
MEPs. They indicated potential, but not actual, political groups in the European 
Parliament, which may develop in the future through electoral success, changes in 
other groups, and more liberal rules on group formation. The regionalists and 
nationalists were one such embyro: identifiable in the European Free Alliance, the 
Technical Co-ordination Group and the Rainbow Group.
29. David Millar, “European Elections Procedures”, in Juliet Lodge (ed). Direct Elections to the 
European Parliament 1984 , p.45.
30. Van Oudenhove, Op. cit., p.22.
31. Fitzmaurice, Op. cit., 1975, p.44
32. Henig, Op. cit., 1980, p.76.
33. Rule 26, clause 4, European Parliament, “Rules of Procedure”, Op. cit., p.24.
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5. The Evolution of the Rainbow Group
The first problem in analysing the new regionalist organisations arises in 
distinguishing between them, as they had an overlapping membership and 
organisation yet existed as separate organisations. The European Free Alliance 
(EFA) is the transnational federation of regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe. 
The Rainbow Group, on the other hand, is a political group within the European 
Parliament that has been the home of regionalist and non-regionalist parties ahke.
The EFA has always been exclusively nationalist and regionalist, though only 
accepting the democratic types of each tradition. The Rainbow Group has been a 
much wider amalgamation of parties and interests. This group had its roots in the 
Technical Co-ordination Group that operated from 1979 to 1984. In order to provide 
coherence to this analysis the Rainbow Group and EFA wiU be dealt with separately, 
but firstly something needs to be said about the Technical Co-ordination Group.
The Technical Co-ordination Group
The Technical Co-ordination Group for the Defence and Promotion of Independent 
Members Interests operated in the European Parliament from 1979 to 1984. Since 
groups and group interests dominated the politics of the European Parliament, those 
who were not members of a group were disadvantaged. Ever since the establishment 
of the Common Assembly in 1952 and the evolution of political groups there had 
been no real role for independent members, with the parliamentary system at the 
transnational level loaded in favour of parties and groups.
This group involved just over half of the independent members in the parliament, 
and managed to gain the number required to establish a group. The remaining MEPs 
remained unaffiliated and included the Front Démocratique des Francophones and 
the Demokraten ‘66, whom the VU sought to involve in the new group.
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Table 6.1 The Technical Co-ordination Group 1979-84
Party MEPs
Volksunie 1
Rassemblement Wallon 1
Independent Fianna Fail 1
Partito Radicale 3
Democratzia Proletaria 1
Partito di Unita Proletaria 1
Folkebevaegelsen Mod EF 4
The Technical Co-ordination Group was established to provide the benefits of group 
status without the political and ideological entanglements of established political 
groups. The disparate nature of the group was evident through the election of three 
Co-Presidents, who rotated as representatives of the group at meetings of the 
Political Bureau of the European Parliament.^"^ It would not be wise to judge this 
group on similar transnational criteria to other political groups as it was not strictly a 
political group. It had a managerial and representative function within the European 
Parliament bureaucracy, but this was the limit of its aspirations. Its goal was to gain 
political and research benefits through group status, and did not involve any other 
common goals or intentions. Therefore, it lacked the integrative functions of other 
transnational party groups. Its membership comprised several parties of interest in 
this thesis, however, which made the Technical Co-ordination Group significant.
The group involved the Volksunie, Rassemblement Wallon (RW), Independent 
Fianna Fail and also the Folkbevaegelsen Mod EF?^ the anti-EC Danish movement. 
In the future each was involved in the European Free Alliance or the Rainbow 
Group. The VU and RW suggested a regionalist embryo, though a divided one. The 
RW and FDF from Francophone Belgium both joined the Technical Co-ordination 
Group in 1979 but quickly left over tactical disagreements, though the RW member 
later rejoined as an independent. The VU had expected a larger embryo group, 
involving the SNP and Fianna Fail, and were surprised when they joined the 
European Progressive Democrats.^^ The VU’s expectations of Fianna Fail were 
persistently misplaced. The latter was a state-nationalist party committed to 
protecting national sovereignty rather than developing a Europe o f the Regions. Like 
the SNP, it had an independence tradition that was not consistent with federalism
34. Francis Jacobs and Richard Corbett, The European Parliament, p.56.
35. J. Gerard-Libois, “Les élections pour le parlement européen, juin 1984”, Courrieur 
Hebdomadaire du CRISP, No.1040, ISth May 1984, p.26.
36. Maurits Coppieters, Ik was een Europese Parlementslid, p.8.
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and re g io n a lism .T h e  VU consistently disregarded this fact, and expected that 
Fianna Fail would join its political group. This was not the only disappointment for 
the VU at this time. Apart from the SNP and Fianna Fail giving the regionalist 
embyro a wide berth, the autonomist member from Greenland sat with the Socialist 
group and the VU’s model reform party, the D ‘66, avoided the Technical Co­
ordination Group to sit as independents.
The Technical Co-ordination Group was important because it brought the 
development and socialisation of relations between a group of MEPs and parties 
who could identify comm» interests with the potential to develop into
something more lasting. This did not mean that all parties involved in the Technical 
Co-ordination Group joined the Rainbow Group or EFA - such as the Partido 
Radicale did not - but it offers some explanation for those parties which joined the 
Rainbow Group in 1984. A second explanation is that they had no other choice in 
1984. It was the Rainbow Group or weak status as independent members.
The Rainbow Group 1984-89
In theory, the Rainbow Group was a temporary home for small party families which 
lacked the numbers to survive as independent party groups. For some, in reality, it 
was a permanent home. The Rainbow Group was originally formed by newly 
elected Green MEPs in 1984. The Greens were one embryo comprising the 
Rainbow Group, others came from the Technical Co-ordination Group, with its 
small regionalist embryo and the Danish anti-EC movement.
The alliance between the various embryos involved was essentially pragmatic. Each 
subgroup continued to operate separately, with little attempt at co-ordination or 
integration between the embryos. At first the regionalists had wished the group to 
remain as the Technical Co-ordination Group and a home for unborn groups. The 
Greens, and particularly Die Grunen, with seven MEPs, preferred to build a more 
coherent group. The Green parties had sufficient numbers in the European 
Parliament in 1984 to form their own political group. That they did not do so 
indicated that they felt too weak and inexperienced, and desired to be members of a 
non-threatening group of greater size.
37. Joan Hart and Bruno de Witte, “De Europese Programma’s van Fianna Fail, FDF-RW en 
Volksunie”, Res Publica, Vol.21, No.l, 1979, p.l07,
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The Rainbow Group had minimal experience of transnational party integration 
across embryo boundaries. Despite good co-operation between individual members 
of the group there were none of the deeper aspects of political co-operation found in 
other groups. The Rainbow Group operated on the principle of maximum autonomy 
for member parties and embryos: with no common programmes or manifestoes and 
no common assemblies. The common Bureau meetings were not used to discuss 
political issues but to allocate office space and speaking times in plenaries. Each 
embryo met separately through the European Free Alliance and the Green Alternative 
European Link (GRAEL), with the intention of transforming each into a formal 
political group. Though there were tensions with the group, particularly with 
regionalist concern at the disorganisation and unorthodox behaviour of the Green 
members, there was the expectation that the Rainbow Group would continue post- 
1989.
Table 6,2 T he R ainbow  G roup  1984-89 
P a rty  M E Ps
Volksunie 2
Partito Sardo d ’Azione 1
Ecolo 1
Agalev 1
Die Grunen 7
Democrazia Proletaria 1
Partito di Unita Proletaria 1
Groen Progressief Akkoord 2
Volkesbevaegelsen Mod EF 4
The Post-1989 Rainbow Group
The 1989 European elections brought success for both main embryos in the 
Rainbow Group. Both Greens and regionalists increased their representation. 
Though both embryos had been continuously seeking out new members in order to 
create their own independent family groups, it was expected that the group would 
continue as before, with maximum autonomy for the subgroups. The electoral 
success of the Green parties, with 29 MEPs, made the formation of a Green group 
possible.
The Greens had two choices. Either establish a Green-only political group or try to 
reconstitute the Rainbow Group as a Green-dominated alliance. The Greens tried the 
latter aproach first, with acrimonious results. It would have meant continued 
minority status for the EFA parties: with their numerical weakness subject to
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majority voting in the new Rainbow Group and greater discipline and cohesion on 
voting and policies in the European Parliament. This was not an attractive prospect, 
particularly as the Greens were choosy about which regionalists would be admitted 
to the new group, and it was unsuccessful. The Greens therefore formed their own 
family group, a move which created problems for the EFA parties as they were too 
weak to form their own group.
Though the EFA gained 8 MEPs in the 1989 elections, it was insufficient for group 
formation. Yet again they were reliant upon the Danish anti-EC movement to achieve 
group status. The post-1989 period produced Rainbow Group Mark II as can be 
seen in the table (6.3). The politics surrounding this remodelled group will be 
discussed below in the context of EFA’s efforts to create a purer political group from 
the regionalist embryo.
Table 6.3 The Rainbow Group 1989-94
Party MEPs
Volksunie
Independent Fianna Fail 
Volkesbevaegelsen Mod EF 
SNP
Partito Sardo d’Azione 
Partido Andalucia 
Unione di u Populu Corsu/Verts 
Independent Grunen
Eusko Alkartasuna/Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya 1
Lega Lombarda 2
6. The European Free Alliance
The European Free Alliance title was foimally adopted in 1981 to describe the parties 
which signed the Bastia Declaration in 1979 and the Brussels Declaration in 1981. 
These declarations supported domestic and European decentralisation and autonomy, 
and a degree of co-operation between the paities. Various parties had met since 
1977/8 to discuss the EFA project, and it was sufficiently developed for the VU to 
campaign as an EFA party in the 1979 European elections.
The Bastia agreement of 1979 was between the VU, Plaid Cymru, the Fryske 
Nasjionale Partij (FNP), the Union Valdotaine (UV), the Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
(PNV), the Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC), the ELV from Alsace
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and the Partei Deutschsprachiger Belgier (PDB) of Belgian Germanophones. The 
agreement was signed at the congress of the Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC), and 
used as the basis for the “European Charter of Peoples W ithout a State", in 
preparation for direct elections to the European Parliament in 1919?^ This core 
group was the beginning of the EFA, though it was not formally institutionalised 
until 1981.
The advent of direct elections yielded a new electoral and institutional political 
opportunity structure for regionalists and nationalists, but they were badly placed to 
take advantage of it. They were electorally weak in their own countries which 
reduced their chances in European elections and, in turn, undermined the 
establishment of a separate regionalist group in the European Parliament.
The European elections of 1979 provided seats for the VU, the SNP and 
Rassemblement Walton (RW), but they fragmented into two groups. The SNP 
joined the European Progressive Democrats along with the Gaullist RPR and Fianna 
Fail, whilst the VU and RW became members of the Technical Co-ordination 
Group. This early fragmentation set a pattern that affected attempts to establish a 
coherent regionalist political group in the subsequent decade. The VU sought to 
address this fragmentation by working to enhance inter-party co-operation amongst 
regionalists, and establish an overarching transnational federation of regionalist and 
nationalist parties. Thus there was an internal approach within the parliament and an 
external approach within the regionahst family.
The VU made considerable advances within Belgian politics in the 1970s, with a 
role in the coalition government in 1977-8. Its domestic success representation were 
far superior to its role in Europe. Yet the VU found itself alone in the European 
Parliament, aligned with non-regionalists and the unstable Wallon federalists. To 
strengthen its role in the European Parliament the VU sought to use its resources and 
status within the parliament to build links to other parties, rather than cultural 
movements or associations: the VU strategy was clearly focused upon electoral 
mobilisation in contrast to previous regionalist organisations. The party intended to 
construct an alliance and common programme amongst regionalists and build a more 
formal structure than that generated by the Bastia agreement.
38. European Free Alliance, “Peoples Without a State: Regionalism, Autonomy and Self- 
government in Europe”, working papers for study day, Brussels, 10th January 1981, p. 10.
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The Brussels congress which formally established the EFA in 1981 was achieved on 
the back of the Bastia congress, but attempted to fulfil rather different goals. The 
Brussels congress was the VU’s baby, organised and managed by it. The congress 
was depicted as a study day on stateless nations, autonomy, regionalism and self- 
government, with the intention of extending the Bastia agreement to produce a larger 
common text amongst the participating parties.^^
A number of common themes and problems were discussed at the congress: some 
clearly driven by European elections and the imperative of making political and 
organisational progress in advance of the next elections in 1984. The Volksunie 
MEP, Maurits Coppieters, was keen to promote a broad structure for regionalist co­
operation, and identified the need for the EFA to develop common electoral lists to 
increase regionalist representation in the European Parliament.^® C oppieters’ 
colleague, Jaak Vandemeulebroucke, who became his alternate in 1981, wanted to 
discuss regionalist attitudes to the European Community and European integration 
itself, to develop common policies as a basis for future political co-operation.^^
Coppieters saw five main areas of expansion for the EFA. First, there was a desire 
to involve the D ‘66 from Netherlands in the EFA. Second, there was a need to 
persuade the RW and the FDF to rejoin the EFA, following their departure over the 
membership of anti-French elements like the Bretons and C o r s ic a n s .^ ^  Third, there 
was an expectation that the SNP and other sympathetic parties could be attracted into 
membership of the EFA and a future regionalist political group. Fourth, there was 
the expectation that EC enlargement to include the Spanish and Portugese would 
bring new regionalist members, particularly in the Spanish case. Fifth, there was 
potential for co-operation with other small parties like the Verts and the Parti 
Socialiste Unifé (PSU) in France, with electoral alliances to enhance the prospects of 
regionalist success.^^
Beyond expansion, the Brussels Congress was also concerned with developing 
common policies. This was the cohesion agenda of the EFA, offering one test of the 
genuineness of the EFA as a transnational organisation. The common text debated at 
Brussels was prepared and distributed by the VU, acting as the European Free
39. Ibid.
40. European Free Alliance, Report of the Brussels Congress of the European Free Alliance, 8th to 
10th January 1981, p.l.
41. Ibid., p.2.
42. P. Claeys and N. Loeb-Mayer, “The European Elections Campaign in Belgium”, in Karl-Heinz 
Reif (ed), European Elections 1979/I98I and 1984 , p.9.
43. European Free Alliance, Report of the Brussels Congress, 8th to 10th January 1981, p.9.
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Alliance, and there was also discussion of a paper submitted by the Parti pour 
rOrganisation d'une Bretagne Libre (POBL) presented by Yann Fouèrè/"^ The VU 
submission expressed the right to self-determination, the decentralist aspect of 
European union (integral regionalism) and sought to offer a general philosophy of 
political and economic life for the regionalists/^ The bulk of this text was adopted at 
the Brussels congress as the founding statement of the EFA.
This first congress also created the organisational means for the EFA's development. 
It established a secretariat in the European Parliament to co-ordinate EFA meetings 
and affairs, managed by the VU. Parliamentary institutionalisation gave the EFA 
resources and personnel, and underlined the intention to establish a political group in 
the parliament. It also gave the VU considerable power over the development and 
direction of the organisation, particularly in maintaining progress towards an 
electoral strategy. There was no separate organisation outside the European 
Parliament. Such strong institutionalisation within the parliament was intended to 
give the organisation permanence and stability,^^ and avoid the short lifespans of the 
Congress of European Nations and Regions and the Bureau for Unrepresented 
European Nations.
The first bureau meeting of the European Free Alliance was in Brussels in 
September 1981. The expansion of EFA and the prospects for forming an EFA 
political group in the European Parliament were debated, along with the issue of 
establishing common electoral lists with other parties to produce more EFA MEPs. 
The chances of negotiating common lists with the new environmental parties was 
raised, though accorded a somewhat sceptical assessment because of the perceived 
difficulty of dealing with such unorthodox organisations in a parliamentary forum.^^ 
The EFA parties were willing to consider an electoral alliance with the Green parties, 
and others like the French PSU, but were less warm towards the consequences of a 
parliamentary a l l i a n c e , though this did not prevent them from establishing a 
common group with the Greens after the 1984 European elections.
44. POBL, “Declaration of Principles”, in working documents for the Brussels Congress, European 
Free Alliance, 1981.
45. European Free Alliance. “Charter of Co-operation for the Construction of a Europe of the 
Nations”, working documents for the Brussels Congress, 1981.
46. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, p.58.
47. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA Bureau meeting, Brussels, 21st September 1981, 
p.4.
48. The contrast between these two types of alliances is drawn from Maurice Duverger, Political 
Parties, p.331.
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The next bureau meeting also discussed EFA expansion, exploring links with the 
Union Valdotaine in Italy and PC in Wales. Also the organisation Bretagne-Europe 
was discussed, with a view to potential m e m b e rsh ip T h is  organisation attempted 
to produce a list of candidates for the 1979 European elections, but faded away. It 
became prominent because the Breton movement had failed to pursue effective 
strategies of electoral mobilisation and had not competed in European elections. The 
issue of Bretagne-Europe became related to the possible membership of the UDB. It 
raised the problem of membership of regionalist parties which were electoral 
competitors. It was possible to have the POBL, the UDB and Bretagne-Europe all 
applying to join EFA, despite the potential conflicts. This problem led the EFA 
bureau to draft its constitution and rules, which established an applications process 
for new member parties to deal with the problem of intra-family competition.
The Instimtionalisation o f the EFA
The next EFA congress in Eupen was attended by the SNP and Rassemblement 
Wallon^ both with one MEP in the European Parliament but non-members of EFA. 
Part of Coppieters' agenda from the inaugural congress in 1981 was starting to be 
fulfilled. The presence of these two parties led the congress to discuss the possibihty 
of a new political group, and also the likelihood of Fianna Fail joining them: a 
perennial and unrealistic item. The EFA identified two spheres in which to gain 
political credibility as the representative of political regionalism in Europe. First, the 
EFA's prestige rested upon its role in the European Parliament, second it rested 
upon developing relations with smaller parties so that the EFA would be genuinely 
pan-European. It would also enable the EFA to help microregionalist parties become 
larger parties, gain electoral representation, and contribute to EFA representation and 
prestige within the European Parliament.^^
The Eupen congress also discussed the role of observers in the EFA, as opposed to 
that of full affiliates. EFA’s constitution recognised the existence of observer status, 
but was intended as a temporary process: a trial period to determine whether 
applicants were suitable for full membership, and allow participation in the EFA to 
see whether membership was beneficial. This dual role of control and socialisation 
was undermined by the fact that some parties were content with permanent observer 
status. At Eupen, the VU proposed the abolition of observer status so the 
organisation could achieve collective and binding common policies and decisions: an
49. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA bureau meeting, Brussels, 9th December 1981, 
pp.2-3.
50. European Free Alliance: Minutes of the EFA Congress, Eupen, 22nd and 23rd April 1983, p.5.
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attempt to force parties such as the SNP into committing themselves to the EFA and 
the prospect of a regionalist party group. This proposal was rejected by the EFA 
members, as they preferred to maintain some level of autonomy for parties within 
the organisation.^!
The m aintenance of autonomy and continuing w eakness of collective 
decisionmaking raised questions about the EFA. Pridham stressed the need for 
groups to sustain common policies and transcend national interests in order to 
qualify as transnational organisations.^^ Observer status allowed certain parties to 
opt out of particular common policies and pursue national interests instead. This 
facet undermined one transnational aspect of the European Free Alliance, but was 
evidence of organisational pragmatism. The trade-off between cohesion and opting 
out was the only way to sustain the EFA. The problem of observer status was 
diluted with the SNP’s announcement at Eupen that it had agreed in principle to join 
the EFA, and with PC's agreement to become a full member at its National 
Council.^^ The accession of the SNP did not, however, lead to changes in the 
pohtical groups of the European Parliament The SNP member remained affiliated to 
the European Progressive Democrats.
Though observer status was maintained, other constitutional rules and procedures 
were adopted. Some of this formalisation was a product of organisational 
expansion. The EFA had grown from eight parties in 1981 to nineteen parties by 
1983.^"! Basically three sets of rules were put forward:
1. Membership of EFA was open to political parties within the 
European Community that espoused democratic principles, opposed 
the use of violence, contested elections, and operated on a regional 
basis;
2. Observer status in the EFA could be given to parties currently 
represented in the European Parliament who were not members of the 
Rainbow Group, to newly formed parties, and to parties from states 
that had applied for EC membership but were not yet members;
3. Members of the bureau were to be bound together, and not 
allowed to co-operate with EFA rivals and competitors. The prospect 
of extending EFA membership to two rival parties from the same 
region was forbidden, and cultural associations were not allowed to 
join EFA as either full members or observers.^^
51. Ibid., pp.8-9.
52. Pridham and Pridham, 1979, Op. Cit., p.249.
53. Minutes of the EFA Congress, Eupen, Ibid.
54. Ibid., p.3
55. Ibid., p.4.
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These rules placed boundaries around the EFA. First, the democratic boundary, 
intended to exclude applications from more extremist parties. Within the regionalist 
and nationalist family there are parties and organisations which diverge from 
mainstream regionalism, and could cause embarrassment to the EFA, such as Herri 
Batasuna^ Sinn Fein and Vlaams Blok. Second, there was also a geographical 
boundary, to make EFA representative of existing and acceding EC member states, 
though the fact that more countries applied to join the EC in the 1990s, with the 
demise of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, meant that this boundary became 
relatively porous. Third, there was an organisational boundary. Because EFA 
wanted to grow into a political party alliance, its preference for electoral 
organisations and exclusion of cultural associations was understandable.
The rules also dealt with the admission of regionalist competitor parties to the EFA. 
This problem was most evident in Brittany and Corsica. At first the statute may 
appear exclusive and obstructive. But it advanced two strategic imperatives. First, a 
desire to force microregionalist parties to sink their differences and develop co­
operative and amalgamative approaches. Second, it may indicate that EFA wanted to 
choose the strongest electoral partner in certain regions to encourage co-operation 
and reduce electoral fragmentation: allowing the replacement of the inactive POBL 
by the electoralist UDB.
The bureau was reorganised in 1983 to establish a six person bureau of three MEPs 
and three EFA delegates for a three year term. This reorganisation reduced VU 
dominance The first three delegates elected were Rudolf Falkena of the Fryske 
Nasjionale Partij, Alexis Betemps of the Union Valdotaine and Gustave Alirol of 
Volem Vuire al Pais.^^ The VU however retained a prom inent role in the 
organisation: Jaak Vandemeulebroucke became the bureau’s chairperson and 
Herman Verheirstraaten the EFA Secretary-General. The responsibilities of the 
bureau involved organising bureau meetings and general assemblies, preparing 
agendas, implementing bureau/assembly decisions, and proposing EFA political 
initiatives within the organisation and in the European Parliaments^ These functions 
gave the bureau and its staff a fair degree of directive power within the organisation.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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Expansion. Programmes and Elections
Following its institutionalisation, the EFA turned to discuss expansion and 
preparations for the European elections in 1984. Both the SNP and PC announced 
they would contest their full compliment of seats: eight in Scotland and four in 
Wales. The VU and RW were preparing to contest their own separate linguistic 
electoral colleges and the Brussels arrondissement. The preparations of the major 
regionalist parties were far superior to the microregionalists. The latter were absent 
from the European elections, or in the case of the Fryske Nasjionale Parti], sought to 
develop joint lists with the Dutch Greens and minor left parties: though this electoral 
alliance did not develop due to differences between the parties.^*
The position of the SNP within the EFA became more stable following the EFA 
congress in Eupen. In December 1983, the bureau reported on discussions between 
the SNP and EFA, and an EFA delegation of Jaak Vandemeulebroucke and Herman 
V erheirstraeten to the SNP conference. There was also discussion o f the 
development of relations between the Italian regionalist parties: with the Union 
Valdotaine, who were present at the bureau meeting in December 1983, and with the 
Partito Sardo d'Azione.
There was already co-operation between Italian regionalists in domestic and 
European elections. The Union Valdotaine had been involved in running a 
regionalist liaison office in the Italian parliament with the Fruilians and Sardinians. 
At the 1979 European election the Union Valdotaine and Partito Sardo d’Azione had 
presented a joint candidate who came near to breaking though the electoral threshold 
for representation.^^ The fact that organisational and electoral co-operation was 
already practiced made the prospects for success and electoral growth in Italy quite 
promising. The same could not be said of France. There, the various regionalist 
parties were weaker and less co-operative. Once again hopes were raised of 
developing a list with the Verts and PSU. These parties, however, had little concern 
with regional issues. They were both vulnerable to the 5% threshold and seen to 
require electoral partners.^  Like the regionalists, these parties were disadvantaged 
by the financial costs of the European elections. It was calculated that regionalist 
participation in the 1984 elections would have cost FF2,000,000 in deposits and
58. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA bureau, 9th December 1983, p.5.
59. Ibid., p.2.
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expenses. Of this only FF150,000 could be reimbursed by the European Parliament 
after the election.^!
The EFA meetings leading up to the 1984 elections also sought to develop a 
common manifesto for the election campaign itself, to demonstrate inter-regionalist 
solidarity and promote regionalism as a transnational movement. Developing a 
common programme amongst such diverse parties was not without its problems. 
Phü Williams of Plaid Cymru made the point that
“any joint manifesto for these elections must be based on the lowest
common denominators”.^^
A small common programme was seen as beneficial, and was proposed by Plaid 
Cymru at the EFA meeting in April 1984. It comprised five basic principles:
1. Equal status for nations and regions in the European Community;
2. Respect for languages and cultural differences, and for the 
development of decentralised political institutions;
3. The strengthening of European Community regional policy;
4. A commitment to an anti-nuclear Europe;
5. Increased aid from Europe to the third world.^^
This proposal ressembled the EFA charter adopted at the inaugural Brussels 
congress in 1981. The VU was critical of the limited substance of the PC proposal, 
however, as it made it difficult for the EFA to proceed beyond minimal political co­
operation. The VU also wished to add a section committing the EFA to the 
démocratisation of European Community institutions and procedures.^"^ Despite such 
concerns it was seen to be too late to alter the programme for the European 
elections,^^ and the EFA parties contested the elections with a minimum common 
programme.
The 1984 elections brought a marginal advance for the EFA parties. The VU 
continued to advance following its late 1970s slump, and took a second seat in the 
European Parliament. The common list of the Union Valdotaine and the Partito 
Sardo d'Azione was also successful in electing an MEP. There was, however, 
defeat for the RW, which had been in a process of disintegration since the late 
1970s.
61. Ibid.
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The three EFA MEPs met with the SNP and Fianna Fail to discuss the prospects for 
group formation, but made no progress. The SNP had retained its single seat whilst 
Fianna Fail increased its representation to eight members. This provided the 
numerical and transnational criteria for a new regionalist group to be formed, but the 
latter parties chose to remain within their existing group, which expanded to include 
members from Greece and Portugal. The SNP was satisfied with the European 
Progressive Democrats, which renamed itself the European Democratic Alliance 
(EDA), as it provided both status and resources.^^ The status was because the 
principal members of the EDA were major parties of government, not microparties, 
and the resources came from the success of the group in pursuing committee 
placements within the parliament. For example, the EDA nominated Mrs Ewing to 
chair the Committee on Youth and Education and elected her vice-president of the 
group.
The Spanish Enlargement
With no chance of forming an EFA group, the three EFA MEPs joined the Rainbow 
Group established by the Green parties and Danish anti-EC movement. Because of 
the enlargement of the EC in 1986, the EFA did not rule out the formation of a purer 
regionalist group in the future. Though the accession of Greece in 1981 had brought 
no change to the EFA, the Spanish accession was seen to create new opportunities 
for the EFA embryo to develop into a full-blown political group. This was because it 
would bring a number of successful regionalist parties into the EC. The SNP 
admitted that this prospect could alter its role in the EP. It conceded the difficulties of 
remaining outside any emergent regionalist political group given the involvement of 
such major parties as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Convergencia i Unio.^ '^
The Spanish enlargement was a substantial opportunity for EFA to transform itself 
from embryo into family group. The VU and the EFA made a number of overtures 
to the Spanish regionalists: the main Basque regionalist party the PNV and the CDC 
of Catalonia, one half of the Convergencia i Unto coalition, had been associated with 
EFA, and the EFA had courted further involvement in the 1980s. The YU sent one 
of its senior elected members, Hugo Schiltz, the former party leader and government 
Minister, for talks with CiU leaders to encourage them to join the EFA organisation. 
The EFA also brought CiU members to Brussels and introduced them to the
66. George Leslie, SNP representative at the EFA meeting, Saint Vincent, 22nd to 25th November 
1984, p.2.
67. Interview with Neil Fergusson, Assistant General Secretary of the Rainbow Group, and 
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European institutional and political network.^* The EFA, however, were not alone in 
courting the Spanish regionalists. The European Democratic Alliance unsuccessfully 
sought the accession of the PNV, CiU and the centrist CDS, though they found 
involvement with the EDA unattractive and wished to avoid association with the 
RPR.69
Efforts to attract the Spanish regionalists went unrewarded. Following the European 
elections in Spain neither the PNV nor CiU joined the EFA or Rainbow group. This 
was a major defeat for EFA. Any expectations of doubling the size of regionalist 
representation within the European Parliament were disappointed. The Spanish 
regionalists turned to mainstream political family groups rather than to regionalist 
solidarity. The two CiU MEPs divided between the European Peoples Party and the 
Liberal Democratic group. The PNV chose to join the European Peoples Party but 
left over the membership of the Allianzo Populare.^^ The CiU intended to use its 
role in two mainstream family groups as part of an opening into extraregional 
politics in Spain, moving from regionalism into national electoral politics to fill the 
political space in the centre vacated by the declining CDS, but this departure from 
regional political mobilisation was unsuccessful.^^
Though EFA was deprived of its main regionalist counterparts in Spain, there was 
some compensation. The 1980s saw the development of new nationalist parties in 
both regions, committed to maximum autonomy. Though regionalist parties have 
tended to be viewed as mobilising parties, acting to develop and mobilise new 
political cleavages, these new organisations, Esquerra Republicana and Eusko 
Alkartasuna, can be seen as challenger parties, in winning support from other parties 
within the established regionalist cleavage.^^ In the Spanish European elections in 
1987, Eusko Alkartasuna, Esquerra Republicana and the Partido Nacionalista 
Galle go formed the “Coalicion Europea de los Pueblos” list, which gained 1.7% of 
the national vote in Spain and one MEP. This gave the EFA and the Rainbow group 
another MEP. Though the chances of the main regionalist parties from Spain joining 
the EFA or Rainbow Group in future were closed off by the entrance of radical, 
dissident regionalists into the organisation.
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The Spanish volte face also undermined the EFA’s continuous hopes of a nationalist 
realignment with the SNP and Fianna Fail. The EFA's group-building efforts 
brought invitations to the SNP, PNV, CDC and Fianna Fail but to no avail. The 
EFA also expected that the domestic parliamentary pact between the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru in advance of the 1987 general election would yield a change in SNP 
attitudes to political group membership.'^^ It assumed that PC pressure over the 
SNP’s association with the RPR would prove effective. However, it only led to 
conflict between the two parties.
The post-1987 environment of the EFA was familiar: it contained parties who were 
not committed to a regionalist group or to the Rainbow Group. It also had the 
problem of allowing competing Breton parties to join the EFA. In the former case it 
allowed non-Rainbow members to continue within the EFA - to do otherwise may 
have alienated them and lost any chance of their accession to a regionalist group 
entirely. In the second area, a decision on the status of the Breton micoregionalist 
parties was deferred.^^
One positive aspect that developed following the European elections of 1984 was the 
common programme. Despite an increase in affiliated parties, with some EFA 
members involved in other political groups, this did not damage the organisational 
coherence of the EFA in developing common policies. From 1984 the agenda of 
bureau and congress meetings took a different shape. Group expansion remained a 
regular issue, but more serious consideration and discussion was given to policy 
development. The EFA General Assembly in Cardiff in 1986 was an example, with 
discussion and adoption of a number of common texts on agriculture, regional 
policy, employment, defence and energy policy.^^
The Green-Regionalist Alliance
The 1984 elections and the unfulfilled expectations of the Spanish accession did not 
deter the EFA from planning for the next round of European elections in 1989. Once 
again, in France there were hopes of joint lists between Greens and regionalists. The 
Green movement in France had experienced disappointment with European elections 
and the 5% threshold. In 1979 they lost out with 4.4%, standing as “Europe- 
Ecologie”. Their performance in 1984 was compounded by fragmentation. The
73. European Free Alliance, Minutes of EFA bureau meeting, Brussels, 10th January 1986, p.2,
74. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA General Assembly, Cardiff, 3rd and 4th July 
1986, p.l.
75. Ibid.
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movement had grown in the intervening years, and expected to gain representation, 
but its efforts were dissipated by the presence of two Green lists in the 1984 
election. The Verts gained 3.36%, and the Entente Radicale et Ecologiste, achieved 
3.31%.^^ This experience made the Verts more amenable to electoral alliances. 
W ithin the EFA, the Parti Occitan was given the responsibility of developing a 
common list between the regionalist parties in France for the 1989 elections.^^ The 
deal brokered between the EFA and the Verts was twofold. First the EFA was to 
establish and campaign for a joint list headed by the Verts. Second, if this list 
succeeded in breaking through the 5% threshold, the regionalists could expect to 
gain an MEP amongst the first four members elected.^^ The EFA also held 
discussions amongst its Spanish regionalist members to repeat the electoral alliance 
that produced a common list and one MEP in 1987.
Forming The New Rainbow Group
The 1989 European elections were the first Europe-wide effort by the EFA. Its 
campaign involved a minimum programme and some limited joint campaigning and 
materials, though the bulk of the election campaigns in 1989 were carried out using 
domestic rather than European themes. Though the VU was reduced to one member, 
the French regionalists’ alliance with the Verts was successful, and made history by 
producing the first nationally-elected regionalist in that country through the UPC of 
Corsica. The Union Valdotaine!Partito Sardo d'Azione were again successful in 
electing a member, whilst a former member, Neil Blaney of independent Fianna 
Fail, was re-elected to the European Parliament. This gave EFA five MEPs, which, 
added to the four members of the Danish anti-EC movement provided a total of nine 
members in the Rainbow Group.
After the 1989 election, the difficulties encountered with the Greens outlined above 
brought the need to develop the EFA embryo into a full political group. Efforts to 
establish a self-standing regionalist group were boosted by the decision of the 
Partido Andalucia to join the EFA, which gave it six members. This encouraged the 
EFA to work on the SNP again. The SNP took the initiative however, and its MEP 
approached the EFA to discuss joining because of discontent with the RPR in 
France.^^ The subsequent accession of a dissident German Green MEP helped the
76. Brendan Prendeville, “Les Verts”, in Ferdinand Muller-Rommell (ed), New Politics in Western 
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regionalist and Danish movement achieve the numerical requirement for recognition 
as a group, so the new Rainbow Group was launched with a stronger regionalist 
subgroup aided by the Danish MEPs from the former Rainbow Group. Regionalism 
and the EFA subgroup were enhanced but still too small to become a single group.
Expansion within the regionalist family post-1989 was not without problems. This 
came most forceably in the shape of the Lega Lombarda (LL) which gained two 
MEPs in the European elections and was subject to the attentions of political groups 
like the European Democratic Alliance. Initially the LL was refused EFA 
membership after objections by the Sardinians, but this disagreement was patched 
up and the LL joined as observers then as full members. The need to gain members 
for the new Rainbow Group and to extend the EFA, especially amongst electorally 
successful parties, was paramount. The LL were also keen to gain the benefits of 
group membership and escape the chance of ending up as independents in the 
parliament.
The expansion of the Rainbow Group continued after the LL accession to involve a 
member of the Portugese centrist party. There was also some final justice regarding 
the larger Spanish regionalist parties. The PNV had run a joint list with a regionalist 
party in the Canary islands, this seat was to be rotated in the final years of the 1989- 
94 European Parliament. The new MEP decided to join the Rainbow group rather 
than continue the PNV’s affiliation.
Following the 1989 elections the EFA more closely ressembled the Rainbow group, 
and set itself three goals. First, the consolidation of the organisation and the new 
political group. Second, the development of the common programme. Third, the 
search for new members.*® The improved synthesis between the EFA and the 
Rainbow group produced a more formalised structure, with biannual congresses 
employed to develop the common programme. This was in contrast to the sharing of 
congresses with the Greens in the former Rainbow group, where each organisation 
had only one congress each year.
The New Agenda o f Expansion
The expansion of the EFA entered a new phase after 1991. The EFA followed 
established practices with accession to membership of the Union fur Sud Tirol and
80. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA Congress, Oostende, 30th September 1991, p .l.
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the Unitat Catalunya,^^ but the post-cold war climate and intended expansion of the 
European Community to the countries of the European Free Trade Area brought new 
opportunities for expansion. With both federation and European Parliament in mind, 
the EFA pursued regionalists and centre or radical parties. The Slovene movement, 
Slovenska Skupnost, became a member in 1991,*^ followed by the Slovak 
independence party, the Slovenska Narodna StranUy in 1992.*^ The EFA also had 
discussions with the Swedish Centre Party, centre parties around the Baltics and 
Scandinavia, and sought to develop dialogue with parties in Romania and 
Slovenia.^"^
The search for new EFA affihates and new members of the Rainbow group entered 
an external expansion phase after 1991, because of expectations of the future 
enlargement of Community. This expansion was numerically useful for the EFA 
parties, as it brought potential new members, but it also brought certain dangers. It 
would seem to draw the EFA and Rainbow group away from the regionalist family, 
as if the organisation accepted that it was destined to remain an embryo organisation 
because of its electoral weaknesses and constraints. Perhaps the EFA felt it had 
exhausted its potential regionalist membership and must look elsewhere for 
members, even though it would dilute and deregionalise the Rainbow Group and the 
EFA. There would seem to be only marginal grounds for electoral expansion within 
the Rainbow Group, though the most striking advances may be made in Italy, which 
could destablise both EFA and the Rainbow group by making the Lega Lombarda 
the dominant party.
The role of the Lega Lombarda was already controversial within the EFA and 
Rainbow group. The success of the LL and its associates in the Lega Nord in the 
Italian national elections in 1992 indicated that the future Rainbow Group would be 
comprised of a large number of LL members. Given the programme and tactics of 
the LL, its tendency towards populism and anti-immigration which make it a rather 
awkward EFA member,*^ current EFA members could expect to face credibility 
problems from involvement Meanwhile the key motivator behind the EFA, the VU, 
entered a period of decline accompanied by fragmentation. Its continued 
organisational and political leadership within the EFA was a consequence of its
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initial founding role and presence in the European Parliament. The VU’s decline may 
lead to the loss of its role in the European Parliament in the 1994 European elections. 
The subsequent repercussions for the EFA and the Rainbow Group would be 
damaging.
Though this possibility casts a shadow over the organisation, it was at its most 
institutionalised and formalised in the early 1990s. The new constitution adopted in 
1991 altered the power relations within the organisation. Though there were already 
full and observer membership statuses, the new constitution differentiated between 
voting and non-voting members. This was based upon common organisational 
criteria. In order to be a member with voting rights a party had to subscribe to Ae 
EFA programme, have a proper organisational structure, produce an internal party 
journal and have elected members at the European, national, regional or local level.*^ 
These criteria effectively disenfranchised the Parti Fédéraliste Flamand and the Parti 
Alsacian , and demoted them to observer status Here was further encouragement 
and pressure on affiliates to adopt electoral strategies.
The EFA also adopted a two stage process for new members, with applicants given 
a probationary year as observers before acceptance into full membership by the EFA 
congress,*^ creating a ‘holding’ function on new members. The EFA bureau was 
also reconstructed and enlarged to produce a nine person bureau with three tiers. The 
first involved the election of the EFA Chair, Vice-Chair and Secretary. The 
Chairperson is required to be an MEP, the Vice-Chair a member of a party not 
represented in the European Parliament, and the EFA Secretary is required to be a 
staff member in the parliaments^ This rule kept the peak of the organisation with the 
MEPs but reserved a place for the unelected parties and microparties. Three posts on 
the bureau were also reserved for the MEPs, and a further three for parties without 
EP representation, to preserve the balance between the two types of parties involved 
in the organisation.
The first set of elections under this new constitution found the SNP’s Winnie Ewing 
elected to the Chair of the EFA, Gustave Allirol of the Parti Occitan was re-elected as 
Vice-Chair, and Herman Verheirstraeten was chosen again as EFA Secretary. The 
bureau consisted of Jaak Vandemeulebroucke of the VU, Max Simeoni of the UPC 
and Francesco Speroni of the LL. The three non-MEPs elected were Jill Evans of
86. European Free Alliance, EFA Constitution, article 1.
87. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA Congress, Oostende, Op cit., p .l.
88. EFA constitution. Article 3 (c).
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214
Transnational Regionalism
PC, J. Canovas of Eusko Alkartasuna and Rudolf Falkena of the Fryske Nasjionale 
PartiJ.^ This mix of representatives meant that the large parties were strong but not 
dominant within the group.
7. The Development of the EFA Common Programme
The development of a common programme for a transnational party organisation has 
several purposes. Its most obvious function is related to the need for a common 
manifesto in European elections. There are also internal reasons for developing a 
programme: it provides a level of cohesion and commitment between members, and 
a means of developing common trust and agreements. The process of organisational 
growth, and an increase in involvement by professional politicians - in this case 
MEPs - also generated the need for common policies to guide to voting in the 
parliamentary arena.
The common programme of the European Free Alliance developed incrementally 
after 1981. The common texts adopted at Bastia in 1979 and in Brussels in 1981 
formed the basis of the common programme In reviewing the contents of the 
common text and policies a number of concerns must be borne in mind. There is the 
need to identify EFA attitudes to European integration and the development of the 
Community itself. The depth of the common programme is of interest, to see 
whether it is purely a minimum programme or has greater political coherence. 
Finally, it is useful to examine the EFA programme as an indicator of a common 
regionalist family ideology or political philosophy.
The initial common text produced in 1981 remained the organisation’s founding 
statement. It was derived from Bastia delaration of 1979, Brussels, the “Charter of 
Co-operation for the Construction of a Europe of the Nations” in 1981, and debates 
over the common manifesto in 1984. The founding statement that emerged from 
these four sources had six component parts, and was an expanded version of the 
short programme advanced in 1984.
The founding text described the European Free Alliance as “Co-operative association 
of political parties” which advocate a form of “integrated regionalism”.^! Federalism 
and federal principles were the best hope for developing political decisionmaking at 
the lowest institutional and geographical levels through decentralisation and 
subsidiarity. It placed integrated regionalism as a decentralist, and identity-based
90. European Free Alliance, Minutes of the EFA congress, Oostende, Op. cit., p.2.
91. European Free Alliance, Common Text, Brussels, p.l.
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variant of integral federalism. The goal of the EFA was “the creation of a Europe of 
the peoples”, though individual member parties views on this issue were to be 
respected, along with their right to develop their own policies and programme on 
this question beyond the common text. The ‘Europe of the peoples’ was a notably 
vague aim, though its obscurity was dealt with through the adoption of integrated 
regionalism.
EFA’s founding text displayed a strong individual and community orientation. Its 
federalism was intended to produce a situation in which “government and public 
authorities are structured or transformed so as to enable the individual to realise to 
the fullest possible extent their own individuality and place in s o c i e t y ” .^ ^  jn common 
with Héraud and Fouèrè and the school of integral federalism of Alexandre Marc and 
La Fédération y the ethnic or national community was advanced as the natural 
community for the individual, with each community based upon historical or cultural 
homogeniety. The community at the regional level, was contrasted with the potential 
remoteness of both the state and the European union. To avoid such remoteness and 
make the union successful in avoiding centralisation and bureaucratisation, it was to 
be constructed upon the ethnic and regional communities which underlay it rather 
than on states. This two step approach, of supranational growth and growing 
regional autonomy, was seen as the antidote to the replication of Jacobinism at the 
European level.^^
The EFA therefore sought the creation of a “European fatherland, based upon ethnic 
and regional communities which formally recognises the rights of small minorities 
that are unable to form federal states” .^  ^The process of European union and regional 
autonomy had a clearly federalist intent, with the EFA expressing support for
“the dismantling of existing nation-states, through a transfer of their 
powers to ethnic and regional communities on the one hand and to 
the European authority on the other^’.^ ^
The EFA attitude to integration appeared both affective and instrumental: supporting 
the concept and pursuit of European union, and also tying it to the interests of the 
regionalists themselves.
9 2 .  Ibid.
9 3 .  Ibid. y p . 2 .
9 4 .  Ibid.
9 5 .  Ibid.y p . 3 .
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The agenda of dual federalism was everpresent in EFA’s approach to European 
integration, and sat rather uneasily with its nationalist members. The parties who 
supported maximum autonomy sought nation-states, not federal units, or regional 
governments. The EFA’s support for submaximal autonomy actually had more in 
common with the opponents of the independence parties in Britain and Spain. The 
Europe o f the Regions, devolution and federalist goals were opposed by the SNP 
and Eusko Alkartasuna in their domestic political contexts, but supported by the 
Labour Party and PNV to some extent. So far this faultline within the EFA has not 
generated conflict, as the level of autonomy on goals and policies within the 
organisation allowed such differences. It may not be the EFA which politicises these 
cleavages, but party responses to the evolving agenda of European integration. The 
independence parties within EFA might reach a point of pooled or limited 
sovereignty beyond which they may not wish to proceed. The regionalists and dual 
federalists, who wish to transcend the nation-state rather than create their own, do 
not share this concern.
Dual federalism was a dominant theme in the EFA common text, and was expressed 
as the best means to protect national and regional diversity in the Community. It was 
the escape from a centralised European nationalism or identity,^^ and from the 
implications of the neofunctionalist concept of political community.^^ The common 
text identified three levels to political life and society: the community, the ethnic 
group or nation, and the supranational level, accepting a triple identity structure 
within European societies. Each level was seen to require full démocratisation and 
rights to political participation. Thus the regions had to be democratically elected and 
able to relate to each other and the European level independently: not through the 
mediation of central authorities. Regional participation was to be ensured through 
creating a second chamber of regions in the European Parliament to institutionalise 
regional interests.^^ Yet again, there were faultlines evident here between the dual 
federalists and the nationalists. The nationalists, as seen in the case of the SNP, 
viewed such a regional chamber as a proposal used by devolutionists within the 
Labour and Liberal parties to head off the independence option. It had no real 
interest in pursuing this future regional option when the Community served nation­
states and national interests.
In reflection of the linguistic and cultural basis of regionalism, the EFA also included 
a brief section on cultural policy in its founding statement. The EFA argued for the
96. See Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe , p p .ll5 ,252,257, and 268.
97. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-57 , p.5.
98. European Free Alliance, EFA Conunon Text, p.4
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establishment of interregional structures to aid cultural co-operation between 
peoples, and for the Community to provide mechanisms through which the minority 
languages of Europe could be used in daily life .^  The EFA programme and efforts 
in the European Parliament emphasised linguistic centralisation and homogenisation 
within states. Whilst EFA sought to transcend nation-states, it did not wish to create 
uniformity in cultural or linguistic fields. The EFA was concerned with the 
homogenising effects of EC policies in relation to education and language, which 
were seen to support majority language teaching and use, but neglected those of 
minorities.
The social ideas of the EFA provided evidence of a commitment to social justice and 
income redistribution. The EFA programme promoted the principle of “progressive 
social justice” and the “fair distribution of knowledge, ownership and power” .^ ®® 
The means to pursue social justice and redistribution did not involve centralisation 
and bureaucratic power, though alternative mechanisms to implement these 
principles were not indicated in the EFA programme. As much of the EFA founding 
statem ent was written in the early 1980s there was a strong concern for 
unemployment, the right to work, the humanisation of work and its redistribution to 
the areas in which workers live rather than vice versa.
Though much of the socio-economic agenda of the EFA was left in the hands of the 
affiliated parties, dealing with domestic economic and political situations, the EFA 
did concern itself with the development of EC intervention in the socio-economic 
arena. The EFA supports the use of EC regional and social funds to pursue 
régionalisation as well as social justice, with a clear emphasis on the enhancement of 
regional autonomy through the Community’s economic development policies. The 
EFA’s economic policy was growth-oriented, but concerned with more even 
territorial economic development and the avoidance of economic and industrial 
concentration: EC regional policy was promoted to achieve more balanced 
development.
There was also a socialistic element to EFA policy, with the expressed desire of 
increasing the démocratisation and social control of industry, particularly in the case 
of the multinational companies. A postmaterialist element was added by a stress on 
lifestyles and the environment rather than purely on production and technical
99. Ibid., p.5.
100. Ibid., p.6.
101. Ibid., p.6.
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p r o g r e s s . The EFA favoured the régionalisation of economic policymaking, and a 
greater local and regional role in intervention to correct the problems generated by 
the free market and industrial restructuring. The EFA also proposed an enhanced 
role for regions in economic development in the Community and locality. Europe 
was seen to provide the regional authorities with the potential for issue-expansion. 
The regional layer was important for the development of small and medium sized 
enterprises and regional economic networks. The EFA promoted two types of 
regional co-operation: one between regions and the Community institutions, the 
other between the regions themselves on a cross-national basis.
W hether the regions should have an institutionalised macro-economic role was 
unclear. Where the regions fitted into Economic and Monetary Union and the central 
banking arrangements of the Delors Report was an open q u e s t i o n ,  The intention 
would seem to be for the regional authorities to maximise their socio-economic roles 
at the expense of the nation-state at the micro-economic level, whilst Europe had the 
same effect on the nation-state at the macro-econonic level: though this preference 
obscured the fact that the proposals for Economic and M onetary Union 
institutionalised the nation-states within the macro-economic framework. Yet this 
fact did not deter the EFA from declaring support for EMU and a single currency. 
Rather, these were seen as policies which would produce economic and social 
benefits if implemented in the context of balanced development and regional policies. 
Though there was some dissatisfaction with the commitment to EMU amongst 
affiliated parties, the support for a strong regional policy provided a system of side- 
payments to those wary of the centralising economic effects of the EMU process. In 
this way the EFA approach was not unlike that of the European Community itself.
Overall, the EFA argued for a federal constitution for Europe, rather than a 
confederal one. There was also a preference for deepening the integration process 
rather than widening it, though this commitment was a product of the early 1980s 
and the new Cold W ar elements in European politics. Then the EFTA and Eastern 
European enlargements appeared very remote. There was support for involvement of 
the East in the EC, to prepare them for future membership, but it was extremely 
vague. The preference iovdeepening of the Community was seen to be the only
102. Ibid., p.8.
103. “Report of the Committee for Economic.and Monetary Union”, Committee for Economic and 
Monetary Union, (Luxembourg: European Communities, 1989).
104. Ibid.
105. See Gary Marks, “Structural Policy in the European Community”, in Alberta Sbragia (ed), 
Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the New European Community .
106. European Free Alliance, Common Text, Brussels, p .ll .
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one on offer in the early 1980s. Widening was developed in the context of Spain and 
Portugal but there was not the surge of interest that grew since the development of 
the European Economic Area and the decline of Soviet hegemony. These changes 
provided new circumstances, though the EFA did not jettison deeper integration for 
widening, but was supportive of both processes.
The common text and founding statement were very general, though subsequent 
policies and programmes provided more commonality and cohesion. However the 
fact that there were various types of regionalist and varying ideological positions 
evident amongst EFA party affiliates made deeper programmatic commitments 
difficult. Regionalism is not an ideology and this fact deprived common 
policymaking of any common philosophical background. Instead of a cohesive 
ideology the EFA had to reconcile contestable interpretations of constitutional 
change.
Though the EFA proceeded rather slowly in developing policies in individual policy 
sectors, with much of the work undertaken at the organisation’s congresses each 
year, it generated a number of common positions. The table below indicates the 
range and timing of the development of the EFA common programme, with a 
clustering of issues evident from 1986-88.
Table 6,4 Policy Debates at EFA Congresses 1981-88 
Congress Policy Debate
Brussels 1981 Common founding text
Ljouwert 1982 Minority languages
Corsica 1982 Regional policy
Eupen 1983 Minority languages
Brussels 1984 Common election programme
Cardiff 1986 Agriculture, energy, regional
and employment policy 
Ljouwert 1987 Minority languages, social policy,
European integration 
Brussels 1987 Environment
Sardinia 1988 Environment, defence, economic
development
The resolutions and policies adopted at these congresses were significant additions 
to the generality of the founding statement. They moved beyond general principles to 
specific commitments, which were the basis for activities in the European 
Parliament. The importance of these policies beyond the EFA congress and the 
Rainbow group was questionable. It was domestic policies and appeals that had
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greater currency in electoral politics, and the parties studied here made little use of 
the EFA programme or organisation in domestic politics. The VU was the obvious 
exception, which was exactly what would be expected. Whilst there was no EFA 
manifesto and minimal use of EFA materials in election campaigns, the VU was 
prominent in presenting the organisation within Flanders and adding it to its electoral 
appeal.
8. Conclusion
The development of transnational regionalism has been lengthy. It might have 
reached its organisational peak in the Rainbow Group and the European Free 
Alliance, but the fact that a number of important regionalist organisations remained 
outside these organisations suggest the imperfections of inter-party co-operation 
within the regionalist family. In addition the regionalists remained an embryo group 
within the parliament.
The advent of the European Parliament and direct elections were of considerable 
significance for party co-operation. Before direct elections co-operation was largely 
symbolic, with little political substance or im pact It was guided by microregionalist 
parties, with few goals or benefits beyond inter-regionalist fratemalism. Such 
organisations as the International Congress of European Communities and Regions 
began as an attempt to create a regionalist dimension to European integration, but 
seemed to have no central function in the absence of the Congresses themselves. The 
European Parliament changed this context quite markedly, and provided the forum 
and resources for the intermeshing of regionalist parties. The European Parliament 
was the motor behind transnational regionalism, but it took the VU to orchestrate its 
fulfilment. The particular configuration of political skills and persistence helped the 
VU successfully form and maintain its two co-operative organisations.
The success of the VU’s efforts was clear, but the interpretation of the transnational 
nature of the Rainbow Group and European Free Alliance is less clear. Whilst the 
parties achieved some level of integration within the transnational party system - as 
members of a transnational federation, a formal political group within the European 
Parliament, and contesting European e l e c t i o n s - the supranational nature of these 
interactions and their depth within the political parties involved must be questioned. 
Though the regionalist organisations were genuinely transnational in composition.
107. See Volksunie/EFA, De Regenboog Fraktie: De Europese Vrij alliantie in Het Europees 
Parlement.
108. Pridham and Pridham, Op. cit., 1981.
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this did not necessarily lead to the adoption of supranational policies or voting in the 
European Parliament. The majority of the parties involved had a supranational 
commitment of sorts - through support for international federalism - but the 
programmatic result was very limited. This is not to belittle the achievements of the 
regionalist groups, rather to point out that their members were still oriented towards 
domestic politics. This trait was similar to other political parties and groups 
represented in the European Parliament
The depth of party commitments to the supranational dimension and common 
policies must also be questioned. The relationship between member parties existed at 
the lowest common denominator in policy, and interactions were limited to the elite 
level. In small parties, which lacked substantial political resources and elected 
officeholders, participation in the transnational party sphere would be limited 
anyway. But the transnational dimension seems to have held little importance for 
domestic party elites or activists, and was limited to a fairly small circle. Extra- 
parliamentary links were restricted to visits and speeches by party leaders and 
M EPs, with little transnational exchange beyond this elite l e v e l . T h e  
overwhelming majority of each party’s members remained oriented towards 
domestic political concerns.
109. This is borne out through examination of the attendance at the EFA Congresses, and links 
between the parties outwith these meetings.
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Comparing Party Attitudes To 
European Integration
1. Political Linkages and European Integration
The evidence presented in the case studies above has demonstrated the prevalence of 
linkage strategies in relation to European integration. All of the parties took notice of 
European union and responded by linking the issue to autonomy. The nature and 
timing of these linkages were different, but the propensity to view European union 
from the standpoint of national and regional autonomy, and vice versa, was 
enduring.
The type of linkage differed between the cases. The UK and the continental cases 
experienced the main cleavage here, with a particularly “British” attitude to linkage 
evident in Scotland and to a lesser extent Wales. Both the Breton movement and the 
VU developed predominantly positive linkages between Europe and autonomy, a 
strategic approach facilitated by their regionalism and long-term preference for a 
Europe o f the Regions. Of course, neither of these parties faced the contextual 
factors of the UK, in being a Community outsider, or the intergovernmental 
traditions that developed across the majority of the British political parties. Equally, 
there were few opportunities to develop a strategic approach to linkage in the way 
afforded by the 1975 referendum in the UK. There were also few other 
opportunities to exploit linkage because of the party political consensus on the 
European question and the regionalist parties’ traditional commitment to 
decentralisation and dual federalism. When opportunities arose - through two French 
referenda on Europe for example - there was hesitation over exploiting the issue for 
fear of appearing anti-Europe in addition to organisational weaknesses, which meant 
that efforts to use the issue went unnoticed.
The political context and traditions of the nationalist parties of Scotland and Wales 
were very different. These parties shared a degree of scepticism towards the 
European Community from its formation in 1957 until the 1980s. Since then 
elements within PC took a more regionalist view of Europe, while the SNP
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remained essentially intergovemmentalist. Overall, both parties used political linkage 
in a more varied and instrumental fashion than the continentals.
The variety of positive, negative and strategic negative linkages practised in the UK 
was a product of a number of factors. First, the context of accession. Particular 
linkages were made because the UK remained outside of EC yet sought 
membership. Here the nationalists took a very negative view of the prospect of 
accession without representation. Second, the issue of representation. The 
nationalists used the EC issue in a bid for Scottish and Welsh representation in 
European institutions. Third, there was electoralism: both parties faced party political 
contexts that laid the EC issue open to exploitation in electoral politics, especially 
against a divided Labour Party in the 1975 referendum. Such exploitation contrasted 
with the consensus of continental parties on European integration.
In addition, differences between the Scottish and Welsh parties and the continentals 
were evident through the level of internal conflict on Europe. Despite the official 
position of opposition to the EC of the two parties in the 1970s, the strength of 
opinion in support of independent membership had a tempering effect upon the 
parties. Whilst strategic negative linkage was a useful tactic for bidding up the idea 
of Scottish and Welsh representation in the EC it was also necessary to sustain the 
involvement of pro-EC elements within both parties. The ambiguity of party slogans 
during the referendum campaign, and the very different statements made by party 
elites, particularly in the case of the SNP, were indicative of the strength of the 
Europeanists within the parties, and the utility of strategic negative linkage. The 
success of this strategy was evident from the fact that the parties campaigned for 
only one side within the referendum and internal conflict on the referendum, and 
European Community generally, has remained low. By contrast, regionalist parties 
in Brittany and Flanders, with internal homogeneity on Europe for the most part, 
had little use of strategic negative linkage. Apart from the Breton divisions in the 
early 1930s, neither of these movements had cause to adopt strategies to sustain 
party coherence on European integration.
2. Direct Elections to the European Parliament
The political parties in this study demonstrated different levels of responses to the 
opportunities provided by direct elections to the European Parliament since 1979. 
Though the issue of party behaviour towards European elections has been dealt with 
to some extent in the cases and the chapter on transnational regionalism, a
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comparison of party responses adds an extra dimension to consideration of the 
European electoral participation of the parties.
Elections to the European Parliament in many countries have been characterised as a 
second-order affair. They have been seen to have no role in government formation 
and generally viewed as less important contests by parties and voters alike. ^  This 
second-order conceptualisation was used to describe national elections in which the 
composition of the national government was not threatened, opening the way to 
relatively cost-free tactical and protest voting. European elections were seen to 
demonstrate all three second-order attributes across a range of EC member states. 
First, the elections were subject to a lower than average voter turnout than national 
contests. Second, they held better prospects for regional and small parties. Third, 
they tended to be characterised by a loss in support for governing parties.^
As a consequence of this second-order aspect, European elections held more 
potential for the cases in this study than for many other political parties. If the 
elections were seen to be less crucial in the electoral-governmental cycle of member 
states, then the parties in this study could reasonably expect that some voters would 
alter their usual voting criteria. The parties may have had some expectation that 
voters would be more open than at national elections, or that differential turnouts 
would have adverse effects on the larger parties which allowed smaller organisations 
to boost their support in percentage terms by ensuring a maximum turnout in their 
own electorate.
Apart from some expectation of changes in electoral behaviour, the second-order 
effect had another potential impact upon European elections. Because European 
elections were rather imperfect campaigns, in that they dealt with domestic political 
themes rather than European issues, there was some opportunity for parties to use 
them as occasions for political agenda-setting. Though they ignore the European 
aspect, the parties developed their own themes and strategies for European elections, 
linked to domestic goals and priorities.
The specifically European  issue content of direct elections to the European 
Parliament remained weak for a number of reasons. The process of direct elections 
has been described as a series of loosely-connected and simultaneous national 
elections rather than a genuine pan-European election.^ This was true for most
1. Karl-Heinz Reif (ed), Ten European Elections, p.4.
2. Ibid., p.9.
3. Juliet Lodge (ed), Direct Elections to the European Parliatnent 1984.
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political competitors, and was certainly the case for the nationalist and regionalist 
parties. Not only were domestic political questions predominantly at issue in these 
elections, but the result was often shaped by voter perceptions of the domestic, 
rather than European, political environment. Some of the explanation for the 
predominance of the domestic agenda lies with the absence of genuinely common 
and transnational parties across states, the lack of common electoral systems and 
procedures, the voters’ identification of MEPs as national rather than supranational 
representatives, and the weakness of the European Parliament.^ In addition, for 
individual voters, the unimportance of European institutions and powers relative to 
national government, the weak service role of MEPs compared to elected members 
of the national parliament, and the elite nature of European policies and problems can 
all be seen to depress voter interest and turnout.
Though the cases in this study can all be regarded as small parties, the majority have 
managed to play an active role in European elections. Two parties have managed to 
sustain electoral representation at the European level. Both the SNP and VU were 
successful in each of their European campaigns, in spite of adverse domestic 
circumstances at some elections. PC failed to exploit the European electoral 
dimension, despite the elevation of the European dimension within the party. The 
Breton parties on the other hand continued to demonstrate an incapacity to develop 
electoral mobilisation at any level beyond local government, and required regionalist 
and non-regionahst allies to play any role at the European level.
The Bretons In European Elections
The Breton weaknesses described in chapter four threatened to undermine the micro­
parties still further. Whilst European elections offered second-order opportunities for 
the other cases in this study, the Breton parties could legitimately view them as 
threats. The financial and organisational constraints that denied any role for Breton 
parties in European elections opened the door to alternative political organisations to 
use the European elections to mobilise regionalist support. This opportunity was 
grasped by two different sets of actors in the 1979 and 1984 elections.
In the period before the 1979 European contest a group of Breton cultural and 
economic figures sought to establish the Région-Europe list for the elections. This 
list involved members of CELIB, the Breton economic lobbying organisation from 
the 1950s, but not the UDB. The political regionalists tended to ignore the new
4. Ibid., p.265.
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organisation. Région-Europe sought to advance a programme centred around the 
defence of cultural diversity and support for regional economies against the twin 
threats of cultural and economic centralisation.^ The Région-Europe list sought to 
present itself as a future political movement rather than a one-off electoral experiment 
- it later sought involvement in the European Free Alliance - and published a list of 
81 nominees for the European elections. One for each French seat in the parliament.^
The ambitions of Région-Europe to achieve electoral success foundered on the same 
rocks as existing Breton political organisations. Like the UDB, the new body found 
it impossible to finance the costs of participation in Europe, which it had estimated at 
FF 3 million.^ This financial barrier effectively excluded the organisation from the 
elections, leaving it to call on voters to cast a blank ballot in protest at the barriers to 
electoral participation in the European arena.^ These financial barriers were also 
effective in preventing a new regional list from competing in the 1984 elections. 
Another group of Breton regional figures sought to establish the Europe des Peuples 
list, but again suffered from lack of funding and were forced to withdraw.^
The SNP and PC In European Elections
The Breton absence from European electoral competition stands in marked contrast 
to the activities of other parties. Each has managed to sustain a high level of electoral 
m obilisation across the three direct elections, and in employing distinct 
domestic/European themes, they used these occasions to advance their political 
linkages. In the case of the SNP and Plaid Cymru the 1989 elections were key 
linkage elections, in which both parties campaigned for autonomy in Europe as their 
main theme. This absolute linkage offers some evidence that these parties treated the 
European elections as a first-order affair in 1989. This was a consequence of the 
linkage itself - the Wales in Europe and Independence in Europe initiatives - but also 
a strategic move by the parties to exploit the opportunities of the second-order 
process by heightening party activity to boost support. The rationale for these parties 
in elevating the importance of the European elections is evident in the table below.
5. Ouest-France, 14th May 1979, p.7.
6. Ouest-France, 26th May 1979, p.8.
7. Ouest-France, 11th May 1979, p.8.
8. Ouest-France, 9th June 1979, p.4.
9. Ouest-France, 9th June 1984, p.3.
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Table 7.1 Comparison of First And Second Order Elections in 
Scotland and Wales 1979 to 1992,
Party National European % Increa
S N P 1979: 17.3 1979: 19.4 2.1
1983: 11.8 1984: 17.8 6.0
1987: 14 1989: 25.5 11.5
Plaid Cymru 1979: 8.1 1979: 11.7 3.6
1983: 7.8 1984: 12 4.2
1987: 7.3 1989: 12.3 5.0
The efforts of nationalist parties to see the European elections in first-order terms, 
and attempt to elevate their importance through adopting themes relating autonomy to 
Europe was fairly clear. The fact that the SNP adopted its Independence in Europe 
programme just 9 months ahead of the European elections in 1989 - with an eye on 
this electoral contest - was some evidence of this, along with the way in which the 
Independence in Europe policy was deployed in the period before the election. For 
PC, the discussions in 1984 to promote the European elections above national 
elections, through the resignation of the party’s two Westminster MPs to stand for 
Europe, and the candidacy of the party leader in the 1989 European elections, both 
demonstrate a gvowmg first-order tendency.
The ability of the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales to benefit from second- 
order effects is fairly clear in the table above. The SNP in particular managed to gain 
substantial electoral benefits in European elections, with the party’s performance in 
1989 its most successful since October 1974 when it recorded 30.5%. The SNP 
performance in 1989 was also notable for the fact that the party faced strong 
competition for second-order votes from other parties. The opposition Labour Party 
had cast the European elections as a referendum on the Conservative Government’s 
handling of European issues,^® and on the Premiership of Margaret Thatcher, and 
was largely successful in its Scottish and UK share of support. The collapse of the 
centre parties provided Labour with their first national electoral success since 1974, 
and also provided opportunities for the Green Party to pick up support.
The Greens significantly blunted PC’s efforts to benefit from second order effects in 
Wales in 1989, picking up 11.3% of the vote and forcing PC into fourth place in 
three of the four Welsh s e a t s . P C ’s vote was still well up on its national electoral
10. Michael Burgess and Adrian Lee, “The United Kingdom”, in Juliet Lodge (ed). The 1989 
Election o f the European Parliatnent.
11. See Tom Mackie (ed), Europe Votes 3.
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score, but it made no advance despite its optimistic forecasts. In Scotland the Greens 
found their performance heavily constrained by the strong showing of the SNP 
across the eight Scottish constituencies. The Greens only picked up 7.2% in 
Scotland, in contrast to the SNP’s 25.5%, a result that was less than half of the 
Green vote for the UK of 14.5%.
Th^YLJjREuropmn Elections
The success of the nationalists in the UK contrasted markedly with the relative 
failure of the VU in European elections. This failure was a consequence of the fact 
that European elections did not conform to the second-order typification in Belgium. 
These elections did not share the three second-order attributes outlined above: they 
tended to have strong turnouts at European elections, as voting is compulsory, 
elections did not seem to benefit small and regional parties to the detriment of larger 
and traditional parties, and the straightforward anti-govemmental trend evident in 
other systems was absent from Belgian politics. In the 1979 election the two 
government parties performed well, though the election was of obvious importance 
to first-order politics as the knowledge that there would be an electoral contest in 
June 1979 had a strong influence on negotiations on coalition formation following 
the 1978 national election.
Table 7,2 C om parison  o f F irs t A nd Second O rd e r  E lections in  
F lan d e rs  1979 to  1991.
P a rty  Nat ional  E u ro p ean  % Decrease
V olksu n ie  1978: 11.5 1979
1981: 15.9 1984
1987: 12.9 1989
1991: 9.3
9.7 1.8
13.9 2.0
8.7 4.2
From the figures above it is obvious that the VU experienced the European elections 
in a very different way from the SNP and PC. Instead of gaining second-order 
votes, the party lost support. Part of the reason was that the VU suffered from one 
of the identifiable second-order problems in the 1979 and 1989 elections. The 
party’s experience in government in 1977-8 and 1988-91 was not popular with the 
VU electorate, so it was the party’s govemmentalism that lost it support in a second- 
order fashion. However, this would not explain the loss of support between the 
1981 national and 1984 European elections. Equally, it does not explain the strong 
performance of the governing parties in 1979.
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O f course, the VU faced greater competition for support in this period, with the 
emergence of the Vlaams Blok, the Liberal (PVV) recovery, and the appearance of 
the environmental party, Agalev. So, not only did the YU lose out because of its 
govemmentalism, it lost out to new parties who benefitted from some element of the 
second-order effect. What is clear is that the VU performed better at national than 
European elections, the reverse of the trend identified in Scotland and Wales.
Though the VU performed comparatively badly in the European elections this does 
not mean that the autonomy question was low on the political agenda on these 
o c c a s i o n s .  Qn the contrary, the issue of state reform was important during the 
1979 elections, because of the need to form a government in the period leading up to 
those elections, which would seek to implement aspects of the former Egmont Pact 
which had precipitated the fall of the government in 1978. The issue was also 
important in the 1984 elections, particularly because of the anti-Flemish backlash in 
Wallonie. This developed as a result of linguistic conflicts over the necessity for 
elected officials to be bilingual in the Fourons area of Eastern Belgium - where a 
mixed Flemish-Francophone area had special linguistic arrangements - and the 
communes around the Brussels metropolitan area. In both cases there was Flemish 
concern that the Mayor of one town in the Fourons, Jose Happart, and a number of 
other town officials around Brussels, were strictly monolingual. This broke the 
linguistic agreements in these areas, and the Flemish demanded the removal of the 
officials concerned. The Francophone community did not back down on this 
question and the issue was propelled into national politics. It was most evident in the 
1984 European campaign when Happart was selected to stand on the list of the Parti 
Socialiste, and was duly elected with a large number of preference votes.
The consensual nature of European integration also made it difficult for the VU to 
exploit the autonomy/Europe linkage in elections. It prevented the party from 
presenting and benefitting from any distinct position or policy related to the EC. 
Equally, the domestic component to European campaigns was constrained because 
the main parties sought to avoid placing stress upon governing coalitions, something 
experienced by the VU in 1989.
Though the nationalist parties clearly benefitted from second-order effects, their 
future prospects in European elections were cast in some doubt in 1993 by the 
prospect of uniform electoral procedures for European elections. The European
12, Paul Claeys and Nicole Loeb-Mayer, “The European Elections Campaign in Belgium”, in Karl- 
Heinz Reif (ed), European Elections 1979/81 and 1984, p.23.
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Parliament had grappled with the issue of uniform electoral procedures for a number 
of years. The parliament’s proposals for electoral harmonisation sought a common 
system of proportional representation in each member state. Though the report 
offered member states the option of establishing national or regional constituency 
lists, a minimum threshold of representation of 5% was proposed. The adoption of 
a threshold arrangement at the national level would have removed nationalist and 
regionalist representation at a stroke. Political pressure from a number of parties 
brought the amendment of the proposals and an element of discretion to member 
states, to establish special arrangements that would facilitate regional variations.^^ 
The fact that uniform electoral systems require unanimity within the Council of 
Ministers may mean that this proposal will never be fully instituted across the EC 
states, though the type of system that would emerge within the UK remained 
unclear.
3. Transnational Co-operation
The case studies on the parties and the chapter on transnational regionalism have 
both shown different attitudes and behaviours to transnational co-operation. Each of 
the organisational manifestations of transnational regionalism were clear responses 
to European integration. The first appearence of transnational regionalism in 1949 
was a response to the perceived failures of federalism at the Hague Congress, and 
the dissatisfaction of regionalists with the lack of representation afforded to regional 
political and administrative forces in the various schemes to promote European 
integration. The second example of transnational regionalism developed as a direct 
response to the European Community, and adopted a lobbying strategy on behalf of 
the stateless nations. The third example developed as a result of the adoption of 
direct elections to the European Parliament. Though bodies like the European Free 
Alliance may have made some progress in the absence of such elections, the impetus 
and resources provided by the parliament were decisive in the development and 
institutionalisation of the organisation.
There is also a clear party aspect to the development of transnational regionalism. 
The behaviour of individual parties within this study allows the cases to be divided 
into two distinct groups. The VU and the Breton movement can be considered as 
formative actors in relation to transnational regionalism, whilst the SNP and PC
13. Karel De Gucht, “Report on the draft electoral procedure for the election of Members of the 
European Parliament”, Committee on Institutional Affairs, European Parliament, PE 200.797/fin, 
26th November 1992, p.5.
14. The Herald, 4th March 1993, p.9.
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were responsive actors. Of course, the nature of responsive actors was very 
different. The SNP was reluctant to involve itself with regionalist parties, preferring 
to associate with state-nationalist parties in the European Parliament and avoid the 
regionalist dimension. The SNP avoided the Bureau of Unrepresented European 
Nations, and was slow to involve itself with the EFA. PC in contrast was keen to 
play a positive role as a responsive actor. This may be a consequence of its cultural 
links to other Celtic countries, the fact that its non-statist view of nationalism was 
not inconsistent with regionalist traditions and the early development of a positive 
position on co-operation in Europe inside PC. These influences meant that PC joined 
the International Congress, with an active role in its executive; helped establish and 
then run the Bureau; and signed the Bastia agreement in advance of formally joining 
the EFA in 1983. Of course, PC did not have to square its EFA role with 
membership in a non-regionalist political group in the European Parliament, which 
was a constraint on the SNP.
The formative actors also responded to European co-operation in distinctive ways. 
The Breton movement sought to build regionalist co-operation in a weak sense, 
through the development of the International Congress as a discussion group, and 
through the lobbying strategy of the Bureau. However, the Bretons did not have the 
advantage of a strong domestic resource base nor the incentive to fashion an electoral 
aspect to co-operation. The VU, in contrast, followed a clear electoral strategy, with 
the programmatic and membership expansion of the European Free Alliance geared 
towards achieving the electoral success necessary to establish and sustain a 
regionalist political group. The Breton efforts occured in the non-electoral context 
because there were no direct elections, and therefore no pressure or incentive to 
develop common organisations and co-operation in the electoral sphere. The VU’s 
efforts were propelled and aided by the prospect of direct elections and then by the 
party’s role in the European Parliament itself. It gave the VU access to a range of 
institutional supports and resources that were not available to previous regionalist 
actors. The integrative role of the parliament and direct elections therefore had a key 
role in the success of the EFA, and it is difficult to envisage the organisation’s 
progress and development without this sphere of integration.
While party attitudes to transnational co-operation can be understood through their 
typification as formative and responsive actors, there is another means to define their 
responsiveness to transnational pressures. Pridham identified four measures to 
assess the level of party integration into the transnational party system: the degree of 
loose links with other parties, the party role in a transnational federation, a role in
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contesting European elections and party membership of a political group in the 
European Parliament. Whilst it may be possible to consider this as offering a 
continuum of party integration, the empirical validity of the continuum is 
questionable. The parties in this study are located inconsistently across the 
continuum in time and behaviour. To take the example of the SNP we find that the 
party contested European elections and joined the European Progressive Democrat 
political group, but played no role in any transnational federation and had only weak 
links to other parties. Therefore, though it is possible to chart party behaviour across 
these dimensions over time, it does not provide for any substantially meaningful 
comparison.
4, Comparing Options For European Representation
It will have become evident within the case studies that the parties have different 
opinions on the issue of representation in European institutions. There were three 
different approaches to sovereignty and integration: one favouring independence and 
an intergovernmental European union, one regional autonomy and a federal Europe 
o f  the RegionSy and the third offers a mixture of these two approaches. These 
involved the conflicting traditions of state-nationalism and integral regionalism.
There are two contexts in which these contrasting options should be explored. First, 
in the historical sense, to identify attitudes across time. Second, in their 
contemporary sense, to identify the importance of the new European Community 
that has developed since the mid-1980s. The prospects for independence through 
intergovernmentalism and a Europe o f the Regions must be examined in the 
contemporary phase in particular, to determine their feasibility.
Independence
If we consider that the principle of independence and the autonomy of nation-states 
are under attack from European integration and factors related to global 
development, then it would seem somewhat surprising to find political movements 
which expected to be able to resist such trends. The proponents of Euro-federalism 
saw nationalism and national independence as the primary sources of conflict 
between states in international affairs, which could only be dealt with through 
supranational integration and the end of nation-states. A second viewpoint held that 
the nation-states, in addition to generating conflict, were functionally inadequate in
15. Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation And European Integration, 
p.193.
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dealing with the global and transnational problems of the late twentieth century, and 
become politically and economically interdependent through the internationalisation 
of politics and economics and an increasing web of interactions between nations that 
are independent of the state.
This ideological and historical argument - that nation-states are obsolete and dying 
through functional inadequacies and interdependence - was used by a number of 
political organisations to justify regionalism and attack the pursuit of independence 
and preservation of national sovereignty. Examples of these can be found in a 
number of the cases in this study, but most obviously in the case of Scotland, where 
the nationalist party responded to European integration by Europeanising 
independence and state-nationalism rather than abandoning it in favour of 
regionalism. Opponents of the SNP sought to resist the Europeanisation of 
independence by referring to the supranational dimension of the Community and the 
desire to move on from the classic nation-state:
“The whole logic of the European Community, even before the leap 
forward it made with the Single European Act, was away from the 
simplistic concept of sovereign nation-statehood. It is now firmly 
directed towards pooled sovereignty....the grain o f European 
thinking is not to create new nations but to weld together those that 
are already there.”
However, this criticism does not seem to point to anything that the SNP has not 
accepted. As the party modernised independence and accepted the notion of pooled 
sovereignty then it did not espouse the classic nation-state position. Rather it 
proposed a wider, intergovernmental Europe of sovereign equality between national 
states, a very British position rather than one that sought to resist European co­
operation. It has been argued that predictions of the demise of the nation-state have 
been based upon “a zero-sum assumption about power and sovereignty: that a 
growth in the power of transnational organisations must be accompanied by a 
decrease in the power of nation-states.” ^^  The SNP, given its changing position on 
the division of powers between the Scottish and the European levels o f authority, 
would not seem to conform to any zero-sum view of sovereignty, a characteristic 
shared by the other parties in this study.
16. George Robertson MP, Labour spokesman on Foreign Affairs, The Scotsman, 16th September 
1991, p.9.
17. Samuel Huntingdon, “Transnational Organisations in World Politics”, World Politics, Vol.25, 
No.3, AprU 1973, p.363.
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In the absence of a zero-sum view of sovereignty, through a willingness to be 
flexible about the doctrine in its international sphere, the SNP merely reflected the 
position of small states in Europe and the efficacy of pooled sovereignty and co­
operation in certain areas. The extent of such co-operation has its limits as will be 
demonstrated below, but what the party’s attitude illustrated was a tendency to de- 
emphasise economic sovereignty at the national level, in favour of operating within a 
centralised and intergovernmental European economy, whilst reasserting political 
sovereignty and the efficacy of Scottish representation as a state actor in European 
and global politics. The SNP appeared to have accepted the development of 
“perforated sovereignties”,^  ^ and the need for increased levels of economic and 
political co-operation.
The possibility of the existence of a Scottish state within an intergovernmental 
European Community was clear, even though in very different circumstances from 
the “classic nation-state” position. However, the process of actually becoming a 
nation-state within the European Community was more problematic. Being 
independent in the EC was possible, but becoming independent in the EC was less 
easy. Opponents of the SNP often made a second-level argument against 
Independence in Europe idea, ignoring the efficacy of an independent Scotland 
within the EC in favour of arguing that the dynamics of European politics and the 
absence of provisions within the Treaty of Rome would make it extremely difficult 
for a stateless nation to declare independence from an EC member state and 
immediately gain the same status as existing members. As the EC lacked any 
procedure for dealing with this potential development then much of the discussion 
on the subject was characterised by legally informed speculation. What was clear 
was that the mechanics of independence within a state and within the EC were 
difficult, even if the post-independence environment was less troubled due to market 
integration and currency union. Despite confident assertions on this issue the SNP 
was unable to provide any real solution.
The Europe o f the Regions
The Europe of the Regions position, and the tradition of international federalism, has 
provided the regionahst political family with a degree of political cohesion through 
acting as a common goal and ethos. Along with the desire for cultural autonomy and 
political and economic decentralisation, it is the nearest thing to an ideology that
18. Ivo Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension o f Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations, 
p.xiii.
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exists within regionalism. This ethos developed throughout the twentieth century in 
the works of politicians and academics such as Maurice Duhamel, Yann Fouèrè, 
Guy Héraud and Denis de Rougement.^^ It consistently sought to identify a pan- 
European solution for stateless nations and European union. The concept, with its 
intention to establish a universal political order in Europe through institutionalising 
overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties between the EC, states and 
autonomous regions, has been regarded as a neo-Mediaeval strategy to overcome the 
twin problems of continental centralisation and rigid state divisions.^®
However, much of the concept was designed in a very different set of circumstances 
from the contemporary phase of European integration. Whilst the writers above were 
essentially proponents of integral federalism during periods of internal state 
expansion and centralisation, their position achieved a new relevance in the period of 
decentralisation that developed in many countries in the 1970s and 1980s. This new 
context had several consequences. First, the growth of decentralist trends in Western 
Europe enabled regionalists to claim that history was on their side, with Fouere’s 
Third Europe coming to fruition. Second, regionalists were able to point to the new 
process of European integration and link it to these decentralisations, calling for 
regional institutions to play a representative role in the European Community.
W hilst this new context was a welcome one for regionalists, bringing 
decentrahsation and partial goal fulfilment, as well as new opportunities to argue for 
regional representation through positive linkage, it also had the potential to generate 
developments that could act to undermine the regionalist parties themselves through 
programmatic fulfilment and the emergence of competing regional representatives. In 
this changing context it was clear that the Europe o f  the Regions idea could no 
longer be considered as a uniform concept or one exclusively helpful to primary 
regionalism. In its original sense it identified the ethnic basis to regional 
communities, which required domestic and international representation. The ethnic 
dimension was the extension of the logic of self-determination to the subnational 
level - to enjoy autonomous co-existence with other ethnic groups, communities and 
regions in larger entitities. Rather than seek a separate state, the anti-etatiste 
regionalists sought to transform the existing m ultinational state through 
decentralisation and transcend the state system in international society to replace it 
with a regionahsed European federation.
19. Duhamel, Op. cit.; Fouèrè, Op. cit; Guy Héraud, Les principes du fédéralisme et la fédération 
européenne; Denis de Rougement, The Meaning of Europe, The Idea o f Europe.
20. See Medley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, pp.254-5.
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This original ethnic conceptualisation of the Europe of the Regions has been joined 
by new interpretations and uses of the concept, which have altered its meaning. 
W hilst regionalists had a monopoly of the idea in the 1960s and 1970s, the period 
since then saw other actors adopt the theme. Just as political parties in Western 
Europe adopted regionalist themes and programmes since the 1960s, some adopted 
Euro-regionalist themes and rhetoric during the 1980s and 1990s.
The rise of regionalism from the 1960s brought changes to the political programmes 
of a number of European parties. The Belgian party system was progressively 
regionahsed with each traditional party family - the Christian Democrats, Liberals 
and Socialists - dividing into linguistic w i n g s . T h i s  produced a Flemish and 
Wallon variant of each party, with some differences also evident in Brussels. This 
fragmentation was repeated with the formation of new parties such as Agalev and 
Ecolo  as separate Flemish and Wallon environmental parties. As the parties 
regionahsed they also developed regional or regionahst themes: the Flemish 
Christian Democrats (CVP) were able to deepen their role as the main Flemish 
defence party, which had been in evidence in the late 19th century and during the 
twentieth century; the Parti Socialiste in Wallonie also developed as a regional 
defence party, especiaUy as it absorbed federalist elements following the demise of 
the Rassemblement Wallon. The French Parti Socialiste also developed a regionahst 
theme, though in the programmatic rather than the organisational sense, and 
integrated aspects of decentrahsation into its programme over time. The Socialist 
tradition also attracted regionahst support, with Breton activists joining socialist 
campaigns in 1965 and 1969, and co-operation between the left and regionalists in 
the 1970S.22
The Labour Party, and the Conservatives to a lesser extent, were also 
programmatically regionahsed by the rise of the nationalist parties in Scotland and 
Wales. The rise of electoral nationalism in the latter 1960s brought political 
responses from both parties, through the Conservative leader’s commitment to 
devolution in 1968, and to Labour’s renewed commitment to devolution from 
1 9 7 4 . 2 3  These parties responded to the national question in the UK in very different 
ways, with Labour acting as the territorial defence party committed to devolution for
21. The Christian Democrats divided into Flemish and Wallon wings in 1965, with the Flemish 
PVV breaking away from the national Liberals in 1969, followed by the Socialist division in 1978.
22. See Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism; Elenore Kofman, “Regional Autonomy 
and the One and Indivisible French Republic”, Environment and Planning: Government and Policy, 
Vol.3, No.4, 1985, pp.11-25.
23. See Michael Keating and David Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism; and James 
Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union.
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Scotland and Wales, and latterly supportive of regional government in England, 
whilst the Conservatives returned to their role as defenders of the constitutional 
status quo, advocating the defence and development of the Union during and after 
the 1992 general election.^
From the 1960s a number of parties responded to regionalism by altering their 
organisations and programmes. Some, such as the French Parti SocialistQ and 
British Labour Party, colonised aspects of regionalism for their own ends: both as a 
defence against electoral competitors and as a means to develop a more attractive 
programme. In the 1980s this process of colonisation entered a new phase, playing 
upon the development of regional institutions in Europe, the perceived growth of 
decentralist trends in the European Community and the electoral needs of the 
traditional parties. This brought a number of parties to stress the need for a regional 
dimension to Europe and adopt the idea of a Europe o f the Regions.
Whilst orthodox regionalists continued to use the Europe o f the Regions concept as 
part of their core programme they were joined by such as the Belgian P arti 
Réformateur Liberal which called for a Europe o f the Regions in 1984 and the 
Belgian Parti Socialiste which called for direct regional representation in the 
European C o m m u n i t y . T h e  regionalist dimension to the Belgian Francophone 
Liberals was a consequence of the influx of centrist activists from Rassemblement 
Wallon in 1976, after the Wallon regionalists turned decisively to the left^^
In the United Kingdom all parties made efforts to develop the European regional 
dimension, some responded explicitly to the SNP’s Independence in Europe 
programme. The Labour Party was influenced by the decentralisation and integration 
processes in Europe, the need to counter the domestic centralisation of local 
government and the desire to promote a European dimension to regional autonomy. 
Part of this response was functionally-driven, through the perception that the 
European Community’s entrance into the regional policy domain required the 
establishm ent of regional government in the UK to promote the efficient 
management of European funding programmes and economic development. The 
other part was more politically-inspired: Labour attempted to look more European 
than the governing Conservatives and Europeanised elements of the autonomy 
question to protect devolution from the SNP.
24. Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good, (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1993), Cm 2225.
25. Paul-Henri Claeys, Nicole Loeb-Mayer and Guido Van Den Berghe, “Belgium”, in Juliet Lodge 
(ed). Direct Elections to the European Parliament 1984, p.65,
26. John Fitzmaurice, Politics in Belgium, p. 164.
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This process saw Labour adopt a pseudo-regionalist position, which fell short of 
supporting a Europe o f the Regions. Though some Labour members promoted this 
solution in the context of Scottish devolu tion ,Labour  did not commit itself to the 
idea. It proposed that a Scottish Parliament would be represented in the European 
Community through an Information Office^ similar to that of the German Lander^ 
whilst developing a role in scrutinising EC Directives and appointing its own 
Minister of European Affairs.^* Labour also pursued such Euro-regionalist themes 
through its involvement in the Constitutional Convention that met to design a cross­
party programme for devolution from 1989-91.^^
W hilst Labour, who were pro-autonomy, made use of elements o f Euro- 
regionalism, the Conservatives, who opposed autonomy, expressed support for 
their own interpretation of a Europe o f the Regions. The Conservatives effectively 
sought to Europeanise the union between Scotland and England, through developing 
a Unionist interpretation of the notion of subsidiarity. The Conservatives were keen 
to stress the economic aspect to Europe, and the prospect for existing Scottish 
representation in the EC, through the Scottish Office and UK Government, as the 
best means to boost the prospects of the Scottish economy within the single market. 
The Government created a Scottish information and lobbying office in Brussels, and 
sought to ensure Scottish representation in the proposed Committee of the Regions 
designated by the Maastricht Treaty.
The Conservatives in Scotland also attempted a rather novel definitional approach to 
a Europe o f the Regions, that departed substantially from the original. Traditionally, 
it has been an argument for decentralisation and devolution, but in the Conservative 
interpretation it became an argument for the status quo. As the Secretary of State for 
Scotland pointed out:
“A Europe of the Regions does not mean all European regions having
a standardised constitutional structure, nor does it mean fragmenting
Member States such as the UK.”30
27. See David Martin, Increased Scottish Representation in an Enlarged Democratic Europe o f the 
Nations and Regions; and “Scotland’s Place at the EC’s Table”, European Affairs, N o.4 ,1990.
28. The Labour Party in Scotland, It’s Time to Get Scotland Moving Again General Election 
Manifesto 1992.
29. Scottish Constitutional Convention: Towards Scotland’s Parliament: A Report to the Scottish 
People by the Scottish Constitutional Convention.
30. Speech by Ian Lang MP, Secretary of State for Scotland, to the International Forum of the 
Scottish Council (Development and Industry), Gleneagles, 1st November 1991.
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This type of regionalist development on the right was an indication of a growing 
bourgeois regionalism,^^ with right parties using their role in regional government 
and administration to boost regional economic performance in the context of the 
single market. It was evident in the UK, through the activities of the Conservatives 
in the Scottish and Welsh Offices, and in the behaviour of certain German Lander, in 
their efforts to promote the economic dimension to their regions and the interests of 
the regional business community.
The right was following a tradition of colonisation developed by the left since the 
1960s with regard to regionalism and regionalist issues. The new  European 
Community gave this process a new lease of life as left parties adopted a form of 
Euro-regionalism in response to the single market and the reform of the structural 
funds. W hilst European politics at the local level experienced something of a new 
urban left phenomenon in the 1970s to 1980s, the period since the Single European 
Act saw the development of a new regional left. This phenomenon was a 
consequence of the regional impact of the single market the Com m ission’s 
partnership initiative on the structural funds, and the new efficacy of regional 
economic intervention. This generated a new public sector regionalism, seeking 
European financial support for economic modernisation and to avoid fiscal crisis
Both bourgeois regionalism and the new public sector regionalism were examples of 
province-building, a regional growth orientation found in the provincial 
governments of federal C an ad a ,^^  with regional economic and political elites seeking 
enhanced autonomy in certain policy spheres to achieve regional economic 
development and service regional interests and preferences.
5. Party Attitudes to Integration
Dimming
The parties in this study also had to respond to the process of integration itself, not 
merely the opportunities it presented. The process of deepening within the European 
Community was debated and carried out along the two contrasting sets of 
constitutional preferences identified in this study - the federalists, who favoured 
supranationalism  and the progressive removal of nation-states, and the 
intergovemmentalists who sought to use European institutions to rebuild and sustain
31. Christopher Harvie, “English Regionalism: The Dog that never Barked”, in Bernard Crick (ed), 
National Identities, p. 105.
32. See Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, p. 103.
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the nation-state. The concepts of widening and deepening have often been seen as 
opposites, though the Community has been capable of combining both processes at 
once. The Hague summit of the Council of Ministers in 1969, for example, found 
the six member states seeking to achieve the completion of the customs union that 
had been proposed in the Treaty of Rome, the deepening of the Community through 
EMU, and also the widening through the intention to proceed with the accession of 
four new member states - Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway.^^ This 
convergence between widening and deepening was also achieved in the mid-1980s 
as discussions of the Single European Act coincided with the Mediterranean 
enlargement. Following this enlargement the Community decided to postpone any 
further widening until the completion of the single market, and the process of EMU 
provided a similar blockage of sorts in the mid-1990s.
Though the Single European Act (SEA) saw some reconciliation in the conflict 
between supranationalists and intergovemmentalists, the period since, with 
discussion on the renewal of deepening through EMU, brought new problems for 
the Community. The post-SEA debate on deepening was characterised by attempts 
to reconcile these two different sets of interests within the EC through the 
enunciation of the principle of subsidiarity. This concept had its origins in Catholic 
social doctrine in the 1930s and played a minor role in both the Tindemanns Report 
on European Union in 1976 and the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty on 
European Union in 1984. The concept appeared in four different guises in the late 
1980s and early 1990s:
1. As a neutral principle to help determine the extent of Community 
competences in new and existing pohcy domains;
2. As mechanism for the firm limitation of EC competences to protect 
national sovereignty;
3. As a principle to assist in the creation and entrenchment of a 
federal European union;
4. A principle with which to advance and defend subnational 
autonomy and interests.^"*
Though the battle for Europe was dominated by the intergovernmental/federal 
conflict between views two and three above, the fourth group of interests also 
sought to develop and exploit the subsidiarity issue. This was a consequence of the
33. Helen Wallace, Widening or Deepening: The European Community and the New European 
Agenda, p.l.
34. See Andrew Adonis, “Subsidiarity: Myth, Reality and the Community’s Future”, lEA Inquiry, 
no. 19, December 1990, p.5.
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fact that the extension of EC powers and policies through the Single European Act 
had considerable impact upon the autonomy and policy domains of regional 
government in the absence of any substantive regional involvement in EC 
decisionmaking. This led regional authorities to seek an autonomous role in 
European institutions and the development of subsidiarily in order to protect regional 
competences from the EC and national governments.
The defensive use of subsidiarity by regional governments was brought about by the 
processes of political and administrative centralisation that followed the negotiation 
and implementation of the Single European Act (SEA). This centralisation was 
especially evident in the case of the German Lander governments. Though the SEA 
had been negotiated with Lander consultation, it led to the European Community 
gaining powers in areas of Lander competence and the absence of any countervailing 
power and influence amongst the Lander in compensation. The SEA also gave the 
government of the Federal Republic enhanced powers over the Lander through their 
role in the Council of Ministers, a superior role which altered the domestic balance 
between central and regional government The Lander's response was twofold: first, 
to call for formal representation of regional institutions within EC decisionmaking, 
second, to use subsidiarity as a defence mechanism to help entrench regional 
competences against EC and national encroachment
Though aspects of the market integration process gave the right of consultation to 
regional authorities, and involvement in EC policy networks and implementation 
through such as the partnership principle in the structural funds,^^ the regions gained 
no formal role in EC decisionmaking. In 1988 the European Commission had 
established a Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities, but the 
regional government lobby found this inadequate. Regional authorities were more 
ambitious in their demands for European representation and influence and presented 
various proposals for enhanced status in preparation for the Intergovernmental 
Conferences on EMU and political union in 1990. The Lander government proposed 
the establishment of a Regional Council within the EC in the short-term and the 
inclusion of subsidiarity in the post-conference Treaty changes.^^ The Assembly of 
European Regions (AER), the lobbying organisation for regional goverment in the 
EC, also sought to develop regional representation on national delegations to the
35. European Commission, Guide to the Reform o f the Community's Structural Funds 
(Luxembourg: European Communities, 1989), p.9.
36. “The Europe of the Regions - Involvement by the states in inter regional co-operation and 
further development of the rights and opportunities for political action of the regions in Europe”, 
Resolution of tiie Heads of Government of the Federal States, 7th June 1990.
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Council of M inisters during discussions on policy domains which were the 
exclusive competence of regional authorities.^^ Similar to the Lander^ the AER 
proposed the establishment of a formal Regional Council to replace the Consultative 
Council. Like the Lander, this was intended as a short-term measure that could 
easily be included in the amended Treaty of Rome without requiring substantial 
institutional changes. The AER envisaged that this Council would act as the 
forerunner for a Europe o f the Regions, and would be transformed in the longer 
term into a Regional Chamber of Parliament with its own constitution.^^
The pressure for regional representation was rewarded in the Intergovernmental 
Conferences with the commitment to establish the Committee of the Regions in the 
M aastricht Treaty.^^ However, the new institution was a minimalist one that 
protected the superior role of national governments within the EC and Council of 
Ministers. The new Committee had a consultative role not dissimilar to the previous 
committee and was modelled on the Economic and Social Committee. In contrast to 
the regionalist view, there was no commitment to develop regional representation 
beyond the committee level towards a Regional Chamber. This left the AER’s longer 
term proposals for a Europe o f the Regions on the shelf.
The Assembly of European Regions also proposed that the Intergovernmental 
Conferences debate the issue of subsidiarity, and include a specific clause dealing 
with the concept into the Treaty of Rome. The AER’s suggested clause stressed the 
need for subsidiarity to assist the subnational dimension:
“The Community shall only exert the authority vested in it by this 
Treaty if and insofar as the action of the Community is necessary to 
effectively achieve the aims stated in this Treaty and if  the actions 
taken by the individual member states and, in particular, by the 
Lander, Regions and Autonomous Communities as territorial 
authorities existing immediately below the level of the central states 
are insufficient.” ®^
However, as a number of authors pointed out, finding a means to apply subsidiarity 
within the EC was problematic.^^ Rather than existing as a legal principle which
37. Assembly of European Regions,“Resolution of the Assembly of European Regions on the 
Institutional Participation of the Regional Level in the Decisionmaking Process of the European 
Community”, Strasbourg, 6th December 1990, p.2.
38. Ibid., p.3.
39. Article 198a, “Treaty on European Union”, Conference of the Governments of the Member 
States, 7th February, 1992.
40. Assembly of European Regions, Op. cit., p.2.
41. Adonis, ibid.', Andrew Tyrie, “Subsidiarity: What Should the Government Do?”, lEA Inquiry, 
No. 19, December 1990; and James Mitchell, “Shibboleths and Slogans: Sovereignty, Subsidiarity
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could be tested and applied as a means to determine and review the allocation of 
powers between European institutions, national governments and regional 
authorities, the principle was viewed as a political slogan in the battle over the 
institutional development of the Community/^
The intergovemmentalists, such as the British Government, sought to use the 
principle of subsidiarity as a constraint upon the growth of Community power and a 
protection for national sovereignty. The federalists on the other hand, saw the 
concept as a useful tool in the fulfilment of eventual European union. Proponents of 
political union viewed subsidiarity as the kind of test that would lead to enhanced EC 
powers, rather than the entrenchment of national sovereignty. This process was seen 
to require institutional changes within the EC and the extension of the powers of the 
European Parliament to balance the new role of the Commission and Council."^^
The regionalist parties also adopted the notion of subsidiarity, though mostly in 
rhetorical terms. Nationalists in Scotland and Wales used it to attack the centralised 
nature of the UK political system, a weapon deployed against the Conservative 
Government in particular:
“The British Government has led the calls within Europe for
subsidiarity for them, however, subsidiarity starts in Brussels
and stops in London. They cannot or will not see the hypocrisy in 
demanding self-determination for the people of Britain but at the 
same time refusing it to the people of Scotland.”^
The regionalist parties, in contrast, were more prepared to take subsidiarity at face 
value, and called for its use as an instrument for the federal distribution of powers 
within Europe and nation-states.
The parties responded to the issue o f deepening in different ways. In general the 
regionalists took a highly favourable position whilst the SNP and PC were more 
circumspect. For the regionalists, the process of deepening had to involve regional 
and popular participation, and also decentralisation and démocratisation. These 
aspects required the underm ining o f the role of m em ber states in EC
and the Constitutional Debate”, in Lindsay Paterson and David McCrone (eds), Scottish  
Government Yearbook 1992.
42. See all authors dealing with subsidiarity, Ibid.
43. This viewpoint was evident in the European Parliament’s own assessment of subsidiarity: see 
clauses five and six, Giscard D ’Estaing, “Interim Report on the principle of Subsidiarity”, 
Committee of Institutional Affairs, European Parliament, PE 139.293/fin, 22nd June, 1990.
44. Scottish National Party, Scotland: A European Nation, p.20; see also Plaid Cymru, Plaid  
Cymru and Maastricht, p.l.
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decisionmaking, to be replaced by regional participation and the strengthening of the 
European Parliament to become a genuine legislature. The response of the 
nationalists to this element of deepening was more complex, and also somewhat 
contradictory. During their period of opposition to the EC in the 1970s both the SNP 
and PC made much of the view that the Community was undemocratic and 
centralised. However, at the same time they argued against the démocratisation of 
the European Parliament.
Though both parties came to accept the process of direct elections, and the electoral 
opportunities that they generated, there was a more limited response to the prospect 
of the development of the parliament in the contemporary period. The SNP attitude, 
for example, was shaped by intergovernmentalism and the need to preserve the role 
of the state as the primary actor within the Community. Any increase in powers for 
the parliament would undermine intergovernmentalism, so the party took a rather 
negative view of the extension of the parliament’s powers and activities:"^^
“The SNP will support moves to make the Commission more 
accountable to both the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament, and to increase the powers of the European Parliament to 
enable it to initiate legislation and have more control of EC revenue. 
Nonetheless, we view talk of European political union under the 
centralised control of the European Parliament as unwise, and we are 
opposed to any moves that might lead to a centralised European super 
state.”^^
The PC attitude changed as the party became more regionalist in the 1980s and 
showed a more positive disposition to the parliament, and to the Senate of the 
regions, though much of this seems to have revolved around the redistribution of 
powers within the EC to the benefit of the regional Senate.^^ The party supported 
increased powers for the parliament, and the institution of a common electoral 
system for the 1994 European elections. Both the parliament and the regional 
chamber were to have legislative initiation and scrutiny functions, with each 
legislature gradually taking over the functions of the European Commission and 
Council of Ministers."^^
The economic aspect of deepening also brought differential responses from the 
parties. The SNP viewed the Single European Act as a limited step towards market 
integration, and sought to downplay the adoption of majority voting through
45. Interview with George Leslie, SNP representative to EFA, Op. cit.
46. George Leslie, discussion paper to SNP National Assembly December 1990, p.2.
47. “Wales and Europe”; resolution 13, Plaid Cynmi national conference, 1990.
48. Ibid.
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asserting that the EC remained an intergovernmental and state-dominated institution, 
with any qualified majority voting aiding the small member states through ensuring 
that their political agreement remained necessary/^ The agenda of economic and 
monetary union generated by the Delors Report and the Maastricht Treaty elevated 
the process of deepening and brought some response from the SNP. The party took 
a favourable attitude to the notion of a single currency and an independent European 
Central Bank, but sought to retain the confederal shape of the Community.^®
Whilst willing to consider economic integration, and accept the institution of a single 
currency and an independent European Central Bank, the party was determined to 
resist political integration. However, in accepting the agenda of economic integration 
the SNP markedly altered its notion of sovereignty. The convergence requirements 
for EMU would seriously circumscribe the economic policy autonomy of any 
Scottish parliament and government, though in giving assent to Maastricht the SNP 
was willing to accept a restricted domestic policy role in economic and monetary 
affairs.
Plaid Cymru’s response to economic integration was very limited. The party took 
notice of integration in this sphere but did not take a view on it. PC saw such 
integration as inevitable and out of Welsh control, it reacted to the agenda of formal 
integration as if it were informal integration that was not being transmitted by public 
authorities.^^ PC seem to have taken Jacques Delors’ comment about 80% of social 
and economic decisions being made at the EC level very seriously, and assumed that 
the EC would become the dominant authority in these policy d o m a i n s . ^ ^  The party’s 
response was to seek side-payments through the European Regional Development 
Fund to compensate for integration and to call for the European Central Bank to be 
democratically accountable to the European Parliament and Senate of the Regions.^^
The response of the Bretons to deepening was limited. Moderate regionalists in the 
POBL made little of contemporary economic and political integration though the 
UDB was more active. The UDB adopted a political response to both elements of 
deepening through calling for regional representation in the EC but took a negative 
view of economic integration. Both the single market and economic and monetary
49. Jim Sillars, Independence in Europe, p.l6.
50. See agenda and report of SNP special national conference, 23rd March 1991, Glasgow.
51. These concepts were employed by William Wallace, The Transformation o f Western Europe, 
p.54.
52. Phil Williams, Constitutional Options in Europe, p.4.
53. Plaid Cymru, Plaid Cymru and Maastricht, p.3.
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union were seen to cause economic inequalities that would work to the detriment of 
Brittany and other peripheral regions.^"^
Widening
Whilst nationalists and regionalists had to respond to the deepening of the European 
Community, they also responded to its widening. The expected expansion of the EC 
in the mid-1990s through the accession of some of the EFTA countries, and then the 
Visegrad countries of Eastern Europe towards 2000, brought a new context for the 
alternative projects of Independence in Europe and a Europe o f the Regions. New 
actors, with different institutional preferences for Europe, would offer new 
perspectives and challenges to both intergovernmentalism and federalism.
Identifying the changes that widening would make to the structures and behaviour of 
the European Community is complex. It is possible that the countries joining the EC 
would seek to preserve and entrench its intergovernmental features and resist the 
process of deepening in order to retain their autonomy: the military neutrality of the 
EFTA countries is one example. This expectation was encouraged by such as the 
British government, seeking to speed up the process of EC enlargement in order to 
ensure that the deepening agenda would be defeated. However, expansion might 
require institutional reforms within the EC and the Council of Ministers, and the 
range of new actors may act to undermine some of the intergovernmental aspects of 
the Community. It may be problemmatic to retain the Luxembourg compromise and 
national veto in the context of a sixteen or nineteen member EC, so that the need for 
compromises and the avoidance of policy conflicts may lead to more qualified 
majority voting than existed previously. So, widening may not close off the 
deepening agenda, it may actually create the problems that can only be resolved 
through abandoning aspects of intergovernmentalism. This could cause problems for 
the SNP, as EC expansion may undermine its strategy for independence through 
intergovernmentalism, and produce a more centralised decisionmaking process that 
made Scotland subject to the will of other states in the EC.
Whilst widening presented problems for state-nationalists, it also created difficulties 
for regionalists. Whereas the regionalists would welcome both widening and 
deepening, with expansion reducing the dominance of the large states, there was 
little evidence that new members would contribute significantly to the development 
of a Europe o f the Regions. The potential new member states were a mixed group of
54. Le Peuple Breton, July/August 1992, p. 12.
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centralised and federalist countries, with national minorities in some cases. Amongst 
the EFTA countries Sweden and Norway lack national minorities beyond the 
Lappish peoples, whilst Finland has a non-territorial Swedish population which has 
its own established political party. These three countries are all unitary states, and 
lack substantial regional authorities and institutions. The other EFTA country intent 
on accession, Austria, is a federal state on the German model, but lacked any 
substantial minority population. So the majority of the EFTA contingent can 
contribute very little to the decentralist element within the EC in terms of 
régionalisation or regionalism.
The East European countries were also predominantly centralised and unitary. The 
secession of the Slovak Republic from Czechoslovakia diminished the decentralist 
aspect to the Visegrad Group, though the regional distinctions within the Czech 
Republic may offer grounds for some regionalistion. Both Hungary and Poland on 
the other hand were centralised and unitary. It would take substantial reforms to alter 
the local/regional structures of these states - when more important political and 
economic reforms hold priority - and it is unlikely to occur in the near future. There 
are a number of national minorities within these states, though this is a source of 
stress within and between the Visegrad countries rather than something that may lead 
to régionalisation or regionalism. The post-secession conflicts between the Czechs 
and Slovaks, and the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia are examples of 
this phenomenon.
Therefore future enlargements would seem to alter the balance of the Community 
membership away from decentralisation towards more unitary states, and limit the 
potential for widening to advance the cause of a Europe o f the Regions. This is not 
to say that the EC itself will not play a role in encouraging régionalisation in the new 
member states through the necessity for regional government to administer the 
structural funds, and have a reinforcement effect through its desire for partnership 
with democratically-elected local and regional governments.^^
55. European Commission, Guide to the Reform o f the Community's Structural Funds 
(Luxembourg: European Communities, 1989), p.9.
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Conclusion
The experience and behaviour of nationalist and regionalist parties since the 1920s 
has provided evidence of the internationalisation of the autonomy issue. Such 
internationalisation has taken place through responses to the processes of state- 
building and European integration that have developed since the Versailles 
settlement, but have also been a result of the strategic and philosophical choices of 
the parties. The nationalist and regionalist parties have been reactive to such 
developments, but have sought to develop their own positions and responses 
beyond short-term reactivism. This has been evident in efforts to achieve party 
political co-operation between regions and generate transnational associations. This 
latter development has occurra.^in spite of the electoral and organisational barriers to 
representation that have confronted the autonomy parties.
European union has proved an enduring political opportunity structure for the 
autonomy parties since the 1920s. Throughout the century the development of 
European integration produced a situation in which the autonomy parties were 
unable to formulate their goals and attitudes without substantial reference to the 
European agenda. Each party has responded to this challenge on a different 
timescale, but the end result by the late 1980s is that the goals of autonomy parties 
and the issue of autonomy per  je, have become substantially Europeanised. Such 
Europeanisation of goals has occurred amongst both regionalists and nationalists, 
and their response has involved some political accommodation to interdependence, 
not a resurgence of autarchy. The parties reaction to internationalisation has not been 
isolationist, but has involved attempts to gain political representation in European 
organisations. Also, curiously, these parties, which seek to mobilise on the issues of 
self-determination and identity, have shown little concern for the identitive aspects to 
European integration.
Europe has also affected the behaviour of autonomy parties. The European level has 
engendered transnational regionalist co-operation and also elevated the efficacy of 
the European electoral sphere. The nationalist parties in particular have been 
prominent in raising the stakes in European elections, and promoting them as 
electoral opportunities equal to national elections.
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The changing international environment has also altered party attitudes to 
sovereignty. Though some of the cases have shown a long-term preference for 
limited political sovereignty, the cases as a whole show some convergence in their 
move away from the classic notion of national sovereignty, clearly evident in the 
case of the SNP, but also in attitudes to economic sovereignty. The political and 
economic boundaries of the nation-state or regional government, and the distinctions 
between high and low politics issues, have been altered to take account of national 
and supranational interdependence. Though the parties have different strategies for 
dealing with interdependence each has been prepared to see more policy domains 
assigned to the European level from the arena of high politics. The reactions to 
Maastricht and economic and monetary union are an example of this development.
Europe has also had a convergent effect on the agendas of nationalist and regionalist 
parties. Regionalist parties have deployed statist arguments and examples in support 
of regional autonomy, comparing their regions to other nation-states rather than 
regions. On the nationalist side PC adopted regionalist themes and rhetoric to 
promote Welsh self-government. In Scotland such themes were adopted by 
devolutionists rather than by the SNP, but did have an impact on the home rule 
movement. All the other cases have been prepared to employ arguments across the 
nationalist/regionalist divide. The flexibility of PC over its final political goals has 
facilitated regionalist penetration of the nationalist camp. The party has been willing 
to adopt a continental attitude to sovereignty. The SNP, in contrast, has retained a 
rather British attitude to national sovereignty to protect independence from political 
opponents and from partisans of alternative constitutional positions in Scotland. The 
SNP has only shown an interest in the creation of a European Gesellschaft, whilst 
the regionalists have shown a preference for a Gemeinschaft.
The autonomy parties have also shown a limited consistency with integration theory 
in their behaviour to European integration. The neo-functionalist prediction that 
parties would gradually transfer their loyalties to the level of European institutions 
has some resonance. The Breton parties and the Volksunie have shown a long-term 
affective affiliation to the notion of European union, and to a lesser extent, to 
European institutions. The intermeshing of international federalism and domestic 
regional autonomy was some evidence of this development, though it is a shared 
loyalty rather than one that was merely transferred from one level of political life to 
another.
The loyalty of the regionalists to European union contrasts with the more pragmatic
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attitudes of the nationalists, and the SNP in particular. Amongst these parties the 
socio-economic agenda of European integration and the prospects for autonomy 
appear of primary importance, through the perceived efficacy of the European 
Community as an external support system and trading umbrella. However, in 
general all of the parties have been drawn into the European policy domain and 
political system, a process which has affected their goals and attitudes.
The impact of European integration upon nationalist and regionalist parties has been 
both substantial and enduring, and the future development of the European Union 
will continue to present the issues of sovereignty and integration in a challenging 
way. In this changing context, the distinct responses of nationalist and regionalist 
parties to the integration process will continue to play a role in their quest for self- 
determination.
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Fieldwork Information
The research for this thesis involved fieldwork in all five of the areas studied, 
financed by a research award from the Economic and Social Research council.
1. Wales: The research for Wales was carried out in Autumn/Winter 1991, with 
several visits to Wales for interview and documentary research. Material was 
selected from the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth, and from the 
University of Wales libraries at Cardiff and Aberystwyth. The staff of the Plaid 
Cymru office in Cardiff were helpful in providing material, and the party’s former 
Vice-Chair, Phil Williams, was particularly helpful in providing an interview and 
material.
2. Flanders: the research on Flanders was carried out as a student at the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven (KUL) from February to June 1992, with a number of 
interviews conducted amongst YU members of the Belgian parliament. Materials 
were selected from the Archief en Documentatiecentrum voor het Vlaamse- 
nationalisme (ADVN) in Antwerp, the libraries of KUL and the Bibliothèque Royale 
Albert I in Brussels. The author would like to thank Luc Lomoy of KUL for 
supplying updates on developments in the Volksunie since 1992.
3. Brittany: research was carried out from July to August 1992, through access to 
the library of Université de Rennes II, the archives of De-et-Vilaine département and 
the municipal library of Rennes.
4. Scotland: the material on Scotland was collected more gradually over a longer 
time period. The SNP staff in Edinburgh were helpful in providing access to 
materials. Other material came through research in the National Library of Scotland 
in Edinburgh. The author also attended the SNP conference in September 1992 in 
Perth, and the National Council meeting in Stirling in December 1992.
5. The European Free Alliance: this material was furnished during the author’s 
period in Leuven. The EFA secretariat gave the author access to the organisation’s 
files and were readily available for interview and information. The EFA General- 
Secretary, Herman Verheirstraeten and the assistant General-Secretary, Neil 
Fergusson, were most helpful in providing assistance. The author also attended the 
general assembly of the European Free Alliance in May 1992 in Brussels.
Additional material was selected from the British Library Newspaper Library, 
Edinburgh University Library and the British Library of Economics and Political 
Science at London School of Economics.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted in three of the four cases, and notes of these interviews 
are available on request. In addition to formal interviews the author was fortunate to 
have a number of informal discussions with political actors across the cases that 
were of use in providing background information. These will be listed beneath the 
interviews.
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1. Formal Interviews:
Gerolf Annemans, Brussels, May 1992: Vlaams Blok member of the Belgian lower 
house.
Herman Candries, Brussels, June 1992: VU member of the Belgian lower house.
Hugo Coveliers, Antwerp, April 1992: VU senate member, joined the VLD in late 
1992.
Winnie Ewing, Brussels, February 1992: SNP M E? from 1974, M E? for the 
Highlands and Islands from 1979.
Neil Fergusson, Brussels, March 1992: assistant to Winnie Ewing M E? in the 
European Parliament from 1980-.
Willy Kuijpers, Leuven, February 1992: VU senate member, former MEP from 
1984-9.
George Leslie, Glasgow, November 1992: SNP Vice-Chair, EFA delegate.
Isobel Lindsay, Glasgow, November 1992: former SNP Vice-Chair.
Robert McIntyre, Stirling January 1993: former SNP MP for Motherwell, party 
Chairman from 1946.
Nelly Maes, Brussels, June 1992: VU member in the Belgian Senate.
David Martin, Edinburgh, December 1990: Labour MEP and Vice-President of the 
European Parliament.
Hugo Schiltz, Deume, April 1992: VU senate member for Antwerp, former VU 
President and Government Minister 1988-91.
B art Staes, Brussels, April 1992: Political assistant to VU MEP Jaak 
V andemeulebroucke.
Dafydd Elis Thomas, London, December 1991: Former President of Plaid Cymru 
1983-92 and MP for 18 years until retiring from parliament in 1992.
Paul Van Grembergen, Brussels, April 1992: VU Fraction leader in the Belgian 
lower chamber.
Herman Verheirstraeten, Brussels, March 1992: Secretary-General of the Rainbow 
Group, General-Secretary of the European Free Alliance.
Phil Williams, Aberystwyth, November 1991. Former PC Vice-Chair and EFA 
delegate. Interviewed over two days.
2. Informal Interviews
Informal discussions were also held with Jaak Vandemeulebroucke MEP, Bert 
Anciaux and Bart Somers of the VU, Jose Luis Linazasoro and Christian 
Guyon’varch of the European Free Alliance, Allan Macartney and David Stevenson 
of the SNP.
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